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Abstract
In 2006, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Latin 
America and the Caribbean (excluding the main financial 
centres) continued their upward trend, reaching over US$ 
72 billion, for an increase of 1.5% over 2005. At the 
same, however, the region’s share of global FDI inflows 
declined, as flows increased more rapidly in other parts 
of the world. 
The situation with respect to FDI outflows in 2006 
was quite different, as outward FDI (OFDI) from Latin 
American and Caribbean countries jumped by 115% to 
about US$ 41 billion, expanding faster than in the rest 
of the world.
The main message of this year’s report is that active 
and integrated FDI attraction policies linked to national 
development strategies are necessary to secure quality 
FDI. These are lessons drawn from policy practices 
in the more successful European and Asian countries, 
which contrast with the more passive and disconnected 
FDI attraction policies evident in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
The 2006 report also contains chapters that analyse 
the experiences of two relatively small investor countries 
in Latin America and the Caribbean: the Republic of Korea 
and Portugal. In the first case, it was found that one of 
the reasons why the region plays a fairly minor role as a 
destination for OFDI from the Republic of Korea is that 
national policies have not been effective in attracting and 
upgrading dynamic FDI in the electronics, automotive 
and apparel sectors. In the second case, passive policies 
proved sufficient to attract significant FDI in services 
from Portugal to Brazil, but only for a limited period 
of time. 
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Summary and conclusions
Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) to Latin America and the Caribbean (excluding the 
main financial centres) reached US$ 72.4 billion in 2006, up from US$ 71.4 billion in 2005 
and US$ 66 billion in 2004. This appears to indicate that the region is on the road to regaining 
a stable position in terms of inward FDI flows, following a substantial fall at the beginning of 
this decade (see figure 1). Another positive aspect is the very significant rise of outward FDI 
(OFDI) from Latin America and the Caribbean (excluding the main financial centres), which 
demonstrates that companies from the region are internationalizing at a much faster rate than in 
the past. Trans-Latins, that is, emerging transnational corporations (TNCs) from the region, are 
the principal source of such outflows. These two indicators suggest that the region is adapting 
to the globalization process by becoming a more active participant in it.
In spite of this achievement, the Latin American and 
Caribbean region’s share of global inward FDI flows not 
only failed to increase but actually fell to 8% in 2006.1 
These figures reflect the fact that, while FDI to the region 
was stable, global FDI flows rose by an estimated 34%. 
Historically, the Latin American and Caribbean region has 
received a larger share of global FDI inflows than it does 
now. During the 1970s, when global inflows were much 
smaller, the region’s share reached 17% before declining 
sharply in the aftermath of the debt crisis of the late 1980s 
(see figure 2). The region again became the recipient of a 
significant portion of global inflows during the FDI boom of 
the 1990s, with its share peaking at 16% in 1997 in the context 
of widespread privatization and deregulation programmes. 
During more recent years, the region’s share averaged around 
11%, before dropping to 8% in 2006. Its share in the total 
1
 The figures presented in this paragraph include financial centres in order to ensure comparability with data for other regions. The trends identified 
in the text apply, however, to FDI received by Latin America and the Caribbean, excluding the main financial centres, which is the focus of this 
report.
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amount of FDI inflows received by developing countries 
was also considerably larger in the 1970s (40%-50%), but 
by 2006 had fallen to approximately one-half its former 
level (see figure 2). Insofar as this decline reflects a cooling 
of transnational corporations’ interest in the region or the 
region’s inability to compete effectively for FDI, it poses a 
stark challenge to policymakers. 
Figure 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FDI AND OFDI FLOWS
(EXCLUDING THE MAIN FINANCIAL CENTRES), 1992-2006 a b
(Billions of dollars)
These two possible explanations for the decline are 
also reflected in other indicators:
The stagnant or shrinking share of FDI inflows 
from the principal traditional sources, such as the 
United States or Europe;
The lack of dynamism exhibited by relatively 
new non-traditional sources of FDI, such as the 
Republic of Korea (see chapter 3) and Portugal 
(see chapter 4). In fact, the former has not yet 
reached its potential and the latter is on the 
decline;
Transnational corporations’ decreasing share in the 
sales of the region’s top 500 companies;
The increase in the number of TNCs that have decided 
to withdraw from the region or to significantly 
reduce their presence in major sectors such as 
telecoms (France Telecom, Verizon, BellSouth, 
AT&T, TIM), electricity (EDF, PPL), water (Suez), 
retail trade (Royal Ahold, Sonae), banking (Bank 
of America) and natural resources (Royal Dutch 
Shell, ENI, Total);
Generally, the limited ability of Latin America 
and the Caribbean to attract and upgrade “quality” 
FDI projects. Examples of such projects include 
those that form part of integrated international 
production systems or involve research and 
development activities, introduce new production 
activities to their host economies and play a 
critical role in their industrial and technological 
upgrading.
One major concern is that the increasing level of 
conflict associated with the development of natural 
resources —be it a result of new petroleum and natural 
gas contracts that reduce foreign investors’ control 
over their operations, increases in royalties or taxes 
applied to petroleum, gas and mining concessions, 
and/or environmental and social issues— could hurt FDI 
inflows. Another concern is the relative ineffectiveness 
of the formal international arbitration procedures 
provided for under bilateral investment treaties or 
free trade agreements in resolving existing investment 
disputes between foreign investors and some national 
governments. 
Considering the important role that inward FDI can play 
in contributing to national development, these indicators 
suggest that now is an appropriate time to evaluate the 
nature of inward FDI in the region, to consider how to 
close the gap between the region’s FDI policies and results 
and those of the more successful recipient countries, and 
to look for ways of promoting and consolidating FDI 







Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as at 24 April 2007. 
a
  The FDI figures indicate inflows of foreign direct investment, minus capital outflows 
generated by foreign investors. The OFDI figures indicate outflows of investment by 
residents, minus capital transfers made by those investors. The FDI figures do not 
include the flows received by the main financial centres. The OFDI figures do not 
include the flows originating in these financial centres. 
b
 These figures are different from those contained in the editions of Economic Survey of 
Latin America and the Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of 
Latin America and the Caribbean published in July and December 2006, respectively, 
as the latter show the net balance of foreign investment, that is, direct investment in 
the reporting economy less outward foreign direct investment. 
Figure 2
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World Investment Report, 2006. FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: 
Implications for Development (UNCTAD/WIR/2006), Geneva, 2006, United Nations 
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2006” (UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2007/001), press release, 9 January 2007; and 
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A. Overview of FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean
The analysis conducted by ECLAC combines two data sets 
to examine the nature of FDI and the presence of TNCs 
in the region. The first consists of balance-of-payments 
information on FDI inflows and outflows; the second set 
relies on information on the operations and transactions 
of individual companies. The combination of these two 
sets permits a more comprehensive analysis of FDI in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Table 1 depicts the situation with regard to inward 
FDI during 1992-2006. The region was able to triple 
its average annual inflows from US$ 27.5 billion to 
US$ 76.9 billion between 1992-1996 and 1997-2001 
before seeing them fall to US$ 61.2 billion during 2002-
2006. As mentioned, during the last three years, the 
Latin American and Caribbean region has progressively 
increased the absolute value of inward FDI from US$ 66.0 
billion to US$ 72.4 billion, although its share of global 
and developing-country FDI inflows has shrunk. FDI to 
the region, measured as a percentage of GDP, has also 
decreased, falling from 4% in 2004 to 3% in 2006, in 
contrast to increasing FDI/GDP ratios in other developing 
regions.
Table 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FDI INFLOWS, 1992-2006 a
(Millions of dollars)
1992-1996 b 1997-2001 b 2002-2006 b c 2005 2006 c
1. Mexico 8 723.6 17 112.6 19 114.0 19 642.7 18 939.0
2. Central America and Panama 793.3 2 500.8 2 989.3 3 226.3 5 199.7
3. Caribbean (excl. the main financial centres) 1 031.0 2 928.2 3 248.9 3 714.0 3 621.2
4. South America: subtotal 16 989.2 54 361.6 35 811.0 44 777.8 44 679.7
  Argentina 4 683.4 10 604.6 3 640.4 5 007.9 4 809.0
  Bolivia 242.8 896.8 185.4 -241.6 237.1
  Brazil 4 496.8 27 075.1 15 745.9 15 067.0 18 782.0
  Chile 2 464.8 5 544.0 5 808.6 6 959.6 8 053.3
  Colombia 1 442.9 2 963.7 4 706.2 10 255.0 6 295.2
  Ecuador 436.0 858.4 1 544.8 1 646.1 2 087.4
  Paraguay 116.4 172.1 50.8 74.6 116.6
  Peru 1 999.8 1 535.4 2 227.0 2 578.7 3 466.5
  Uruguay 109.9 219.2 632.9 847.4 1 374.4
  Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) 996.4 4 492.2 1 269.0 2 583.0 -543.0
Total: Latin America and the Caribbean 27 537.1 76 903.3 61 163.1 71 360.8 72 439.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates.
a
 Excludes investment received by the main financial centres. Net FDI inflows are defined as FDI inflows to the reporting economy minus capital outflows generated by foreign 
companies. These FDI figures differ from those published by ECLAC in the Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies 




 Data were not available, as of 24 April 2007, for FDI inflows to several Caribbean countries for 2006. The estimates presented here for 2006 are based on annual averages for 
2001-2005. 
Mexico more than doubled its average annual FDI 
inflows, which jumped from US$ 8.7 billion in 1992-1996 
to US$ 17.1 billion in 1997-2001, and has been able to 
improve its performance even further since then, with 
average annual inflows reaching over US$ 19 billion 
during 2002-2006. Central America and Panama more 
than tripled their average annual FDI inflows to US$ 2.5 
billion over the same two periods and then succeeded 
in boosting them to US$ 3 billion in 2002-2006 and 
to US$ 5.2 billion in 2006. Preliminary numbers for 
the Caribbean indicate sustained growth in FDI to the 
subregion. The South American countries received the 
lion’s share of FDI inflows, tripling their inflows from 
an annual average of US$ 17 billion to US$ 54.3 billion 
between 1992-1996 and 1997-2001, although they declined 
to US$ 35.8 billion thereafter. This subregion saw a 
significant upswing for both 2005 and 2006 that brought 
inflows up to approximately US$ 44.7 billion. Brazil 
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(US$ 18.8 billion), Chile (US$ 8.1 billion), Colombia 
(US$ 6.3 billion) and Argentina (US$ 4.8 billion) were 
the principal recipients in South America in 2006.
Viewed from the perspective of the corporate 
strategies driving this inward FDI, there are important 
differences among the subregions of Latin America and 
the Caribbean in respect of the kinds of inward FDI that 
they attract. Natural-resource-seeking inward FDI goes 
where the resources are and where there is access to 
them, which historically has been Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina and the 
Andean countries in the case of petroleum and natural 
gas, and Chile, Argentina and Peru in the case of minerals. 
Other factors that favour inward FDI include the continued 
high international prices of many natural resources, the 
quality of the deposits and improved access to them. 
Factors that work against it include the lack of clarity 
regarding contracts, regulatory changes that increase the 
level of State ownership in the petroleum sector and raise 
royalties in mining, and environmental and social issues 
in the mining sector. The new and more forceful demands 
for increased national benefits from the extraction and 
export of non-renewable resources being expressed in 
the region are an additional consideration.
Market-seeking inward FDI has gone primarily 
to the larger markets in the region, such as Brazil and 
Mexico. Chile has also been a major recipient of this type 
of investment. In the goods sector, the automotive, food 
and beverage and chemical industries have stood out, 
while in services the focus has been on financial services, 
telecommunications, retail trade, electricity and natural 
gas distribution. Both the continued macroeconomic 
stability in these markets and their growth potential 
have helped attract this sort of inward FDI, while other 
factors, such as the appreciation of national currencies, 
regulatory changes in basic services and higher growth 
rates in other markets outside the region (China, India, 
etc.) have done the opposite.
Efficiency-seeking inward FDI, geared towards exports 
to third markets (especially that of the United States), 
has been directed primarily to Mexico in the electronics, 
automotive and apparel industries and to the Caribbean Basin 
for apparel and some light electronics. Factors conducive 
to higher levels of inward FDI include the continued 
restructuring of these industries in the United States and 
opportunities associated with free trade agreements with 
the United States, particularly NAFTA and CAFTA-DR. 
Factors that may dissuade investors from boosting inward 
FDI include increasing competition from China and other 
Asian countries and the upcoming discontinuation of fiscal 
incentives or subsidies for export processing zones under 
World Trade Organization rules.
The region’s levels of strategic asset-seeking inward FDI, 
which is usually associated with research and development 
activities, are negligible. 
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin are typically 
recipients of efficiency-seeking FDI, mainly from United 
States TNCs in the motor vehicle, electronics and apparel 
industries, while South America receives more market-
seeking FDI, primarily from European TNCs in a few 
major manufacturing industries (motor vehicles, food 
products, beverages and tobacco), a number of services 
(finance, telecommunications, retail commerce, electricity 
and gas distribution), and natural-resource-seeking FDI, 
mostly from Anglosaxon TNCs in petroleum, natural gas 
and mining. A certain degree of specialization in terms of 
the corporate strategies underlying inward FDI is therefore 
evident within the region.
The principal changes that have taken place in recent 
years have to do with recipient countries, source countries 
and modalities. In terms of recipient countries or groups of 
countries, those that significantly surpassed their average 
annual FDI inflows for 2002-2006 in 2006 were Uruguay 
(141%), Ecuador (83%), Central America and Panama 
(71%), and Chile (40%). As for source countries, Europe 
has declined significantly, primarily due to a sharp downturn 
in Spanish FDI, and the United States has maintained its 
share. Most of the source countries that have increased 
their flows to the region are relatively new investors, such 
as Canada, Mexico and other Latin American countries. 
Although OFDI from developing countries has risen 
globally, and investors from several developing countries 
(China, India, Republic of Korea) have expressed interest in 
investing in Latin America and the Caribbean, that interest 
has yet to be reflected in substantial new inward FDI for 
the region. Acquisitions continue to be an important FDI 
modality for inflows, but this category was less notable in 
2006 than in previous years when huge acquisitions had 
taken place (i.e., Bavaria, Ambev, etc.).
Viewed from the perspective of the areas of activity 
involved, there has been no major change. Although the 
numbers for 2005 apparently pointed to a rise in FDI in 
natural resources, the situation for 2006 is unclear, with 
FDI increasing in some countries and stagnating or falling 
in others. 
The information available on OFDI from Latin America 
and the Caribbean is relatively limited, but there is no doubt 
that a huge increase has taken place during the last three 
years, as official figures point to a rise from US$ 6 billion 
to US$ 38.6 billion during that period. The principal driver 
behind these OFDI flows is the internationalization of a 
relatively small group of Brazilian and Mexican trans-
Latins. The Brazilian group includes Companhia Vale do 
Rio Doce (CVRD), which purchased INCO (Canada) for 
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US$ 17 billion, and Petrobras, Gerdau and Itaú, which have 
purchased a diverse range of assets individually. The Mexican 
group includes América Móvil and Telmex, which made 
major acquisitions within Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and the Alfa Group, which expanded in the United States, 
Europe and China. Cementos Mexicanos (CEMEX) bought 
the Rinker Group (Australia) for over US$ 14 billion, but 
did not actually complete the deal until April 2007. Apart 
from these Brazilian and Mexican trans-Latins, major 
investments were undertaken by Tenaris (Argentina), 
which bought Maverick Tube Corp. (United States), and 
the State petroleum company of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), which is 
investing in refineries (Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Uruguay) 
and gas pipelines (Colombia) in the region. These operations 
demonstrate that trans-Latins have recently become much 
more active participants in internationalization processes, 
especially outside the region.
The proportion of TNCs found within the top 500 
companies, measured by sales, in the region grew sharply, 
rising from about 27% in 1990 to 41% in 2000, before 
falling back to 25% in 2005 (see figure 3). The share of both 
State and local private companies, by contrast, expanded 
significantly between 2000 and 2005. The presence of 
TNCs is most notable in manufactures, even though their 
share of the top 500 firms’ sales of manufactures dropped 
from 58% in 2000 to 39% in 2005. The sector in which 
TNCs have the second-largest stake is services, where 
their share of the total sales made by service firms within 
the top 500 fell from 38% in 2000 to 23% in 2005. In 
the primary sector, where TNCs have a less pronounced 
presence, their share shrank from 17% in 2000 to 13% in 
2005. Local private firms are the strongest in manufactures 
and services, while State companies clearly dominate the 
primary sector. There has also been a notable turnaround in 
the composition of the 200 largest exporters in the region. 
Whereas in 2000 State-owned companies accounted for 
only 15% of exports and TNCs for 50%, by 2005 this 
situation had been reversed, with the former accounting for 
46% of that group’s exports and TNCs for only 27%. This 
reflects, among other things, the sharply rising prices of 
hydrocarbons, a natural-resource sector where State-owned 
firms are a dominant presence in the region.
Figure 3
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department 
of the América economía magazine, Santiago, Chile, 2006. 
In sum, the combination of these two data sets 
provides an analytical basis for insights into FDI and 
the operations of TNCs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. On the one hand, while in recent years the 
region has succeeded in progressively increasing annual 
FDI inflows, which reached US$ 72.4 billion in 2006, 
its relative share of global and developing-country FDI 
inflows is shrinking. On the other, in terms of their 
position among the top companies in the region, TNCs 
are losing ground while local private and State-owned 
firms are gaining.
The current situation regarding FDI in the region 
represents a challenge for policymakers in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and calls for action on their part if they 
are to close the gap with more successful recipients of 
FDI in other regions.
B. FDI policies in Latin America and the Caribbean and
 the gap between the region and more successful
 country recipients of FDI
The 2005 edition of Foreign Investment in Latin America 
and the Caribbean analysed FDI-attraction policies and 
the corresponding institutional frameworks in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. That analysis showed that 
the region, in general, is in an infant stage of development 
in terms of FDI attraction policies, which are passive and 
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rely fundamentally on natural advantages and horizontal 
incentives (opening up these economies, liberalization, 
deregulation, and privatization). The study also found 
indications that these countries are moving towards the 
design of more comprehensive policies that assign a more 
active role to national investment promotion agencies; 
nonetheless, these agencies tend to be small, understaffed 
and with limited budgets, which blunts their impact. 
This year’s report examines some of the best practices 
in the rest of the world in order to better define the gap 
between them and those of Latin America and the Caribbean 
(see chapter II). This examination highlights the principal 
differences between the passive policies common in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and the more active and integrated 
FDI policies found in the more successful FDI recipient 
countries and regions. This analysis indicates that the central 
difference between the two is that the role of FDI in the more 
successful recipients’ development strategies is more clearly 
defined and is progressively more important, such that greater 
and more focused efforts are made to attract “quality” FDI. 
In addition, the impacts of such investments are continually 
evaluated with a view to relating them directly to development 
policy objectives. The effective implementation of active 
and/or integrated FDI policies is one of the factors that has 
contributed to the “catching-up” process observed in several 
Asian countries during the last quarter century. 
The starting point for this analysis is a more complete 
understanding of the TNC decision-making process involved 
in the selection of investment sites (see figure 4). This process 
consists of several stages. Once the investor has a definite 
idea of the firm’s needs as they relate to the investment 
project, the first step is a preliminary analysis of possible 
investment sites and the preparation of a “long list” of the 
best potential sites that meet those needs. This is followed 
by a considered examination of those sites in order to rank 
them in terms of attractiveness and then pare down their 
number to a more manageable shortlist for more detailed 
evaluation. This examination often includes on-site visits by 
the investment team or by a team put together by a specialized 
company contracted to carry out this information-gathering 
activity. A more exhaustive evaluation is then undertaken 
to select the definitive investment site. Subsequent TNC 
decisions on further investment or reinvestment at that site 
are evaluated on the basis of the company’s experience there 
and perceived opportunities in other locations.
Policymakers in potential host countries must decide 
whether they should attempt to influence the TNC investment 
site decision-making process at critical junctures and, if 
so, how. Simply put, an aspiring host country usually fits 
into one of three principal scenarios (see figure 5). In the 
first, the potential host country already possesses what 
the foreign investor needs. In the second scenario, the 
potential host country does not quite have what the foreign 
investor requires, whereas competitor host countries do. 
In the third scenario, the potential host country is far from 
possessing what the foreign investor requires, while, here 
again, other competitor host countries do.
Figure 4
TNC INVESTMENT SITE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Figure 5
TNC INVESTMENT SITE DECISIONS: THREE HOST-COUNTRY 
SCENARIOS
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The government of a potential host country in 
scenario 1 might decide that it need take no action 
and that passive FDI policies are sufficient to give it a 
good chance to capture the investment. The country’s 
attractiveness, in the presence of passive FDI policies, 
revolves around its innate competitive conditions (such 
as the natural resources available, market size and growth, 
export potential and geographical proximity to major 
markets, as well as infrastructure, business environment, 
macroeconomic stability, foreign trade facilities, etc.), 
the existing legal framework for FDI (regulatory system, 
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restrictions on property ownership, the FDI approval 
process and investment protection standards) and any 
specific initiatives, such as privatization programmes. This 
process is more typical of natural-resource-seeking and 
market-seeking FDI. Success on the part of the recipient 
country is usually measured in terms of the quantity of 
FDI received. This is quite characteristic of the historical 
situation not only in Latin America and the Caribbean as a 
whole, but even in the case of Mexico and the Caribbean 
Basin, which receive most of the efficiency-seeking FDI 
that reaches the region.
The government of a potential host country in 
scenario 2 might decide that more active FDI policies 
are needed to close the gap between what the country 
possesses and what the foreign investor needs. At this 
point, a major new element enters into the investment 
site selection calculus in the form of the country’s 
investment promotion agency (IPA). The IPA may become 
proactive in several areas in an attempt to enhance the 
country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. To this 
end, it may seek to promote the country, in general, by 
providing information, facilitating conversations with 
foreign investors or sometimes negotiating directly with 
them, and offering post-investment services. It may also 
operationalize the national government’s FDI priorities in 
terms of regions, functions, sectors, types of companies 
or types of projects by targeting individual TNCs. Beyond 
these measures, the potential host country may attempt to 
influence the investment site decision for specific high-
priority projects by providing incentives (tax or financial 
measures) or selective policies (building infrastructure, 
undertaking human resource training, providing land, 
etc.) to improve its chances of selection. This decision-
making process often concerns efficiency-seeking FDI 
in which a component of a transnational corporation’s 
international system of integrated production is established 
in the host country. Success here is usually linked to 
improving the international competitiveness of the host 
country and specific achievements in priority regions, 
functions, sectors, types of companies and/or types of 
projects. This situation is more common in a number 
of developing Asian countries (e.g., Malaysia and the 
special economic zones of China and the Republic of 
Korea) and some European nations (e.g., the Czech 
Republic, Spain and France).
The government of a potential host country in either 
scenario 2 or 3 may decide that it requires integrated FDI 
policies to close the gap between what the country possesses 
and what foreign investors need in order to give the country 
a chance to attract FDI in the future. In this situation, 
the institutional framework and competitive conditions 
that a country needs in order to move on to scenario 2 
or scenario 1 are created in a conscious and coordinated 
manner over the longer term. In the process, new policies 
to integrate FDI policy into development strategy will be 
implemented (such as a proactive identification and removal 
of FDI barriers, the improvement of the host economy’s 
absorptive capacity, etc.), together with evaluations of the 
performance of FDI (measuring it against specific goals 
such as industrial and technological upgrading, technology 
transfer, the establishment of production linkages, human 
resources training, local enterprise development, etc.). 
In the celebrated cases of Singapore and Ireland, which 
have been the most successful with these policies, FDI 
has been transformed into the backbone of the national 
development strategy. Once it has matured, this kind of 
national policy is often associated with attracting strategic 
asset-seeking FDI, especially R&D activities and regional 
headquarters functions. 
Globally, the shift from passive to active and/or 
integrated policies has generally been accompanied by 
greater harmony between the objectives and priorities of 
the host country’s development strategy and the corporate 
strategies of the TNCs undertaking the investments. With 
regard to host-country FDI and national development 
policies, certain activities gain importance in the shift from 
passive to active or integrated policies, including policy 
interventions in factor markets (skill creation, institution-
building, infrastructure development, supplier support), 
use of incentives and selective policies for high-priority 
projects, encouragement of R&D and technological 
institutions, proactivism in attracting, targeting and guiding 
investments, and efforts to improve the impacts of TNC 
activities in the context of national strategic priorities 
by directing new investments into defined higher-value 
areas and inducing existing affiliates to upgrade their 
technologies and functions. Thus, the focus shifts to 
attracting “higher-quality” FDI. In order to accomplish 
this, some of the more successful recipient countries 
have designed and implemented inward-FDI policies 
which are being increasingly integrated into the national 
development strategy and are continuously evaluated in 
terms of those priorities. 
A central question is to what extent FDI can assist a 
recipient country to achieve basic development goals such 
as improving its existing production structure by shifting 
from simple, low-value-added and less internationally 
competitive activities to more technologically sophisticated, 
higher-value-added and more internationally competitive 
ones. In this regard, national policy definitely counts. 
The more successful FDI country recipients have had 
clearly defined priorities for their development strategies, 
and their FDI policies have focused on those TNCs that 
they feel can contribute to their achievement.
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ECLAC has long espoused the thesis that quality 
FDI has a strategic role to play in Latin American and 
Caribbean development. On the basis of an analysis 
of recent trends in FDI inflows, the size of the gap 
between the region’s FDI policy practices and those 
of the more successful FDI country recipients, the 
experiences of certain non-traditional FDI source 
countries and other factors, ECLAC is now advancing 
the proposition that the region’s chances of attracting 
quality FDI will improve to the extent that it defines 
and implements more active and integrated FDI and 
development strategies.
The final two chapters of this year’s report deal with 
the experiences of two non-traditional sources of FDI for 
Latin America and the Caribbean: the Republic of Korea and 
Portugal. The main purpose of this analysis is to examine the 
nature and impact of these non-traditional FDI sources, but 
it also provides some insight into the role of inward FDI in 
these countries’ own development trajectories, particularly 
in the case of the Republic of Korea.
C. The experience of Korean TNCs in Latin America
 and the Caribbean
The Korean development experience is impressive and 
provides important lessons for developing countries. The 
country was brought to a rude awakening during the twentieth 
century, first, by Japanese colonization (1910-1945), second, 
by its severe dependence on direct aid from the United 
States, which heavily influenced its development options 
after the Second World War, and, third, by the global clash 
between capitalism and communism that, in the wake of 
the Korean War (1950-1953), left the country divided into 
a communist north and a capitalist south. A poor country 
then based mainly on agriculture and mining (about 50% 
of GDP), with a per capita GDP similar to that of African 
countries such as Mozambique and Senegal, in the early 
1960s the Republic of Korea started taking bold steps towards 
becoming an independent economy by way of “guided 
capitalism”. Public policies were expressly focused on 
building up national industrial and technological capabilities 
in order to gain international competitiveness. The focus 
here was on strengthening the national conglomerates, or 
chaebols. Inward FDI did not play a significant role in this 
phase of the Korean development strategy, however.
The Republic of Korea’s prolific GDP growth 
during this period was based on an outward-oriented 
industrialization process that transformed its economy 
into the world’s tenth largest (measured by GDP), made it 
the world’s twelfth-biggest trader and raised its per capita 
GDP to the equivalent of two thirds of the average of the 
OECD countries.2 The Republic of Korea thus became one 
of the principal showcases of the “East Asian miracle”.
In spite of this stellar growth, the country was overtaken 
by a debilitating financial crisis towards the end of the 
twentieth century that obliged it to rethink its existing 
development strategy. At the same time, the Republic of Korea 
found itself in an Asian “nutcracker” between a technology 
leader (Japan) and several Asian fast followers (especially 
China) that strained its international competitiveness. 
In short, the country was losing wage competitiveness 
without gaining ground in terms of advanced technology. 
In response, the government opted to promote the formation 
of a “knowledge economy” that would be better able to 
sustain GDP growth while making the transition from being 
a “technology follower” to being an “innovator”. In order to 
do so, it began to focus on the continuous restructuring of the 
economy through technological upgrading and innovation 
in higher-value-added and technologically sophisticated 
activities. In that context, the Korean economy mounted 
an R&D effort equivalent to more than half of the entire 
developing world’s total private-sector R&D spending.3 
Starting from this stronger base, the country embraced 
the globalization process and became a world leader in 
2
 To give but one comparison: the Republic of Korea’s real per capita GDP jumped from US$ 1,110 to US$ 12,230 between 1960 and 2003, while 
that of Mexico only increased from US$ 2,560 to US$ 5,790 over the same period (Chen, 2006). 
3
 To give another example: the Republic of Korea undertook 35 times more industrial R&D, measured as a proportion of GDP, than Mexico, 
which produces roughly the same level of manufacturing value-added (UNCTAD, 2003).
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information and communications technology, among other 
knowledge-based activities. Thus, the significance of the 
Korean experience lies in the country’s ability to face up to 
severe challenges by taking tough decisions to reorient its 
development strategy under trying conditions. This ability 
can be considered particularly relevant for Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
In general, it would seem reasonable to conclude that 
when the Republic of Korea embarked on its fast-follower 
trajectory, it possessed a development strategy suited to that 
task. Now that it has evolved into a competitive stakeholder 
in the international economic system and aspires to become 
a technology leader, its national development strategy has 
been altered to reflect these changed circumstances and 
its policies have become more orthodox and focused on 
objectives associated with the knowledge economy. For 
example, specialized institutions now actively promote 
inward FDI and seek to direct it towards high-tech projects 
in competition with national companies. 
Korean outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
played a role in both its initial and subsequent development 
strategies, although its effects have been conditioned by 
the country’s balance-of-payments situation. The Republic 
of Korea has accumulated about US$ 70 billion in OFDI 
and generated a significant number of world-class TNCs. 
While the original industrial export model was in effect, 
OFDI was necessary to secure supplies of natural resources 
and gain access to the world’s principal markets. As that 
model matured and the goal of creating a knowledge 
economy came to the fore, OFDI began to play a more 
important role in transferring certain export activities to 
export processing zones in lower-wage countries and in 
acquiring competitive technologies for use in the home 
economy. Globally, Korean OFDI has been concentrated 
in manufacturing (mainly in China, other Asian countries 
and lower-wage countries close to major markets such as 
those of North America and Europe). Large Korean TNCs 
have used OFDI to establish international and regional 
production systems in electronics (Samsung Electronics 
Company, LG Electronics) and motor vehicles (Hyundai 
Motor Company) and to strengthen their competitiveness 
in natural resources and resource-based manufactures 
(SK Corp, POSCO) while smaller Korean TNCs (Sae-A, 
Shinwon, Hansae, Hansoll) have used it to set up regional 
production systems in the apparel industry.
The principal focal points of Korean OFDI in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, to which about 8% of Korean 
OFDI has been directed, are found in the electronics industry 
in Mexico and Brazil, the apparel industry of Central America 
and natural resources in Peru, Brazil and Chile. This Korean 
OFDI has produced significant impacts, particularly with 
regard to increased local exports. In principle, these OFDI 
focal points should have become the “transmission belts” 
that would pass on the Korean economy’s dynamism to host 
countries in the region, thereby helping them to learn from 
the Korean development strategy. In practice, however, these 
contact points have not done so and therefore have failed to 
realize their potential for inducing industrial and technological 
upgrading in the region. This is so for several reasons.
First of all, Korean OFDI in electronics has primarily 
been in large-scale plants devoted to the assembly of final 
goods, such as color television sets, mobile phones, monitors, 
DVDs, etc., in Mexico and Brazil. Samsung Electronics 
Company, LG Electronics and their associates possess 
modern plants in Mexico, close to the border with the United 
States, and in Brazil, in the Manaus free zone and around 
São Paulo. These operations represent huge investments in 
capital equipment and have been very important for their 
headquarters companies, that is, Samsung Electronics 
Company and LG Electronics, but have been less successful 
ventures for their business associates (in terms of local 
supply networks) and the two host countries (in terms of 
the localization of components and the technological and 
industrial upgrading of these activities). 
A good example is provided by the shift from conventional 
(cathode ray tube) color television sets to the modern liquid 
crystal display (LCD) or plasma display panel (PDP) models. 
Whereas the plants for conventional sets incorporated 
associate firms’ locally assembled components (Samsung 
Electro-Mechanics, Samsung SDI in the case of Samsung 
Electronics, and LG Innotek and LG-Philips in the case of 
LG Electronics), the new LCD and PDP models incorporate 
modules imported directly from the Republic Korea which 
account for a large share of the final sales price. The most 
significant value-added operations in the host countries are 
essentially limited to the assembly of printed circuit boards, 
whereas, previously, the cathode ray tubes, deflection yokes, 
flyback transformers and other components and parts were 
locally produced. In other words, as this example suggests, 
the progress being made towards manufacturing modern, 
competitive final products by these Korean companies in 
Latin America seems to be coming at the expense of the 
local production of components.4 The host countries have 
gained increased export earnings (Mexico) or more local 
4
 LG Electronics opened a new PDP plant in October 2006 at its complex in Reynosa, Mexico. It is the only one in the region and enjoys a clear 
technological edge in this regard. The new plant is an outcome of a corporate strategy aimed at increasing localization in core sites (China, 
Mexico, Poland and the Republic of Korea).
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R&D activities (Brazil), but their local industrialization 
process is being truncated in the process due to the lack of 
continuity in the transition from one model to the next. In 
addition, existing production linkages may be uprooted in 
the process. 
Korean OFDI in the textile and apparel industry 
began to be directed towards Central America, especially 
Guatemala, primarily in the 1990s in the context of the 
United States import quotas facilitated by the Multifibre 
Arrangement, which limited direct exports from the 
Republic of Korea. Korean apparel firms took advantage 
of the quotas of host countries in Asia and Latin America 
to continue exporting to the United States market. Most 
assembled relatively simple knits (sweatshirts, shirts, 
blouses, trousers, etc.) in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Some Korean apparel companies exported to the United 
States market using cheaper Asian cloth and paying duty 
at the United States border; others complied with the 
rules for “production sharing,” which required the use of 
more expensive cloth cut and formed in the United States, 
as well as other inputs, in order to qualify for duty and 
quota benefits. Some of the headquarters firms of Korean 
subsidiaries operating in Central America became world-
class competitors based on their textile industry and their 
capacity to serve as full-service apparel providers. 
Rather than reflecting their global competitiveness, 
the operations of Korean firms working out of Central 
American export platforms have been severely impaired by 
several factors. The multilateral Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing put an end to the era of quotas and progressively 
opened up the United States market to competitors, 
especially in lower-cost segments. As a result, fabrics cut 
and formed in the United States became less and less able 
to compete with the more efficient offshore vertically-
integrated operations of firms from Asian countries such 
as China and India. Moreover, the appreciation of the 
Central American currencies and the worsening situation 
in terms of personal security in the subregion deterred 
Korean investors, especially established ones, and these 
investors therefore began to postpone reinvestments. Korean 
apparel companies started to re-examine their options for 
offshore apparel assembly sites and increasingly came to 
prefer Asian locations. Unfortunately, the host countries 
did not mount active or adequate policy responses to the 
problems faced by these Korean textile and apparel firms, 
nor did they build on these firms’ competitive advantages 
as textile producers and full-service providers. 
In the natural resources and resource-based 
manufacturing sectors, Korean TNCs maintain a rather 
passive presence in Latin America and generally work 
with partner firms in order to spread the financial risk. 
For example, SK Corp’s participation in the huge Camisea 
natural gas project in Peru takes the form of a minority 
share in the project consortium, which is led by United 
States companies. LS Nikko sources more than half of its 
copper from Chile, Peru and Brazil by way of operations 
with Japanese partners. POSCO sources iron ore pellets 
from Brazil via its participation in a local firm, Kobrasco, 
whose operational management is in the hands of its 
Brazilian partner (CVRD). These companies tend to be 
much more active in other regions of the world, and the 
more strategic aspects of their internationalization processes 
are more visible outside Latin America. 
Some changes are evident, however. SK Corp plays a 
role as partner in all three elements of the Camisea project: 
exploration/production, transportation (natural gas and 
liquids pipelines) and distribution (the liquefied natural gas 
plant). LS Nikko is beginning to purchase its own mines 
and is considering the possibility of building a copper 
smelter in Latin America or China. POSCO is setting up 
its own steel plant in Tampico, Mexico, to supply the local 
automotive industry with galvanized steel. Another active 
company is Eagon, which specializes in forestry products. 
This company’s very existence has depended on its ability 
to adapt to the fallout from its headquarter firm’s financial 
crisis by charting a more independent course. Nonetheless, 
the operations of these companies still typically take the 
form of passive participation in joint projects, in spite of 
the recent record highs reached by international prices 
for these commodities, which might be expected to make 
them more aggressive in investing in Latin America and 
the Caribbean.
The single biggest Korean TNC that is conspicuously 
absent in Latin America is Hyundai Motor Company (HMC). 
This world-class company is the most recent example of a 
new automotive TNC from a developing country that has 
broken into the top 10 global TNCs in this sector. HMC is 
usually considered to be one of the industry leaders, after 
Toyota and Honda. Thanks to its relatively more limited 
degree of internationalization, HMC was better prepared 
for the Korean financial crisis, which was a significant 
factor in the restructuring of that industry in the Republic 
of Korea. In fact, it was the only Korean automotive 
producer that was not sold to foreign investors, and it even 
acquired the number two Korean motor vehicle producer, 
Kia, around that time. Subsequently, HMC established 
an extremely competitive international production system 
that focused on major markets, and particularly those of 
the United States, China, India, Turkey and the Czech 
Republic (for the European market). This company’s 
production capacity (together with Kia) is approaching 
5 million units worldwide, and it exported 2 million units 
from its Korean base in 2005. Unfortunately, HMC still 
possesses no major operations in Latin America and the 
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Caribbean, preferring to export to those markets where 
feasible. In Brazil, it has been mired in legal problems 
stemming from the operations of some of the affiliates of 
the firms that it acquired during the Asian financial crisis, 
namely Asian Motors and Kia. Eventually it decided 
against bringing Brazil into its international production 
system and is instead exporting knocked-down kits for 
light trucks and sport utility vehicles to a plant built by a 
local company. In Mexico, HMC is apparently close to 
a decision on investing in a new assembly plant. Under 
circumstances that appear to be similar to the case of LG 
Electronics’ investment in the PDP module plant, the local 
FDI policy does not seem to have been a significant factor 
in this investment decision, which is instead primarily a 
reflection of the firm’s own corporate strategy. In other 
words, with the exception of this new plant in Mexico, 
the automotive industry in the region does not enjoy the 
benefits that would be associated with the presence of one 
of the Republic of Korea’s most competitive, world-class 
TNCs. Unfortunately, FDI policy in the region has not 
been a factor in changing this situation. 
Thus, whether it is due to the existence of better 
investment options in other parts of the world, the 
comparative passivity of Latin America and Caribbean 
FDI policies, or other factors, the impact of the operations 
of Korean TNCs in the region would appear to fall far 
short of their potential. As a consequence, the host 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean still have 
much to learn from one of the more successful and 
dynamic development strategies of the last half century, 
one that spans both export-based industrialization 
and the transition to the knowledge economy. This 
situation can be attributed to the fact that the existing 
transmission belts in textiles and apparel, electronics, 
motor vehicles and natural resources are not at present 
fulfilling their role.
D. The experience of portuguese TNCs in
 Latin America and the Caribbean
In many ways, the case of Portugal represents the “flip 
side” of the Republic of Korea’s experience. Whereas 
the latter set development benchmarks, Portuguese TNC 
operations have their origin in an empire that has long 
been in decline. The most competitive Korean TNCs are 
world-class ventures, whereas the principal Portuguese ones 
can be considered to be third- or fourth-tier enterprises. 
Whereas the largest Korean TNCs have a global presence, 
that of the biggest Portuguese TNCs is limited mainly to 
the Iberian Peninsula, neighbouring countries and former 
colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Cabo Verde, Macao, 
etc.). Similarly, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
presence of Korean TNCs is relatively widespread (Mexico, 
Brazil, Central America, Chile and Peru), whereas that 
of Portuguese TNCs is heavily concentrated in just one 
country: Brazil. Lastly, whereas Korean FDI in the region 
holds out great potential, much of the Portuguese FDI in 
Brazil has lost its dynamism, and a substantial portion of 
it appears to be stagnating if not declining. 
Portugal was the centre of an extensive empire in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with overseas 
possessions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Today, 
Portugal is one of the smaller members of the European 
Union. It has, however, enjoyed somewhat of an economic 
resurgence, in part based on European Union subsidies 
aimed at reducing regional disparities, national deregulation 
and privatization processes that have strengthened some 
of the principal Portuguese enterprises, and the national 
government’s efforts to help emerging Portuguese TNCs 
to internationalize their operations. The pressure on 
Portuguese firms to engage in OFDI in recent years has 
come from the increased competition within the European 
Union associated with the liberalization process in services 
(such as telecommunications and electricity) and the 
impact of adopting the euro. 
Annual flows of OFDI from Portugal were quite small 
during the early 1990s, averaging less than 500 million 
euros per year. However, they increased rapidly thereafter, 
rising to about 3.5 billion euros per year. As a result, the 
OFDI stock had surpassed 21 billion euros by the year 
2000. Since then, outflows have, for the most part, remained 
strong, but with sharp fluctuations from year to year. The 
principal characteristics of Portuguese OFDI are that it is 
recent, encompasses few activities, is concentrated in a few 
recipient countries and is carried out by a small group of 
large but not highly internationalized companies.
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The firms that dominate Portuguese OFDI come 
from two groups: large, recently privatized, public utility 
monopolies that needed to internationalize to avoid being 
acquired by larger European competitors in the context of 
the European Union’s liberalization process; and existing 
private firms that had consolidated their base in Portugal 
and needed to expand internationally in order to sustain 
their growth. The first group includes companies such as 
Portugal Telecom (telecommunications), Electricidade de 
Portugal (electricity) and CIMPOR (cement). The second 
is made up of firms such as Sonae (retail trade) and the 
Pestana Group (tourism), as well as a number of firms in 
the financial services, construction and other industries. 
Brazil became the epicentre of the Portuguese OFDI 
boom that began in the mid-1990s, accounting for 95% of 
Portugal’s OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean.
This concentration reflects the fact that these 
internationalizing Portuguese companies were interested 
essentially in Brazil, not the rest of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Brazil was attractive for reasons of common 
history, language and culture, as well as its large market 
and growth potential, coupled with economic reforms 
(the Real Plan, the steps taken to open up the economy, 
liberalization, deregulation and, especially, privatization). 
Although Portugal accounted for only about 6% of Brazil’s 
inflows of FDI in 1996-2000, Brazil was the destination for 
over 50% of Portugal’s OFDI in roughly the same period 
(1995-2000). The macroeconomic crisis that hit Brazil 
in 2000 caused those inflows to nosedive, however, and 
several Portuguese companies subsequently decided to leave 
Brazil or sharply reduce their assets there. In other words, 
a small group of Portuguese investors engaged briefly but 
intensively in FDI activity in Brazil.
During the FDI boom, inflows were concentrated in 
just three principal activities: telecommunications (39.9%), 
retail trade (16.8%) and electricity, gas and water (15.4%). 
From this perspective, the history of recent Portuguese FDI in 
Brazil is mainly about the experiences of Portugal Telecom, 
Sonae, Electricidade de Portugal and a few others.
Portugal Telecom (PT) is the product of the amalgamation 
of three Portuguese telecommunications companies in 1994. 
It was privatized in the late 1990s, although the Portuguese 
government has retained its “golden share” in the company. 
By 2005, it had sales of 6.3 billion euros and 40 million 
clients and was the eighth-largest telecommunications 
company in the European Union. Although the firm has 
far-flung international investments, including assets in many 
former colonies (Cabo Verde, São Tome and Principe, Macao 
and Timor-Leste), its principal FDI destination is Brazil. 
These investments have, for the most part, been made in 
association with Telefónica of Spain, the European Union’s 
fourth-largest telecommunications company.
Brazil accounted for 32% of the global sales of PT 
and 71% of its clients worldwide in 2005. PT was one of 
the principal participants in the privatization of Telebras, 
Brazil’s dominant State telecommunications company, in 
partnership with Telefónica. Their joint venture, BrasilCel, 
which controls the Vivo brand, became the single largest 
national telecom company in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and its Brazilian market share peaked at 44% in 2003. The 
instability of the telecommunications market at the turn of 
the century has weakened PT, however, and it has begun to 
refocus its efforts on its home base and Spain, especially 
since another large Portuguese group (Sonae) tried to take 
it over in 2006. There is speculation that Telefónica will 
buy out Portugal Telecom’s assets in Brazil. 
Sonae started out producing wood panels for 
construction in the 1950s, but it then diversified into retail 
trade (originally in association with the French group, 
Promodes), the construction of shopping centres and 
other activities (telecommunications, tourism, etc.). By 
the 1980s, it was the largest private non-financial group 
in Portugal and it began its internationalization process 
in earnest. That process was focused on Brazil, where 
Sonae originally joined with a local firm, Josepar, to create 
Cia. Real de Distribuicão. It later bought out Josepar and 
created Sonae Distribuicão, which expanded rapidly in 
southern Brazil. It obtained significant market shares in 
several Brazilian states, such as Rio Grande do Sul (32.3%), 
Paraná (23.1%) and Santa Catarina (15.4%), as well as its 
share in the more populous São Paulo area (3.4%). In the 
course of its effort to establish its local footprint, Sonae 
faced increasing competition from other retail TNCs, 
such as Carrefour, Casino, Royal Ahold and, eventually, 
Wal-Mart. The 2001 crisis and subsequent devaluation 
in Brazil also hit Sonae hard, causing its Brazilian sales 
to plummet from the equivalent of 4.4 billion euros in 
2001 to only 2.3 billion euros in 2002. Its rationalization 
efforts caused Sonae to drop from third to fourth place 
in Brazilian retailing. By 2005, Sonae decided that it 
had higher priorities and better investment opportunities 
elsewhere. It proceeded to sell 10 São Paulo hypermarkets 
to Carrefour for 105 million euros and, towards the end 
of the year, it sold its remaining retail holdings in Brazil 
to Wal-Mart for US$ 750 million. These resources helped 
Sonae in its bid to take over Portugal Telecom in Portugal. 
Thus, this large private company eventually turned its 
back on Brazil as a major investment site. 
Electricidade de Portugal was formed through the 
amalgamation of 13 electricity providers in 1976. In the 
1990s, generation, transmission and distribution activities 
were separated to facilitate their privatization, although the 
Portuguese government still controls about 25%. In 2004, 
in recognition of its diversification into other activities, 
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such as water, natural gas and telecommunications, its 
name was changed to Energias de Portugal (EdP). It is the 
tenth-largest electric company in the European Union, with 
sales of 9.7 billion euros in 2005. EdP has concentrated 
primarily on the generation and distribution of electricity, 
but it also holds 30% of the largest transmission company in 
the country, REN. The firm’s strategy has been to preserve 
its lead in Portugal, to internationalize and to diversify. 
It has done so with the help of powerful local associates 
(GALP Energy, Aguas de Portugal, Brisa and BCP) and 
established TNCs (Iberdrola of Spain and Thames Water 
of the United Kingdom). Its internationalization efforts 
have focused primarily on the Iberian Peninsula (6.5 
million clients) and Brazil (3 million clients), where the 
vast majority of its 9.5 million clients are found.
In a situation akin to the experience of Portugal 
Telecom in telecommunications, EdP was one of the 
principal participants in Brazil’s privatization process 
in the electricity industry. The macroeconomic crisis 
in Brazil hit privatized services, and especially the 
electricity industry, particularly hard, and the firm’s 
huge investments in that sector came under financial 
pressure. EdP then refocused its corporate strategy on 
the Iberian Peninsula and sold off many of its non-core 
activities while it attempted to reorganize its Brazilian 
holdings. In 2005, it launched Energias do Brasil on the 
local stock market. By 2006, it still had market shares of 
1% of generation, 8% of distribution and 10% of supply 
activities (trading) in Brazil’s electricity sector, and some 
of its new investments in generation were coming on 
stream. Thus, Brazil still plays an important, if reduced, 
role in EdP’s internationalization process.
Another example is that of CIMPOR, one of Portugal’s 
two principal cement producers. This company was also 
privatized in the 1990s. The new owners set out to expand 
beyond national borders by concentrating on three key 
markets: the Iberian Peninsula, the Mediterranean basin 
(Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) and Brazil. This move is 
reflected in the firm’s installed production capacity in 2006 
in the Iberian Peninsula (9.6 million tons), Mediterranean 
basin (6.6 million tons) and Brazil (5.7 million tons). 
In terms of global sales, the Iberian Peninsula (where 
CIMPOR is second only to CEMEX) contributed about 
60%, while Brazil (where CIMPOR is in third place after 
Votorantim Cimentos and João Santos) accounted for 
18%. Thus, Brazil has become an important element in 
CIMPOR’s internationalization process. 
Finally, the Pestana Group seems to have decided to 
stay in Brazil for the long haul, as it is heavily investing 
in tourist facilities in the north-eastern region.
Portugal’s experience serves to illustrate the case 
of a relatively minor source of OFDI. The interactions 
of several factors, such as the new competition coming 
from within the European Union, the liberalization of the 
national economy and the impact of the euro, have obliged 
many of the dominant Portuguese companies to accelerate 
their internationalization processes. In Portugal’s case, this 
process is quite recent, involves a small group of activities 
in a relatively few principal recipient countries and is 
driven by a fairly small number of dominant companies. 
In general, companies in the telecommunications, retail 
trade, electricity and cement industries have had similar 
internationalization strategies which revolve around 
neighbouring countries (especially Spain) and former 
colonies having a shared history, culture and language 
(particularly Brazil). The focus on Brazil as a hub for the 
internationalization processes of such companies as Portugal 
Telecom, Sonae, Energias de Portugal and CIMPOR was 
intense but, for many, it did not last long in the face of the 
macroeconomic crisis, regulatory problems, the entry of 
global competitors, and what these firms considered to 
be better opportunities elsewhere. 
E. Messages
The 2006 report contains three basic messages. First, 
the region has succeeded in stabilizing the absolute 
level of inward FDI over the last three years while 
outward FDI has skyrocketed, suggesting that the 
region is becoming a more active participant in the 
globalization process. Second, even so, the region’s 
share of global and developing-country inward FDI 
has not increased. Numerous factors account for this 
outcome, and the causality involved is complex. The 
elements in this equation include the fact that some 
TNCs feel that they have better options elsewhere, that 
there are macroeconomic and structural limitations in 
the region, and that FDI policies in the region remain 
passive and relatively ineffective in comparison with 
more successful country recipients of FDI in other parts 
of the world. For example, the more successful host 
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countries in Europe and Asia tend to employ active 
FDI policies, which are often integrated into their 
development strategies, to attract more and better-quality 
FDI. Third, in a context in which traditional sources of 
FDI, such as Europe or the United States, are not very 
dynamic, it makes sense to seek out non-traditional 
sources. Unlike the situation with traditional sources, 
OFDI from non-traditional investor countries is often 
concentrated in a relatively small number of companies. 
Thus, the effectiveness of active FDI policies to attract 
and upgrade FDI from non-traditional sources depends 
to a significant degree on the kind of FDI and the 
nature of the corporate strategies of the principal TNCs 
involved, as is amply demonstrated by the contrasts to 
be seen between the mainly manufacturing activities 
of Korean TNCs and the primarily service activities 
of the Portuguese ones. 
These are a number of important lessons to be 
learned from these experiences by policymakers in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, who may wish to build 
upon them by adopting more active and integrated FDI 
policies that focus more on the quality rather than the 
quantity of FDI, that better define the role of FDI in 
the development process, and that evaluate its impact 
on an on-going basis within the context of national 
development priorities. 
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Chapter I
Foreign direct investment and transnational 
corporations in Latin America and the 
Caribbean
A. Introduction
In 2006 net FDI inflows in Latin America and the Caribbean, excluding the main financial centres, 
amounted to US$ 72.44 billion (see figure I.1 and box I.1). This is 1.5% higher than the 2005 figure 
and confirms that investment levels have stabilized after having declined early in the decade. This 
stability contrasts, however, with the estimated 34% growth in global FDI flows.
Meanwhile, OFDI from the countries of the region has 
risen at an unprecedented rate, reaching US$ 40.62 billion, 
115% more than in the previous year. It was this increase, 
which is part of a global rising trend in OFDI flows from 
developing countries, that led to the inclusion in this 
chapter of a section on OFDI and the strategies employed 
by Latin American and Caribbean firms (trans-Latins) in 
making such investments.1
This chapter analyses FDI trends and determinants 
from an analytical viewpoint based on the strategies adopted 
by firms that invest abroad (ECLAC 2004, 2005, 2006a). 
Two complementary data groups are used: (i) official 
figures on FDI flows and their distribution by sector and 
country of origin; and (ii) information on the operations of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) and trans-Latins, cross-
border acquisitions and investment projects. The first group 
of data comes from official sources, while the second has 
been compiled from secondary information sources such 
as the specialized press, analysts’ reports and information 
obtained directly from the companies involved.
Section B provides an overview of global foreign 
investment flows; section C analyses FDI inflows in Latin 
America and the Caribbean; and section D studies OFDI 
flows from the countries of the region.
1
 The characteristics of the internationalization process of this group of companies in recent years were described in detail in the previous edition 
of this report (ECLAC, 2006a).
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Figure I.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FDI AND OFDI FLOWS
(EXCLUDING THE MAIN FINANCIAL CENTRES), 1992-2006 a b
(Billions of dollars)
Box I.1
METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS AND COVERAGE OF FDI DATA FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
figures as at 24 April 2007. 
a
  The FDI figures indicate inflows of foreign direct investment, minus capital outflows generated by foreign 
investors. The OFDI figures indicate outflows of investment by residents, minus capital transfers made 
by those investors. The FDI figures do not include the flows received by the main financial centres, and 
the OFDI figures do not include the flows originating in those centres. 
b
 These figures are different from those contained in the editions of Economic Survey of Latin America 
and the Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 
published in July and December 2006, respectively, as the latter show the net balance of foreign 
investment, that is, direct investment in the reporting economy less outward foreign direct investment. 
The FDI figures contained in this report 
indicate inflows of such investment in the 
reporting economy, minus capital outflows 
generated by foreign investors. These figures 
are different from those contained in the 
editions of Economic Survey of Latin America 
and the Caribbean and Preliminary Overview 
of the Economies of Latin America and the 
Caribbean published in July and December 
2006, respectively, as the latter show the net 
balance of foreign investment, that is, direct 
investment in the reporting economy less 
outward foreign direct investment. 
The main financial centres of the region 
(Bermuda, British Virgin Islands and Cayman 
Islands) are not considered in this report, 
except in interregional comparisons in the 
international overview (section B). According 
to UNCTAD estimates, those jurisdictions 
received 99.2% of flows to the Caribbean 
financial centres between 1990 and 2005 
(which in turn received approximately 10% 
of global flows between 2002 and 2006) 
(UNCTAD, 2006). Other jurisdictions in 
Latin America and the Caribbean that are 
considered tax havens or financial centres 
according to OECD and/or IMF criteria 
receive substantial amounts of foreign 
direct investment in non-financial sectors 
and are therefore included in the analysis 
carried out in this report.
The data included are the most 
recent official figures available as at 24 
April 2007. They are official figures for the 
year, official estimates or extrapolations 
on the basis of quarterly data for 2006 for 
those countries that had not yet published 
data for the complete year at that time. 
In the absence of annual or quarterly 
data or official estimates for 2006, and 
solely for the purpose of estimating an 
amount for the region and subregions, 
average flows received between 2002 
and 2005 were considered. Owing to the 
response times of official surveys and 
investment records, the official data are 
usually revised retroactively by national 
authorities, which may result in differences 
appearing over time in FDI figures for one 
and the same period.
As for FDI data by destination sector 
and country of origin, the estimates are 
based on the best official data available 
for a representative universe of destination 
countries. Differences in data compilation 
methodologies and criteria between 
the various countries limit the quality of 
the estimates if they are considered as 
absolute values. In some cases they reflect 
net income and in others gross income 
or income actually received, while some 
countries exclude some investment sectors 
or categories of investment from their 
classification by country of origin. In the 
case of data by country of origin, there is 
the additional limitation that in many cases 
companies make investments from financial 
centres or subsidiaries located outside their 
country of origin. Nevertheless, these data 
can be used to identify general trends in 
the composition of investors and in FDI 
distribution at the aggregate level.
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Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2006 27
B. International background
According to preliminary estimates, global FDI flows 
amounted to US$ 1.23 trillion in 2006, which is an increase 
of 34% in relation to the previous year (see table I.1).2
Table I.1
GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF NET FDI INFLOWS IN THE WORLD,
BY GROUPS OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, 1991-2006
(Billions of dollars)
      Percentage
 1992- 1997- 2002-   change
 1996 a 2001 a 2006 a b 2005 2006 
b
 2005-
      2006 b
World total 276.3 908.7 700.7 916.3 1 230.4 34.3
Developed countries 170.9 674.9 434.6 542.3 800.7 47.6
Developing countries 101.7 223.0 237.0 334.3 367.7 10.0
Countries of South-
 Eastern Europe and CIS 3.7 10.8 29.1 39.7 62.0 56.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
World Investment Report, 2006. FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: 
Implications for Development (UNCTAD/WIR/2006), Geneva, 2006. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. E.06.II.D.11; and “Foreign direct investment rose by 34% 
in 2006” (UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2007/001), Press release, 9 January 2007.
a
  Annual averages. 
b
  Preliminary figures. 
The robust performance of the world economy —which 
posted average growth of 4% of GDP— was a decisive 
factor in the strength of global FDI flows. The United 
States economy posted higher-than-expected growth 
rates, although there may be a slowdown in 2007. In the 
euro zone and Japan, growth rates were higher than in 
previous years. Developing countries had average growth 
rates of 6.5%, with outstanding performances from India 
and China (ECLAC, 2006b). 
China’s 10.2% growth in 2006 (ECLAC, 2006b) has 
had an impact on global FDI flows in various ways. First, 
Chinese demand for natural resources has grown with 
the expansion in its production capacity, and this has put 
pressure on commodity prices and led to investments in 
other countries to secure the supply of minerals and other 
inputs. Second, China’s growth has encouraged investments 
that capitalize on domestic market potential.3 Third, the 
country’s production competitiveness, based on low costs 
but also, to an increasing extent, on technological assets 
(human capital, science and technology infrastructure, 
innovation capacity and others) has created new parameters 
for competition among countries to attract efficiency-
seeking investments to serve third markets. 
There is growing competition among countries to 
attract FDI, especially of the kind that will bring greatest 
benefit to a country in terms of investment levels, job 
creation, higher-value-added activities and innovation 
(see chapter II). This is taking place at a time when larger 
companies are becoming increasingly active in their 
search for more competitive investment locations (OCO 
Consulting, 2005). 
The increase in global FDI in 2006 in relation to 2005 
benefited developed countries and transition economies. 
This is a change from the trend of the past few years, when 
developing countries had posted more rapid growth. As 
in previous years, Western Europe and North America4 
were the main recipient regions. Investments in those 
regions have basically been intra-European or between 
the two regions. The global wave of acquisitions, which 
reached an all-time high in 2006, was a determining factor 
in this result. Assets in Europe and the United States 
accounted for approximately three quarters of the value 
of global acquisitions in 2006 (Columbia University and 
the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006; UNCTAD, 2006; 
Financial Times, 2006a).
Of the developing regions, Asia and Oceania, followed 
by Latin America and the Caribbean, received the most 
FDI in 2006. Preliminary estimates indicate that China, 
the leading developing-country recipient of FDI in 2006, 
shows signs of experiencing a slowdown in the growth 
of these inflows (UNCTAD, 2007). The relative stability 
of flows to Latin America and the Caribbean contrasts 
with the growth in other regions, which reflects a fall in 
the region’s share of FDI inflows received by developing 
countries and of global inflows (see figure I.2). If the main 
financial centres are included, the region’s FDI/GDP ratio 
is higher than that of Asia and Oceania. Nevertheless, it 
has fallen in the past two years (see figure I.3).5 If the main 
financial centres are excluded, the FDI/GDP ratio for Latin 
America and the Caribbean is 3% (see section C).
2
 UNCTAD estimates (2006, 2007).
3
 Real per capita GDP grew on average by 9.4% per year between 1990 and 2004 (ECLAC, 2006b).
4
 Between 2004 and 2005, net United States OFDI fell from over US$ 220 billion (27% of global flows) to a negative figure of US$ 12 billion, 
owing at least in part to the entry into force of federal government fiscal incentives (the Homeland Investment Act). This law allowed the 
repatriation of profits at the lowest tax rates during a single tax year, 2004 or 2005. This has reduced reinvestment abroad, which is an important 
component of United States OFDI (UNCTAD, 2006). 
5
 In order to ensure comparability with data on other regions, all conclusions and data referring to Latin America and the Caribbean contained in this 
paragraph and in figures I.2 and I.3 include the main financial centres. The trends identified, however, also apply to data that exclude those centres.
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Figure I.2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SHARE
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
World Investment Report, 2006. FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: 
Implications for Development (UNCTAD/WIR/2006), Geneva, 2006, United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.06.II.D.11; “Foreign direct investment rose 
by 34% in 2006” (UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2007/001), Press release, 9 January 
2007; and International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2007 for 2006 GDP figures.
According to estimates for 2006, the United 
States and the European Union (especially the United 
Kingdom, France and Spain) were once again the 
main countries of origin of such investment (Columbia 
University/The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006). 
Investments by developing countries, however, grew 
substantially between 2003 and 2005 (see figure I.4) 
6
 Mittal Steel is controlled by the Mittal family of India and is listed on the Amsterdam (Netherlands) stock exchange.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
World Investment Report, 2006. FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: 
Implications for Development (UNCTAD/WIR/2006), Geneva, 2006, United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.06.II.D.11; “Foreign direct investment rose 
by 34% in 2006” (UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2007/001), press release, 9 January 
2007.
Figure I.3
FDI INFLOWS AS A PROPORTION OF GDP,
DEVELOPING REGIONS, 1992-2006
(Percentages)
and preliminary information on OFDI and on mergers 
and acquisitions indicates that this trend continued in 
2006. In the last few years, many of these countries 
have improved their macroeconomic performance, 
increased their exports and accumulated financial 
assets. These countries’ firms, with their increasingly 
developed management and financial capacities, have 
become more active as investors outside their respective 
borders. The Latin American and Caribbean region has 
not remained aloof from this trend, as the trans-Latins 
have expanded their international presence both in the 
region and outside it (see section D) (ECLAC, 2006a; 
Columbia University/The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2006; UNCTAD, 2006; Euromoney, 2006). 
Figure I.4
OFDI FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1970-2005
(Billions of dollars and percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
World Investment Report, 2006. FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: 
Implications for Development (UNCTAD/WIR/2006), Geneva, 2006. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.06.II.D.11.
These new trends are reflected in the dynamics of 
large-scale acquisitions. Although most of the large 
global cross-border acquisitions announced or concluded 
in 2006 involved purchases by firms in developed 
countries (see table I.2), some large transactions were 
carried out by developing-country firms (Brazil, India 
and Mexico), mainly in sectors using natural resources 
or manufactures based on those resources. The largest 
acquisition of this type made during the year was the 
purchase of Arcelor, the steel giant that resulted from 
the merger of Arbed and Aceralia, by Mittal Steel, a firm 
with Indian capital.6 Latin American and Caribbean firms 
have become key agents. The Brazilian Companhia Vale 
do Rio Doce (CVRD) paid out approximately US$ 16.7 
billion to buy control of the Canadian mining company 
Inco, after competing against Phelps Dodge (United 
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States) and Teck Cominco (Canada).7 CEMEX (Mexico) 
acquired Rinker (Australia) for approximately US$ 14.6 
billion.8 In addition, in January 2007, after several months 
of competition with the Brazilian Companhia Siderúrgica 
Nacional (CSN), Tata Steel (India) won control of the 
Corus Group (United Kingdom) (Financial Times, 2007). 
These operations involving trans-Latins —CVRD with 
the purchase of Inco and CEMEX with the purchase of 
Rinker— are larger than any acquisition made by TNCs 
in Latin America in the course of 2006.
Table I.2
CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS FOR AMOUNTS IN EXCESS OF US$ 10 BILLION, 2006 a
(Millions of dollars)
 Country fo the  Country of Stated valueFirm bought
 firm bought Buyer firm buyer firm (millions) Sector
 (a) Operations concluded b
Arcelor Luxembourg Mittal Steel Co. NV India/Netherlands  35 929 Iron and steel
O2 Plc United Kingdom Telefónica Spain 31 126 Telecommunications
BAA Plc United Kingdom Grupo Ferrovial and others Spain 27 373 Engineering and construction
Scottish Power Plc United Kingdom Iberdrola SA Spain 27 209 Electricity
Gallaher Group  United Kingdom Japan Tobacco Inc. Japan 19 020 Tobacco
Falconbridge Ltd. Canada Xstrata Plc United Kingdom 18 049 Mining
Vodafone assets United Kingdom Softbank Corp. Japan 17 528 Telecommunications
Inco Ltd. Canada Companhia Vale do Rio Doce Brazil 16 727 Mining
Boc Group Plc United Kingdom Linde AG Germany 15 599 Chemicals
Thames Water Plc United Kingdom Macquarie Bank Ltd.  Australia 14 883 Water and sanitary services
Lucent Technologies United States Alcatel SA France 14 444 Telecommunications
Corus Group Plc United Kingdom Tata Steel Limited India 12 780 Iron/Steel
Societé des Autoroutes Paris France Macquarie/Eiffage Australia/France 12 138 Roads
Winterthur Schweiz Switzerland AXA France 10 915 Insurance
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Italy BNP Paribas France 10 848 Banks
AWG Plc United Kingdom Osprey Acquisitions Ltd. United Kingdom, 10 388 Water and sanitary services
    Australia, Canada
 (b) Operations pending b
Rinker Group Ltd. Australia Cemex SAB Mexico 14 627 Construction materials
KeySpan Corp.  United States National Grid Plc United Kingdom 11 283 Gas
Euronext NV Netherlands NYSE Group Inc. United States 10 670 Diversified financial services
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures provided by Bloomberg.
a
  Transactions involving internal restructuring of enterprises were excluded. Purchases made by trans-Latins are shaded.
b 
 As at 24 April 2007.
c
  Mittal Steel is controlled by the Mittal family of India. The company is listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange.
Another global trend has been the rise in cross-
border investments made by private equity funds. These 
investments typically have a shorter timeline than 
those of TNCs and are considered direct when they 
involve a share of over 10% of a company’s capital. 
This trend may cause concern in receiving countries 
about the long-term operations of the companies being 
purchased. At the same time, these sources of capital 
also represent solutions for enterprises in difficult 
periods or when large amounts of investment funds 
are needed (UNCTAD, 2006).
In general, the regulatory environment has been 
favourable to FDI. In this context, however, there are signs 
of a trend toward increasing social demands with regard to 
local participation in the benefits of FDI. Some measures 
have been taken in Latin America and the Caribbean to 
increase State participation in the ownership of natural 
resources and in the benefits from their extraction. This 
reflects a certain degree of dissatisfaction concerning 
the distribution of benefits from the exploitation of 
natural resources (see section C). Some Asian countries, 
in the context of more active and integrated investment 
attraction policies, have imposed conditions to ensure 
greater linkages between FDI and local companies. In 
Europe and the United States, obstacles to some of the 
main cross-border acquisitions have been associated with 
political sensitivity in relation to the purchase of “national 
champions”, questions of national security, fear of job 
losses, or concerns about standards of corporate social 
responsibility and social protection (UNCTAD, 2006; 
Columbia University/The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2006; OECD, 2006; Financial Times, 2006b).
7
 In this transaction, CVRD was competing with the United States company Phelps Dodge, which was subsequently purchased by another United 
States company, Freeport. This last transaction is not included in table I.2 as it is not a cross-border acquisition, despite involving assets outside 
of the United States.
8
 An offer of US$ 12.062 billion was made in October 2006 and the purchase was carried out in 2007 for US$ 14.627 billion.
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To sum up, global FDI reached an all-time peak in 2006, 
under generally favourable circumstances. The growth in FDI 
flows has mainly benefited developed countries. As for the 
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are rapidly-growing sources of FDI. The Latin American and 
Caribbean region also showed growth, but at less than the global 
rate. The biggest news in terms of the region’s share in global 
FDI flows is its growth as the origin of investments.
Table I.3
FDI IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,
BY RECEIVING COUNTRY, 1992-2006
(Millions of dollars)
 1992- 1997- 2002-
 1996 a 2001 a 2006 a 2005 2006
South America 16 989 53 362 35 811 44 778 44 679
Argentina  4 683 10 605 3 640 5 008 4 809
Bolivia  243 897 185 -242 237
Brazil 4 497 27 075 15 746 15 067 18 782
Chile  2 465 5 544 5 809 6 960 8 053
Colombia  1 443 2 964 4 706 10 255 6 295
Ecuador  436 858 1 545 1 646 2 087
Paraguay  116 172 51 75 117 b
Peru 2 000 1 535 2 227 2 579 3 467
Uruguay  110 219 633 847 1 374
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 996 4 492 1 269 2 583 -543
Mexico and Caribbean 
Basin 10 548 22 542 25 352 26 583 27 760
Mexico 8 724 17 113 19 114 19 643 18 939
Costa Rica  307 502 830 861 1 436
El Salvador  13 366 342 517 204
Guatemala  91 319 186 208 325
Honduras  50 187 301 372 385
Nicaragua  62 235 237 241 290
Panama 271 892 1 094 1 027 2 560
Dominican Republic 217 898 929 1 023 1 183
Suriname  -27 -47 -74 -37 -144 b
Trinidad and Tobago 346 777 884 940 883
Jamaica 136 436 621 682 621 c
Other Caribbean countries 342 609 888 1 106 1 078 c
Total 27 537 76 903 61 163 71 361 72 439
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), estimates 
on the basis of official figures as at 24 April 2007. The figures exclude the 
main financial centres. 
a
  Annual averages.
b
  Extrapolations based on the quarterly data available.
c
  Estimates based on the average for 2002-2005. 
C. FDI inflows and TNCs in Latin America
 and the Caribbean
1. Characteristics and trends
(a) FDI inflows
In 2006, FDI flows into Latin America and the 
Caribbean, (excluding the main financial centres) 
amounted to US$ 72.4 billion, which is 1.5% higher than 
in the previous year. This result confirms the somewhat 
stable nature of FDI over the past three years, a trend 
which reflects a slight fall in South America (0.2%) and 
an increase of 4.4% in net FDI inflows for Mexico and 
the Caribbean Basin (see figure I.5). 
Figure I.5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FDI
BY SUBREGION, 1990-2006 a b
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates on the basis of official figures as at 24 April 2007. 
a
  The main financial centres are not included. The FDI figures indicate FDI inflows, 
minus capital outflows generated by foreign investors. 
b
 These figures are different from those contained in the editions of Economic 
Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the 
Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean published in July and December 
2006, respectively, as the latter show the net balance of direct foreign investment, 
that is, inward direct foreign investment in the reporting economy less outward 
foreign direct investment.
In 2006, the leading FDI recipient countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean were Mexico and Brazil (which 
together accounted for 52% of total inflows); followed 
by Chile and Colombia (see table I.3 and table I of the 
annex). The largest variations recorded in relation to 2005 
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were due to specific transactions or accounting issues. The 
increase in investment in Panama was attributable to the 
purchase of Banistmo by the British Hong-Kong Shanghai 
Bank Corporation (HSBC), and the fall in investment in 
Colombia was due to the exceptionally high FDI figure 
for 2005 owing to the purchase of Bavaria by SABMiller.9 
The decline in FDI recorded in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela was mostly the result of accounting issues 
which are described in detail in subsection 2. The annex 
contains a brief description of the information available 
on these flows for each country.
In terms of GDP, excluding the small Caribbean 
economies, Panama received the most FDI in 2006, 
followed by Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Costa 
Rica. The regional average FDI/GDP ratio remains at 
3% (see figure I.6).
Figure I.6
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 
RATIO OF NET FDI INFLOWS TO GDP, 2005-2006 a
(Percentages)
while that of Canada10 has increased. Intraregional 
flows fell in relation to 2005, but remained close to the 
average level for the period 2002-2005. This stability 
contrasts with the sharp increase in OFDI from the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, which 
was mostly due to a small number of transactions 
outside the region (see section D).
Figure I.7
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN INVESTOR 
COUNTRIES AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES
(Percentages)




















Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
2005 2006
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and projections for 2006.
a
  The ratio shown in the figure is obtained on the basis of each year’s FDI and the 
three-year moving average of GDP. 
In 2006, the United States, Netherlands, Canada and 
Spain were the main countries of origin of FDI received 
by Latin America and the Caribbean (see figure I.7). 
In relation to previous years, Spain’s share has fallen 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates on the basis of official figures as at 16 April 2007.
a 
 Includes Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Netherlands 
Antilles.
b 
 Includes the economies of South-Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. 
Latin America and the Caribbean has begun to attract 
investments from other developing regions, although this 
is not yet reflected to a significant extent in the official 
figures.11 A clearer indication of this phenomenon can be 
found in the information on acquisitions and investment 
projects by investors from China, India and other countries 
which have launched new undertakings in the region, 
mainly in natural resources (see subsection 2). The 
Indian conglomerate Tata is an interesting exception as 
it has also started making investments in other sectors 
(see box I.2). 
9
 The effect of these transactions is also reflected in the large variation in the FDI/GDP ratio for these countries between 2005 and 2006 (see 
figure I.6).
10
 The strong presence of Canada is partly due to a transaction in Chile that involved the purchase of assets by Canadian companies from other 
Canadian companies. Chile records investments made, but not the withdrawal of investment, so Canada is overrepresented. Nevertheless, even 
without taking into account Canadian investments in Chile (which amount to much more than this transaction), Canada is still the third-largest 
investor in 2006 in the group of countries considered.
11
 One of the reasons why official flows do not reflect this trend, apart from the fact that this is a recent phenomenon, is the use of financial centres 
or investments from subsidiaries situated in other countries (as in the case of SABMiller mentioned above), which are particularly significant for 
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Box I.2
THE TATA GROUP: INVESTOR AND COMPETITOR
The Indian group Tata is a conglomerate of 
96 companies distributed over seven sectors: 
information and communications systems; 
engineering; materials; services; energy; mass 
consumer products and chemicals. The group 
has operations in 54 countries, revenues of 
US$ 22 billion for the fiscal year 2005-2006 
and over 200,000 employees. Three of the 
group’s companies have a global presence 
and have had various roles in Latin America 
and the Caribbean or have interacted with 
companies in the region: Tata Motors, which 
takes advantage of synergies with Latin 
American companies to supply markets in the 
region and in India; Tata Consultancy, which 
seeks markets in high-technology services in 
Latin America; and Tata Steel, which competes 
with the region’s companies for assets and 
global markets. 
Tata Motors was created in 1945 and 
is the main Indian motor vehicle producer, 
with income of US$ 5.5 billion for the fiscal 
year 2005-2006. The company exports to 
Europe, Africa, the Middle East, other Asian 
countries and Australia, and has assembly 
operations in Bangladesh, Kenya, Malaysia, 
the Russian Federation, Senegal and 
Ukraine. In recent years, its international 
expansion has been driven by two acquisitions: 
Daewoo Commercial Vehicle Company, the 
second-largest Korean truck manufacturer, in 
2004; and a share in Hispano Carrocera, a 
Spanish bus manufacturer, in 2005 (with an 
option to acquire the remaining shares). Tata 
Motors’ first vehicles were produced under a 
collaboration agreement with Daimler-Benz 
(Germany) in the 1950s and the company 
continues to benefit from collaboration with 
other companies, including Cummins (United 
States) and Hitachi Machinery Company 
(Japan). Two collaborative projects with Latin 
American companies were announced in 2006. 
The first is a joint venture with Marcopolo 
(Brazil) for bus manufacture and assembly 
in India. Marcopolo’s international operations, 
as in the case of Tata Motors, have grown 
substantially in the last few years as it has 
capitalized on its experience in markets with 
typical developing-country characteristics. 
The second is a collaboration project with Fiat 
(Italy), which is still under consideration, to 
manufacture Tata vehicles in Latin America. 
The Fiat plants in Córdoba, Argentina, or Minas 
Gerais, Brazil, would be used to manufacture 
vehicles of both makes for sale within and 
outside the region.
Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) is 
a leading consultancy firm for information 
technology, business process outsourcing 
(BPO) and technological solutions for 
companies around the world. It has offices in 
33 countries and clients in 55, covering sectors 
that include banking and financial services, 
insurance, manufactures, telecommunications, 
retail trade and transport. Its main service 
centres in Latin America are in Brazil, Chile 
and Uruguay. The company was established in 
Uruguay in 2002 and has a global development 
centre for services to Spain and the Spanish-
speaking countries of Latin America. At the end 
of 2006, it established a new centre in Uruguay. 
Its operations in Brazil were established in 2002 
and focus on specific projects, operating in 
partnership with a local group. In 2005 these 
operations were expanded by the signing of 
an outsourcing contract with the bank ABN 
Amro. TCS also began to operate in Chile 
in 2002, and in 2005 it bought Comicrom, 
a BPO company. The purchase was made 
in the context of efforts to diversify the 
company’s sources of income by increasing 
the BPO component, among other measures. 
In January 2007, the company announced a 
new investment in Ecuador, after signing an 
outsourcing contract with Banco Pichincha, 
the largest private bank in Ecuador. One of the 
company’s main challenges in Latin America 
is finding qualified personnel.
Tata Steel is India’s largest integrated 
private-sector steel company. Outside India, it 
has operations in Singapore and Sri Lanka and 
projects in Australia, Bangladesh, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, South Africa and Thailand. 
In contrast to its compatriot and competitor, 
Mittal Steel, it has not made significant 
investments in Latin America. At present, it is 
better known as a competitor rather than an 
investor. This became apparent in the battle 
with CSN (Brazil) for the purchase of Corus 
Steel (United Kingdom), which the Indian 
company won in January 2007. Tata Steel 
shares many of the competitive advantages 
of Latin American steel companies, such as 
backward linkages (iron, energy) and low 
production costs. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information obtained from the Official website [online] www.tata.com; Isto é 
dinheiro, “Tata de carro no Brasil”, 28 June 2006; Valor econômico, “Múltis no país “importam” talentos de subsidiárias”, 8 January 2007; Thomas Friedman, “Latin 
America’s choice”, The New York Times, 21 June 2006; América economía, “Tata cierra contrato por US$ 140 millones con banco ecuatoriano”, 22 January 2007; 
Financial Times, “Tata Steel wins Corus with £6.2bn offer”, 31 January 2007.
In terms of sectoral distribution, services have 
attracted the most FDI in the region over the past 10 
years, followed by manufactures. This pattern has 
continued in recent years as well (see figure I.8). 
Excluding the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
which posted substantial levels of OFDI in 2006 in the 
primary sector (the reasons are explained in subsection 
2), the proportion of FDI allocated to this sector has 
increased. 
Lastly, data on cross-border acquisitions in the 
region show that they accounted for a smaller share 
of FDI inflows in 2006 than in the previous year and 
that the growth in net FDI therefore appears to be due 
to increased investment in new capacity or extensions 
and modernizations (see the following subsection). 
Reinvestment has increased in Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico, according to the data available 
for the main recipients.12
Figure I.8
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SECTORAL 
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12
 Brazil’s published data do not distinguish between reinvestments, new investments and acquisitions.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), estimates 
on the basis of official figures as at 16 April 2007. 
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(b) Cross-border acquisitions in 200613 
In 2006, in line with the global trend, the total value 
of cross-border acquisitions increased substantially in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, although not all of 
them reflected actual FDI inflows. 
Cross-border acquisitions may be classified as: (i) new 
intries (the purchase of assets or local companies by a 
foreign company); (ii) “change-of-hands” operations (the 
purchase, by a foreign company, of assets or companies 
controlled by another foreign company); or (iii) exits 
(the sale of assets of foreign companies to local business 
groups). There are three important points to be made 
in relation to the 35 largest cross-border transactions 
concluded each year between 2004 and 2006 in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.14 
First, entries continued to predominate but were 
proportionally less in 2006 than in the two previous years 
(see figure I.9).15
TNCs from developed countries –traditionally the 
largest investors in the region– are also becoming less 
significant in relation to trans-Latins and firms from other 
developing countries. This trend, which is a reflection 
of the global trends mentioned previously (UNCTAD, 
2006), can be seen both in entries (see figure I.10) 16 
and in change-of-hands operations (see figure I.11).
13
 This section is based on data provided by Bloomberg on transactions for which the amounts were made public. It therefore does not include the 
complete universe of cross-border acquisitions made. Nor does it include transactions involving companies from Latin America and the Caribbean 
which have their headquarters outside the region, as in the case of Quinsa, the holding company that controls Quilmes, which was purchased in 
one of the largest acquisitions in 2006 (see table I.4). Nevertheless, it does allow the identification of trends over time for a significant proportion 
of these transactions. Caution is required when interpreting the impact of known transactions on FDI flows, as in many cases the purchases are 
financed with shares of the same company. When a local company buys assets from a foreign company (in operations referred to in this section 
as OFDI), and the acquisition is financed with shares equivalent to more than 10% of the purchasing company, FDI inflows are recorded for 
the equivalent sum, which offsets the impact of the OFDI operation on FDI flows. Meanwhile, an inward FDI transaction, financed with shares 
amounting to more than 10% of the capital of the purchasing company, may be recorded in the balance of payments as OFDI of the purchased 
company’s country. As will be seen in section D, this factor had a strong influence on the OFDI flows of some Latin American and Caribbean 
countries in 2004 and 2005.
14
 In 2006, the 35 largest transactions accounted for 83% of the total amount of cross-border transactions involving assets in Latin America recorded 
by Bloomberg for which the amount is known. In 2004 and 2005 this percentage was 86% and 92%, respectively. 
15
 In 2006, the two largest exits involving assets in the services sector in Brazil were: the sale by Bank of America of BankBoston operations in 
Brazil to the Itaú group (part of a transaction that also involves assets in Chile and Uruguay), and the sale by Électricité de France (EDF) of the 
electric power company Light to a group of local investors (see table I.4).
16
 The largest entries in 2006 were: the acquisition of Kerzner International, a tourist development company in the Bahamas, by Istithmar (Dubai); 
and the purchase of Hylsamex by Ternium of the Techint group. The largest acquisition by a European company was Banistmo, purchased by 
HSBC. Of the entry transactions worth over US$ 500 million, none had a purchaser from the United States (see table I.4). Some firms from 
developing countries were also involved in changes of hands, as shown by the purchase of the Ecuadorian assets of Encana (Canada) by Andes 
Petroleum Company (China) and the purchase of 50% of Omimex Colombia (United States) by Sinopec and ONGC (China and India) (see 
table I.4). In addition to these operations there is the acquisition by América Móvil of Verizon´s assets in the Dominican Republic and Puerto 
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Figure I.9
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPOSITION
OF CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITION BY
INVESTMENT AMOUNT, 2004-2006
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures provided by Bloomberg. 
Figure I.10
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPOSITION OF 
ACQUISITIONS INVOLVING ENTRIES, 2004-2006
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
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Figure I.11
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPOSITION OF 
CHANGE-OF-HANDS OPERATIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN 
INVESTORS, 2004-2006
(Percentages)
Lastly, and also in line with the global trend (UNCTAD, 
2006), 2006 brought an increase in relation to 2004 and 
2005 in the share of foreign institutional investors (private 
equity funds, pension funds and others) in the largest 
cross-border transactions in the region (for example 
Istithmar’s purchase of a controlling stake in Kerzner, 
and the acquisition of a controlling interest in Transelec 
by Brookfield Asset Management and others) (see table 
I.4). Local institutional investors also played a significant 
role, purchasing a larger share of TNC assets in 2006 than 
in the two previous years.17 
The greater incidence of exits in relation to entries 
confirms the trend observed in previous years of a decline 
in the share of TNCs among the largest enterprises in the 
region (see the following subsection). Added to the change 
in the structure of the largest investors, this trend means 
that public policymakers need to adapt their targeting 








Withdrawal of trans-Latins and entry of firms from other developing countries
Withdrawal of developed-country firms and entry of developing-country firms
Transactions between developed-country firms
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures provided by Bloomberg.
Table I.4
CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS OF ASSETS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
FOR OVER US$ 500 MILLION, CONCLUDED IN 2006 a
Firm or assets Country of the  Country of the  Country Value
acquired firm or assets  Purchasing firm purchasing Seller of seller announced Sector
 acquired   firm
Kerzner International Bahamas Istithmar Dubai  -- -- 3 630 Tourism
Hylsamex b Mexico Techint Argentina SA Argentina Local investors Mexico 2 581 Steel
Transelec  Chile Brookfield Asset Management Canada Hydro-Quebec Canada 2 367 Electricity
BankBoston Brazil Brazil Banco Itaú Holding Financeiro Brazil Bank of America  United States 2 172 Banks/financial
     Corp.     services
Grupo Banistmo SA Panama HSBC Holdings  United Kingdom Local investors Panama 1 770 Banks/financial
        services
Coal operations – Cerrejón Colombia Xstrata Plc United Kingdom Glencore Switzerland 1 712 Mining
Light SA Brazil Rio Minas Energia e Part. Brazil Electricité de France France 1 627 Electricity
Petroleum/pipeline  Ecuador Andes Petroleum Company China Encana Canada 1 420 Hydrocarbons
 businesses b
Quilmes Industrial SA Argentina Companhia de Bebidas  Brazil/Belgium Bemberg Group Argentina 1 250 Food/beverages
   das Américas
Banco Pactual SA Brazil UBS AG Switzerland Local investors Brazil 1 000 Banks/financial 
        services
FirstCaribbean  Barbados Canadian Imperial  Canada Barclays Plc United Kingdom 989 Banks/financial
 International   Bank of Commerce      services
Embratel Participações Brazil Teléfonos de México Mexico   812 Telecommunications
Omimex de Colombia (50%) Colombia Sinopec and ONGC China and India Omimex Resources United States 800 Hydrocarbons
Tintaya Mine Peru Xstrata Plc United Kingdom BHP Billiton United Kingdom/  750 Mining
      Australia
Oil and gas operations  Argentina Apache Corp. United States Pioneer Natural United States 675 Hydrocarbons
 in Argentina     Resources
50%+1 of Cartagena  Colombia Glencore International  Switzerland Ecopetrol  Colombia 656 Hydrocarbons
 refinery     (State-owned)
BankBoston Chile Chile and Banco Itaú Holding  Brazil Bank of America  United States 650 Banks/financial services
  Uruguay Financeiro   Corp.
Sky Latin American Brazil, Mexico DirecTV Group United States News Corp., Liberty United States 579 Telecommunications
 Platform c     Media, and others  and others
Share in Megacable  Mexico Teleholding SA de CV Mexico RCN Corp. United States 550 Telecommunications
 and MCM
Companhia de Transmissão  Brazil Interconexión Eléctrica SA Colombia State of Sao Paulo Brazil 535 Electricity
 de Energia Elétrica Paulista
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures provided by Bloomberg and press reports. 
a
  Includes transactions in which the assets are situated in Latin America and the Caribbean. Does not include internal restructuring of business groups.
b 
 Transaction announced in 2005, carried out in 2006.
c 
 Transaction announced in 2004, carried out in 2006.
17
 Another large purchaser has been the Advent fund, which purchased the Milano retail chain in Mexico, the Brazif duty-free store chain in Brazil, 
Nuevo Banco Comercial in Uruguay, and, at the beginning of 2007, announced the establishment of a US$ 1 billion acquisitions fund for the 
region (Business Latin America, 2007a). The Matlin Patterson fund has also had a stake in the Brazilian airline Varig since the beginning of the 
company’s financial restructuring process.
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(c) Presence of TNCs18 
The largest TNCs in the region are found in the 
telecommunications, commerce and automotive sectors. 
In 2005, primary-sector companies had a larger share 
than in the previous year, this result being influenced by 
the rise in prices of the respective products (see table 4 
of the annex). 
The data for 2005 confirm the trend observed in 
previous years (ECLAC, 2006a) of a fall in the share of 
TNCs in the sales of the 500 largest companies of the 
region and an increase in the share of local companies, 
both State-owned (mainly in natural resources) and 
private firms (mainly in manufacturing and services (see 
figure I.12). The presence of TNCs in the region grew 
significantly between 1990 (27% of sales of the 500 
largest enterprises in the region) and 2000 (41% of such 
sales). Nevertheless, by 2005 their share had diminished 
again to 25%, although in absolute terms the fall was less 
sudden. These changes are naturally influenced by many 
factors, including variations in the exchange rate and the 
effect of relative prices, in addition to the actual growth 
of some local companies and the withdrawal (or reduced 
activities) of some TNCs.
Figure I.12
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SALES OF THE 500 
LARGEST FIRMS, 1990-2005
(Percentages)
manufacturing sector, the TNC share was down from 58% 
of the total of the 500 largest companies in 2000 to 39% 
in 2005. For the services sector, it declined from 38% 
to 23% over the same period. In contrast, local private 
enterprises were the ones that increased their share the 
most in each of the three sectors.
TNCs have also lost ground in terms of their position 
among the largest exporters in the region. This contrasts with 
the State-owned enterprises, which is mainly attributable 
to the upswing in the prices of natural resources.19 Of 
the 200 largest exporters, TNCs accounted for 18% of 
exports in 1990, reaching a high point of 50% in 2000, 
and dropping to 27% in 2005. State-owned enterprises 
followed an inverse pattern. They accounted for 50% of 
the exports of the 200 largest exporters in 1990. This 
percentage dropped to 15% in 2000 and rose to 46% in 
2005 (see figure I.13). 
Figure I.13
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department 
of América economía magazine, Santiago, Chile, 2006. 
This relative fall in the presence of TNCs occurred 
in all three sectors. In the primary sector, sales of TNCs 
were down from 17% in 2000 to 13% in 2005, although 
in absolute terms sales actually increased. For the 
18
 This section is based on data on the 500 largest companies in the region by sales, provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department of 
América economía magazine, Santiago, Chile. The most recent data available are for 2005.
19
 Of the 500 largest companies by sales, 293 are involved in exports, and data on exports in 2005 are available for 186 of these firms. For 15 
companies, data on exports between 1995 and 2004 were used to estimate exports for 2005 based on the average ratio of exports to sales during 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department 
of América economía magazine, Santiago, Chile, 2006. 
Brazil and Mexico have the highest concentration of 
foreign-owned companies, accounting for 51% and 25%, 
respectively, of total sales in this group. They are followed 
by Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru.
In Brazil, TNCs are mainly involved in the 
telecommunications and automotive sectors. In 
telecommunications, Telefónica of Spain, Portugal Telecom 
and América Móvil (Mexico) are the main actors. In the 
automotive sector, the largest companies include General 
Motors (United States), Volkswagen (Germany) and Fiat 
(Italy) (see table 4 of the annex). Some companies which 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)36
were included in 2005 among the largest TNCs established 
in the country —such as AES Corp. (United States) and 
Électricité de France (France) in the electricity sector— sold 
a large proportion of their assets in 2006. 
In Mexico, the automotive sector and retail trade are 
clearly the areas with the largest transnational presence. 
The first sector includes General Motors, DaimlerChrysler 
(Germany), Volkswagen and Ford (United States). In 
the retail trade sector, the main participant is the Wal-
Mart chain (United States), which has one of its largest 
operations outside its country of origin in Mexico (see 
table 4 of the annex).
The combination of data on FDI inflows, acquisitions 
and the presence of TNCs in the region indicates that 
FDI inflows have remained relatively stable, with a slight 
increase, which is a positive development, but that for a 
number of reasons, FDI in the region is slowing, declining 
in relation to global flows and to GDP; that acquisitions 
involve more and more departures and fewer entries of 
foreign companies; and that TNCs account for a declining 
share of the region’s large companies, not only in natural 
resources but also in manufacturing and services. The 
following subsection analyses these trends from the point 
of view of corporate strategies. 
2. FDI in 2006 from the point of view of corporate strategies
Foreign investments can be categorized by the main 
motivation for the investment, which may be a search for 
markets, natural resources, efficiency for exporting to third 
markets or technological assets. A large proportion of FDI 
in Latin America and the Caribbean has been motivated 
by the search for markets. In addition, South America 
has attracted significant flows of FDI in search of natural 
resources, while Mexico and the Caribbean Basin have been 
the destination for efficiency-seeking investments, mainly for 
export to the United States market (see table I.5) (ECLAC, 
2005, 2006a). Technological asset-seeking investments have 
not been significant in any of the subregions.
Table I.5
MAIN DESTINATION SECTORS FOR FDI IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,
BY CORPORATE STRATEGY
 Natural-resource    Technological asset-
 seeking FDI Market-seeking FDI Efficiency-seeking FDI seeking FDI
Goods Petroleum and gas:  Automotive: MERCOSUR Automotive: Mexico
  Andean countries, Argentina,  Chemicals: Brazil Electronics: Mexico and the
  Trinidad and Tobago Food: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico  Caribbean Basin
 Mining: Chile, Andean  Beverages: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico Apparel: Caribbean Basin,
  countries Tobacco: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico  Mexico
Services Tourism: Caribbean  Finance: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of  Back-office services:
  Basin, Mexico  Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru  Costa Rica
  Telecommunications: Argentina, Bolivarian 
   Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Peru
  Retail trade: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico
  Electric power: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
   Central America
  Gas distribution: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
   Colombia 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2004 (LC/G.2269-P), Santiago, Chile, 
2005. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.II.G.32.
(a) Market-seeking FDI
Market-seeking investments in the region benefited 
from positive macroeconomic trends in 2006. GDP growth, 
inflation control, expansion of private credit, relatively 
low interest rates and lower unemployment have boosted 
domestic demand (ECLAC, 2006b). Nevertheless, these 
investments have suffered the effects of regulatory 
instability and of competition from imports, exacerbated 
by currency appreciation in some of the main markets. 
Some TNCs, mainly in the services sector, decided to 
sell all or part of their operations in the region in order 
to concentrate on more profitable markets. The trans-
Latins have become more important as market-seeking 
investors within the region, especially for services and 
mass consumer goods. 
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(i) Services
In the services sector, the main destination sectors for 
FDI have been telecommunications, retail trade and the 
financial sector. In the electricity sector and in sanitation 
services, the year brought more FDI exits than entries. 
In any case, the trans-Latins have expanded their share 
in all of these segments.
In the telecommunications sector, the Mexican 
companies América Móvil and Telmex, and the Spanish 
Telefónica continued to dominate in the region, increasing 
their presence by acquisitions and new investments. This 
included the purchase by América Móvil of some of the 
assets of Verizon (United States) in the Caribbean.20 These 
companies have invested in integrating telecommunications 
services and media, acquiring cable TV operators and 
broadband Internet services. In addition to these two 
groups, there is Millicom (Luxembourg), which acquired 
control of the State-owned Colombia Movil (Ola) 
for US$ 478 million (Expansión, 2006a). Telefónica, 
América Móvil and Millicom are also competing in the 
telecommunications market in Central America. The recent 
opening of the market in Honduras and Nicaragua has 
contributed to the growth of investments in this sector. 
CAFTA has played a positive role in this connection by 
guaranteeing the interconnection of networks (Estrategia 
y Negocios, 2006).
The main withdrawals of TNCs from the 
telecommunications market in Latin America included the 
sale by Telecom Italia of Digitel, in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, to the local group Cisneros and the sale by 
Verizon of assets in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Telecom Italia 
had already begun to reduce its Latin American activities 
with the sale of TIM Peru to América Móvil, followed by 
the sale of its share of ENTEL (Chile) in 2005. Telecom 
Italia began to focus its expansion on broadband services 
and media in Italy and other European countries, while in 
Latin America it continues its mobile telephone operations 
in Brazil.21 Verizon has concentrated on markets with greater 
growth potential in wireless telephony and Internet, especially 
in the United States (Bloomberg, 2007).
In retail trade, the large international operators have 
focused on the biggest markets —Brazil and Mexico— and 
on Central America, while the trans-Latins, especially 
the Chilean ones, are conquering other markets in South 
America. In 2006, Wal-Mart, the largest TNC in Mexico 
by sales, began a project worth over US$ 2 billion in that 
country. In Central America, it acquired control of Central 
American Retail Holding Co. (CARHCO), based in Costa 
Rica, with stores in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua.22 In addition, it began to enter 
financial services by establishing Walmex. In Brazil, Wal-
Mart consolidated its position with the purchase of Sonae 
assets in 2005 (see chapter IV), and then announced an 
investment plan of US$ 800 million to open new stores 
and to alter existing ones (Valor econômico, 2006a).
The French companies Carrefour and Casino have 
focused their efforts on South America. After leaving the 
Mexican market in 2005, Carrefour bought minor assets of 
Sonae in Brazil and in 2006 began expansion programmes 
in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. Casino also focused its 
growth on the latter two countries. In Colombia, it acquired 
additional shares in Almacenes Éxito (for which Cencosud, 
of Chile, had made an offer). In Brazil it maintains its share 
in Companhia Brasileira de Distribuição (Dinero On Line, 
2007; Valor econômico, 2006b).
Chilean companies are entering the battle of the TNCs 
in Argentina, Colombia and Peru. While Argentina has been 
a traditional destination for Chilean investment in retail 
trade,23 Colombia and Peru were the destinations with the 
strongest growth in 2006. Cencosud, Falabella and Ripley 
have expanded their regional operations, especially in the 
two countries mentioned. One of the competitive advantages 
that has resulted in this continuous expansion over the past 
few years is the integration of retail and credit facilities, 
while one of the factors leading these firms abroad is the 
small size of the domestic market (Calderón, 2006). These 
companies still have not entered significantly into larger 
markets such as Brazil and Mexico, where the competition 
of TNCs is stronger (Capital, 2006). In fact, FASA withdrew 
after a brief encounter with the Brazilian market and sold 
its main assets in the country, although it retains a strong 
presence in Mexico. 
20
 América Móvil had made an offer for Verizon’s assets in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, estimated at 
US$ 3.7 billion. In December 2006, its assets in the Dominican Republic were included in the sale to América Móvil of Verizon Canada Holdings 
Corp., the owner of Verizon’s assets in that country. In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in view of the announcement that companies in 
strategic sectors would be nationalized, América Móvil abandoned the planned purchase. These assets were then purchased by the Venezuelan 
Government in February 2007. As at March 2007, the purchase of the assets in Puerto Rico was still pending.
21
 In Brazil, after a long period of conflict with its partners, Telecom Italia announced that it would transfer its 38% share in the controlling company 
of Brasil Telecom to a trust fund, and authorized JP Morgan to sell this stake. During the year there was also speculation on the possible sale 
of the cellular telephony unit of Telecom Italia in Brazil, when the company released a statement confirming the receipt of an unsolicited offer 
and letting it be known that the administrative council had authorized negotiations for a possible sale (www.teleco.com.br). In Bolivia, Telecom 
Italia has a majority share in ENTEL, which is being considered for nationalization (Business Latin America, 2007b).
22
 Wal-Mart already owned 35% of the company and acquired an additional 51%.
23
 The Chilean group Paulmann (Cencosud) leads the supermarket ranking in Argentina (Mercado, 2006).
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In the financial services sector, a number of foreign 
institutions made new investments, but there were also some 
significant withdrawals. In fact, the largest transaction in the 
sector was the sale, by Bank of America, of BankBoston’s 
assets in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay to the Brazilian 
bank Itaú. This bank already had a significant presence 
in Argentina through the bank Itaú Buen Ayre, and thus 
consolidated its regional presence and its share of the 
domestic market. In Argentina, the assets of BankBoston 
went to Standard Bank Group, of South Africa.24 
The main entries in this sector were the purchases 
of Banistmo, in Panama, by HSBC, and of the Pactual 
bank in Brazil by UBS. The first is associated with 
the growth prospects of the Panamanian and Central 
American market, taking into account factors such as 
the expansion of the Panama Canal, CAFTA-DR, and 
growth in remittances from residents abroad, which has 
boosted the market for bank and financial services in the 
isthmus (see box I.3). The second reflects the expansion 
of UBS in a niche market —investment banking— in 
Brazil. The company also began to enter retail segments 
in Mexico. HSBC and Scotiabank have invested in that 
country’s credit and mortgage segments. As mentioned 
previously, Wal-Mart has begun to provide financial 
services in Mexico, targeting low-income consumers 
(América economía, 2007).
Box I.3
RECENT FDI IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN CENTRAL AMERICA
The Central American banking market is 
going through an intense restructuring. 
A number of  large investments
—acquisitions and expansions— marked 
this sector in 2006. One of the main factors 
to stimulate foreign investors’ interest in the 
region’s financial sector is the prospect of 
the entry into force of CAFTA-DR, which 
will increase trade, FDI in other sectors 
and the demand for banking services. A 
second factor is the prospect of bringing 
large segments of the population into 
the banking market. The region has low 
penetration rates by global standards: 
26% in Costa Rica compared with 87% 
en Canada. In terms of demographic 
patterns, the young population of the 
subregion (as in the rest of Latin America 
and the Caribbean) is a contrast to that of 
the northern hemisphere and offers good 
prospects for growth and diversification of 
services and income sources. Lastly, family 
remittances create a growing demand for 
banking services. 
In this context, a number of international 
banks have purchased regional banks that 
had expanded within Central America. 
The largest transaction in the sector (and 
in the subregion in general) in 2006 was 
the purchase of Banistmo (Panama) by 
HSBC (United Kingdom), for US$ 1.771 
billion. When the negotiations for the 
purchase began, in 2005, Banistmo had 
significant positions in Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua, as well as 
Panama. In February 2006, it took control 
of Banco Salvadoreño, which, in addition to 
a strong position in El Salvador, has offices 
in California, Nevada and Texas (United 
States) to provide services to the immigrant 
community and facilitate remittances. 
The transaction gives HSBC a strong 
position, which its largest transnational 
rival, Scotiabank (Canada), had achieved 
through a gradual strategy that it has 
intensified in the last few years. Citigroup 
bought control of Grupo Financiero Uno 
(El Salvador) —which had assets in 
various Central American countries— and 
Grupo Cuscatlán (Panama). The latter had 
acquired the Central American operations 
of Lloyds TSB (United Kingdom) in 2004, 
which enabled it to enter Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Panama. It also has 
operations in Costa Rica and an office 
in Nicaragua. 
There has also been a process of 
consolidation and internationalization 
among the Central American banks. In 
July 2006, Banco Continental (Panama) 
bought Banco Atlántico (Panama) from 
the Spanish bank Sabadell, counting on 
prospects of growth owing to the Panama 
Canal expansion. In Costa Rica, the 
national banking system has regulatory 
restrictions on expansion via acquisitions, 
but has plans to grow in the region through 
its partnership with Banco de Costa Rica. 
Banco de Reservas (Dominican Republic) 
has plans to establish itself in Haiti. Banco 
Industrial (Guatemala) is growing through 
acquisitions within the country, but also 
plans to expand to other countries in the 
region and to open offices in the United 
States and Mexico. At the beginning of 2007, 
there was a merger of Banco General and 
Banco Continental (Panama), and G&T 
Continental, of Guatemala, bought its 
rival Banex-Figsa. Lastly, Banagrícola (El 
Salvador) was purchased by Bancolombia 
in January 2007.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of “La defensa de Banistmo”, América economía, 10 February 2006; “A kinder, 
gentler foreign bank”, LatinFinance, August 2006; “May the best banks win”, Business Latin America, 6 November 2006; “Upheavals whet big banks’ appetites”, The 
Banker, 1 September 2006; “Bancolombia anuncia compra salvadoreño Banagrícola”, Reuters, 11 January 2007; “LatinFinance Banks of the Year 2006”, LatinFinance, 
November 2006; “Deals”, LatinFinance, February 2007.
As for the electricity sector, a combination of 
regulatory and management problems led investors 
to exit from this sector in Brazil. The main such 
withdrawal was that of Electricité de France (EDF), 
which sold its share in Light, an energy distributor 
for the State of Rio de Janeiro, to a local consortium, 
24
 Also in Brazil, American Express sold its operations to the local group Bradesco.
25
 Light had been controlled by EDF since 2002 (the company had acquired its first share in Light at the time of its privatization in 1996). EDF 
also sold generating assets in Argentina in 2006.
after accumulated losses that were due, inter alia, to 
the effects of the currency devaluation in 1999 (which 
increased the value in reais of the company’s debt) 
and the crisis in Brazil’s energy sector.25 In smaller 
transactions, Alliant Energy, El Paso, Public Service 
Enterprise Corporation Global and AES sold electric 
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power assets to local investors.26 The total value of these 
transactions was almost US$ 3 billion (Business Latin 
America, 2006a). At the same time, in one of the largest 
cross-border transactions of the year, a new investment 
entered Brazil’s electric power sector from Interconexión 
Eléctrica SA (ISA) of Colombia, which bought shares 
in CTEEP, an energy transmission company. ISA also 
purchased shares in Transmantaro, in Peru.27
In Argentina, in the period following the crisis which 
triggered the “pesification” of public utility rates, some 
companies renewed their investment projects in the country; 
others decided to leave, such as Aguas de Barcelona and 
Suez in the area of sanitation services. These companies 
withdrew from Aguas Argentinas, which returned to State 
control. Aguas de Barcelona also sold its share in Aguas de 
la Costa in Uruguay (which returned to State ownership) 
while Suez sold its share in Aguas Cordobesas and in January 
2007 announced its withdrawal from drinking water supply 
services in Bolivia (América economía, 29 January 2007). 
In summary, in the services markets there has been 
a great deal of interest in the telecommunications sector, 
some financial services segments and retail trade. In all 
of these sectors there have been winners and losers in 
the battles for national markets, both within and outside 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Some companies have 
therefore chosen specific countries on which to focus their 
expansion efforts. In the process, there were significant 
outflows of foreign investment from some countries, creating 
opportunities which have been taken up by trans-Latins and 
some local groups. Meanwhile, in basic services, outflows 
have been caused by regulatory changes and past sectoral 
and macroeconomic crises. Measures taken to nationalize 
some services in Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela since 
the beginning of 2007 may result in greater reticence on 
the part of foreign investors in the near future.
(ii) Manufactures
The main industries targeted by market-seeking 
investments in manufactures were beverages in the mass 
consumer goods segment and the automotive industry in 
the durable goods segment. Most of these investments 
went to South America.
Inflows to the beverages sector were lower than 
in the two previous years as there were no large 
acquisitions such as those of AmBev (2004) and Bavaria 
(2005) (ECLAC, 2006a). Nevertheless, these same 
companies, now part of transnational groups, have 
made investments to expand their operations in the 
region. Bavaria invested in a new plant in Colombia 
and increased its share in Backus (Peru). AmBev 
purchased an additional share in Quilmes (Argentina) 
for US$ 1.2 billion and invested in new capacity in 
Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay.28 
The Mexican company FEMSA, which entered 
the Brazilian market in 2003 by purchasing Panamco 
(ECLAC, 2006b), expanded rapidly again in Brazil 
in 2006, purchasing 68% of the Kaiser brewery from 
Molson Coors (Canada) and integrating its beverage 
and beer operations. In Mexico, it increased its share 
of the carbonated beverages subsidiary that it operates 
in partnership with Coca-Cola and purchased, with this 
same partner, Jugos del Valle, a local company with a large 
share of the market in several countries of the region and 
substantial production capacity in Brazil.
Also in Mexico —a key market for TNCs in beverages 
(see ECLAC 2006b)— the Peruvian Ajegroup, which in 
2006 invested in a new plant in Tabasco, is competing with 
companies such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi and is gaining 
ground by establishing a low-cost niche. It also has 
operations in Venezuela, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
Guatemala and Colombia (El Comercio, 2007). 
In contrast to the situation in Mexico (see subsection 
c), elsewhere in Latin America the automotive industry 
mainly supplies the local and regional market. There 
is a trend towards specialization in more compact 
vehicles: smaller and lower-cost models for the large 
manufacturers, motorcycles, and new corporate plans 
for low-cost cars that have been successful in other 
developing markets. 
In 2006, FDI inflows to the automotive sector in 
Brazil dropped to their lowest level since 1997. Due to 
pressure from the exchange rate, idle capacity in some 
plants and labour conflicts, the closure of some plants 
was announced. Exports dropped in 2006 (Anfavea, 
2007) and went mainly to other Latin American countries, 
26
 In the context of the announcement of nationalization of strategic sectors in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, AES sold, in February 2007, 
its 82% share in CA Electricidad de Caracas (Radio Nacional, 2007).
27
 ISA bought control of CTEEP for US$ 535 million. In January 2007, ISA made a takeover bid of US$ 352 million for additional shares in 
CTEEP (América economía, 2007).
28
 In 2007, AmBev made an offer of approximately US$ 313 million for the remaining share (Business Latin America, 2007c).
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especially Mexico.29 As a result of currency appreciation, 
the former prospects for expanding Brazilian exports to 
other regions fell away (ECLAC, 2005). Volkswagen, 
for example, stopped exporting its Fox model to Europe 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers Automotive Institute, 2006; 
Valor econômico, 2006c). Nevertheless, domestic sales of 
locally produced vehicles and vehicle production increased 
(Anfavea, 2006), indicating a decline in export prospects 
rather than in the domestic market. In this context, the 
main manufacturers began to modernize and expand. Fiat 
is implementing a modernization plan estimated at US$ 1.4 
billion through 2008, Ford announced an investment plan 
of US$ 100 million until 2011, and Volkswagen US$ 1.2 
billion until 2012 (Business Latin America, 2007d).
In Argentina, Toyota and PSA Peugeot Citroën 
expanded their operations to supply the rest of South 
America, and Honda established a motorcycle plant, a 
sector in which the government had established a series 
of investment promotion measures. As in other sectors, 
greater interest is gradually being shown by investors 
from India (see box I.2 on the investment plans of Tata 
motors) and China (a joint venture was established by 
Chery and the Argentine group Socma to produce Chery 
vehicles in Uruguay).
In general, the region has attracted substantial market-
seeking investments in manufactures, although there 
are some factors which limit the volumes of this type 
of FDI. The main ones are: competition from low-cost 
Asian manufactures; GDP and per capita income growth 
rates at lower levels than in Asian developing countries; 
exchange-rate volatility (especially recently); and factors 
that constitute what is generally referred to as the business 
environment. At the same time, the shortage of qualified 
human capital and local supplier networks limits the nature 
of activities in the region. As chapter III shows, much of the 
investment in high-technology sectors such as electronics 
is in assembly activities, partly because of the difficulty of 
establishing linkages with local suppliers of components. 
The region continues to be generally off the map in activities 
that involve a higher R&D content and that could generate 
greater linkages with the local economies. 
(b) Natural-resource-seeking FDI
In 2006, natural-resource-seeking FDI in the region 
reflected the tension between two forces: the sustained 
rise in commodity prices (see figure I.14) and changes 
in the legal conditions for natural-resource exploration 
and exploitation in some countries. This occurred in 
the context of growing demands from governments and 
civil society groups for a greater share in the benefits of 
natural-resource exploitation and for greater control of the 
environmental and social impacts of these activities. In 
these circumstances, foreign investors have reacted in very 
different ways. While some have almost abandoned the 
region, have restructured their investments or are on stand-
by in relation to new investments, others have announced 
new projects. Moreover, some trans-Latins and investors 
from other developing countries —especially China and 
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[online] ifs.apdi.net, 17 April 2007.
Note: The crude oil price is West Texas Intermediate.
(i) Hydrocarbons
In the hydrocarbons sector, two opposing trends are 
observed in relation to policies on the participation of 
foreign capital in exploration and production activities. 
Some countries have taken measures to attract companies to 
the sector as a way of ensuring investments in exploration 
and thereby restoring reserves and production levels. Others 
have made changes to their legislation, or have begun to 
actually implement measures they had previously adopted 
in order to obtain greater profits and increase the State 
role in petroleum activities (see box I.4). 
29
 An agreement implemented in 2003 provided for an import quota of motor vehicles at a zero tariff as a production complementarity initiative 
under which Brasil would export compact cars to Mexico, and Mexico would export to Brazil vehicles of higher unit values. Under this same 
agreement, there would be free trade as of 2007. Nevertheless, exports from Brazil to Mexico have been much higher than in the opposite 
direction. An agreement of November 2006 effectively established free trade in motor vehicles, but postponed it to 2011 for the commercial 
vehicles category (Valor econômico, 2006d). 
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Box I.4
CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE PETROLEUM 
AND GAS SECTOR IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES
In the last few years, significant changes 
have been made in the standards and 
rules that regulate the activities of private 
investors (in practice mostly foreign 
investors) in the petroleum and gas sector 
in the Andean countries. The direction of 
these changes has varied, however. While 
in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Ecuador the trend has been 
towards higher taxes and more restrictions 
on private investment as a way of ensuring 
that the countries receive a greater share 
of the profits from petroleum activities, in 
Colombia the changes have Market-seeking 
been towards greater openness, for reasons 
that include encouraging higher levels of 
investment in exploration and production 
and recovery of reserve levels. 
In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
at the end of 2005, the government required 
private investors to accept the conversion 
of their operating agreements into joint 
ventures, with a majority share for PDVSA. 
Soon afterwards, the government proposed 
an increase in royalty taxes (which had 
also been increased in 2004) on projects 
for extra-heavy crude extraction from the 
Orinoco Belt. At the beginning of 2007, 
there was an announcement that these 
operations would be nationalized as of 
1 May. The consortiums were converted 
into joint ventures, with a controlling share 
for PDVSA.
In Bolivia, the Hydrocarbons Act of 
2005 created a royalty of 32% in addition 
to the existing 18% tax. The law allowed 
foreign investors a period of 180 days to 
migrate to the new contracts. This period 
elapsed without changes being made 
in the contracts, although the investors 
were paying the additional royalties to 
the government. When the nationalization 
of hydrocarbons was declared on 1 May 
2006, an additional period of six months 
was allowed, this time for the companies 
to sign new operating contracts (which 
included transfer of ownership to the State) 
with higher tax rates that varied according 
to the characteristics of each project, up to 
a legal maximum of 82%. In October the 
petroleum companies signed new contracts. 
In September, the nationalization of private 
refineries was announced. This measure, 
which would affect mainly the interests of 
Petrobras (Brazil), was still under negotiation 
in early May 2007.
In Ecuador, as in Bolivia and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the law 
on hydrocarbons was reformed in order 
to give the government a greater share in 
revenues from petroleum and gas extraction. 
It was established that when crude prices 
exceeded the levels agreed in the contract 
with each private company, the State 
would receive 50% of the export income. In 
contrast to what occurred in the other two 
countries, the reforms in Ecuador did not 
require a transfer of ownership to the State. 
Nevertheless, one episode did lead to the 
exit of a significant investor. On a date very 
close to the nationalization of hydrocarbons 
in Bolivia, the State procurator’s office 
and Petroecuador accused the United 
States company Occidental of violating 
its exploration and exploitation contract, 
which led to the company’s withdrawal 
from Ecuador. The Ecuadorian Ministry 
of Energy declared that Occidental had 
illegally transferred a piece of land from 
its exploration contract for Block 15 to the 
Canadian company EnCana in 2000. The 
concession was cancelled and the assets 
used in that operation were transferred to 
the State.
In Colombia, in contrast, foreign 
investment in the hydrocarbons sector has 
been encouraged as a way of increasing 
reserve levels. Since 1999 the government 
has reduced the obligatory share of Ecopetrol 
in joint ventures and has made regulatory 
and institutional changes which include 
the creation of the National Hydrocarbons 
Agency. In 2006, the Cartagena refinery 
was privatized. Glencore International AG 
(Switzerland) won the bidding, in which 
its competitors included Petrobras. The 
government announced that it would sell 20% 
of Ecopetrol, this measure being authorized 
by Congress in November 2006.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of “Ecuador: Tax before trade”, Business Latin America, 1 May 2006; “What’s new 
in your industry”, Business Latin America, 15 May 2006; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Investment Treaty News (ITN), various issues; “Colombia 
charms oil and gas investors”, Financial Times, 31 August 2006; “Bolivia acorralado”, Expansión, 4-18 October 2006; “Estado asumirá operaciones en la Faja del 
Orinoco desde el 1 de mayo”, press release, Ministry of People’s Power for Energy and Petroleum, 2 February 2007; “Revisão de contratos no Equador pode afetar 
Petrobrás”, Valor econômico, 29 November 2006; Genaro Arriagada, “Petróleo y gas en América Latina. Un análisis político de relaciones internacionales a partir de 
la política venezolana”, Real Instituto Elcano, 20 September 2006; “Bolivia suspende nacionalização de refinarias”, Gazeta mercantil, 25 September 2006.
As a result of this combination of factors, there has 
been a restructuring of the actors in the sector. Some 
companies, especially North American and European 
companies, have sold their assets in the region. At the 
same time, there has been a rapid increase in interest 
shown by firms, especially State-owned companies, 
from China, India and other developing countries. Major 
acquisitions in 2006 included the purchase of EnCana’s 
assets in Ecuador by Andes Petroleum Company (China)30 
and the purchase by Sinopec (China) and ONGC (India) 
of 50% of Omimex in Colombia. The latter also bought 
shares in an exploration block in Brazil operated by Royal 
Dutch Shell.31 PDVSA signed a series of cooperation and 
investment agreements with China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) and with Petropars (Iran), and 
began joint exploration contracts with both companies. 
PDVSA was also one of the most dynamic investors 
in the hydrocarbons sector in the region, together with 
Petrobras (see section D).32
Other significant events included new investments 
by Repsol YPF in Argentina (where it also invested in the 
refining segment, after the introduction of new rules on fuel 
sulphur content) and the purchase by Glencore (Switzerland) 
of control of the Cartagena refinery in Colombia.
30
 The transaction was announced in 2005 and implemented in 2006.
31
 Royal Dutch Shell bought ExxonMobil´s 30% stake in block BC-10 of the Campos basin, and sold 15% to ONGC (Shell Media Center, 2006).
32
 PDVSA is also negotiating an agreement with ONGC. Moreover, the Government of India signed agreements with the Governments of Cuba 
and Ecuador for oil and gas exploration in these countries, and had talks with Brazil in relation to oil and gas exploration and production and 
cooperation initiatives to produce ethanol (ONGC 2006a, 2006b).
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FDI flows to the hydrocarbons sector indicate that, 
in regional terms, the net effect of these opposing trends 
seems to have been positive in 2006, with flows increasing 
by 57% in Colombia and by 26% in Ecuador in relation 
to 2005. In Brazil, they diminished slightly in relation to 
2005, but remained much higher than in 2004 and than 
the average level since 1997, when the sector was first 
liberalized. Although no data are available on flows to this 
sector in Peru in 2006, the granting of 16 new licences 
for exploration and production points to an increase in 
investment over the next few years (Ministry of Energy 
and Mines, 2007a).33 
In Bolivia, the figures on FDI inflows do not show 
a substantial decline from 2005 to 2006, despite the 
regulatory changes mentioned above. The official data 
indicate that gross FDI inflows remained essentially stable 
at US$ 104.5 million, compared to US$ 105 million in 
the previous year.34 
It is the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela that shows 
the steepest drop in net FDI flows for hydrocarbons, 
reaching a negative value of US$ 1.958 billion in 2006. 
Nevertheless, this fall is not directly related to the 
regulatory changes made in 2005-2006. It is explained 
by the fact that between 2003 and 2004, PDVSA stopped 
publishing its financial accounts, thus preventing the 
distribution of profits among the foreign participants in 
strategic partnerships set up to operate in the Orinoco 
Belt. In 2005 and 2006 the financial accounts were 
published and the distributed profits were recorded as 
FDI outflows. Reinvestment in the Venezuelan petroleum 
sector remained relatively stable.
The fact that the changes in the operating conditions of 
foreign companies, especially in Bolivia and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, did not have a greater impact on 
FDI inflows between 2005 and 2006 may be explained 
by various factors, in addition to the appeal of high oil 
prices. First, the uncertainty in the years preceding these 
changes had already caused a contraction in the flows 
destined for the hydrocarbons sector, as of 2001 in the 
case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 2002 
in Bolivia. Second, no agreement was reached in 2006 
on compensation for the assets nationalized in Bolivia or 
for the termination of PDVSA operating agreements with 
the companies that did not agree with the conversion to 
joint ventures in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.35 
Accordingly, no disinvestments were reported, although 
some investors did leave the country.36 
Last, as these activities have high sunk costs, exit costs 
are also high, which is a reason for investing in projects 
already underway. Nevertheless, some countries may have 
modified their investment plans in these markets in view 
of the changes mentioned. In Bolivia, for example, the 
moratorium on new investments declared by companies 
operating in Bolivia between the time of nationalization 
in May and the signing of the new contracts in October 
and the uncertainty that remains in relation to operating 
conditions have probably slowed any additional investment 
that had previously been planned, although the flows 
actually received have been maintained. The announcement 
by Petrobras that it would substantially increase its 
investments in gas exploration and production in Brazil 
in order to reduce its dependence on Bolivian gas is very 
significant in this respect. 
(ii) Mining and metallurgy
Favourable international price trends have also 
stimulated new investments in the mining and metallurgy 
sector. In Chile, the increase in mining investments in 2006 
has a strong reinvestment component. In Peru, investments 
in new mining projects reached US$ 700 million in 2006 
(Ministry of Energy and Mines, 2007b). Xstrata (United 
Kingdom), Grupo México (Mexico), Newmont Mining 
(United States), Phelps Dodge (United States), Gold Fields 
(South Africa), Monterrico (United Kingdom), and Rio 
Tinto (Australia/United Kingdom) were among the main 
investors. Mining activity also shows signs of increasing 
in Bolivia. According to the Central Bank of Bolivia, 
FDI in mining in 2006 increased by 37% in relation to 
2005 (Banco Central de Bolivia, 2007).37 Despite a fall in 
relation to 2005, mining was the main recipient sector for 
FDI flows in Colombia, with flows in the first semester 
33
 As in other countries of the region, environmental issues are one of the biggest challenges for the hydrocarbons sector in Peru. New gas leaks and 
a fire in 2006 raised doubts about the safety of the Camisea project. A new initiative in the context of the Camisea project, which involves the 
construction and operation of a natural gas liquefaction plant, a marine loading terminal and a connection to the gas pipeline of Transportadora 
de Gas del Perú (TGP), has been the subject of consultations between IDB and civil society. One of the requirements for the financing of the 
project is compliance with a strategy that takes social and environmental aspects into account. 
34
 As no data are available on disinvestment in the hydrocarbons sector, net flows cannot be evaluated, but according to the central bank, disinvestment 
in the first nine months of 2006 was due entirely to amortization of intra-firm loans (Central Bank of Bolivia, 2007). 
35
 In March 2007, the companies Total and BP ceded to PDVSA their operating rights to the Jusepín oil field. This transaction will bring them 
US$ 350 million (Americaeconomia.com, 2007).
36
 The compensation to Occidental for its Ecuadorian assets is also pending. 
37
 At the end of 2005 the Indian firm Jindal Steel and Power won a tender for US$ 2.3 billion for an iron-ore exploration project associated with 
a steel plant, but this was suspended at the beginning of 2007 owing to lack of agreement with the government in relation to the terms of the 
energy supply.
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of US$ 2.01 billion reflecting investments mainly in gold 
and coal operations. Drummond (United States) made 
significant investments in the La Loma coal mine. 
In Brazil, where mining is strongly concentrated 
in the hands of local companies, the steel company 
Companhia Siderúrgica do Atlântico was established by 
ThyssenKrupp (Germany). The project, valued at US$ 3.6 
billion, is the first investment in a new steel plant in Brazil 
since the 1980s. The objective is to take advantage of the 
availability of iron ore in Brazil to meet the expanding 
global demand for steel, and 100% of production will 
be exported. In addition to the plant, the investment, 
in which CVRD has a share, includes port facilities, a 
coking plant and a thermoelectric power plant (Valor 
econômico, 2006e).
Mexico also received large investments in the steel 
sector, in particular with Mittal Arcelor’s purchase of the 
steel company Siderúrgica Lázaro Cárdenas-Las Truchas 
(Sicartsa) of the Villacero group and the purchase of 
Hylsamex by Techint, which was announced in 2005 and 
completed in 2006. The two companies —Techint and 
Mittal Arcelor— already own over half of Mexico’s steel 
production capacity (Expansión, 2007a). 
Some government and labour and civil society groups 
are making stronger demands for bringing the benefits 
of mining activities closer to the local population and 
limiting environmental impacts. With regard to fiscal 
issues, in 2005 Chile instituted a specific tax on mining 
activity.38 In Peru, there was discussion at the beginning 
of 2006 of a possible tax hike in the mining sector, after 
which mining companies agreed to make a contribution 
of US$ 772 million over the next five years to reduce 
poverty, malnutrition and social exclusion. The Bolivian 
authorities announced increases in taxes on mining and 
the nationalization of the sector. There is still uncertainty 
in relation to the recent changes, especially in Bolivia and 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
In relation to workers’ interests, the employees of the 
Escondida mine in Chile, controlled by BHP Billiton and 
accounting for 8.5% of world copper production, went 
on strike for 25 days, with a significant impact on the 
company’s production.39 
Lastly, some mining projects have met with opposition 
from groups that protect the environment and the interests 
of indigenous peoples. The Pascua Lama (Argentina-
Chile) and Junín (Ecuador) projects have been the focus 
of conflicts between companies, governments and civil 
society representatives on these issues.40 
(iii) Paper and pulp
Environmental issues also had a strong impact 
on investment in the paper and pulp sector in 2006. 
This sector —and the associated forestry activities— 
contributed much of the increase in FDI to Uruguay. 
The projects of the paper companies Ence (Spain) and 
Metsae-Botnia (Finland) in the region of Fray Bentos 
are expected to bring approximately US$ 1.6 billion 
to the country over three or four years (Business Latin 
America, 2006b). Metsae-Botnia’s investment, which 
is at a more advanced stage, has already generated 
investments by its local and foreign suppliers, including 
Stora Enso (Finland/Sweden), which is about to start 
investing in the central region of Uruguay. Nevertheless, 
the Fray Bentos projects have been the subject of disputes 
between the Argentine and Uruguayan governments and 
criticism and demonstrations by civil society groups in 
both countries for environmental reasons, which have 
generated uncertainty with regard to the actual timing 
and location of the investments.41 
In summary, natural-resource-seeking investments 
in the region seem to be trapped between two opposing 
forces: on the one hand, the strong appeal of these activities 
in a context of high commodity prices and, on the other 
38
 The new law ensures that an invariable tax regime is maintained for defined periods for large companies operating under the regime of Decree 
Law 600. The invariable tax also applies to investors that sign new foreign investment contracts for mining projects with a value of no less than 
US$ 50 million (Foreign Investment Committee [online] www.foreigninvestment.cl). Moreover, through the law on the Innovation Fund for 
Competitiveness, the government agrees to assign part of the revenue collected to that fund.
39
 The mine’s production fell to 40% of capacity, at an estimated cost to the company of US$ 17 million per day (EIU, 2006a).
40
 The Pascua Lama gold project of Barrick Gold, which includes activities in Argentina and Chile, has been criticized for alleged impacts relating to 
glaciers, water quality and quantity, tailings storage, and other aspects. The National Environment Commission (Conama) of Chile approved the 
project in February 2006, with conditions that seek to limit the impact of activities on the glaciers. Conama confirmed its approval after analysing 
the appeals filed by citizens’ organizations on issues including impacts on water quality and noise levels (www.conama.cl; www.barrick.ca). 
In Argentina, the project was approved in December 2006 by the Interdisciplinary Mining Environmental Assessment Commission (CIEAM), 
after a period of 25 months. The Junín Project (copper, molybdenum, porphyrin) of Ascendant Copper (Canada) has encountered resistance 
from some local and Canadian organizations. In March 2007 the operations were still awaiting approval of the environmental impact study. In 
November 2006 the company signed cooperation agreements with local organizations on issues relating to health, education, infrastructure and 
local participation in the jobs to be generated by the project.
41
 In Brazil, one of the most significant recipients of gross FDI inflows in 2006 was the paper and pulp sector. A large proportion of these 
investments are related to the restructuring of International Paper, which sold some of its assets to Stora Enso, Nippon Paper and the local 
company Votorantim. 
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hand, stricter requirements from governments and civil 
society groups in relation to the benefits of these activities 
for the local population and the management of their 
environmental impacts. It is a huge challenge for industry 
and governments to reconcile these interests and ensure 
the sustainable production that brings concrete benefits to 
the local population, while not scaring off private investors 
that could bring value added to natural resources. 
(c) Efficiency-seeking FDI
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin are long-standing 
recipients of FDI thanks to a combination of low costs 
and their proximity to the United States. A number of 
factors are threatening these comparative advantages, 
but the region seems to be adapting by creating new 
sources of competitive advantage. 
Mexico has lost competitiveness in low-technology 
segments such as wearing apparel (see chapter III), and 
many companies have been closed down or transferred 
to Central America or Asia. Nevertheless, production 
costs in North America and the growing availability 
of skilled manpower have led some operators in more 
sophisticated sectors and activities to Mexico.42 
In the face of the imminent restructuring of the 
United States automotive industry, Mexico seems well 
placed to receive new investments. After announcing the 
closure of plants in the United States, Ford representatives 
then announced an investment of US$ 560 million to 
expand the company’s operations.43 Volkswagen, General 
Motors and DaimlerChrysler announced investments 
in new capacity, new plants or supplier development. 
Nissan, Mazda, Honda and Toyota are investing in new 
capacity (Expansión, 2006b). One of the main reasons 
for the recent investments is the growth in demand in 
the United States for small, low-cost vehicles owing 
to high oil prices. The obstacles to be overcome in 
order to take advantage of proximity to the United 
States market include improvements in infrastructure, 
updating of the supply network and development of a 
more highly-skilled labour force that can help to attract 
more complex operations, in which competition is not 
only on a cost basis (Business Latin America, 2006c, 
2006d; The Economist, 2006; Expansión, 2006c).
In Central America and the Caribbean, competition 
from Asia, termination of free-zone incentives under WTO 
rules and the end of quotas in the United States market 
create a challenging situation for the wearing apparel 
sector, which accounts for a significant proportion of 
manufacturing in these countries. The entry into force 
of CAFTA-DR could generate significant opportunities 
if the countries manage to find niches where they can 
improve their competitiveness.
As the countries adapt to these new challenges, 
they are seeking new sources of competitiveness 
and diversification. Honduras has made changes in 
its textiles and wearing apparel industry in a move 
towards vertically integrated operations (Banco Central 
de Honduras, 2006). In El Salvador, there has been 
diversification into new sectors, such as motor vehicle 
parts, electronics and tourism (Proesa, 2006). In the 
Dominican Republic there are also efforts underway 
to increase the already substantial level of investment 
in tourism and to attract investments in call centres 
and other back-office services. Also contributing to 
this trend is the return of bilingual Dominicans with 
work experience in the United States (Latin Finance, 
2006a). In Costa Rica, the country in the subregion with 
the longest experience in diversification and upgrading 
of its production, new investments have been made in 
electronics (mainly by Intel), medical equipment, call 
centres, outsourcing of business services, financial 
research, analysis and design of gas turbines, engineering 
and back-office services (CINDE, 2006). A process of 
diversification is also under way in the member countries 
of CARICOM (see box I.5).
In summary, changes are taking place in Mexico and 
the Caribbean Basin as a result of factors that include 
the challenges of growing competition from Asia. Some 
countries are making efforts to diversify their production 
base and create competitive advantages that go beyond 
low costs and can be sustained in the longer term. 
42
 Whirlpool announced the transfer of part of its United States production to Mexico (www.whirlpoolcorp.com). General Electric, General 
Motors, Honeywell, and Delphi created R&D centres in the country. Bombardier also transferred some segments of its production from Canada 
to Mexico, and plans to increase the country’s share of its aircraft assembly process (Business Week, 2006).
43
 The company did not deny or confirm the press speculations about a plan to significantly increase its Mexican operations with investments of 
US$ 9.2 million to 2012 (Expansión, 2006e).
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Box I.5
RECENT FDI TRENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN
A recent CARICOM study shows increases 
in investment flows among the countries of 
the group and from abroad as a result of 
more flexible exchange controls, greater 
macroeconomic stability, double-taxation 
agreements and growing experience with 
internationalization processes.
The main investors are Canada, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. The 
intra-CARICOM flows (in which Trinidad 
and Tobago is the largest investor) account 
for approximately 10% of the total, a figure 
close to that of intra-regional investment 
in Latin America and the Caribbean as a 
whole. There is very little investment from 
the countries of South America, Central 
America and Mexico.
The main type of investment in terms 
of total amounts has been in natural-
resource-seeking projects. In fact, the 
leading recipients of investment are 
Trinidad and Tobago (particularly in the 
hydrocarbons sector) and Jamaica (where 
bauxite and aluminium mining have 
attracted large volumes of FDI). In view 
of the relatively small size of the market, 
market-seeking investments are mainly in 
financial and telecommunications services 
and retail trade. In manufactures, there 
are good results from the beverages and 
foodstuffs and cement segments, where 
the logistical component justifies the local 
production option. As in Central America, 
the wearing apparel industry is suffering 
from competition with Asia. Nevertheless, 
several Caribbean countries have developed 
exportable services industries, such as 
call centres and other administrative 
support services, in which the English 
language is an advantage. In 2006, Verizon 
Communications announced an investment 
in call centres in Jamaica which would 
create 5,000 jobs.
There is a general shift of focus, even 
in the countries in which investments 
have traditionally concentrated on natural 
resources, towards services, and within 
this sector, there is greater diversification. 
In addition to the administrative services 
mentioned, FDI is growing in tourism and 
hotels and in transport. In the last few 
years, there has also been increased 
investment in land purchases, which 
is an indicator of future FDI, mainly 
in infrastructure and tourism-related 
services. 
In relation to the OFDI of these 
countries, the main investor is Trinidad and 
Tobago, followed by Barbados and Jamaica. 
These investments involve a wide range 
of sectors. Some of the main investors are 
conglomerates with simultaneous operations 
in primary activities, manufacturing and 
services. Apart from the conglomerates, 
the largest companies are in the financial 
sector. An increase in FDI flows is expected 
among the CARICOM countries as a result 
of the common market that entered into 
force in January 2006. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Caribbean Trade and Investment Report, 
2005, 2006; “What’s new in your industry”, Business Latin America, 24 July 2006; “Special report, Caribbean”, LatinFinance, September 2006; OCO Consulting, FDI 
Quarterly, issue four, quarter 1, 2006.
3. Conclusions
This section has shown that, despite the exit of some investors 
and the significant challenges facing some countries and 
sectors in their efforts to enhance the region’s appeal, FDI 
remains stable, and with a slight increase in absolute terms. 
Nevertheless, it has also shown that the region’s share in global 
FDI flows is falling. The reasons for this are not entirely 
clear, but a number of factors are certainly involved. First, 
the region’s growth rates have been relatively low compared 
to those of other developing countries, which has limited the 
region’s appeal for market-seeking investments. 
Second, the institutions that evaluate national 
business environments do not give very positive ratings 
to Latin America and the Caribbean relative to other 
regions, with the exception of a few countries.44  Problems 
associated with the complexity of the tax structure, gaps 
in infrastructure, regulatory uncertainty and other factors 
not only reduce the region’s appeal for FDI but also affect 
the competitiveness of the local operations of the region’s 
companies. Latin America and the Caribbean continue to 
be one of the regions with the greatest number of disputes 
between investors and the State.45
Third, investments in Latin America and the Caribbean 
have been limited to those that seek static comparative 
advantages: natural resources, markets and efficiency derived 
from low labour costs and proximity to the United States 
market. The region has not managed to attract a significant 
amount of investment seeking dynamic comparative advantages 
such as technological assets. This type of investment usually 
has significant potential for generating benefits in terms of 
creating quality jobs and opportunities for local businesses, 
when there is local capacity available to absorb these benefits. 
It is also subject to strong competition among potential 
44
 In the World Bank’s “Doing Business” classification of 175 countries, Chile is ranked 28th, Mexico 43rd, Trinidad and Tobago 59th and the 
other countries between 65th and 164th. 
45
 Of the 109 cases pending in February 2006, 58 involved Latin American and Caribbean countries. Most of them date from the period from 2001 
to 2004. 
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destinations because this type of investment does not depend 
on intrinsic national assets such as natural resources or 
geographical proximity to specific markets. It therefore 
depends on long-term policies that develop factors such 
as skilled labour, scientific, technological and innovation 
capacity, and local business capacity, and that promote these 
attractions in an active and integrated manner (see chapter II). 
The region’s performance in developing these assets has 
been weak compared to the Asian developing countries, 
and this generates significant challenges for the expansion 
of manufacturing industries (Moreira, 2006). 
These issues highlight the importance of consistent 
and stable public policies for developing assets to ensure 
the competitiveness of production in the respective 
countries, an issue for which the Korean experience is 
an important reference point (see chapter III). Moreover, 
rather than an objective, FDI is an instrument in the 
process of creating production capacities. As discussed 
in chapter II, FDI attraction policies can contribute to 
maximizing this potential if applied in an integrated 
manner in keeping with each country’s development 
strategy.
D. OFDI and the trans-Latins
1. Outward foreign direct investment flows
In 2006 there was a significant increase in OFDI flows 
from the Latin American and Caribbean countries, which 
reached record levels (see figure I.15).46  The total OFDI 
of the countries of the region amounted to US$ 40.62 
billion, more than twice the level observed in 2005. 
The increase in OFDI in recent years is largely 
attributable to a small number of large transactions 
originating in just a few countries, sectors and enterprises. 
In 2006, significant transactions included the acquisition 
of the Canadian company Inco by the Brazilian firm 
CVRD. In the two previous years, the amount of OFDI 
had been influenced by the purchase of RMC by CEMEX 
(2005) and two transactions associated with the purchase 
of trans-Latins by TNCs (the incorporation of AmBev 
into the InBev group and the purchase of Bavaria by 
SABMiller).47 As part of the financing of the last two 
operations, the owners of the acquired firms received 
shares in the acquiring enterprise (in the case of AmBev, 
from InBev, the entity resulting from the merger). Those 
acquisitions therefore involved significant amounts of 





















 Data on OFDI have serious limitations. Whereas national records and surveys provide reasonably full coverage for FDI, many countries keep little 
or no record of OFDI data and often estimate levels using samples. For FDI, countries usually record capital invested, inter-company loans and 
reinvestments, while data on OFDI are often limited to capital investment. Mexico, which is one of the main investor countries, only began to record 
its outward investment in 2001, which explains the apparent increase in OFDI for that country and the region as a whole from that year.
47
 As part of the series of transactions that led to the creation of InBev, AmBev bought the Canadian Labatt and its controllers acquired shares in 
the merged company. The purchase of the Colombian Bavaria by SABMiller also involved the former controlling group buying shares in the 
purchaser’s company.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures as at 24 April 2007. 
a
  The figures do not include investments from the main financial centres. OFDI figures 
indicate outward investment by residents minus capital inflows generated by those 
investors.
The large scale of these operations has made for highly 
concentrated flows, which means that levels of OFDI and the 
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growth rates observed in 2006 will not be maintained over the 
next few years.48 Nonetheless, there is a clear upward trend in 
the outward investments of Latin American enterprises, and 
this should increasingly be reflected in official figures.
Figures from the 1990s show that Argentina and Chile 
were the main investor countries (taking into account the 
fact that Mexico began to publish OFDI data only as of 
2001, and in that year reported higher investment than 
the other two countries). In the more recent period, Brazil 
and Mexico have taken the lead (ECLAC, 2006a).
Table I.6
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET OFDI FLOWS,
MAIN INVESTOR COUNTRIES, 1992-2006
(Millions of dollars)
 1992- 1997- 2002-
 1996 a 2001 a 2006 a 2005 2006
Brazil 516 1 095 8 461 2 517 28 202
Mexico ... 881 3 389 6 474 3 897
Chile 726 2 220 1 697 2 209 2 797
Venezuela 
 (Bol. Rep. of) 400 639 1 247 1 183 2 089
Argentina  1 196 1 754 749 1 151 2 008
Colombia 205 412 1 539 4 662 1 098
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based 
on official figures as at 24 April 2007.
a
 Annual averages.
In 2006, Brazil was the top outward investor, followed 
by Mexico and Chile (see table I.6).49  In terms of GDP, 
the top investor in 2006 was Brazil, partly owing to the 
acquisition of Inco (Canada) by CVRD (Brazil) and a 
series of other acquisitions and investments by companies 
such as Itaú, Petrobras, Votorantim, Gerdau, Odebrecht, 
Camargo Corrêa, Weg and Marcopolo.
The second largest investor (in absolute terms) 
was Mexico, with operations concentrated in 
telecommunications, food and beverages, and cement. 
Chile, the second investor in terms of GDP and the third 
in absolute terms, made investments in retail trade and 
mining. In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, OFDI 
mirrored FDI inflows in the sense of being dominated by 
the hydrocarbons sector. PDVSA invested about US$ 1 
billion abroad in the form of reinvested profits but the 
company also sold assets abroad (shares in a United 
States refinery, see box I.6) for a similar amount. In the 
case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the main 
component of hydrocarbon investment abroad takes the 
form of PDVSA accounts receivable for petroleum sales 
to companies abroad (recorded as FDI). 
48
 Having said that, transactions such as the purchase of Rinker by CEMEX could bring OFDI flows to similar levels in 2007.
49
 Many of the region’s countries do not publish official OFDI figures. For these countries, data on FDI by Latin American and OECD country of 
origin suggest that Ecuador and Panama are the main investors. Similarly, official figures for Uruguay seem to significantly underestimate the 
FDI that other countries report as originating in Uruguay.
Box I.6
TRANS-LATINS IN THE HYDROCARBON SECTOR: PETROBRAS AND PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA SA (PDVSA) IN 2006
The hydrocarbons sector has played a significant 
part in OFDI from Brazil and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. Initially, internationalization 
was prompted by the level of oil supplies within 
these countries. Petrobras concentrated on 
natural-resource-seeking investments at a time of 
uncertainty surrounding Brazil’s domestic reserves, 
while PDVSA sought out petroleum refining and 
marketing channels in the main markets (United 
States and Europe). These strategies changed 
over time (ECLAC, 2006a).
Faced with new competitors in Brazil in 
the late 1990s, the management of Petrobras 
sought increasingly to diversify its markets and 
products; company’s directors transformed 
Petrobras into an integrated energy company, 
developed the gas market and entered refinery 
and distribution markets in other Latin American 
and Caribbean countries without neglecting the 
international expansion of its exploration and 
production activities.
In 2006, Petrobras continued this strategy 
of investing in exploration and production within 
and beyond Latin America and the Caribbean. 
In terms of distribution activities, Petrobras 
purchased Gaseba (Uruguay’s main natural 
gas distributor) from Gaz de France and also 
acquired Shell’s distribution assets in Colombia, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. In Uruguay, Petrobas 
had already bought the gas distribution company 
Conecta from the Spanish group Unión Fenosa. 
These acquisitions are yet another example of 
the tendency for trans-Latins to fill the gaps 
left by European companies in the services 
sector.a Petrobas is now entering a third phase 
of international expansion: it has consolidated 
large crude-oil production flows in Brazil and 
other countries, and begun to invest in refining 
near some of its main markets. With a view to 
increasing its Brazilian heavy crude refining 
capacity and adding value to its export products, 
it paid out US$ 370 million to purchase 50% of 
a refinery in Pasadena, Texas (in association 
with the Belgian Astra Oil) and invested US$ 500 
million in its modernization.b The company 
also made a bid for the Cartagena refinery 
in Colombia, but lost to the Swiss company 
Glencore. It then announced it was seeking 
opportunities in refining assets in Europe and 
Asia (probably Japan). 
Meanwhile, PDVSA has made a radical 
change to its internationalization policy. It has 
moved away from the United States market and 
closer to other Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, China, India and other developing 
countries. In 2006, the company sold the 
share of its subsidiary Citgo in a refinery in 
Houston, Texas, signed an agreement with 
Petrobras for the construction of a refinery in 
Brazil (in the framework of broader cooperation 
agreements), and began studies for buying a 
refinery in India. The company has invested in 
exploration and production in several countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean. It has 
also invested in the construction of a gas 
pipeline between Colombia and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. In the fuel distribution 
segment, PDVSA also bought the ANCAP 
share in Petrolera del Cono Sur (PCSA), 
which has a large network in Argentina. As 
a result of intergovernmental agreements, 
several targets have been set in terms of 
energy integration and cooperation between 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 
other countries in the region.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2005 (LC/G.2309-
P/E), Santiago, Chile, 2006; official websites: www.petrobras.com.br and www.pdv.vn; “Petrobras vai às compras na Ásia e Portugal”, Gazeta mercantil, 6 April 2006; 
“Petrobras investirá US$ 500 mi nos EUA”, Valor econômico, 6 April 2006; “Petrobras compra e se torna a 5ª no Uruguai”, Gazeta mercantil, 1 June 2006; “Petrobras 
conclui compra da uruguaia Gaseba”, Valor econômico, 1 June 2006; “Petrobras compra refinaria no Japão”, Gazeta mercantil, 14 September 2006.
a  Using a similar strategy, ENAP of Chile bought Shell’s distribution assets in Ecuador and Peru and invested in diversifying its sources of raw materials both within and 
outside the region.
b
  Brazil’s refinery facilities were mainly built before large volumes of petroleum began to be produced there. Previously, it was processing lighter petroleum from the Middle 
East, but the national production of large volumes of heavy oil means there is a deficit in the country’s refinery capacity in relation to its production of crude.
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As with FDI, much of the variation in the 
OFDI/GDP ratio from one year to another can be 













attributed to the effect of a few very large operations 
(see figure I.16).
Figure I.16
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF NET OFDI TO GDP, 2005-2006
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on 
official figures as at 24 April 2007.
2. Latin American and Caribbean OFDI from the viewpoint
 of trans-Latins and their strategies
The previous edition of this report contained an in-depth 
analysis of the strategies of trans-Latins (ECLAC, 2006a). 
This section covers some of the trends observed during 
2006 in the following sectors: (i) natural resources and 
natural-resource-based manufactures; (ii) mass consumer 
goods and services; and (iii) intermediate-technology 
manufactures. Each of these sectors has a different outward 
investment strategy in response to the competition patterns 
of each industry. All of the main acquisitions made during 
the year fit into one of these strategies (see table I.7). 
Table I.7
MAIN ACQUISITIONS BY TRANS-LATINS OUTSIDE THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, 2006 a
(Millions of dollars)
 Country of  Company Country of
Acquired by acquiring or assets company Announced Sector
 company acquired acquired value
Companhia Vale do  Brazil Inco Ltd. Canada 16 727 Mining
 Rio Doce
América Móvil Mexico Operations in Latin America  Dominican Republic, 3 700 Telecommunications
   and the Caribbean   Puerto Rico
Techint (Ternium) Argentina Hylsamex Mexico 2 581 Steel
Techint (Tenaris) Argentina Maverick United States 2 390 Steel
Telmex Mexico Embratel Brazil 812 Telecommunications
Companhia Vale do  Brazil Canico Resource Corp. Canada 678 Mining
 Rio Doce
Banco Itaú Brazil BankBoston Chile and Uruguay 650 Financial
Alfa Mexico Hydro Castings Germany, Austria,  545 Motor vehicle parts
   Hungary, Sweden
Interconexión  Colombia Companhia Paulista de Brazil 535 Electricity
 Eléctrica SA  Transmissão de Energia 
  Elétrica (CTEEP)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures provided by Bloomberg and press reports.
a
 The table includes transactions over assets which are located in Latin America and the Caribbean. It does not include internal reorganizations of corporate groups. The purchase 
of Rinker (Australia) by CEMEX (Mexico) is not included because it was not completed in 2006.
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(a) Natural resources and natural-resource-based 
manufactures: trans-Latins seek global leadership
The initial growth of many of the region’s major 
companies was based on exports of natural resources or 
natural-resource-based manufactures from their countries 
of origin. In recent years, these enterprises have managed 
to broaden and diversify their markets, products and 
the location of their assets by investing in production 
capacity and reserves abroad, thereby ensuring their 
own competitiveness and financial robustness (ECLAC, 
2006b). In this context, and in many cases owing to the 
high prices of their respective products, these companies 
have been involved in some of the main transactions 
and offers at the global level in 2006. Such operations 
are now part of a pattern of global competition based on 
scale, diversification and appropriate risk management 
for primary activities. 
In the case of hydrocarbons, the peculiarities of the 
market and the fact that the region’s main petroleum 
companies are State-owned has generated some unique 
experiences (see box I.6).
In the mining sector, the largest acquisition made by a 
trans-Latin (indeed one of the largest transnational acquisitions 
in the world) during 2006 was the purchase of the nickel 
mining company Inco (Canada) by CVRD (Brazil). This 
operation is part of the company’s strategy to diversify the 
location of its assets and its supply of mining products, in 
contrast with the strategies of other major Brazilian groups 
towards a growing diversification of activities (ECLAC, 
2006b). The acquisition of Inco brings down the percentage 
of CVRD mining reserves in Brazil from 98% to 60%, 
and the company is reducing its dependency on iron ore, 
which moved from 74% of sales in 2005 to 56% in 2006 
(Valor econômico, 2006f). By purchasing Inco, CVRD 
is intensifying its concentration on its main business of 
mining (see box I.7). In November 2005, in keeping with 
the move towards focusing on mining while diversifying 
geographically and in terms of products, the company 
purchased Canico Resource Corp. (a gold mining company 
in the United States) and made new investments in Latin 
America and Africa. Those new investments included coal 
production in Mozambique, where the company is expected 
to invest some US$ 2 billion. 
Box I.7
CONDITIONS PLACED ON THE ACQUISITION OF INCO BY CVRD
The Government of Canada approved 
the acquisition of the mining company 
Inco in Canada by Brazil’s CVRD, subject 
to some major conditions regarding the 
future running of the company. The legal 
basis for these conditions is the Investment 
Canada Act, which makes approval of 
acquisitions conditional upon the existence 
of net advantages for Canada, in terms 
of a transaction’s effects on the country’s 
level of economic activity, the participation 
by Canadians in the project, the effect of 
the investment on industrial output and 
productivity, its compatibility with national 
economic, industrial and cultural policy and 
its contribution to Canadian competitiveness. 
In this case, the government-imposed 
conditions on the transaction were that 
the buyer’s current and future nickel 
business management be transferred 
to Canada (under the new CVRD Inco); 
CVRD Inco’s global activities be managed 
from Toronto; Canadian executives remain 
in key positions; no employees be made 
redundant for at least three years; and that 
the workforce should never fall below 85% 
of current levels. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information obtained from the Official website www.cvrd.com.br; Investment 
Canada Act, 1985.
In other news of trans-Latin mining companies, 
Antofagasta Minerals (controlled by the Chilean Luksic 
group) made headway in its expansion beyond Latin 
America by gaining control of the Australian companies 
Tethyan (whose main assets are copper and gold reserves 
in Pakistan) and Equatorial. The company also announced 
long-term plans to invest between US$ 600 million and 
US$ 700 million in Pakistan and bought exploration licenses 
for that country from BHP Billiton. Within Latin America, 
the company signed a joint venture with AngloGold to 
explore copper and gold reserves in Colombia. 
As for iron and steel, CSN, Gerdau and Techint have 
all sought to take an active role in the new wave of steel-
sector consolidations at the global level. 
CSN, which owned 50% of Lusosider (Portugal), 
bought the remaining 50% from Corus. This transaction 
means that CSN can increase its exports of crude steel 
to Europe, using processing facilities in Portugal and 
selling products with higher value added while avoiding 
trade barriers to exports. This is along the same lines as 
previous CSN investments in the United States (ECLAC, 
2006b). However, CSN was unsuccessful in its two main 
endeavours of the year. It failed in its bid for Wheeling-
Pittsburgh in the United States and, following several 
months of offers and counter-offers in early 2007, lost 
out to Tata Steel in the battle for Corus Steel. 
The Brazilian company Gerdau, which by 2005 had a 
majority of its sales and capacity outside Brazil, purchased 
Sheffield Steel in the United States and GSB Acero in 
Spain. The purchase of Sheffield Steel provides entry to 
the long steel market in the south-west of the United States 
(Valor econômico, 2006g). As these acquisitions were 
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carried out by Gerdau-controlled companies in the United 
States and Spain, they do not necessarily affect Brazil’s 
OFDI flows. In Latin America, Gerdau gained control of 
Siderperú. Following the lead of other companies, Gerdau 
is also beginning to explore opportunities in China (Valor 
econômico, 2006h).
The Techint group’s production of flat and long 
steel is currently concentrated in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In 2006, the group (through its subsidiary 
Ternium) finalized the purchase of Hylsamex in Mexico, 
which had been announced in 2005. In the steel tubes 
market, the group has expanded into other regions through 
its subsidiary Tenaris. In 2006, the largest acquisition abroad 
by an Argentine company was the purchase by Tenaris of 
the Maverick Tube Corporation in the United States, for 
US$ 2.39 billion (and taking on US$ 700 million of debt). 
This transaction will facilitate access to the hydrocarbon 
exploration, production and transport market in the United 
States. Spurred on by the buoyancy of the petroleum sector, 
Tenaris also announced investments in a tube-finishing 
centre in China. Early in 2007, Tenaris purchased Hydril 
(a deep-water drilling valve and gauge manufacturer in 
the United States) for approximately US$ 2 billion, and 
Ternium acquired control of the steel firm IMSA in Mexico 
for approximately US$ 3.2 billion. 
In the cement market, CEMEX is one of the top three 
global operators, along with Lafarge and Holcim. After 
doubling in size by buying RMC in the United Kingdom 
during its last major expansion in 2005 (ECLAC, 2006a), 
the company geared up for further expansion in 2006. The 
new target of CEMEX was Rinker (Australia), for which 
it made an offer of US$ 12.062 billion in October 2006. 
The transaction was approved in April 2007 for an amount 
of US$ 14.627 billion. Rinker is in one of the world’s 10 
largest construction materials companies, with operations 
in Australia and the United States (Expansión, 2006d). 
CEMEX is also exploring the possibility of entering the 
Chinese market (Financial Times, 2006c).50 
Besides CEMEX, smaller companies in the region 
have been investing in cement and concrete manufacturers, 
especially in the United States. In 2006, the Colombian 
firm Argos purchased two major cement manufacturers in 
the United States (Ready Mixed Concrete and Southern 
Star) for a total of US$ 680 million, in addition to buying 
the smaller Concrete Express. Cementos de Chihuahua 
(GCC) of Mexico purchased Mid-Continent Concrete Co. 
and Alliance Transportation Inc. for US$ 271 million, and 
announced the construction of new production plants in 
the United States. 
In summary then, these global players in natural resources 
and natural-resource-based manufactures have made good 
use of the financial opportunities offered by the international 
environment by successfully handling risk and borrowing to 
consolidate their global positions while deploying an aggressive 
acquisitions strategy. Thanks to the competitive advantages 
of the natural resources in their markets of origin, they have 
progressed from being exporters to global producers. 
(b) Mass consumer goods and services: market-
seeking within and beyond Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
A second category of investment involves trans-Latins 
using competitive advantages acquired in their countries of 
origin to expand into markets where competition is focused 
on reaching the final consumer: mass consumer goods 
and services. The success of these companies in seeking 
markets is attributable to a combination of competitive 
advantages relating to knowledge of regional consumption 
patterns (in some cases the Hispanic community in the 
United States) and the fact that they operate in economic 
and regulatory environments that share some common 
features (ECLAC, 2006b). There are two characteristics 
that define the recent internationalization of Latin American 
companies in these sectors.
First, some trans-Latins have expanded in markets in 
the region with strong TNC presence. The integration of 
AmBev and Bavaria into transnational groups in 2004 and 
2005, respectively, raised the question of whether trans-Latins 
could survive in the face of competition from such major 
international groups, who were attracted by the penetration 
of these companies within the region, among other factors. 
In 2006, the acquisition of Banistmo by HSBC followed 
a similar logic (see box I.3). Nevertheless, in contrast 
with that trend and as mentioned previously, the year was 
also marked by the expansion of trans-Latins, which in 
some cases took over market shares previously occupied 
by TNCs. In the services sector, América Móvil bought 
Verizon’s assets in the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, 
while the Itaú bank purchased Bank of America assets in 
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, and the petroleum companies 
Petrobras and ENAP acquired Shell fuel-distribution assets 
in a number of countries (see box I.5). The managers of 
Chilean retail chains have also taken measures to face 
up to competition from major global chains (Calderón, 
2006). Having consolidated their position in Argentina and, 
increasingly, in Peru, during 2006 these companies began 
to invest strongly in the Colombian market. As mentioned 
50
 CEMEX sold its 24.9% share of Semen Gresik in Indonesia following a dispute with that country’s government over the purchase of additional 
shares in the company. The case was brought before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
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previously, FEMSA has invested in capturing the Brazilian 
market, where it faces stiff competition from TNCs in sales 
of soft drinks and beer.
The second trend observed in these markets during 
2006 is an expansion into new destinations outside the 
region. For a long time, Mexican companies have been 
using their regional competitive advantages in the Hispanic 
market within the United States. In 2006, Banorte (Mexico) 
purchased 70% of the bank INB (United States) for US$ 259 
million and, in early 2007, bought the money transfer 
firm UniTeller (also of the United States). América Móvil 
also expressed possible interest in the North American 
market, where it is currently active only in the sector of 
prepaid telephone cards. The company also began to show 
interest in Europe, as suggested by the announcements of 
possible negotiations to acquire Telecom Italia (The Wall 
Street Journal Americas, 2007). In terms of manufactures, 
Mexican firms are expanding even further. In 2006, the 
food companies Bimbo and Gruma, which were already 
strong players in Latin America, the United States and 
Europe, began investing in Asia. Bimbo purchased the 
Chinese operations of the Spanish firm Pan Rico (Valor 
econômico, 2006i). Gruma bought Rositas Investments 
in Australia and invested in food production projects in 
China and Japan, costing an estimated US$ 200 million 
(Latin Trade, 2006b).51
Most of the manufacturing companies in this group are 
Mexican. The exception is the Peruvian firm Ajegroup. In 
addition to its above-mentioned regional investments, the 
group has also launched operations in Thailand, helped along 
by the similarity between the two markets in terms of per 
capita production costs and consumption, plus advances in 
the opening up of bilateral trade between the two countries 
that facilitate the export of packaged and prepared goods 
from Peru (Agenda Empresarial, 2006). 
(c) Medium-technology manufactures: trans-Latins 
seeking efficiency
In sectors where the comparative advantage of trans-
Latins is unrelated to the availability of natural resources, 
such as medium-technology manufactures (motor vehicle 
parts, vehicles, white goods, white goods components, 
engines, etc.), there is a tendency to increase production 
close to main markets or in third countries with low costs 
and proximity or good access to those markets. Many of 
the investment by trans-Latins in these sectors have been 
directed outside of Latin America and the Caribbean.
In terms of motor vehicles and parts, the main 
investments were motivated by proximity to customers, 
the benefits for the development of products and solutions 
and the need to avoid trade barriers. In 2006, Nemak 
(part of the Alfa group) announced the construction of 
a new production plant in China and the expansion of 
its European operations. The company, which already 
had plants in North America and Mexico, made several 
investments in automotive parts abroad. It extended 
its aluminium-head and car-engine plant in the Czech 
Republic. The company also purchased operations of the 
high-technology aluminium-component manufacturer 
TK Aluminum in China, North America and South 
America, and then integrated those operations with the 
European plants of Hydro Castings (which it purchased 
from Norsk Hydro) in Austria, Germany, Hungary and 
Sweden. The Brazilian company Marcopolo launched 
a project with Tata Motors (see box I.2) to supply the 
Indian market (Valor econômico, 2006j). This operation 
means that the company can avoid high import tariffs 
and transport costs, while benefiting from the strength 
of a major local chassis producer and distributor in the 
promising Indian market.
Other motivations include more efficient production 
conditions to satisfy market needs traditionally met 
through exports. The main example is a group of Brazilian 
companies that began to invest abroad when currency 
appreciation damaged their export competitiveness. 
The case of Marcopolo, referred to above, was 
examined in the previous edition of this report. It began 
its process of internationalization in the form of assembly 
operations for Brazilian-produced automotive parts. 
The company is slowly transforming and has begun 
to produce parts closer to destination markets to avoid 
the risks of exchange-rate volatility and trade barriers 
(ECLAC, 2006a). In 2006, other companies followed 
the same trend. Metalfrio set up a refrigerator factory in 
Turkey to supply the European market, abandoning its 
earlier plans to transform its headquarters in Brazil into 
an export platform. Weg, a producer of industrial engines 
and transformers, purchased shares in a transformer 
company in Mexico, with which it also carried out a joint 
venture to supply the North American market as part of 
its strategy to increase production in other countries. 
Lastly, the automotive part manufacturer Sabó began 
construction of a factory in the United States, with a 
view to increasing local production for the United States 
automobile industry while reducing exports from Brazil 
(Valor econômico, 2006k, 2006l, 2006m). 
These trends show the capacity of Latin American 
companies to make use of their competitive advantages 
in a market based on combining cost with technology. 
51
 Televisa made an unsuccessful bid for control of Univision, the most watched Spanish-language television chain in the United States, and is 
seeking other ways of expanding into that market (Expansión, 2007b).
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At the same time, in some cases the outward investment 
seems to be partly associated with shortcomings in the 
domestic business environment that lead firms to diversify 
the location of their assets and seek protection against 
instability factors such as exchange-rate volatility. This 
stresses the importance of developing attractive local 
production features that go beyond low labour costs or the 
local market, and improving the business climate.
3. Conclusions
In summary, recent investments by the trans-Latins have 
been motivated by forces that differ according to the 
competition patterns of their respective sectors: the need to 
maintain a leading position in the natural resources sector; 
opportunities to explore competitive advantages in new 
markets; and the need to ensure competitive production 
conditions to ward off threats to export competitiveness. 
Most of the increase in OFDI is concentrated in a small 
number of companies and sectors. It remains to be seen 
whether this investor base will expand, to what extent 
and with what consequences for home countries.
For the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
in general, these companies are a potential new source 
of investment. In each individual country of origin, the 
increased international integration of local companies 
generates positive feedback, including direct effects on 
company growth, increased investment capacity for local 
operations, improved management skills and greater exposure 
to international levels of competition and best practices.
Nevertheless, the increasing capacity of local companies 
to internationalize their production also highlights the 
problems that prevent them from operating competitively 
in their countries of origin. These factors include the loss of 
advantages related to cheap labour, currency appreciation, 
risks created by macroeconomic, regulatory or political 
factors, and the effects these have on capital cost. In this 
regard, public policy geared to productive development 
must seek not only to attract foreign investment but also 
to broaden the range of activities that can be conducted 
competitively in each country. 
E. General conclusions
In 2006 net FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 
reflected a continuation of the period of stability that 
followed the sharp decline observed in the early part of 
the decade. Such growth is, to a great extent, the result 
of good macroeconomic performance in preceding years 
and high commodity prices, which boosted inflows of 
FDI seeking markets and natural resources, respectively. 
Efficiency-seeking operations, mainly in Mexico and the 
Caribbean basin, face challenging times due to growing 
competition from other regions and changes in market 
access conditions for the products involved.
Although the figures are stable in absolute terms, 
the relative share of Latin America and the Caribbean in 
global FDI inflows has fallen. Data on the presence of 
transnational corporations among the largest companies 
in the region and the nature of the main transnational 
acquisitions suggest a loss of interest on the part of 
some traditional investors from the United States and 
Europe, although this has been partly offset by the entry 
of new investors. There has been no surge in strategic 
asset-seeking investments. Some contributing factors to 
this may be shortcomings in the business environment 
and slow advances in terms of skilled workforce and 
logistic, scientific and technological infrastructure. The 
region would have greater success with more active and 
integrated FDI policies (see chapter II). 
There is growing demand for a greater share in the 
benefits generated by FDI, especially from investments 
in the extraction of natural resources. Improving the local 
distribution of these benefits is a major challenge for the 
region’s policymakers and, in addition to regulatory changes, 
will require human resources and business capacity to 
be developed in order to take advantage of the potential 
profits from the operations of foreign companies.
As for OFDI from the region’s countries, volumes 
continue to rise. This is attributable to a combination of 
the following factors: (i) large transactions in the natural 
resources sector and natural-resource-based manufactures 
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by enterprises which export worldwide and are seeking 
asset bases so that they can continue competing with major 
operators, mainly outside the region; (ii) market-seeking 
investment in consumer services, food and beverages 
concentrated in the region but increasingly gaining 
ground in North America, Europe and Asia; and (iii) a 
move towards efficiency-seeking and market-seeking 
investment for medium-technology manufactures, also 
outside the region. This increased investment abroad 
reflects the capacity of local groups to react to pull factors 
on the world market. Nonetheless, higher investment 
is also a reflection of negative factors in local business 
environments and trade imbalances. 
The public-policy implications of FDI and OFDI 
trends run along similar lines: the business environment, 
macroeconomic climate and local capacities (human capital, 
supplier base, science and technology infrastructure) 
must all be improved not only in order to attract foreign 
investment but also to ensure that the internationalization of 
local companies’ production is based on their competitive 
advantages, thereby complementing and contributing to 
industrial development in their countries of origin.
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Annex
 Latin America and the Caribbean: main characteristics of foreign
 direct investment in 2006, by country
Argentina
In Argentina, net inflows of FDI fell by 4% in 2006 
compared with 2005, to stand at US$ 4.809 billion. The 
balance of payment figures show a strong increase in 
reinvestment (from 13% in 2005 to 47% in 2006) and 
in inter-company loans, while there was a reduction in 
the share of FDI in transnational acquisitions and equity 
investments (INDEC, 2007). 
According to the investment database of the Production 
Research Centre (CEP), the value of investment projects 
announced by foreign firms in the first nine months of 
2006 was 6% higher than for the whole of 2005. The 
same database shows the main investor countries to 
be Spain (27% of total investment), the United States 
(21%) and Brazil (17%). Capital-formation investment 
projects accounted for 61% of the total (compared with 
72% the previous year), with acquisitions representing 
the remaining 39%. The main destination sectors of 
capital-formation investments were infrastructure and 
industry (ADI, 2006).
Flows of OFDI rose by 74% in 2006, to stand at 
US$ 2.008 billion. 
In terms of investment-attraction policy, 2006 saw 
the investment promotion system strengthened thanks to 
budgetary and operational improvements at the Investment 
Development Agency, followed by the official establishment 
of the new National Investment Development Agency, 
with enhanced authority, instruments and budgetary 
independence. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela recorded 
negative net FDI inflows of US$ 543 million in 2006, 
in sharp contrast to the previous year’s positive figure 
of over US$ 2.583 billion. These outflows were mainly 
attributable to transactions between foreign companies in 
the hydrocarbon sector and PDVSA. Between 2003 and 
2004, PDVSA did not published its financial accounts, thus 
preventing the distribution of profits among the foreign 
participants in strategic partnerships set up to operate in the 
Orinoco Belt. In 2005 and 2006 these financial accounts 
were published and the distributed profits were recorded 
as US$ 3.258 billion worth of disinvestment. Plans to 
nationalize the energy, mining and telecommunications 
sectors could have a negative effect on FDI inflows.
According to information from the Venezuelan Council 
for Investment Promotion (CONAPRI, 2007), non-petroleum 
and non-financial investment fell from US$ 629 million 
in the first three quarters of 2005 to US$ 76 million in the 
same period of 2006. The main investors were Colombia, 
Panama and the United States. The main recipient sectors 
were manufactures, commerce and construction (CONAPRI, 
2007). Many of the groups investing in the country are 
from the tourism sector: Pestana (Portugal), Decameron 
(Colombia) Embassy Suites (United States) and Hesperia 
(Spain) (CONAPRI, 2006).
As far as OFDI is concerned, the US$ 2.089 billion 
recorded in 2006 was also the result of PDVSA transactions. 
That company invested around US$ 1 billion abroad in 
the form of reinvested profit, while also selling assets 
abroad (a stake in a United States refinery) for a similar 
amount. Accounts receivable by PDVSA for petroleum 
sales to companies abroad, which are considered as FDI, 
are the main component of the country’s OFDI in the 
hydrocarbons sector (information from the Central Bank 
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).
Bolivia
In Bolivia, net FDI inflows went from a negative 
balance of US$ 242 million in 2005 to a positive balance 
of US$ 237 million in 2006. Data on gross inward FDI 
show stable flows to the hydrocarbon sector and increased 
investment of around US$ 68 million (37%) in mining. 
The difference in liquid flows is mainly attributable to 
lower disinvestment in 2006 than in 2005. According 
to the Central Bank of Bolivia (2007), disinvestment 
in the first nine months of 2006 corresponds entirely to 
loan amortizations by resident companies to their parent 
companies abroad. 
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Brazil
In Brazil, net inflows of FDI stood at US$ 18.782 
billion in 2006, which is 25% higher than the previous 
year. This is due to the combined effect of higher inflows 
and lower disinvestment. Some 55% of net inflows went to 
the services sector, especially to financial intermediation 
and electricity, gas and water. Industry received 39%, 
particularly the metallurgy (including iron and steel) and 
paper and pulp sectors, which were up considerably on 
2005. In the primary sector, which accounted for 7% of 
inflows, the dominant segments were hydrocarbons and 
mining. The main countries investing in shareholdings 
in Brazil were the United States, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland (Central Bank of Brazil, 2007). Switzerland 
was particularly significant in the purchase of the Pactual 
bank by UBS.
The main new development in 2006 is that outward 
foreign direct investment (OFDI) overtook net FDI inflows 
for the first time, at US$ 28.202 billion (see figure I-A-1). 
The purchase of the Canadian mining company Inco by 
CVRD (for US$ 16.727 billion) was a major factor in that 
result. In fact, 62.9% of Brazil’s external investments in 
shareholdings were in the mining sector.
Figure I-A-1
BRAZIL: INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)
AND OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT (OFDI), 1990-2006
(Billions of dollars)
by mining and transport and communications. The main 
investors were Canada (54%), United States (11%) 
and Australia (6%). These data refer to gross inflows 
of FDI and are strongly influenced by the purchase of 
92% of Transelec, with control of the company passing 
from one group of Canadian investors to another. That 
transaction reflects the large roles of the electricity sector 
and of Canada, but should not have a strong effect on 
net investment flows to Chile, in which mining is likely 
to be the dominant sector. 
Chile’s OFDI amounted to US$ 2.797 billion in 
2006, 27% higher than in 2005. Retail commerce is 
one of the main sectors of Chilean OFDI. Data from 
the General Directorate for International Economic 
Affairs (DIRECON) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Chile show that Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Peru 
received 80% of Chilean OFDI realized between 1990 
and 2006. The Santiago Chamber of Commerce predicts 
that US$ 3.0 billion will be invested in this sector outside 
Chile between 2006 and 2009 (Santiago Chamber of 
Commerce, 2006a, 2006b). 
Colombia
Colombia posted net inflows of FDI totalling 
US$ 6.295 billion in 2006, a steep fall compared to the 
figure of US$ 10.255 billion in 2005, due mainly to the 
purchase of the Bavaria brewery by SABMiller. Taking 
into account only the first three quarters of 2005 (Bavaria 
was purchased in the fourth quarter), FDI to Colombia 
in 2006 was up 25% on the previous year, thanks to a 
positive international environment for the exploitation 
of natural resources, national growth, macroeconomic 
stability, improved security conditions and an increasingly 
FDI-friendly regime (Proexport, 2006a). In 2006, FDI was 
mainly channelled into mining and hydrocarbons, which 
accounted for 60% of net flows received (data from the 
Bank of the Republic). 
As in the case of FDI inflows, the decline of Colombia’s 
outward investment to US$ 1.098 in 2006 is due to the 
unusually high levels recorded in 2005 when SABMiller 
purchased Bavaria. Part of the compensation to the owners 
took the form of shares, which were recorded in the balance 
of payments as an outward investment from Colombia. 
Taking into account the first three quarters only and thereby 
excluding the sale of Bavaria, Colombia’s OFDI increased 
considerably during 2006. According to data from the Bank 
of the Republic, the manufactures sector and electricity, 
gas and water were the main destinations for Colombia’s 
outward foreign direct investment in 2006.
In terms of FDI attraction policies, the foreign 
investment promotion agency Coinvertir closed at the 
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Foreign investment in Brazil Brazilian investment abroad
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Brazil as at 24 April 2007. 
Chile
In Chile, net FDI inflows amounted to US$ 8.053 
billion in 2006, which is 16% higher than the previous 
year. Reinvestments have risen constantly since 1999, 
and represent a large proportion of the country’s FDI 
inflows. Figures from the Foreign Investment Committee 
(2006) indicate that the main destination sectors for FDI 
during 2006 were electricity, gas and water, followed 
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infrastructure abroad has been fundamental for the 
adoption of a more proactive strategy. The entry into 
force of the free-trade agreement with the United States 
should attract investors seeking access to the Colombian 
market as an export platform for manufactures (Valor 
econômico, 2006n; Proexport, 2006b). 
Costa Rica
Net inflows of FDI for 2006 stood at US$ 1.436 
billion, which is 67% higher than the 2005 figure 
(Central Bank of Costa Rica, 2007). Preliminary 
estimates suggest that the main recipients of FDI 
in 2006 were industry, the property sector and the 
financial sector, which combine to account for 78% 
of total flows. The sectors that recorded the highest 
growth were the financial sector and tourism. Within 
the industrial sector, investments were recorded in 
medical equipment and electronics (including Intel’s 
US$ 80 million expansion). Reports by the Costa Rican 
Coalition for Development Initiatives (CINDE) and 
the Inter-agency Group on Foreign Direct Investment 
emphasize the elevated level of FDI growth in high-
technology sectors, both in terms of manufactures and 
services (electronics, medical equipment and information 
technology services) (CINDE, 2006, 2007; Inter-agency 
Group on Foreign Direct Investment, 2007). The main 
countries of origin of FDI (not including the property 
sector) were the United States and Canada, followed 
by Colombia and El Salvador. 
As far as Costa Rica’s outward investment is 
concerned, OFDI flows amounted to US$ 96 million, 
compared with the US$ 105 million recorded in 
2005.
Dominican Republic
In the Dominican Republic, FDI flows reached 
US$ 1.183 billion in 2006, 16% higher than the previous 
year. Investment was boosted by a growth rate of around 
10% (ECLAC, 2006b). The main sectors of attraction for 
FDI in 2006 were tourism and telecommunications. Spain 
and the United States were the main sources.
Ecuador
FDI inflows to Ecuador in 2006 amounted to US$ 2.087 
billion, 27% higher than in 2005. Some 88% of FDI was 
channelled into the mining and quarrying sector, mostly 
hydrocarbons. Investment in this sector was 26% higher 
than the previous year. The main investor countries in 
2006 were Canada and the United States (data from the 
Central Bank of Ecuador). 
El Salvador
Net FDI inflows to El Salvador amounted to US$ 204 
million in 2006. Although this represents a fall in comparison 
with earlier years, information on projects which have 
been announced promises good prospects for a recovery 
in FDI. In 2005, the country received US$ 517 million, 
with an average of US$ 357 million between 2001 and 
2005. Although most foreign investment is channelled into 
the clothing sector, there has also been a diversification 
towards other sectors, such as vehicle parts and electronics, 
software development, telecommunications, business 
process outsourcing and distribution and call centres. The 
year 2006 saw the entry into force of the Tourism Act, 
which offers fiscal incentives for investment in tourism. 
The completed construction of the Puerto de la Unión 
and the expansion of the international airport’s freight 
terminal are expected to encourage new investment. The 
United States was the largest source of investment in 
2006, although flows from other countries in the region 
(Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, and Panama) were also 
significant (Proesa, 2006). 
El Salvador generated OFDI of US$ 50 million. The 
country was one of the main investor countries of Central 
America, channelling resources into air transport, hotels 
and real estate, especially within the region.
Guatemala
Inflows of FDI to Guatemala are estimated at US$ 325 
million in 2006. Data from the Central Bank show that 
investment was directed mainly at the communications, 
commerce and chemicals sectors. Information on acquisitions 
and investment projects suggests that the electricity, tourism 
and banking services sectors also received inflows.
Honduras
The Central Bank of Honduras reports net FDI inflows 
of US$ 385 million for 2006, plus about US$ 110 million for 
the maquila sector. Within maquila operations, investment 
is concentrated in the textiles sector and is mainly from 
the United States. In response to the challenge of Chinese 
competition and the prospect of CAFTA-DR, Honduras has 
begun to shift the industry towards more vertically integrated 
operations that encompass from thread production to the 
end product. Nonetheless, estimates for the first half of 
2006 suggest a decline in investment in the maquila sector. 
Apart from maquila activities, the main destination sector 
for FDI in the first half of 2006 was telecommunications 
(44.5%), followed by manufacturing, in the milling, 
paper and cement sectors. The financial sector received 
12.2% of non-maquila investment. The main investors 
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outside the maquila sector in the first half of 2006 were 
the United States (with 73.8% of the total), followed by 
Central America (17.1%) and Europe with 12.1% (mainly 
from Switzerland and the United Kingdom). There was 
disinvestment from Bahamas-based companies, owing 
to repayments on business credit and loans. 
Honduran OFDI amounted to US$ 22 million in 2006, 
and consisted of investments in commerce, industry and 
finance, mostly within Central America. El Salvador is 
the main destination of such investment (Central Bank 
of Honduras, 2006).
Mexico
In Mexico, inflows of FDI in 2006 stood at US$ 18.939 
billion, approximately 4% below the 2005 figure. According 
to data from the Secretariat of Economic Affairs, the largest 
component of these flows was new investments, followed 
by inter-company accounts, profit reinvestment, maquila 
investment (maquila companies using foreign investment 
to import fixed assets) and mergers and acquisitions. 
There was a decline in the volume of new investments 
and acquisitions. Levels of investment and reinvestment 
in the maquila sector remained relatively stable (up by 
5% and 7%, respectively) while inter-company account 
movement increased. Investment remained concentrated 
in manufactures (61.3% of net inflows), with the main 
segments being metal products, machinery and equipment. 
Commerce chalked up considerably lower flows in 2006 
then in previous years, which is largely due to the purchase 
of Carrefour assets by the local Chedraui group (announced 
in 2005), resulting in negative FDI flows to this sector. In 
terms of the sources of investment, the United States was 
the main investor country, followed by the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom and Spain (Secretariat of Economic 
Affairs, 2006, 2007a). 
Mexico’s OFDI amounted to US$ 3.897 billion, 
significantly below the 2004 and 2005 figures. The 
reduction is the result of a year that featured no major 
transactions, unlike 2005, when CEMEX acquired RMC. 
In addition, there were investment withdrawals, such as 
that of CEMEX from Indonesia.
Nicaragua
In Nicaragua, net FDI inflows are estimated at 
US$ 290 million in 2006, 20% higher than the previous 
year. Information on investment projects suggests that the 
United States was the top investor, with the main sectors 
being retail trade and clothing. The country also has new 
investment opportunities in hydrocarbons and biofuels. 
In January 2006, the country announced the setting 
up of an inter-agency group to monitor foreign investment 
and private capital. The group includes the Central Bank 
of Nicaragua, the Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Commerce and the Supreme Council of Private Enterprise, 
and will carry out surveys to compile private-sector 
information used to produce the balance of payments 
(Central Bank of Nicaragua, 2006).
Panama
In Panama, FDI flows were US$ 2.56 billion, almost 
three times the 2005 figure. FDI has surged since 2003, 
following a decline between 1997 and 2002 which was 
partly due to the end of the cycle of privatizations and 
management concessions, the closure of some banks after 
1999 and banking losses in 2002, and the transformation of 
the Canal Commission into a domestic enterprise in 2000. 
Much of the upturn in 2006 is linked to the acquisition of 
Banistmo and other Panama-based banks. Other significant 
sectors in 2006 were infrastructure, property and tourism. 
The widening of the Panama Canal, approved by referendum 
in October 2006, should have a significant impact on FDI 
in the coming years (data from the Comptroller-General 
of the Republic (2006), and the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Finance (2006a, 2006b).
Information on the origin of FDI received in other 
countries shows that Panama is one of the region’s main 
investors, which is partly a reflection of its position as a 
financial centre.
Paraguay
In Paraguay, net FDI stood at US$ 87 million as of 
the third quarter of 2006, close to the figure for the same 
period in 2005. There was a steep fall in shareholding 
investments and a rise in FDI in respect of reinvested 
profits and inter-company loans. The largest investors 
were the United States and Brazil.
In terms of investment promotion, in December 
2006 the responsibilities of the trade and investment 
promotion agency Proparaguay were incorporated into 
the Investment and Export Network (REDIEX), which 
is part of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, with a 
view to rationalizing the use of available resources. New 
offices will soon be opening abroad (www.rediex.gov.py, 
22 January 2007).
Peru
In Peru, net inflows of FDI represented US$ 3.467 
billion, 34% more than the previous year, thanks to high 
growth rates and an international context favourable to the 
country’s mining and hydrocarbon production (information 
from the Central Reserve Bank of Peru). The FDI stock 
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in the petroleum sector has not changed since 2002. 
This does not include investment in gas development 
projects (such as Camisea), however. Another factor is 
that hydrocarbon investments can be classified according 
to specific activities (transport, services, construction).
Data from the Private Investment Promotion Agency 
(PROINVERSIÓN) show that the countries investing 
most in Peru in 2006 were the United Kingdom and the 
United States, and the main recipient sectors were mining 
and manufactures.
Uruguay 
In Uruguay, 2006 saw inflows of US$ 1.374 billion 
in FDI, 62% higher than the 2005 figure. Much of the 
increase is due to investments in the paper and cellulose 
sector. According to the Central Bank, 17% of FDI received 
went to the banking sector and 22% to the property sector 
(Central Bank of Uruguay, 2007). 
Net OFDI amounted to a negative US$ 2.83 
million.
Table I-A-1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY COUNTRY, 1997-2006
(Millions of dollars)
 1992-1996
 (annual 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 average)
Anguilla 17 21 28 38 40 30 33 29 87 78 ...
Antigua and Barbuda 22 23 23 32 43 98 66 166 77 114 ...
Argentina  4 683 9 160 7 291 23 988 10 418 2 166 2 149 1 652 4 584 5 008 4 809
Bahamas 49 210 147 149 250 102 153 190 274 360 ...
Barbados 12 15 16 17 19 19 17 58 -12 62 ...
Belize 16 12 18 54 23 61 25 -11 112 126 153
Bolivia 243 731 949 1 011 734 703 674 195 63 -242 237
Brazil 4 497 19 650 31 913 28 576 32 779 22 457 16 590 10 144 18 146 15 067 18 782
Chile 2 465 5 271 4 628 8 761 4 860 4 200 2 550 4 307 7 173 6 960 8 053
Colombia 1 443 5 562 2 829 1 508 2 395 2 525 2 139 1 758 3 084 10 255 6 295
Costa Rica 307 408 613 619 409 460 659 575 617 861 1 436
Cuba 16 442 207 178 448  ... ... ... ... ...
Dominica 26 21 7 18 18 15 18 29 24 26 ...
Ecuador 436 724 870 648 720 1 330 1 275 1 555 1 160 1 646 2 087
El Salvador 13 59 1 104 216 173 279 470 142 376 517 204
Grenada 20 34 49 42 37 59 54 89 54 26 ...
Guatemala 91 84 673 155 230 456 111 131 155 208 325
Guyana 91 52 44 46 67 56 44 26 30 77 
Haiti 1 4 11 30 13 4 6 14 6 26 160 a
Honduras 50 122 99 237 282 193 176 247 325 372 385
Jamaica 136 203 369 524 468 614 481 721 602 682 ...
Mexico 8 724 14 180 12 416 13 704 17 776 27 487 19 342 15 345 22 301 19 643 18 939
Montserrat 4 3 3 8 2 1 1 2 2 1 ...
Nicaragua 62 203 218 337 267 150 204 201 250 241 290
Panama 271 1 299 1 203 864 624 467 99 771 1 012 1 027 2 560
Paraguay 116 236 342 95 104 84 10 25 28 75 117 a
Peru 2 000 2 139 1 644 1 940 810 1 144 2 156 1 335 1 599 2 579 3 467
Dominican Republic 217 421 700 1 338 953 1 079 917 613 909 1 023 1 183
Saint Kitts and Nevis 19 20 32 58 96 88 80 76 46 47 ...
Saint Lucia 32 48 83 83 54 59 52 106 80 108 ...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 33 92 89 57 38 21 34 55 66 56 ...
Suriname -27 -9 9 -62 -148 -27 -74 -76 -37 -37 -144 b
Trinidad and Tobago 346 999 730 643 680 835 791 808 998 940 883
Uruguay 110 126 164 235 273 297 194 416 332 847 1 374
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 996 6 202 4 985 2 890 4 701 3 683 782 2 040 1 483 2 583 -543
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 24 April 2007.
a
  Extrapolated from third-quarter data.
b
  Extrapolated from data for the first half of the year.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)60
Table I-A-2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT BY DESTINATION SECTOR, 1997-2006
(Percentages)
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Argentina  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ... ...
Natural resources 2 18 74 26 41 53 -17 53 ... ...
Manufactures 36 16 8 14 2 46 69 29 ... ...
Services 53 50 13 46 58 -21 33 3 ... ...
Other 9 16 4 14 -2 23 15 16 ... ...
Bolivia  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources 38 57 47 53 65 72 63 44 71 82
Manufactures 3 2 15 11 10 9 11 23 14 11
Services 59 42 38 36 26 19 26 33 14 7
Brazil 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources 3 1 2 2 7 3 12 5 10 7
Manufactures 13 12 25 17 33 40 35 53 30 39
Services 84 88 73 81 60 56 54 42 60 55
Chile 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources 34 42 15 12 23 59 31 8 39 37
Manufactures 12 9 9 8 16 6 18 9 10 3
Services 54 49 76 80 61 34 50 83 51 60
Colombia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources 12 3 -3 5 42 42 53 57 32 60
Manufactures 9 28 34 21 10 15 18 8 54 11
Services 78 69 70 73 49 43 29 35 14 29
Costa Rica 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources 9 7 8 -3 0 -1 -6 6 4 3
Manufactures 68 72 59 75 51 74 69 57 43 31
Services 22 21 32 27 48 28 37 36 52 65
Other 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Ecuador 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources 78 88 93 95 86 84 56 81 90 89
Manufactures 6 3 1 1 4 4 5 3 4 3
Services 16 8 5 4 10 11 39 15 6 8
El Salvador   100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources   -7 -6 11 4 -1 5 0 12
Manufactures   10 30 32 27 92 18 76 7
Services   98 77 57 69 9 77 24 82
Honduras 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources 6 3 47 11 5 13 9 11 6 2
Manufactures 41 24 20 63 43 40 51 53 48 45
Services 53 73 33 27 52 47 39 36 46 53
Mexico 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources 1 1 2 2 0 2 1 1 0 1
Manufactures 60 60 67 56 21 45 44 57 58 61
Services 39 39 32 43 79 54 56 42 42 38
Nicaragua 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ...
Natural resources 14 16 8 3 4 0 0 0 0 ...
Manufactures 8 13 11 27 37 34 24 13 36 ...
Services 78 71 81 70 59 66 76 86 64 ...
Panama 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ... ...
Natural resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ... ...
Manufactures 3 -3 5 0 68 -77 0 4 ... ...
Services 99 108 98 63 46 100 79 99 ... ...
Other -2 -5 -3 37 -14 77 20 -3 ... ...
Peru 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources 9 20 21 1 8 11 3 87 88 56
Manufactures 20 16 9 3 21 38 73 -38 2 33
Services 72 63 70 96 71 51 24 51 10 11
Dominican Republic 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 7 3 2
Manufactures 51 25 17 21 22 29 21 40 36 25
Services 49 70 80 71 74 68 58 47 55 60
Other 0 4 4 9 3 3 9 -2 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ... ...
Natural resources  80 70 90 94 98 88 89 ... ...
Manufactures  2 1 -6 -2 2 1 2 ... ...
Services 0 2 3 0 4 5 1 5 ... ...
Other  16 26 15 4 5 7 4 ... ...
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Natural resources 54 36 68 26 59 67 0 -35 34 -356 a
Manufactures 21 48 17 22 14 -22 14 157 28 146
Services 25 16 15 51 31 55 36 27 38 110
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 16 April 2007.
a
 Refers to negative net flows in the petroleum sector, totalling US$ 1.958 billion.
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Table I-A-3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1996-2006
(Percentages)
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
           
Argentina 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ... ... 100
Netherlands 19 15 2 4 60 -20 -10 23 ... ... 9
United States 22 13 5 9 25 16 -15 14 ... ... 11
France 2 18 6 6 24 -29 -11 9 ... ... 6
Italy 3 5 3 9 -3 -4 24 0 ... ... 4
Spain 20 12 70 65 23 -15 2 1 ... ... 43
Other 34 38 13 7 -29 152 110 52 ... ... 27
Bolivia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ... ... 100
Argentina 11 21 10 10 11 3 4 2 ... ... 10
Brazil 8 3 14 5 8 18 11 2 ... ... 9
Italy 17 11 6 6 7 3 5 0 ... ... 8
Spain 10 5 1 6 7 27 11 11 ... ... 9
United States 30 35 34 44 40 29 33 36 ... ... 35
Other 24 25 35 29 26 20 36 48 ... ... 29
Brazil 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
France 8 8 7 7 9 10 6 2 7 3 7
Netherlands 10 15 8 8 9 18 11 38 15 16 14
Portugal 5 8 9 9 8 5 2 3 2 1 5
Spain 4 23 21 33 13 3 6 5 6 7 14
United States 29 21 30 19 21 14 18 20 21 20 21
Other 45 26 25 25 40 50 57 32 50 53 38
Chile 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Australia 4 7 0 1 13 4 4 3 24 6 5
Canada 21 17 6 24 3 27 15 8 4 58 16
Spain 29 15 50 21 8 7 12 81 10 2 29
United Kingdom 10 12 4 5 9 45 11 2 13 3 10
United States 17 22 15 26 36 16 29 3 4 11 18
Other 20 27 26 22 31 1 29 4 45 20 22
Colombia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100
Netherlands 2 6 18 5 10 2 6 0 4 1 5
Panama 33 4 8 7 7 3 14 4 3 8 10
Spain 26 15 7 15 10 6 13 7 7 16 13
United Kingdom 0 2 1 0 1 -1 3 1 46 1 12
United States 4 13 23 4 13 46 22 43 17 48 20
Other 35 61 43 70 59 43 42 45 23 28 41
Costa Rica 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ... 100
Canada 2 6 6 -1 8 -1 3 1 4 ... 3
Mexico 5 3 15 7 7 4 7 5 5 ... 6
Netherlands 1 0 0 0 1 35 5 3 1 ... 6
Panama 0 0 11 6 14 5 0 3 2 ... 4
United States 75 79 56 68 57 50 62 72 80 ... 67
Other 17 11 12 19 15 7 23 17 8 ... 14
Ecuador 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Canada 17 26 23 27 34 29 22 28 35 36 29
Italy 2 11 11 10 7 9 4 4 6 5 6
Panama 3 2 2 2 6 4 6 6 6 5 5
Spain 4 0 0 13 7 7 3 4 8 8 6
United States 46 46 40 37 25 33 14 28 22 16 27
Other 28 15 24 11 20 18 52 30 23 31 27
El Salvador ... ... 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Canada ... ... 1 0 10 1 1 2 17 12 7
Mexico ... ... -6 0 1 2 8 131 8 2 27
Panama ... ... 3 4 2 7 0 1 10 32 8
Spain ... ... 18 0 19 19 2 8 0 0 8
United States ... ... 66 63 38 70 48 -1 -15 4 24
Other ... ... 18 33 30 1 41 -40 80 51 26
Honduras 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Canada 3 12 22 6 10 12 9 13 3 1 8
El Salvador 21 9 6 3 -1 9 3 5 7 3 6
Mexico 0 1 2 0 3 1 1 11 12 7 5
United Kingdom 10 7 1 6 6 0 -1 19 13 5 7
United States 41 36 47 18 31 83 60 21 35 65 44
Other 24 35 22 66 51 -5 28 31 30 18 30
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Table I-A-3 (concluded)
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
           
Mexico 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Canada 2 3 5 4 4 1 2 2 2 3 3
Netherlands 3 13 8 15 9 8 4 15 11 8 10
Spain 3 4 8 12 3 4 12 33 7 4 10
United Kingdom 15 2 -1 2 0 6 7 1 5 5 4
United States 61 65 54 71 78 67 63 37 52 64 61
Other 16 13 27 -4 6 14 13 12 23 17 13
Panama 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100
Japan 16 5 4 5 -9 6 -29 14 7  5
Mexico 8 4 11 27 -11 -5 36 -1 -3  5
Spain 2 1 1 0 4 -6 27 6 28  6
United Kingdom -1 63 14 12 2 18 19 3 -4  18
United States 16 8 36 37 30 19 174 11 8  22
Other 59 19 35 19 83 68 -128 66 65  44
Paraguay ... ... ... ... ... 100 100 100 100 100 100
Argentina ... ... ... ... ... -33 49 -26 22 4 9
Brazil ... ... ... ... ... -77 -71 -2 21 24 7
Japan ... ... ... ... ... 229 13 29 7 1 13
Portugal ... ... ... ... ... -8 2 72 -1 -1 8
United States ... ... ... ... ... 355 112 6 68 84 80
Other ... ... ... ... ... -366 -4 20 -18 -12 -17
Peru 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Spain -5 4 2 74 -3 13 1 277 2 0 25
United Kingdom 22 31 52 6 31 28 38 -317 -2 42 21
United States 23 21 18 4 -11 -43 18 161 56 28 16
Panama 26 3 1 0 1 36 102 11 -17 1 6
Netherlands 13 3 8 9 31 6 32 -8 -65 3 5
Other 21 38 19 7 53 60 -91 -24 126 26 26
Dominican Republic 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100
United States 31 29 15 26 46 58 100 26 28 70 40
Spain 10 33 38 25 20 5 -3 18 24 19 21
Canada 39 21 8 17 1 3 -5 40 21 9 14
Netherlands 0 0 5 5 26 18 5 0 4 -3 6
France 0 0 3 13 6 17 7 12 9 0 6
Other 20 18 31 14 1 -1 -5 4 14 5 11
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ... ... 100
(hydrocarbons)
United States 39 39 5 31 3 36 6 17 ... ... 13
Netherlands 1 0 2 0 22 4 0 53 ... ... 8
Panama 3 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 ... ... 2
United States 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 ... ... 1
France 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 ... ... 1
Other 57 59 87 66 71 59 94 29 ... ... 74
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(other)
United States 27 8 11 15 13 18 85 35 40 21 31
Netherlands 3 2 13 14 51 24 4 0 3 5 10
Spain 22 1 4 10 3 2 1 4 3 5 5
Switzerland 2 1 6 7 0 1 0 32 0 9 4
Colombia 2 4 11 9 5 3 2 4 0 10 4
Other 44 85 55 45 28 52 8 24 53 50 46
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 16 April 2007.
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Table I-A-4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOP 50 NON-FINANCIAL TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BY CONSOLIDATED SALES, 2005
(Millions of dollars)
 Ranking  Ranking    Consolidated Main subsidiaries
 2005  2004 Corporation Country  Sector sales in the region
 1 3 Wal-Mart United States Commerce 21 124 Mexico, Brazil, Guatemala
 2 1 General Motors Corp. United States Motor vehicle 19 965 Mexico, Brazil, Colombia
 3 2 Telefónica de Spain S.A. Spain Telecommunications 19 425 Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela
        (Bol. Rep. of), Chile, Peru,
        Mexico, Colombia
 4 4 DaimlerChrysler AG Germany Motor vehicle 15 971 Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
 5 5 Volkswagen Germany Motor vehicle 15 680 Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
 6 6 Bunge  United States Agro-industry 10 407 Brazil, Argentina
 7 7 Endesa Spain Electricity 10 252 Chile, Brazil, Argentina
 8 9 Telecom Italia SpA Italy Telecommunications 9 904 Brazil, Argentina
 9 12 Repsol YPF Spain Petroleum/Gas 9 661 Argentina, Peru
 10 14 Royal Dutch-Shell Group Netherlands/United Kingdom Petroleum /Gas 8 033 Brazil, Argentina
 11 24 Arcelor Luxembourg Steel 7 747 Brazil
 12 13 Carrefour France Commerce 7 229 Brazil, Colombia, Argentina
 13 17 Cargill, Inc. United States Agro-industry 6 489 Brazil
 14 21 BHP Billiton Plc Australia/United Kingdom Mining 5 989 Chile, Brazil, Peru
 15 25 ChevronTexaco United States Petroleum/Gas 5 874 Brazil, Colombia
 16 16 ExxonMobil United States Petroleum/Gas 5 727 Brazil, Colombia
 17 8 Ford Motor Co. United States Motor vehicle 5 665 Mexico, Argentina
 18 11 AES Corp. United States Electricity 5 662 Brazil, Chile, Venezuela 
        (Bol. Rep. of)
 19 20 Nestlé Switzerland Food 5 183 Brazil, Mexico
 20 30 Fiat Auto Italy Motor vehicle 4 708 Brazil, Argentina
 21 35 The Coca-Cola Company United States Beverage/beer 4 327 Brazil
 22 26 Siemens AG Germany Electronics 4 210 Brazil, Mexico
 23 29 Iberdrola SA Spain Electricity 4 007 Brazil
 24 22 General Electric United States Electronics 3 993 Mexico, Brazil
 25 34 Portugal Telecom Portugal Telecommunications 3 611 Brazil
 26 11 Dow Chemical United States Petrochemical/chemical 3 328 Brazil, Argentina
 27 37 PepsiCo United States Beverage/beer 3 072 Mexico
 28 28 Bayer Germany Petrochemical/chemical 2 762 Brazil, Mexico
 29 50 BP Amoco Plc United Kingdom Petroleum/Gas 2 704 Argentina, Colombia
 30 32 British American Tobacco  United Kingdom Tobacco 2 676 Brazil, Venezuela
    Plc. (BAT)     (Bol. Rep. of), Argentina
 31 31 Anglo American Plc United Kingdom Mining 2 636 Chile
 32 - Caterpillar United States Machinery 2 594 Brazil
 33 - Renault France Motor vehicle 2 298 Brazil, Colombia, Argentina
 34 48 Électricité de France France Electricity 2 087 Brazil
 35 44 Kimberly-Clark Corporation United States Cellulose/paper 2 067 Mexico
 36 47 Sonae SGPS Portugal Commerce 1 978 Brazil
 37 - Samsung Corporation Republic of Korea Electronics 1 877 Brazil, Mexico
 38 15 Unilever Netherlands/United Kingdom Agro-industry 1 851 Mexico, Argentina
 39 18 Hewlett-Packard (HP) United States Computing 1 763 Brazil
 40 42 E.I. Du Pont de Nemours United States Petrochemical/chemical 1 753 Brazil, Mexico
 41 - Robert Bosch GmbH Germany Motor vehicle parts 1 715 Brazil
 42 46 BASF AG Germany Petrochemical/chemical 1 651 Brazil
 43 49 Procter & Gamble United States Hygiene/cleaning 1 556 Mexico
 44 - Mittal Steel Co. Netherlands  Steel 1 551 Mexico
 45 - Volvo Sweden Motor vehicle 1 505 Brazil
 46 - Newmont Mining United States Mining 1 490 Peru
    Corporation
 47 - Avon United States Hygiene/cleaning 1 490 Brazil, Mexico
 48 - Rhodia France Petrochemical/chemical 1 482 Brazil
 49 - Intel United States Computing 1 444 Costa Rica
 50 - Makro Netherlands Commerce 1 441 Brazil
    Total     271 616
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department of América 
economía magazine, Santiago, Chile, 2006.
Note: This table was produced by aggregating the sales of the subsidiaries of each transnational corporation operating in the region, on the basis of primary 
information on the sales of the largest companies. In cases where the subsidiary is owned by two or more transnational corporations, its sales are distributed 
among them according to the percentage ownership of each parent company. This is the case with: Vivo (Brazil), which belongs to Telefónica of Spain and 
Portugal Telecom; Doña Inés de Collahuasi mining company (Chile), owned by AngloAmerican (United Kingdom) and Falconbridge (Canada/United Kingdom); 
and the mining company Antamina (Peru), owned by BHP Billiton (Australia/United Kingdom) and Falconbridge (this last example is not included in the list).
In terms of the subsidiaries in the region, the table mentions only those for which sales information was available, which means that the list does not necessarily include 
all subsidiaries of each transnational corporation.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)64
Table I-A-5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FLOWS OF OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY COUNTRY, 1997-2006
(Millions of dollars)
 1992-1996 
 (annual 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 average)
Argentina  1 196 3 653 2 325 1 730 901 161 -627 774 442 1 151 2 008
Barbados 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 4 9 ...
Bolivia 2 2 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil 516 1 042 2 721 1 690 2 282 -2 258 2 482 249 9 807 2 517 28 202
Chile 726 1 463 1 483 2 558 3 987 1 610 343 1 606 1 527 2 209 2 797
Colombia 205 809 796 116 325 16 857 938 142 4 662 1 098
Costa Rica 5 4 5 5 8 10 34 27 61 -43 96
El Salvador 0 0 1 54 -5 -10 -26 19 -53 217 -50
Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 26 22 22
Jamaica 42 57 82 95 74 89 74 116 60 101 ...
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 4 404 891 1 253 4 432 6 474 3 897
Paraguay 2 6 6 6 6 6 -2 6 6 6 0 a
Peru -2 85 62 128 0 74 0 60 0 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 0 264 25 150 106 -225 25 341 370
Uruguay 0 13 9 -3 -1 6 14 15 18 36 -2
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 400 557 1 043 872 521 204 1 026 1 318 619 1 183 2 089
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 24 April 2007.
a
  Based on third-quarter data.
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Chapter II
Active policies for attracting foreign direct 
investment: international experiences and 
the situation in Latin America and the 
Caribbean
A. Introduction
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are constantly seeking out and assessing possible new 
geographical locations for their investments, while countries compete globally to attract such 
investments and harness the benefits they provide. Beyond the theoretical, and, in some cases, 
ideological, considerations that may be brought to bear, governments face two fundamental 
policy options in their pursuit of foreign investment. The first is to do nothing, that is, to adopt 
a passive stance in terms of attracting investment; the second is to intervene actively to obtain 
the maximum benefit from the investment process.
The passive policies associated with the first option 
essentially rely on a country’s comparative advantages 
or macroeconomic or structural conditions, which 
are taken as a given. In the extreme case, countries 
limit their role to defining the legal framework and 
administrative procedures that regulate foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and refrain from influencing firms’ 
decision-making processes. This passive strategy may 
be sufficient to attract investments for which the key 
inducements are intrinsic to a particular country (domestic 
or neighbouring markets and natural resources). In such 
cases, the success of this policy is measured mainly by 
the size of the investment.
However, the global tendency has been to move 
towards increasingly sophisticated policy frameworks in 
which it is not just the volume of flows that is important 
but also the type of investment, that is, its quality in 
terms of its contribution to, and consistency with, the 
country’s economic development objectives. While there 
are multiple strategies and emphases relating to FDI 
attraction, the countries that have been most successful 
in attracting these types of investments and in harnessing 
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their benefits have been those that have adopted more 
active and targeted policies.
To the extent that a country’s political objectives 
coincide with the interests of a particular TNC, a virtuous 
circle can be generated from which both parties stand to 
gain. Although the benefits of investment do not come 
automatically, taking into account the fact that FDI 
does not on its own —except in very rare cases— solve 
development and growth-related problems, it may play an 
important role if it is aligned with the strategic objectives 
of recipient countries. 
As shown in the 2005 edition of this report, this 
trend is not unknown in the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2006a, chapter II). 
Nevertheless, in comparison with the policies followed 
by some developed (mainly European) countries, certain 
transition nations (the Czech Republic and Hungary) and 
some emerging Asian economies (Malaysia, Republic 
of Korea, Singapore and Thailand), the efforts made 
in the Latin American countries have been weaker in 
terms of both the definition of explicit policies and 
their degree of integration with other national economic 
development policies. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss factors 
that may contribute to the design of more active policies 
that can help close the existing gap with countries that 
have been more successful in attracting quality FDI. The 
first section develops a conceptual framework, based on 
corporate motivations and requirements, for the different 
components of an active and integrated policy. The second 
section examines various experiences in Asia and Europe 
which show how the concepts presented in the first 
section have been implemented. An effort is then made 
to determine how policies used by Latin American and 
Caribbean countries to attract FDI differ from those applied 
by countries that are more advanced in this respect, and a 
number of policy proposals are put forward with a view 
to narrowing this gap.
B. An analytical framework for attracting FDI: the
 importance of active policies
The elements of a theoretical framework which can serve as 
a basis for the design of policies for promoting and attracting 
quality FDI are set out in this section. Consideration will 
first be given to the motivations and other factors that have 
a bearing on a company’s appraisal and selection of a given 
geographical location when it decides to invest abroad. The 
discussion will then move on to the approaches adopted by 
different countries —depending on the degree of proactivity 
and integration with development policies— for influencing 
those decisions and deriving the maximum benefit from 
existing FDI. Lastly, the promotion policies and incentives 
for attracting these capital flows are examined. 
1. Motivations and factors that influence foreign investment
 decisions
A government that has prior knowledge of the motivations 
and requirements of TNCs is in a better position to 
design and implement policies and actions to improve 
conditions in its country and to convey these advantages 
appropriately to potential investors, thereby enhancing 
its competitiveness in attracting quality FDI. ECLAC has 
classified the motivations for foreign companies investing 
in Latin America and the Caribbean in four categories: 
natural-resource-seeking, local or regional market-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking investments 
(see chapter I). 
The needs of investors will depend on the main 
purpose of the investment. Once a company has determined 
what these needs are, it prepares a plan of action for 
identifying the geographical locations where they can 
best be satisfied. 
TNCs use a fairly structured approach for evaluating 
different investment options. This process usually includes 
the following stages (see figure II.1):
Analysis of opportunities: companies are constantly 
seeking and analysing locations that are likely to 
satisfy their requirements. 
•
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Longlist: once the formal appraisal has been started 
in accordance with the parameters and criteria that 
have been defined, firms collect general information 
and draw up an initial list of countries or locations 
that meet their requirements. 
Shortlist: based on this analytical process, a shortlist 
of the most attractive countries is prepared and 
more detailed information is then compiled. This 
stage usually includes visiting the countries on the 
shortlist to evaluate, check and compile information 
•
•
in the field and may include negotiations with 
local authorities.
Appraisal: the final decision is taken on the basis of 
the information and data gathered in the previous 
stage. The process may involve several repetitions, 
since the conditions offered by countries may vary as 
negotiations concerning incentives or other facilities 
proceed. Once a location has been selected, the company 
keeps the possibility of making additional investments 
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During this process, companies explicitly set out 
the requirements they consider most relevant for their 
decisions. Crucial elements include access to resources 
or markets and a stable economic, political and social 
environment. Other conditions frequently mentioned 
are an enabling business climate, the existence of good, 
reliable infrastructure and basic services, the availability 
of professional, technical and managerial skills and a low 
level of corruption (MIGA, 2002). Interestingly, even 
though tax exemptions or rebates are some of the most 
commonly used policies for attracting investments, the 
tax system actually appears to be of secondary importance 
on this list of requirements. 
Thus, the starting point for the design of policies for 
attracting FDI is to understand the motivations, factors and 
decision-making processes of TNCs. Whether a country will 
be included on the longlist depends on structural factors 
which determine how attractive a country is to would-be 
foreign investors. Generally speaking, economically stable 
countries with good growth prospects and conditions, such 
as clear regulatory frameworks, efficient and transparent 
institutions, skilled human resources, a favourable business 
environment and openness to foreign trade, are in a better 
position to attract FDI. These variables may be influenced 
by general policies for improving competitiveness in the 
context of each country’s development plan, priorities and 
resources. Similarly, policies designed to promote growth 
and economic stability generate a more inviting investment 
climate and make the country more appealing to foreign 
investors (see figure II.2). When a country determines 
that FDI or a certain type of FDI has the potential to 
contribute to these development objectives, it may then 
decide to design specific FDI policies to facilitate the 
inflow of such investments. 
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Figure II.2
LINKS BETWEEN COMPETITIVENESS, INVESTORS
AND POLICIES
In order to have a positive impact on corporate 
evaluation processes, countries can generate mechanisms 
or institutions that interact with foreign companies at 
different levels. Specific attributes of a country can be 
highlighted through promotional efforts and can be 
brought to the attention of corporate decision-makers. 
Investor support services help to generate knowledge and 
facilitate the evaluation of the country’s attributes on the 
ground. Furthermore, many countries have decided to 
provide investment incentives which help to enhance their 
attractiveness vis-à-vis potential competitors. 
Different models and policy options for attracting 









Country makes itself 
attractive to investors
FDI generates increased 
competitiveness 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
2. Models and policy options
There is increasingly intense competition for the 
resources and benefits to be derived from the 
international expansion of TNCs. The quality of FDI 
is also increasingly important, not just the quantity 
(Mortimore and Vergara, 2006). In terms of specific 
policies, national authorities have two basic options: 
either to adopt a passive stance, which does not imply 
a lack of interest in or rejection of FDI, or to intervene 
actively to tap into these capital flows. 
Globally, the present trend is to establish increasingly 
sophisticated policy frameworks that are integrated into 
the country’s other development policies. Countries that 
have been successful in attracting quality investments 
and in taking advantage of their benefits have been those 
that have adopted more active and more targeted policies 
(UNCTAD, 2004; UNCTAD, 2005a; and Mortimore, 
Vergara and Katz, 2001). There are three basic models 
that can serve as a basis for a conceptual framework for 
the design of policies for attracting FDI: passive, active 
and integrated policies.
Passive policies rely on a country’s comparative 
advantages and are confined to the establishment of policy 
frameworks geared to facilitating investment inflows. 
Active policies entail specific measures designed to 
attract types of investment that have a greater potential 
to translate into positive externalities for a given country 
(for example, production linkages or the generation of 
value added, know-how and employment). When a country 
chooses to attract a certain type of investment that it 
feels can contribute to its strategic objectives within the 
framework of its development policies, it is using what 
are known as integrated investment attraction policies. In 
this case, there is a feedback loop between the investment 
and general policies which gives rise to a virtuous circle 
that is of benefit to both parties. 
These three basic FDI intervention models will be 
discussed below, starting with the simplest scheme and 
progressing to the most complex. Depending on the 
situation prevailing in a given country, an effort can 
be made to determine which type of policy would be 
the most appropriate. As shown in figure II.3, passive 
policies would be the most appropriate for a country 
whose attractions surpass those of its competitors, while 
active policies could be adopted by a country whose 
situation is slightly inferior to that of its competitors. 
The third case, that of a country which is far behind 
its competitors, would not benefit particularly from 
active policies and would call for long-term action to 
produce structural changes through the implementation 







Competitor countries’ FDI attractiveness
Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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(a) Passive policies: making the most of a country’s 
comparative advantages
In this case, no specific policies are adopted to attract 
FDI, although this does not necessarily signify a lack 
of interest in such investments. Rather, the authorities 
feel that the country’s comparative advantages or 
macroeconomic conditions are sufficient to result in FDI 
inflows and do not consider it necessary to intervene in 
the process. This type of scheme for attracting FDI is not 
necessarily integrated with any productive development 
policy, and its success is measured basically by the size 
of investment inflows. This approach may be sufficient 
to attract companies pursuing the advantages intrinsic to 
a particular country (domestic or neighbouring markets 
and natural resources). In this model, the host country’s 
circumstances —for example, its macroeconomic 
situation, human resources, infrastructure and business 
environment— and the FDI regulatory framework are 
the basic components of what the country is offering 
to investors (see figure II.1). Investors then compare 
these elements with the profile of competing countries 
and evaluates the situation in the light of their own 
requirements (see figure II.4). 
Figure II.4
PASSIVE POLICIES
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Nicolo Gligo S., “Políticas activas para atraer inversión extranjera directa en América 
Latina y el Caribe”, Desarrollo productivo series, No. 175 (LC/L.2667-P), Santiago, Chile, January 2007. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.07.II.G.18.
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A passive policy is successful when a country’s advantages 
meet the investor’s needs and surpass those offered by its 
closest competitor (scenario 1) (see figure II.3). The company’s 
appraisal can result in other outcomes, however. 
(b) Active policies: attempting to close the gap with 
competitors
These types of policies are used when national 
governments wish to take a more proactive approach 
to FDI attraction. The general idea here is to determine 
what kind of investment will produce the desired benefits 
and then to create —within the limits of the country’s 
possibilities— the conditions needed to attract it. In many 
cases, these policies are geared towards attracting quality 
investments that will generate significant benefits for 
the host economy in terms of know-how, employment, 
production linkages, technology transfers, etc. In these 
cases, microeconomic variables —availability, quality 
and cost of factors of production— are highly important, 
and competition among countries to attract investors is 
much more intense.
In order to implement this type of policy, countries set 
up an institutional structure for promoting and attracting FDI 
and take explicit steps to achieve their stated objectives (see 
figure II.5). The main components of this model are:
Investment promotion agencies (IPAs): these 
bodies disseminate information about the country’s 
attributes among potential investors and assist them 
with their appraisals.
•
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Incentives: many countries have opted to create 
investment incentives, which basically take two 
forms: tax incentives (exemptions or rebates) 
and financial inducements (direct subsidies for 
investment projects).
Investment facilitation measures: improvements in 
the regulatory framework are part of a continuous 
process involving ongoing contact with investors.
Selective policies for boosting a country’s 




deliberate effort in the short run to improve factors 
that influence the country’s attractiveness (by, for 
example, training scarce human resources).1 
All these elements help to enhance what the country has 
to offer and to close the gap separating it from competitors, 
provided that it is not too wide (i.e., when the costs of 
doing so are clearly lower than the expected benefits and 
the government can afford to do so (scenario 2)) (see figure 
II.5). If this gap is not closed, the country runs the risk of 
losing the investment. 
1
 Costa Rica and El Salvador have set up specific training programmes to satisfy the growing demand for skilled bilingual technical personnel in 




Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Nicolo Gligo S., “Políticas activas para atraer inversion extranjera directa en América 
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A country may prioritize a particular type of investment 
or prefer it over other types and take certain steps to attract 
it. This type of policy is based on a targeting strategy and 
uses all the elements outlined above. There are at least 
two reasons for adopting this type of strategy: (i) when 
the country wishes to achieve a specific objective; and 
(ii) when funds are scarce and the authorities decide to 
concentrate the available resources on effective promotion 
activities.
In these cases, the strategy’s areas of emphasis are 
usually defined in terms of the advantages that the country 
has to offer, the requirements of potential investors and the 
country’s interests as set forth in its FDI policy objectives. In 
the best-case scenario, these criteria match, and the country 
therefore has attributes that enable it to attract FDI in those 
areas that are of interest to it. If, however, the country’s 
aspirations far exceed its actual assets, it may run the risk 
of setting aside resources for activities that do not produce 
the expected results (scenario 3) (see figure II.3). Targeting 
should be a natural outcome of a defined development 
strategy. Failing this, it will be a primarily operational tool 
for guiding the work of investment promotion agencies. 
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(c) Integrated policies: towards structural changes 
When FDI attraction policies and development 
policies are coordinated and integrated, they can both 
leverage the conditions that make a country attractive 
to investors and make the most of the potential benefits 
that FDI has to offer. In such cases, the country defines 
its strategies, and FDI helps it to carry them out. This 
means that, within the context of international competition 
for investment, a country’s profile may be structurally 
modified (Gligo, 2007, p.24).2 In addition, countries can 
use a series of indicators to monitor the impact of FDI, 
track progress in policy implementation and compare 
their performance with that of their main competitors. 
These policies do not seek only to attract FDI, but also 
to maximize absorption of the benefits it brings. To this 
end, it is crucial to raise the competitiveness of local 
firms so that they can be integrated into the production 
and marketing networks of the foreign corporations 
(see figure II.6).
2
 As will be discussed later on, in the cases of Ireland and Singapore, FDI has become a pivotal factor of development around which the definition 
of other policies revolves. In other cases, FDI has contributed to growth surges in sectors that are strategically important for a country’s productive 
development plan (e.g., Malaysia’s export-oriented electronics industry).
Figure II.6
INTEGRATED POLICIES
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Nicolo Gligo S., “Políticas activas para atraer inversión extranjera directa en América 
Latina y el Caribe”, Desarrollo productivo series, No. 175 (LC/L.2667-P), Santiago, Chile, January 2007. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.07.II.G.18.
With integrated policies, structural improvements 
may be implemented that enable countries to move out of 
scenario 3 over the medium or long term and eventually 
transition into a situation more in line with scenarios 2 
or 1 in a wider range of activities and sectors (see figure 
II.3). Such policies also allow countries to absorb greater 
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3. Active and integrated policy tools
There are two major promotion instruments that can be used 
to implement active and integrated policies: facilitation 
by investment promotion agencies, and incentives.
(a) Investment promotion agencies (IPAs)
One of the challenges faced by countries in seeking 
to attract FDI is potential investors’ lack of familiarity 
with the features and advantages of a particular location 
or country. This is due to:
Information asymmetries: Firms require information 
as decision-making inputs, but this information 
is not always available or readily accessible. 
Potential investors may therefore be unaware of a 
country’s true situation or may develop a distorted 
perception of its situation in the course of the 
appraisal process.
High learning and set-up costs: For companies 
investing in a country for the first time, unfamiliarity 
with legal procedures, factor markets, the business 
culture or even basic conditions of everyday life 
can become an obstacle to installation and may 
result in the loss of a potential investment.
The most common way in which countries and, in some 
cases, provinces or regions seek to solve these problems 
is by setting up an organization, unit or programme to 
promote investment (what is generically referred to 
as an “investment promotion agency”, or IPA). The 
main purpose of such institutions is to make known the 
advantages of a location, provide relevant information 
to potential investors and facilitate decision-making and 
establishment in the country. Recently, as a result of 
growing competition for FDI, IPAs have been springing 
up in a large number of countries.3 
Most IPAs are designed to provide support to 
investors in the different phases of the decision-making 
process (see figure II.7). At least five primary functions 
of such agencies and three others, which, while not 




 More than 160 countries now have national IPAs. If regional and provincial agencies are included, the number rises to 250. Two thirds of them 
were created in the 1990s (UNCTAD, 2001).
4
 The best promotors for a country are “satisfied customers” (Gligo, 2007, p. 27).
5
 Since incentives are included in the negotiation process, IPAs should at least have access to information and be in constant touch with the agencies 
that administer them.
activities, can be identified. The first group includes: 
(i) analysis of investment opportunities, bearing in 
mind potential investors and the conditions in the host 
country; (ii) definition and promotion of a favourable 
country image in terms of FDI; (iii) promotional efforts 
targeting potential investors; (iv) services for the 
investor during the appraisal process and project start-
up; and (v) monitoring and post-investment service.4 
The complementary functions include (i) advising 
authorities on how to improve the local business climate; 
(ii) allocating and evaluating incentives,5 and (iii) helping 
local companies to become more competitive so that 
they can become potential suppliers of products and 
services to foreign firms.
Such an agency’s scope for action is determined, 
among other factors, by the size of its budget and its 
human resource endowment. As pointed out by a recent 
study, a basic minimum of financial resources is necessary 
if promotion is to yield effective results (Morisett and 
Andrews, 2004). In addition, since attracting FDI depends 
on the establishment of relationships and networks, an 
ongoing presence and proximity to potential investors 
abroad —through offices abroad— can greatly facilitate 
this task (Gligo, 2007, p. 29). However, given the high 
cost of this type of operation, few countries maintain 
offices beyond their borders that are devoted exclusively 
to investment promotion. 
(b) Incentive policies
The use of incentives as part of an active and 
integrated investment-promotion policy can heighten 
the attractiveness of a country or specific locality whose 
structural conditions assure it a place on a company’s 
shortlist. Incentives are generally either fiscal (tax cuts or 
temporary or permanent exemptions) or financial (direct 
subsidies in the form of non-reimbursable contributions, 
reductions in the cost of production factors or provision 
of infrastructure) in nature. 
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2006 73
Figure II.7
IPA-INVESTOR RELATIONS
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Nicolo Gligo S., “Políticas activas para atraer inversión extranjera directa en América 
Latina y el Caribe”, Desarrollo productivo series, No. 175 (LC/L.2667-P), Santiago, Chile, January 2007. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.07.II.G.18.
FDI incentives would appear to be justified, in theory, 
insofar as they can correct market failures and create positive 
externalities for the country. The benefits of FDI, such 
as technology transfers or job creation, and the positive 
effects generated by early arrivals that are the first to set 
up operations in a country in a given industry are sound 
reasons for offering incentives so long as their cost does 
not outweigh the expected social benefits.6
In an ideal situation in which a country’s assets give 
it an unquestionable edge over its competitors, incentives 
would not be necessary (scenario 1). However, countries 
that make it on to the shortlist often exhibit quite similar 
conditions. In such cases, incentives can influence the 
investor’s final decision. Authorities should therefore weigh 
such factors as: (i) the conditions existing in their country; 
(ii) the incentives they are in a position to offer and their 
6
 While incentives may easily be quantified, measuring the social benefits of FDI may be a more complex task. Methodological and practical 
problems arise in assessing benefits of this type. For example, it may prove difficult to assign a value to the difference between an investment 
made by a prestigious company and one made by a company that is relatively unknown.
costs; and (c) the potential benefits of the FDI projects 
in question. This implies that the incentives to be granted 
are the outcome of negotiations with the potential investor 
(Gligo, 2007, p. 30). Thus, when a country is going to offer 
incentives, they should be the bare minimum required to 
meet the investor’s expectations and outdo the conditions 
offered by competitor countries (scenario 2) (see figure II.3). 
The cost of the incentives should also be significantly less 
than the benefits to be obtained. Under no circumstances 
should incentives be used to close a very wide gap such as 
that existing in scenario 3.
This line of reasoning is similar to the rationale being used 
by competitor countries and the investing firm, however. Faced 
with the prospect of losing a desired investment, a country 
may improve its bid by increasing its incentives, which could 
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lead to a series of escalating bids and an “incentives war”. 
Countries may even end up modifying their legal frameworks. 
One example of this is the competition that occurred among 
Brazilian states trying to attract automotive investments in the 
1990s (ECLAC, 2004, p.119). Thus, the level of incentives 
to be offered should have a ceiling that is set on the basis of 
the potential benefits for the host country.
This dynamic could result in a fairly complex 
competitive situation in which investors press authorities 
for greater benefits. Countries, for their part, are facing a 
situation analogous to the “prisoner’s dilemma”, where 
they can cooperate with each other and reduce the amounts 
of incentives offered, or try to make a better offer than the 
competition and thus win the project, but at the risk of 
entering into an “incentives war” where the spiralling cost 
of inducements would eclipse the benefits that the country 
would stand to gain (Oman, 2000 and Charlton, 2003).
In practice, incentives are allocated in one of two 
ways:
Automatic allocation: companies obtain incentives 
for investment projects that comply with previously 
established requirements.
Allocation on a case-by-case basis: subsidies 
and their amounts are determined on the basis 
of pre-established criteria and the merits of the 
projects. This approach is more flexible, allowing 
resources to be targeted based on the impact of the 
investment, but the greater discretionality of this 
approach increases the associated administrative 
costs and may generate conflicts of interest.
•
•
Lastly, the empirical evidence would seem to indicate 
that in the initial selection phase, in which the company 
draws up its longlist, incentives are not particularly relevant, 
since it is the structural advantages of each country that are 
at stake. Incentives take on a more important role, however, 
in particular among efficiency-seeking companies, when 
the time comes to evaluate and compare countries that 
are already on the shortlist. In other words, incentives are 
not the most important determining factor, but it would 
appear that they can have an influence in the final stage 
of the selection process.
To sum up, incentives are not the most important 
factor for investors when assessing their investment site 
options, but they do seem to have more influence in certain 
investment categories (efficiency-seeking projects) and 
in the final phase of the selection process (the shortlist). 
Therefore, under similar conditions, the decision could shift 
towards the country that offers the best incentives. Even 
attractive incentives, however, are not enough on their own 
to compensate for a weak competitive position resulting 
from a poor business climate or insufficient resources.
The ideal situation from the standpoint of overall 
benefits is for countries to compete on the basis of their 
structural advantages rather than on the basis of incentives. 
However, when countries believe that the type of investment 
they want to attract warrants a special effort, it is important 
to have transparent mechanisms for evaluating the costs 
of the incentives and the potential social benefits of the 
investment in order to avoid competition that results in 
negative social effects.
C. International experiences
Following this analysis of key elements in forging 
a strategy to promote and attract FDI, this section 
will turn to a number of specific cases in which these 
policies have been applied. The case descriptions serve 
a twofold purpose. On the one hand, they establish a 
point of comparison between practices in the region and 
the more successful active policies of more advanced 
countries. On the other hand, they provide information 
that the region’s agencies can use in their policy design 
process. 
1. Developing countries: active policies that have helped to close
 the gap with industrialized economies
The process of formulating and implementing active 
and integrated policies has usually proved complex and 
difficult. The experiences of different countries have varied 
widely. While some have implemented on ambitious, 
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sophisticated policies that have lasted for a number of 
decades (Singapore), other countries have implemented 
more targeted measures (Malaysia). In the case of the 
Czech Republic and the Republic of Korea, crises have 
prompted national authorities to make radical changes in 
their countries’ linkages with the rest of the world and to 
assign a new role to FDI.
(a) Singapore: a knowledge-intensive economy
Singapore has implemented an integrated investment-
attraction policy that is both ambitious and sophisticated 
(Lall, 2000). While focused on attracting TNCs in 
knowledge-intensive sectors, it has also improved physical 
and human infrastructure in order to increase the country’s 
attractiveness.
Since the early 1960s, Singapore has managed 
to modernize its industrial structure through effective 
planning and the implementation of an industrial policy 
in which FDI has played a central role. Initially, the 
country focused its efforts on creating jobs, establishing 
a production structure and attracting FDI. In the 1970s, 
it strengthened its industrial base and then focused on 
developing the manufacturing and service sectors as a 
key element for economic growth and for research and 
development (R&D) activities.
One of the main institutions to stimulate national 
development has been the Economic Development 
Board (EDB). Founded in 1961 as part of the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, EDB is responsible for general 
strategic guidance and coordination of all matters 
relating to FDI and industrial competitiveness. It 
has thus played a central role in implementing and 
executing economic policies for industrial and services 
development. It has also been the agency responsible 
for promoting and supporting FDI and has managed 
to attract investments for which skills training and 
development are crucial. 
In this context, thanks to strong State support 
for industrial development in which TNCs have 
become key agents —together with the local private 
sector, universities and other educational and research 
institutions— Singapore has become one of the Asian 
region’s main centres for innovation, incorporation of 
knowledge and R&D. Critical components of this process 
have included incentives for labour-intensive TNCs to 
switch to capital-, training- and technology-intensive 
activities. This has brought the country to a stage where 
it now acquires technology for subsequent adaptation, 
improvement and production.
The State’s contribution to this process has been 
fundamental, particularly in relation to developing and 
improving the country’s human capital. Proactive policies 
that match up with corporate needs have equipped the 
country with the kind of professional and technical workers 
that have the qualifications needed to meet production 
requirements (see box II.1). Thus, the combination of 
appropriate policies for human capital development, a 
good system of incentives, quality infrastructure and 
the guiding role of the State has enabled Singapore to 
out-compete other countries in attracting high-quality 
investments.
Meanwhile, rising labour and land costs have led the 
government to encourage companies to reorganize their 
operations on a regional basis. A number of mechanisms 
have been designed for this purpose, including the 
International Business Hub 2000 (IBH2000), which seeks 
to encourage TNCs to site many of their administrative, 
financial and logistical activities in Singapore in order to 
provide services to the entire region. Its highly qualified 
human resources and good road and port infrastructure are 
some of the factors that have encouraged large companies 
to move to Singapore.
Recently, efforts have been focused on creating and 
strengthening clusters for manufacturing activities. In 
1991, the Manufacturing 2000 programme was created 
to promote not only FDI but also training in order 
to improve the competitiveness of major industrial 
clusters. In the same year, the National Technology Plan 
was launched, under which the National Science and 
Technology Board was created. The Board’s goal was 
to allocate 2% of GDP to R&D in predefined sectors. 
In 1996 the second National Science and Technology 
Plan was launched to provide more explicit support 
for scientific knowledge. Expenditure on science and 
technology doubled between 1996 and 2000, and 30% 
of the total amount was assigned to strategic industries 
selected by the government.
As part of the country’s investment attraction policy, 
incentives for TNCs are combined with measures to 
support local agents in order to move forward with the 
process of national industrial development. Thanks to 
these measures, about 7,000 TNCs, half of which have 
regional operations, are now based in Singapore. The 
country’s production structure is focused on manufactures 
and services, especially in areas of high value added. This 
is due not only to the government’s proactive attitude 
towards investment attraction, but also to its capacity to 
anticipate the needs of firms and formulate appropriate 
solutions through a public/private partnership model.
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Box II.1
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT BASED ON FDI AND EDUCATION
The Government of Singapore’s most 
ambitious undertaking in recent times has 
been to transform the country into a high-
level technological manufacturing centre. 
In order to make more rapid progress, the 
local authorities focused on FDI rather than 
on local businesses. Based on a long-term 
perspective, they created the conditions to 
attract certain kinds of investments from 
TNCs and established incentives for foreign 
enterprises to bring advanced technology 
into the country. This mechanism led to a 
“natural selection” in favour of enterprises 
with sophisticated technologies, while the 
producers of low-technological-content or 
labour-intensive manufactures opted to 
leave the country.
Singapore has introduced measures 
to create a stable and supportive business 
environment for high-technology investments. 
These measures include capital contributions, 
tax exemptions, progressive infrastructure 
and improvements in education. In all of 
these ways, Singapore has sought to 
maximize the benefits of FDI, which are 
understood to include a learning process, 
absorption of high technologies and technical 
capacity-building. 
After several decades of applying this 
approach to industrial development, the 
country has seen FDI become a powerful 
engine of progress in high-technology 
sectors. Despite their focus on foreign 
companies, these policy measures have also 
been aimed at ensuring competitiveness 
by stimulating the creation of clusters, 
and in this area the performance of local 
businesses has been vital. 
T h e  g ove r n m e n t  h a s  a l s o 
understood the importance of education 
for technological progress and has 
made substantive changes in university 
programmes, giving priority to courses 
relating to the exact and natural sciences 
rather than social sciences. In addition, 
it has encouraged the development of 
an industrial training system which is 
now considered to be one of the most 
advanced in the world. 
In 1979 the Vocational and Industrial 
Training Board was established to provide 
and manage training programmes for 
young graduates and workers based on 
the needs of business enterprises. These 
programmes include practical classes at the 
plants themselves and theoretical classes 
at academic institutions. The programmes 
have had good results. They have mainly 
benefited large corporations, but efforts 
have been made to extend the benefits to 
small and medium-sized enterprises as 
well. To this end, the Skills Development 
Fund, also established in 1979, has provided 
financial assistance for the training activities 
of SMEs.
The most recent advance in relation 
to education and training is the founding 
of the Agency for Science, Technology 
and Research (A*STAR). Set up in 
2002, this autonomous governmental 
organization’s mission is to improve the 
competitiveness of the Singaporean 
economy by promoting R&D, especially in 
the public sector. It consists of a number 
of bodies responsible for different areas 
in the training of highly qualified human 
resources and support for technological 
progress. The substantive bodies of A*STAR 
are the Biomedical Research Council and 
the Science and Engineering Research 
Council, which promote, support and 
supervise the country’s R&D activities; 
the A*STAR Graduate Academy, which 
offers scientific stipends to students and 
supports various initiatives and programmes 
to enhance human resources; and Exploit 
Technologies, which protects the intellectual 
property created by research centres and 
facilitates the transfer of new technologies 
to industry.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
(b) Malaysia: the development of an export 
manufacturing industry 
Over the last few decades FDI attraction in Malaysia, 
as in a number of other South-East Asian countries, has 
been integrated with development strategies and policies. 
Malaysia’s experience illustrates two components of the 
active and integrated policy discussed above: the restrictions 
and barriers of the FDI regulatory framework, and a system 
of incentives with clearly defined objectives based mainly 
on fiscal measures. Both of these elements are included 
and integrated into the country’s industrial policy. 
Malaysia is actively and selectively promoting FDI, 
seeing it as an engine of growth and of changes in its 
production structure, especially in relation to exports of 
manufactures. The authorities deploy a broad system of 
incentives that are aligned with their strategic priorities for 
national development. There is also a series of restrictions 
on factors such as ownership which limit the activity of 
foreign enterprises. 
The beginnings of the Malaysian policy to attract 
FDI date back to 1958, when a law was passed granting 
a two-year tax exemption for “pioneering” manufacturing 
projects. This benefit was subsequently extended to 
other types of projects. In 1971, a new economic policy 
was promulgated under which foreign ownership of 
business enterprises was limited to a 30% stake. In 1975, 
in order to secure compliance with these provisions, 
the Industrial Coordination Act established a system in 
which manufacturing enterprises of a certain size had 
to request an operating licence, which led to a drop in 
foreign participation.
In the 1980s, Malaysia significantly changed the 
direction of its industrial and investment-attraction policy 
by placing greater emphasis on export manufacturing 
activities. In 1986 the Industrial Master Plan was launched, 
which defined strategic guidelines for the next 10 years. 
Under this initiative, some of the conditions established 
for granting licences were relaxed in order to give a new 
boost to private investment. Permission was thus given for 
up to 100% foreign participation in projects where 80% 
of production was destined for foreign markets. FDI was 
also accepted in other sectors in which local capacity was 
limited. In the same year, the Promotion Investment Act 
was promulgated. This law introduced new incentives to 
promote exports, tourism and agriculture, training, R&D 
and other activities. Since then, the country’s exports of 
manufactures have grown robustly. This is especially true 
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in the case of electronics, a sector dominated by foreign 
companies. From 1985 to 2005, the share of total exports 
accounted for by electrical products and electronics jumped 
from 9% to 50%. 
In 1996 the second 10-year industrial development 
plan was introduced. This plan came in response to the new 
challenges facing the country, which included the much 
more competitive international environment engendered by 
the use of growth strategies based on export development 
and FDI attraction by other countries able to offer lower 
production costs. The new plan called for the further 
development of the manufacturing sector, expansion of 
higher-value activities in the production chain, productivity 
gains and the development of related services. As part of 
this scheme, the regulatory framework for FDI was made 
more flexible, with up to 100% foreign ownership being 
allowed regardless of the level of exports involved or the 
sector concerned.
In August 2006, the Third Industrial Master Plan 
was launched. The ultimate goal of this 15-year plan 
(2006-2020) is to transform Malaysia into a developed 
country. FDI continues to play a vital role, but there is 
even more emphasis on the need to attract investments 
for high-value-added activities. The three pillars of this 
plan are the manufacturing, services and agricultural 
sectors, and the aim is to achieve increases in value added, 
technology use and R&D. It is expected that by around 
the year 2020 Malaysia will have a mature manufacturing 
sector, thanks to the development of 12 clearly identified 
subsectors. The plan also includes measures to ensure 
the best possible use of natural resources and to generate 
high-value products, while also promoting the growth of 
the services sector in line with international trends. 
These policy guidelines have been backstopped by 
the create of a suitable institutional structure. In 1967 the 
Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) was 
created to coordinate and promote the country’s industrial 
development. This organization’s supervisory role has 
gradually evolved into a more proactive approach to FDI 
promotion. It now has a network of 16 offices abroad 
and 10 offices in different parts of the country. The main 
functions of this body are as follows:
To promote local and foreign investment in 
manufactures and related services;
To plan and develop policy and strategy proposals 
for industrial development which are then submitted 
to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry;
•
•
To evaluate investors’ applications in terms of 
licences, tax incentives and customs exemptions;
To support business enterprises in the implementation 
and operation of projects;
To facilitate and coordinate the exchange of 
information among agencies involved in industrial 
development.
The Malaysian incentive system has three main 
features: (i) it is based on tax benefits; (ii) these incentives 
are aligned with the development strategy defined by 
the government; and (iii) the institutional framework is 
dynamic, with constant adjustments and improvements 
being introduced. The main incentives are a 70%-100% 
tax exemption for a period of up to 10 years (“Pioneer 
Status”) and a provision allowing between 60% and 100% 
of a firm’s capital expenditure to be offset against 70%-
100% of its taxable income (Investment Tax Allowance) 
(Gligo, 2007, p. 77).
One of the incentive system’s requirements is that 
the investor must demonstrate that the operation will 
support, directly or indirectly, income distribution, 
employment growth, exports, production quality, production 
diversification, the use of local raw materials, training 
and R&D (Thomsen, 1999). As of the mid-1990s, the 
incentives have been linked to the Industrial Master Plan, 
focusing on support for priority sectors, and they have 
subsequently been modified to support the government’s 
new strategies. In fact, in the 1990s, the incentives were 
reduced and the selection of activities became stricter 
(Gligo, 2007, p.78). The system has also been expanding 
to incorporate new activities and products, especially the 
information and communications technologies (ICT) sector, 
which receives special treatment (Thomsen, 2004).7 
Thus, Malaysia has displayed a very strong capacity 
for planning its industrial development over a 10-20 year 
timeline. FDI attraction policies have greater significance 
when their objectives are clear. In this Asian country, 
attracting FDI has been a key factor in the production 
changes that have been made, particularly in the area of 
exports of manufactures and electronics. 
(c) Czech Republic: overcoming a lack of confidence 
in FDI
At the beginning of the 1990s, Czechoslovakia underwent 
profound social, political and economic upheavals as a 





 The Government of Malaysia created the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) long-term plan for the development of the ICT sector. This initiative 
is intended to attract foreign investment by means of a package of 10 incentives and government commitments, which include the provision of 
high-level physical and telecommunications infrastructure and special fiscal incentives.
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abandoned the centralized planning model and split up into 
two new States: Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
In 1992, the new Czech government created CzechInvest 
with a mandate to promote the country abroad and attract 
FDI to support restructuring and industrial development. 
Over time, new programmes and services were included to 
respond to investors’ needs, and this improved the quality 
of the products offered by the country. As a consequence 
of these changes, CzechInvest, initially intended to act as 
a promotion agency, became a development organization.8 
It is precisely this capacity to adapt and evolve according 
to business needs and the country’s development strategies 
that has made CzechInvest so successful.
In view of the initial mistrust shown by the government 
and the population to the presence of FDI, CzechInvest 
understood the need to show positive and rapid results. 
According to the government, the success achieved by 
CzechInvest is mainly attributable to three of its three 
programmes:
An incentive system, created in 1998 and subsequently 
improved, is designed to make the country more 
attractive to foreign investors. According to the 
authorities, a significant proportion of the increase 
in FDI is due to this programme.
Development of industrial facilities to meet investors’ 
needs for suitable facilities.
Improved local procurement for investors, which 
place a high value on quality local suppliers capable 
of dealing with foreign companies. This initiative 
includes a supplier development programme, which 






 The approach adopted by the Czech Republic differs from that of Ireland in a number of ways, one of which is that it has followed the opposite 
organizational path: while the Irish Industrial Development Agency (IDA) went from being a development agency to a promotional entity, 
CzechInvest started out as a promotional body and became a development agency.
Box II.2
THE CZECHINVEST SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
In 1999, the Supplier Development 
Programme was launched as a pilot project. 
Although intended to meet the needs of 
foreign enterprises in terms of finding local 
providers (lower cost and more flexibility), 
it also sought to ensure that the benefits 
of FDI would be absorbed by the local 
economy.
The programme took an eminently 
practical approach. A group of 45 companies 
that showed potential were selected for 
training and then given individual technical 
assistance to raise their technical standards 
to meet investors’ requirements. In 2003, a 
second phase of the programme was initiated, 
based on the first phase’s success.
In addition, CzechInvest facilitates 
contacts between foreign clients and 
local suppliers by managing a database 
of approximately 2,000 providers from 
different sectors having different production 
capacities. In 2004, 15 contracts were signed 
with 10 foreign companies for a total of about 
US$ 40 million over a three-year period.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The current structure of CzechInvest is based on 
the merger of three bodies with complementary aims: 
CzechInvest, the institution responsible for FDI promotion 
(which gave its name to the institution now in operation); 
the Business Development Agency (oriented towards 
SME development) and CzechIndustry, the industrial 
development agency. This consolidation has given the 
institution a broad enough structure and array of functions 
to allow it to find solutions for meeting investors' needs. 
After the merger of the three organizations, the distribution 
of both financial and human resources has continued to 
reflect a strong focus on attracting FDI, a task carried 
out by the promotion division and the investment support 
division (Gligo, 2007, p. 67). 
The main task of the promotion division is to 
identify and attract new clients. In the case of FDI, this 
involves securing the greatest possible number of high-
value investment projects for the country. The emphasis 
has been on high-technology sectors, such as electronics 
and microelectronics, precision engineering, R&D in 
the motor vehicle industry, aviation, biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment manufacturing, 
software development and business service centres. In 
order to attract investments in these sectors, the Czech 
Republic, with the support of the European Union, has 
a network of offices in a number of European and Asian 
countries, as well as in the United States. 
The investment support division works with investors 
as they assess, implement and subsequently operate their 
investment projects. It provides assistance in decision-making 
regarding the siting of projects, acts as an intermediary 
between the agencies that administer subsidies and investors, 
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supports relations with local suppliers and promotes the 
expansion of existing investments in the country, while 
also offering assistance with any problem that may arise 
in the course of their activities. 
The experience of CzechInvest illustrates the multiple 
functions that an investment promotion agency may take on 
and how important it is for it to have sufficient resources. 
Clearly, the attraction of investments is an area in which 
promotion policies, the agencies that implement them 
and resource allocations are important factors.
The specific techniques, activities and programmes 
used by the different agencies around the world depend 
on the type of project concerned (sector of activity), the 
characteristics of the country and the objectives being sought. 
For example, attracting investment from enterprises that 
exploit natural resources is very different from attracting 
it from enterprises that carry out R&D. Nevertheless, the 
structure and functions of CzechInvest are sufficiently broad 
to serve as a reference and to illustrate the complexity of 
the investment-attraction process. 
One of the merits of CzechInvest has been its capacity 
to adapt and evolve so as to remain in step with companies’ 
needs and the country’s development strategies. Ongoing 
contact with investors has made it possible to design support 
programmes better adapted to their needs. Its priorities and 
objectives are also clear, and criteria have been established for 
follow-up and evaluation of the agency’s performance. 
An organization’s implementation capacity is, 
of course, directly related to the human and financial 
resources on which it can draw, especially as promotion 
activities abroad are expensive. CzechInvest has had the 
good fortune to receive support in the form of European 
Union funds and expert consultancy services.
(d) Republic of Korea: opportunities during a crisis
The Asian crisis of 1997 triggered the introduction 
of significant changes in FDI. For several decades, the 
Republic of Korea had based its growth on the creation and 
development of large export-oriented business conglomerates 
which received strong government support. In this context, 
the economy restricted the entry of foreign capital (see 
chapter III). In 1998, however, the country began to modify 
its strategy as it shifted towards a market orientation and 
started to assign a more important role to FDI. 
The economic reforms of that time were intended 
to bring about a shift from control and regulation to 
promotion and facilitation. They were also designed to 
convert the Republic of Korea into a North-East Asian 
hub for FDI, trade and logistics, manufactures, and R&D. 
There were two main factors that the authorities took into 
account. The first was the country’s location between 
China and Japan, which makes it a natural centre for 
trade and logistics. The second was its need to position 
itself in high-value-added sectors and knowledge-based 
services, since it could not compete in manufacturing 
costs with China or Taiwan Province of China. Within 
this framework, the local authorities gave priority to the 
establishment of R&D centres in order to take advantage 
of the country’s advanced technological infrastructure 
and highly skilled manpower. 
In order to define an investment-attraction policy 
which sought quality rather than quantity, the Republic 
of Korea implemented a series of measures, including 
the following;
Development of investment infrastructure and 
facilities. The government offers foreign investment 
zones, free trade zones and economic zones for 
enterprises investing in selected sectors or possessing 
a certain level of technology.
Tax and financial benefits. Firms that meet certain 
requirements may request income tax reductions. 
In the case of high-technology sectors, financing 
is available for up to 15% of plant construction 
and equipment acquisition costs. There are also 
subsidies for up to 50% of employees’ wages, with 
ceilings and time and other limits.
The establishment of Invest Korea. Created in 1998, 
this investment promotion agency has the typical 
structure for institutions engaged in promotion and 
facilitation. There is also an investment ombudsman 
that plays a significant role. This office, which is 
outside the hierarchical structure of Invest Korea, 
helps resolve difficulties being experienced by foreign 
enterprises already present in the country.
Decentralization. Local governments have more 
autonomy to compete in developing support and 
incentive packages, as well as to approve FDI 
projects. 
Despite its success in boosting FDI inflows, the 
Republic of Korea still faces the challenge of improving 
its image in business circles, as it is considered a difficult 
market in which to operate. Bureaucratic costs need to be 
reduced and the population’s negative view of FDI will 
have to be changed. A comparison with other countries and 
cities in the region, such as Singapore, Hong Kong (Special 
Administrative Region of China) and Shanghai, makes it 
even clearer that the country needs a comprehensive array 
of infrastructure for FDI reception. This would include, 
for example, a more widespread use of English, improved 
programmes for new arrivals and assistance for foreigners 
in handling day-to-day affairs. 
As this is a fairly recent initiative, and there are still 
some problems to be resolved, more time is needed to see 
whether the Republic of Korea’s efforts in this regard will 
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2. Developed countries: from passive to active policies
(b) France: a search for investment and talent
In recent years, France has adopted a more proactive 
attitude to attracting investments and has increasingly 
sought to integrate this area with its development 
policies. In 2001, the French authorities created a 
national agency for attracting investment (“Invest in 
France Agency” (IFA)), which brings together in a 
single institution the network of promotion offices 
abroad operated by the national regional development 
agency, Délégation à l’aménagement du territoire et 
à l’action régionale (DATAR),9 the Invest in France 
Network (IFN), which consists of a coalition of regional 
development organizations, major enterprises, financial 
and consulting institutions, and the Delegation of Foreign 
Investments of the Ministry of Economy, Finance and 
Industry, which carries out trend analyses and surveying 
tasks. At present, IFA has a staff of 140 persons, 60 
of whom work at the Paris headquarters while the rest 
work in the institution’s offices abroad.10 
Despite the fact that France is one of the main 
recipients of FDI at the global level (see chapter I), the 
growing competition among countries to attract FDI has 
prompted the government to take a series of short- and 
medium-term measures to generate conditions favourable 
to investment. In 2003, the authorities agreed upon an 
agenda for increasing the country’s attractiveness and 
decided that the country should make a continuing effort 
to attract both the best human resources and investments 
that will have a strategic impact on economic growth. 
Specific measures have been introduced for this purpose 
in three priority areas (IFA, 2003):
Attracting talent and experience. Programmes have 
been formulated to attract foreign investors and 
repatriate French researchers, improve conditions 
for the entry and long-term retention of foreign 
executives, and offer incentives to postgraduate 
students in scientific, technological and business 
administration fields. This is a special feature of the 
French proposal, as in most countries the emphasis 
is on attracting enterprises, whereas in this case the 
intention is also to attract people.
•
Because of the competition for FDI, even some developed 
economies which have historically been the main 
recipients of capital inflows have begun to adopt more 
active policies.
(a) Spain: the first steps
In general, Spain’s strategy for FDI has been rather 
passive. With few restrictions on foreign investment 
and with conditions that make this country an attractive 
destination for TNCs, the lack of active policies —especially 
compared to other European countries— has not been 
an impediment to receiving large inflows of FDI. This 
attitude contrasts with the impetus that the Spanish 
authorities have given to the internationalization of their 
enterprises, both in terms of direct investments abroad 
and in terms of exports.
Nevertheless, in response to the greater competition 
among countries to attract, Spain decided to create an 
agency to promote and attract FDI and retain it in the 
country. In 2005, the Council of Ministers authorized 
the creation of the State Society for the Promotion and 
Attraction of Foreign Investments, SA. This new legal 
entity was established with capital provided by the Foreign 
Trade Institute (ICEX) and reports to the State Secretariat 
for Trade and Tourism of the Ministry of Industry, Trade 
and Tourism. 
At the beginning of 2006, the new institution began 
to operate under the name of “INTERES Invest in Spain”. 
With its mission to promote, attract and retain FDI, it has 
become a focal point for investors and a meeting place 
for all institutions at the central, autonomous and local 
levels that are involved in investment promotion and 
attraction. The organization has the structure of a service 
enterprise, with specific units responsible for promotion 
and institutional relations, investor support, and information 
and dissemination. In addition, support is provided by the 
network of offices for economic and commercial affairs 
of Spanish embassies around the world, three of which 
(London, New York and Tokyo) have departments that 
specialize in generating foreign investment.
9
 In December 2005, DATAR was renamed Délégation interministérielle á l’aménagement et la compétitivité des territoires (DIACT). Its broad 
mandate includes investment promotion, investor relations and administration of regional incentives.
10
 The international network consists of 22 offices: 12 in Europe, 3 in North America and 7 in Asia. They support investors in the selection of 
locations, organize field tours and help to maximize the financial incentives offered by the country.
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Attracting international investments. To boost 
competitiveness, targeted improvements to the 
French tax system have been carried out, especially 
in relation to R&D and innovation. In addition, there 
is now more effective business set-up support, and 
investors have more legal security.
Initiatives in specific sectors. A search has been 
conducted for new enterprises, and incentives 
have been offered to assist with the installation 
of major TNC subsidiaries and R&D centres. 
Procedures for the establishment of international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations 
have been simplified, and the country has become 
more competitive as a financial centre and in areas 
such as cinema and art.
This new approach has been reinforced by four 
ongoing initiatives which provide institutional support: 
(i) regular ministerial meetings;11 (ii) a strategic council 
with private-sector participation (the Conseil strátegique 
pour l’attractivité de la France);12 (iii) the development 
of indicators to measure the country’s attractiveness 
and compare it with its main competitors; and (iv) an 
international communication campaign to improve France’s 
image in business circles. 
In order to evaluate the results of the new strategy, 
a set of indicators serving a twofold purpose has been 
designed. On the one hand, these indicators can be used 
as an objective yardstick for measuring the country’s 
strengths and weaknesses as an investment destination. 
On the other hand, they can be used to monitor progress 
in the application of policies intended to make the country 
more attractive. To the extent possible, the values of 
these indicators are compared with those of another nine 
countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, United Kingdom and United States) and 
with the European average. Other relevant countries, such 
as China, are included when considered necessary. This 
experience is expected to serve as a basis for a unified 
measurement system for the entire European Union.13
In an increasingly competitive international 
environment, where advantages are rapidly eroded, 
France is a particularly interesting case study. Even 
though it is already a major FDI recipient, France has 
adopted proactive measures in order to make the country 
more attractive. These measures are based on a strategic 
•
•
approach for identifying priority activities (R&D and 
major subsidiaries) that attaches special importance to 
human capital (that is, attracting talent and skills), an 
aspect that few countries have made an integral part of their 
strategies (Gligo, 2007, p. 64). An institutional support 
framework has also been set up with backing from the 
country’s highest authorities, together with a mechanism 
to measure and monitor the results. 
(c) Ireland: the capacity to evolve towards dynamic 
sectors
FDI attraction has been a fundamental part of Ireland’s 
development strategy. This policy has focused on export-
oriented investments and has resulted in almost half of 
manufacturing employment being created by TNCs, 
which also sell over 80% of their output abroad (mainly 
to countries of the European Union).
In the last two decades, the Irish economy has undergone 
profound changes, including a fall in unemployment 
combined with GDP and export growth. The Industrial 
Development Agency (IDA) has played a crucial role 
in this process. Created in 1949, and then restructured 
in 1969 and 1994, it has been responsible for attracting 
new investments and for supporting the expansion of 
existing ones. As IDA has gained more experience, it has 
concentrated its efforts on major sectors and companies, 
especially in electronics and pharmaceuticals. 
The main tool used by this agency has been Ireland’s 
tax system. The country’s 12.5% tax rate, which applies 
to all companies (with some restrictions), is currently the 
lowest in the European Union and among the countries 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). This has been particularly beneficial 
for United States enterprises, which have seen Ireland as 
a potential export platform for the rest of Europe.
In addition to tax incentives, IDA has other tools 
at its disposal, including direct financial support for 
recruitment, training, R&D and the purchase of fixed 
assets. At the beginning of the 1990s, about 80% of 
foreign companies in Ireland had made use of such tools 
(OECD, 1994). In 2004, IDA allocated over 65 million 
euros for their financing. 
Changing conditions in the country and in the world are 
posing new challenges for Ireland as it strives to maintain 
11
 The annual meetings are also referred to as “government seminars to increase France’s attractiveness”. 
12
 Established in 2004, the Council is made up of 20 executives from major French and foreign companies. It is consultative in nature and its job 
is to identify and propose ways of making France an attractive country for foreign investment. The Council meets once a year, with the Prime 
Minister presiding and IFA acting as technical secretariat.
13
 Recently, a comparison was made with the situation in Eastern European countries. A joint project with Invest in Germany has been presented 
with a view to applying the same set of indicators to the other countries of the European Union.
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its current levels of competitiveness. On the one hand, its 
success has led to price increases and higher domestic 
wages. On the other hand, more recently, the euro has 
appreciated against the dollar and new competitors have 
emerged (Eastern Europe, China and India, to name a 
few) which are imitating its export- and FDI-based growth 
strategy and offering tax exemptions, incentives, lower 
costs and skilled labour.
Ireland has responded by adjusting its strategy in order 
to establish competitive advantages that are difficult to 
replicate in specific activities and niches (Forfás, 2003). To 
date, Ireland’s main strengths have been concentrated in 
operational aspects of manufacturing and services, rather 
than product or market development. This is particularly 
the case in relation to foreign enterprises, which produce 
goods designed elsewhere in the world to meet foreign 
market specifications. Ireland has thus managed to make 
progress in the segments of the chain that generate more 
value, such as marketing and R&D.
This new strategic direction does not mean that Ireland 
has decided to abandon manufacturing, which continues to 
be one of the country’s principal engines of growth. On the 
contrary, the idea is to focus on high-value-added niches 
where competition is not based on labour costs, but rather on 
productivity and specialization. This new strategy requires 
a greater orientation towards innovation, and Ireland is 
making substantial investments to generate the necessary 
infrastructure and human resources (Forfás, 2004).
This change of strategy, which began to be implemented 
in 2000, is also reflected in the redefinition of the IDA 
mission. The agency has gradually come to focus more on 
securing new investments in higher-quality segments in 
the value chain, encouraging the development and growth 
of companies already present in the country in order to 
increase the value added by their operations and their 
strategic importance, and developing the physical and 
educational infrastructure required by knowledge-intensive 
businesses (IDA, 2004). In addition to modifications in the 
IDA strategies and mission, new tools suited to these new 
orientations have been created to measure performance. 
There are a number of factors underlying Ireland’s 
success story. The first is that policies were designed from 
the top down, thanks to the institutions that proposed the 
national strategies. Forfás, a council that reports to the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, has 
the mission of leading public policymaking in relation 
to business support and technological development. It 
provides technical support to IDA and to Enterprise Ireland 
(the agency responsible for supporting local companies), 
Science Foundation Ireland and other advisory councils. 
An annual assessment is made of the country’s situation in 
terms of competitiveness and of any threats to its position, 
and the findings of the evaluation are then used to develop 
policy proposals at the national level.
A second element that has contributed to the country’s 
achievements is that its investment strategy is not only 
integrated into the country’s overall competitiveness policy, 
but is also a pivotal element of that policy. As an example, 
the rationale for the creation of Science Foundation Ireland 
emerged as a result of a detailed analysis of the country’s 
loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis Asian and European 
competitors. The possibility that companies operating 
in Ireland might move to these other locations had to be 
countered by encouraging them to invest in R&D in the 
country rather than leaving it. The corresponding incentives 
were then created, the quality of the stock of human capital 
was improved, and joint ventures or partnering arrangements 
were promoted. This analysis also indicated that a small 
country such as Ireland should focus on a few high-value-
added activities such as biotechnology and ICTs. 
Yet another element has the direct involvement of 
the Irish government in the management of FDI policy. 
Its role in this respect includes direct implementation 
of business activities, centralized planning and public 
investments designed to create favourable conditions for 
private investment. 
D. Proposals to reduce the gap between Latin America
 and the Caribbean and countries with best practices
 in terms of FDI attraction policies
The various European and Asian experiences discussed 
above differ markedly from the situation in Latin 
America and the Caribbean in certain ways. In general, 
the region is at an earlier stage in its efforts to develop 
a proactive investment-attraction policy. The countries 
of the region are beginning to transition from a passive 
system, in which investment inflows depend on the 
country’s comparative advantages and where policy 
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success is measured mainly by the amounts received, 
towards a more active approach. This new approach calls 
for greater proactivity in investment-attraction policies, 
together with complementary horizontal efforts to attract 
investments by means of specific measures targeting 
desirable sectors and projects.
1. Characteristics of the gap
A comparison of promotional activity in Latin America 
and the Caribbean —analysed in last year’s edition of this 
report (ECLAC, 2006a)— and in countries that have been 
more successful in attracting FDI shows that the region 
is lagging behind in this respect. Some of the elements 
accounting for this gap are considered below. 
(a) A lack of strategic direction and targeting
In general, the investment promotion agencies of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, although recognizing the 
importance of FDI, have not managed to mount policies 
in this area that are integrated and coordinated with other 
national development policies. Even in countries such as 
Costa Rica and Chile, which appear to be the exceptions, 
the efforts being made to attract quality investments seem to 
be attributable to operational factors rather than the pursuit 
of strategic objectives (Gligo, 2007, p. 100). From the 
point of view of active policies, Costa Rica demonstrated 
its highest degree of proactivity during the negotiations 
for the installation of INTEL. From that time on, the 
issue does not seem to have enjoyed the same priority on 
the government agenda, and most promotional activities 
have been placed in the hands of a private organization, 
the Costa Rican Coalition for Development Initiatives 
(CINDE). In Chile, the investment-attraction policy was 
developed “from the bottom up”, and its main promoter 
has been the government’s economic development agency, 
the Production Development Corporation (CORFO). 
Recent events appear to be leading in the direction of a 
rethinking of this policy and a more strategic, development-
oriented stance.
In contrast, in the more advanced countries FDI has 
taken on a strategic role and is integrated into the countries’ 
overall policies. France wishes to be the “New France” and 
is focusing its efforts on attracting enterprises to carry out 
R&D. A similar effort is being made by Ireland, which, 
when it saw its competitiveness in the manufacturing 
sector being eroded by developments in Asian and Eastern 
European countries, it defined a strategy to attract higher-
value activities in the production chain. In Malaysia, where 
rapid export development has been driven mainly by FDI, 
especially in the electronics sector, efforts are also being 
made to attract these kinds of activities.
Other nations facing complex political and economic 
situations have used FDI to re-establish their position in 
relation to the rest of the world. In the Czech Republic, 
foreign capital has been fundamental to the transition 
process and has contributed to productive changes. Based 
on the realization that the country’s industries cannot 
compete on the basis of cheap labour, efforts have been 
made to maintain the quality of technical education and 
to compete on the basis of quality and productivity. The 
Republic of Korea, facing an acute financial crisis in the late 
1990s, began to make a radical shift in its economic policy, 
opening itself up to FDI. This country created an investment-
attraction agency and made significant resources available 
for infrastructure, as well as offering offer incentives for 
change in order to position itself as the North-East Asian 
business hub. Nevertheless, this effort is still at an early 
stage, and more time will have to pass before the success 
of this type of agency can be evaluated.
In short, whatever the form and style of action 
associated with investment-attraction policies in the more 
developed countries, they all share a number of features: 
the existence of commitment, political will, strategic 
definitions, coordination and availability of resources 
for effective implementation. The economies of Latin 
America and the Caribbean can learn from the experiences 
of these countries and from the way in which they have 
integrated FDI into their national development goals. 
In this connection, it is important to determine whether 
active FDI promotion policies are appropriate and, if so, 
to ensure that they are properly coordinated and integrated 
with productive and economic development measures. 
Equipping FDI-promotion agencies with the necessary 
human and financial resources is one of the steps that 
must be taken in order to accomplish this. 
In operational terms, the absence of strategic definitions 
in the Latin America and Caribbean countries results in a 
failure to target promotion policies properly. Although the 
countries in the region are working to develop measures for 
targeting their policies, in most instances these efforts are 
still rather general in scope and lack a strategic approach. 
To date, it is only in exceptional cases that countries are 
reaping the benefits of this type of strategy. It may be 
noted that Colombia is beginning the process in a fairly 
structured way (see box II.3).
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Box II.3
TARGETING METHODOLOGY: THE CASE OF COLOMBIA
Colombia is in the process of shifting 
from a passive to a more proactive 
approach for attracting FDI. To this end, it 
is working with international consultants 
to identify target companies, by sector of 
activity and by country, using the following 
methodology:
• Developing a shortlist with initial criteria 
for sectoral selection. These criteria 
are designed to identify sectors to 
which FDI is being directed at the 
global level, growth sectors in terms 
of foreign trade at the global level, 
sectors with high value added, and 
sectors generating positive economic 
and social impacts. 
• Mapping of the assets offered by 
selected sectors in Colombia so that 
they can be matched up with investors’ 
interests.
• Verifying the impact of each sector on the 
country. When this classification has been 
prepared, second-order selection criteria 
are applied (impact on GDP, employment 
and exports, and definition of sectors 
where promotional efforts are actually 
required) to assign priority to certain 
sectors. Efforts are then to be focused 
on these sectors in terms of policies and 
competitiveness as well as promotion.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
(b) Weak promotion agencies
One specific manifestation of an active policy is the 
existence of an investment promotion agency equipped with 
sufficient tools and resources to carry out its work properly. In 
fact, this is the mechanism most frequently used to promote 
the advantages of a country and to serve as an interface 
between the country and investors. In 2004, there were at 
least 160 organizations of this kind at the national level and 
over 250 at the subnational level (OECD, 2005).
The work of these organizations takes place in a context 
of increasingly intense international competition. At present, 
export development strategies based on attracting FDI are 
no longer the exclusive province of the South-East Asian 
countries. Favourable developments in the transitional 
economies of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern 
European States have brought new stakeholders into this 
competitive arena, which, together with the appearance 
of new and large competitors such as China and India, 
have whittled away at the advantages of countries that 
had previously seemed well-established. On the other 
hand, new ICTs and falling transport costs offer new 
possibilities to investors, who now have many location 
options. Under these new circumstances, competition 
among countries to attract FDI is growing and becoming 
more sophisticated. Although this is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, countries are making increasingly frequent, 
more proactive and ambitious efforts to attract the best 
investment projects of foreign companies.
Seen against this backdrop, it is clear that investment 
promotion agencies should make every effort not only 
to identify the investors that can make the greatest 
contribution to the country’s objectives, but also to spread 
awareness of what the country has to offer so that it will 
be considered by investors and included on their longlists 
and shortlists. This challenge is even present for countries 
which supposedly enjoy international recognition as 
investment sites. In order to be effective, then, investment-
promotion agencies must have the capacities and resources 
to compete at the global level.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, most countries 
have set up investment promotion agencies or equivalent 
institutions to centralize these functions. Nevertheless, 
investment promotion activity in the region is still at an 
incipient stage.14 In addition, Latin American agencies 
suffer from major weaknesses when compared to the 
more developed countries of Asia and Europe. The main 
differences include:
A less proactive approach and a low level of 
promotion activity abroad (such as promotional 
seminars, visits to companies and participation in 
fairs and other events).
A low level of awareness of their role as participants 
in global competition for investment projects. In 
general, the Latin America and Caribbean countries 
believe that their main competitors are their own 
neighbours.
Scant resources and small operational budgets. The 
agencies in the region, with some exceptions, operate 
with budgets and staffing tables that are smaller 
than the international average and, in some cases, 
are even below what can be considered to be basic 
minimum levels. Whereas a high-income country 
spends about US$ 9.4 million and has a staff of 
about 20 for promotional activities, low-income 
countries spend an average of US$ 550,000 and 
recruit an average of 11 people to perform these 





 In all, 12 of the 15 institutions included in a recent ECLAC study had been created or had undergone major changes as of 2000 or were in the 
process of institutional reorganization (ECLAC, 2006a). 
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Latin America and Caribbean countries that want to 
increase their inflows of FDI therefore need to ensure that 
the resources and staff assigned to FDI attraction are up 
to the task. In this connection, the experiences —whether 
successful or not— of their neighbours and other countries 
that have faced similar challenges can be very valuable.
(c) Inefficient and poorly targeted incentives
Fiscal incentives (corporate tax exemptions), mainly 
for the installation of businesses in free zones and specific 
sectors, are the most commonly used promotional tool in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. These incentives are 
granted automatically and are general in scope, which 
indicates a lack of targeting and a lack of specificity in 
relation to the type of investment received by the country. 
In addition, in federal systems (such as those of Mexico, 
Brazil and Argentina), states and provinces can offer 
incentive packages on their own. This has resulted in 
poor coordination with the central level, however, and, 
in some cases, in competing incentives being offered by 
various regions or states.
Meanwhile, two categories of incentives predominate 
in regions with more advanced FDI policies:
In the South-East Asian countries, the predominant 
model is a combination of restrictions
—control processes, limits on foreign ownership, 
exclusion lists, among others— and fiscal incentives, 
mainly corporate income tax reductions or 
exemptions. This is the case of Malaysia, where 
systems of incentives and restrictions coexist, both 
functioning in a coordinated manner according 
to defined national development criteria. FDI is 
sought out in a selective and proactive manner with 
a view to maintaining consistency with industrial 
development plans having timelines of from 10 
to 15 years. Companies receive incentives on the 
•
basis of a technical evaluation, and their projects 
must be in keeping with national objectives. 
In Europe, the preferred option has been direct 
subsidies, financed by the European Union, the 
country or local governments, for training, job 
creation, investment, R&D and other activities. In 
general, these entitlements vary according to the 
geographic area within the country and European 
Union rules. Unlike fiscal incentives, this type of 
benefit places significant pressure on the budgetary 
resources of a country, especially if they are widely 
used. In Ireland, financial incentives are managed 
directly by IDA. As part of its negotiation process 
with investors, this agency can offer a package of 
incentives for recruitment, training and R&D, as 
well as for the purchase or establishment of fixed 
assets. In 2004, the budget allocated to incentives 
in Ireland amounted to 65 million euros. The main 
criteria used for their allocation are the quality 
of the employment created and the geographic 
location, although recently promotional efforts 
have also been focused on R&D-intensive projects. 
The main advantage of these types of benefits lies 
in the ease of evaluating their impact, thanks to 
the fact that they target specific activities that are 
of interest to the country.
If Latin American and Caribbean countries wish to define 
their priorities and attract specific kinds of investments, they 
would do well to review their incentive frameworks and 
evaluate the advisability of applying some more targeted 
measures, especially as they will have soon have to adjust 
their free zone systems to conform to the requirements of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Better targeting of 
incentives would not only make them more competitive 
—and better suited to companies’ requirements— but would 
also increase the probability of making the best use of the 
resources allocated for such incentives.
•
2. Proposals to close the gap
This comparison of the experiences of Latin America and 
the Caribbean with those of more developed countries is 
not intended to serve as the basis for the proposal of any 
particular model. As each country has unique structural 
conditions and its own objectives, no single model could be 
appropriate in all cases. Moreover, the objective situation 
makes it difficult to exactly replicate those models that 
have yielded good results owing to the differing constraints 
that may exist in terms of institutional frameworks or the 
availability of resources. Nevertheless, these experiences 
provide important points of reference.
The intention here is rather to offer a series of 
recommendations that can be used to construct models 
for attracting FDI based on national circumstances. The 
first step is to define the elements that should be included 
in any model that is implemented.
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The central element in any active or integrated policy 
model is the decision to seek to attract a certain type of 
investment on a selective basis. This determination should 
be based on three factors:
Development policy objectives;
The country’s advantages; and
Investors’ needs.
Projects are viable when the country’s advantages 
coincide with investors’ needs. If they are not aligned 
with the country’s policy objectives, however, there is 
no apparent reason to employ active attraction policies. 
Policy objectives, in turn, may not be in keeping with a 
company’s requirements, especially if the country lacks 
the advantages that attract a certain type of investment 
project. When FDI is considered to be strategic for a 
nation’s development, countries can build political and 
institutional capacities that result in a positive dynamic 

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Nicolo Gligo S., “Políticas activas para atraer inversión extranjera 
directa en América Latina y el Caribe”, Desarrollo productivo series, No. 175 
(LC/L.2667-P), Santiago, Chile, January 2007. United Nations publication, 
Sales No. S.07.II.G.18.
In order to create a policy framework that 
can attract FDI, a country must have the 
capacity to harmonize its development 
policy objectives with the advantages it 
offers and the requirements of potential 
investors. Some of the elements to consider 
are the following:
• Capacity to define policy objectives: 
Ideally, there should be a formal, explicit 
development policy that can serve as a 
basis to coordinate FDI promotion policy 
and to define specific objectives. This is 
not usually the case in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. The political will must exist, 
at least, for coordination with national 
development objectives and policies.
• Capacity to define country advantages: 
This is an eminently technical task of 
strategic analysis. It is necessary to be 
able to evaluate both domestic factors 
and the country’s position vis-à-vis its 
competitors, especially the closest ones. 
As has been noted, the Latin America 
and Caribbean countries have little 
awareness of the competition that exists 
beyond the region. The ideal solution 
would be to have in place a permanent 
team of experts in sectoral competitive 
analysis, with international connections 
and experience and the capacity to 
closely track international trends and even 
anticipate them. This would require an 
involvement in the networks of TNCs and, 
possibly, a presence in the countries of 
interest. Such capacities are usually the 
domain of international consulting firms, 
which significantly increases the cost of 
this type of activity. A more economical 
option would be to establish technical 
teams with local-market experience 
and capacity to research and monitor 
trends using public information sources. 
Permanent and fluid contact with foreign 
firms based in each country can help to 
secure relevant information.
• Capacity to assess business requirements: 
A fluid relationship with both potential 
investors and those already established 
in the country is a core aspect of 
achieving convergence. Ideally, a 
country should have offices abroad or, at 
least, adequate mechanisms to ensure 
permanent interaction with investors. The 
capacity to conduct technical assessment 
of projects is also important, in order 
to make sound targeting decisions in 
relation to a project’s expected benefits 
and to develop incentives whose benefits 
can reasonably be expected outweigh 
their costs. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Box II.4
CAPACITIES NEEDED TO CONVERGE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES, COUNTRY ADVANTAGES AND BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS
Nevertheless, beyond the specific mechanisms 
involved, if the gap is to be narrowed there must be the 
political will to do so. Where the political will exists, 
measures can be implemented that are highly effective 
and do not necessarily require huge disbursements of 
resources. More specifically:
Investment promotion agencies should reflect the 
political will to attract investments; this will mean 
replacing their receptive approach with a more 
proactive one in order to ensure that decision-
makers place the country on their “mental map”. 
•
In a context of scarce resources, agencies should 
target their efforts more precisely and identify 
those measures that are likely to reap the greatest 
benefits. To this end, the agencies must build up 
their professional resources and accelerate their 
organizational development.
The system of incentives should evolve from the 
provision of general support to a more selective and 
targeted model. Whatever the model of incentives 
used, the main point is that it should be consistent 
with policy decisions and the benefits expected from 
•
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investments. An efficient system of incentives must 
be underpinned by the requisite technical expertise. 
First and foremost, ex ante evaluations must be 
carried out to determine the types of projects that 
the country wishes to attract (when allocation is 
automatic) or to establish and describe the appraisal 
criteria to be used (when the analysis is carried out 
on a case-by-case basis).
When a given investment is deemed to be of 
strategic importance, specific measures are needed 
to close the gap between the conditions offered 
by the country and investors’ requirements. This 
type of action often calls for coordination between 
government agencies and the private sector. This 
can make it possible to identify factors that can 
generate positive impacts in the short run that will 
enhance the business and investment environment 
without requiring major financial disbursements. A 
country will be better able to implement this type of 
measure if the necessary political will exists, and, 
•
above all, if it has mature investment promotion 
agencies on which to rely.15
Cooperation is a fairly effective way of acquiring 
financial resources and skills. At least two forms 
of cooperation are worth examining in this respect. 
The first is concerted action by the public and 
private sectors, whereby the presence of experienced 
professionals in the latter can compensate for the 
lack of expertise or lack of institutional maturity of 
the former (MIGA, 2005). An interesting case in this 
connection is that of Zonamerica in Uruguay (see 
box II.5). The second option is for Latin American 
and Caribbean countries to work together to promote 
the region (or given geographic areas within it). 
This would enable them to acquire critical mass, 
share resources and organize promotional events 
that would attract investors. The first step is to focus 
positive attention on the region. Once that is done, 
each country can put forward its best arguments 
for attracting investors to its own territory.
•
15
 Since they are in constant touch with investors, investment promotion agencies are in a very good position to detect what types of measures are 
needed and can, at the least, act as advisors to the competent authority in such matters. The resources that investment promotion agencies invest 
in fostering and disseminating investment policies seem to be those that bring in the highest returns in terms of attracting investment (Morisett 
and Andrews, 2004).
Box II.5
ZONAMERICA: AN EXAMPLE OF PRIVATE-SECTOR FDI PROMOTION
Funded with Uruguayan and Belgian capital, 
Zonamerica was originally conceived as a 
free zone for trade with the countries of the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). 
A number of problems soon arose, however. 
Under MERCOSUR regulations, goods from 
free zones in member countries (except 
the special customs areas of Manaus and 
Tierra del Fuego) were subject to tariffs as 
if they were entering from a third country, 
which defeated the purpose for which the 
venture had been created.
Meanwhile, reflecting global trends, 
the region started to attract the attention of 
companies in search of new locations from 
which to provide services (such as call centres 
and shared services). At the same time, 
Uruguayan software firms began to set up in 
Zonamerica in order to avail themselves of its 
free-zone advantages. These developments 
were quickly identified and it was decided 
to switch strategy and create a world-class 
business and technology park.
The location was appealing for a 
number of reasons: on the one hand 
were country factors, such as political 
stability, level of education and quality 
of life and, on the other, there was an 
attractive framework of tax and customs 
incentives linked to the free-zone regime. 
Zonamerica rounded off this proposition 
by creating architectural infrastructure 
and telecommunications services that 
met the standards required by TNCs. 
It also engaged in intensive efforts to 
proactively promote its services on the 
international market.
Zonamerica currently has 182 
companies on board and actively promotes 
investments in seven business areas: 
shared-service centres, logistics and 
distribution, financial services, consultancy 
and auditing, call centres, information 
technologies and biotechnology.
From the viewpoint of the private 
sector, Zonamerica has supported the 
development of a new sector in Uruguay 
—export services— underpinned by 
new ICTs. The government provided the 
incentives and Zonamerica was able to 
use them to put together a deal of higher 
value. This initiative did not result from a 
concerted effort between the two parties, 
however. In fact, no information has been 
compiled on the size of investments or the 
employment generated in Zonamerica. 
It would be interesting to look at how a 
similar model might be implemented with 
the public and private sectors working in 
tandem from the outset. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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E. Conclusions
The competition for FDI is increasingly intense, and 
the countries that are competing successfully are those 
which, in addition to offering the necessary conditions, 
are developing active policies to attract and harness 
the benefits of FDI. The economies that stand the most 
to gain from these investments are the ones that have 
targeted them in the light of their national development 
objectives. Existing international experience is broad and 
sufficiently varied to offer valuable points of reference 
for each country.
In terms of their institutional profiles, most 
investment promotion agencies in Latin America and 
the Caribbean are relatively new and are still in the 
midst of an institutional learning and consolidation 
process. This is compounded, except in a few cases, by 
budgetary constraints, a shortage of human resources, 
and poor coordination and integration with other policies. 
This suggests that the capacity to execute FDI policies 
efficiently is yet to be fully developed.
Countries must assess their own competencies 
and advantages and, on this basis, draw up appropriate 
strategies for attracting investments. Among other things, 
they must develop the necessary technical capacity and 
the ability to conduct the kinds of evaluations that are 
needed in order to design effective promotion activities, 
gauge the level of incentives they offer to ensure that 
their costs will not outweigh the benefits afforded by a 
given investment, and identify projects and companies 
that will make a positive contribution to the country’s 
development strategies.
The countries of the region are making strides in 
this direction, and changes are being made with a view 
to consolidating the institutional structure for investment 
promotion. Countries are aware of the benefits of, and the 
need for, more precisely targeted promotion initiatives 
and are taking the necessary steps to achieve them. And, 
in fact, investment policies are becoming more active. It 
is to be hoped that the move in this direction will gather 
speed and become more focused so that the countries 
can narrow the still yawning gap that separates them 
from developed countries and the emerging economies 
of Asia.
There is a degree of consensus as to the potential benefits 
of FDI. Harnessing those benefits is not an automatic 
process, however, and their transfer and absorption 
will depend both on the specific characteristics of the 
investment and on the particular features of the host 
country, in particular in terms of such factors as the 
existence of a trained workforce, the competitiveness 
of local manufacturers (and their capacity to serve as 
suppliers to foreign companies), and the existence of 
associated clusters. Host countries face the challenge 
of capturing these benefits, since if the necessary 
conditions are not present, a foreign company may end 
up as an enclave within the country, and no more than 
a fraction of the potential benefits will be transferred 
to the local economy.
More advanced countries’ awareness of the need to 
boost technology transfer and absorption of FDI benefits 
has prompted them to employ a variety of measures 
which may be classified in the following categories:
Boosting local businesses’ efficiency and 
competitiveness. The aim is to ensure that these 
businesses can produce goods that meet foreign 
companies’ quality standards and price requirements 
and can thus become suppliers for those firms.
Establishing programmes to create links between 
local and foreign companies. Some support 
programmes are geared towards collecting 
information and contacts in order to facilitate 
sourcing from local firms (see box II.2).
Specifying requirements for foreign investment. 
For example, in order to promote investments that 
are further up the value chain, Malaysia no longer 
provides incentives for low-skilled labour-intensive 
projects. For its part, Singapore encourages foreign 
companies to establish risk-sharing partnerships 
with local firms. 
Carrying out ex ante project evaluations. These 
appraisals are geared towards channelling 
promotional efforts, investment searches and 
support into those sectors, projects and companies 
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Chapter III
Republic of Korea: investment and 
corporate strategies in Latin America
and the Caribbean
A. Introduction 
The development experience of the Republic of Korea is impressive and provides important 
lessons for developing countries. The country was brought to a rude awakening during the 
twentieth century, first, by Japanese colonization (1910-1945), second, by a severe dependence 
on direct aid from the United States that conditioned its development options after the Second 
World War and, third, by the global clash between capitalism and communism that, as a 
result of the Korean War (1950-1953), left the country divided into a communist north and a 
capitalist south. The Republic of Korea, then a poor country with an economy based mainly on 
agriculture and mining —the two sectors accounted for about 50% of GDP— and a per capita 
GDP similar to that of some African countries such as Mozambique and Senegal, began in 
the early 1960s to take drastic measures aimed at becoming an independent economy (“Jarip 
Gyongjé”) through guided capitalism (“Gyodo Jabon-Jui”). As a consequence, public policies 
were deliberately aimed at building up national industrial and technological capabilities to gain 
international competitiveness.
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The Republic of Korea’s prolific GDP growth thereafter 
was based on an outward-oriented industrialization process 
that endowed the Korean economy with the world’s tenth 
largest GDP, made it the twelfth largest trader (Invest Korea, 
2005a) and raised its per capita GDP to the equivalent of two 
thirds of the average for the countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 
2003).1 The Republic of Korea thus became one of the 
principal showcases of the rapid industrialization process 
known as the “East Asian Miracle”. 
In spite of this stellar growth, a debilitating financial 
crisis towards the end of the twentieth century obliged 
the country to rethink its existing development strategy. 
At the same time, it found itself in an Asian “nutcracker” 
between a technology leader (Japan) and several Asian 
fast followers (especially China), which challenged its 
international competitiveness. In short, the Republic 
of Korea was losing wage competitiveness without 
gaining advanced technology. Hence, the government 
opted to promote a knowledge economy in order to 
make the transition from “technology follower” to 
“innovator”. The Republic of Korea thus opted to 
concentrate on continually restructuring its economy 
through technological upgrading and innovation in 
higher value, knowledge-based activities in order to 
advance towards a knowledge economy that would 
better sustain GDP growth. The Korean economy has 
made a very significant R&D effort, expending the 
equivalent of over half of the developing world’s total 
private-sector R&D spending.2 From this stronger base, 
the country has embraced globalization and become 
a world leader in information and communications 
technologies (ICTs), among other knowledge-based 
activities. The Korean experience is thus particularly 
relevant for Latin America and the Caribbean, since the 
country has been able to face up to severe challenges 
by taking tough decisions to reorient its development 
strategy under trying conditions.
1. The initial burst of growth, 1962-1997
1
  By way of comparison: Korea’s real per capita GDP grew from US$ 1,110 to US$ 12,230 between 1960 and 2003, while Mexico’s increased 
from US$ 2,560 to US$ 5,790 over the same period (Chen, 2006). 
2
 To give another example: the Republic of Korea undertook 35 times more R&D by industry as a proportion of GDP than did Mexico with roughly 
the same manufacturing value-added (UNCTAD, 2003).
The principal drivers of the first rapid growth phase 
were, initially, labour-intensive industries, such as 
apparel, footwear and domestic appliances and, later, 
capital-intensive activities such as textiles, automobiles, 
shipbuilding and semiconductors. In only three or four 
decades, the Republic of Korea made its presence felt 
in several global manufacturing industries by way of 
a focused investment programme that resulted in brisk 
growth. By the turn of the century, the Korean textile 
industry ranked seventh in the world by production 
capacity and fifth by exports and, measured by global 
market shares or production, the Republic of Korea ranked 
first in shipbuilding, third in petrochemicals and fifth in 
both the automotive and steel industries (Invest Korea, 
2005a). Figure III.1 suggests that dynamic manufactures 
evolved mainly in a small number of industries that for 
the most part came on stream between 1970 and 2000. In 
general, manufacturing evolved from simple to complex 
activities and from lower to higher technology.
Figure III.1
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: DYNAMIC MANUFACTURES, 1970-2000
(Percentages of GDP)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of M-K. Pai, “How are Korea’s core industries faring?”, KIET Industrial 
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The conventional interpretation of the Republic 
of Korea’s success tends to focus on market reforms 
and export performance (World Bank, 1993), but this 
largely misses the central point.3 The country achieved 
phenomenal success based on strategic industrial and 
technological policies designed and implemented by a 
developmental State4 for the purpose of strengthening 
national private conglomerates or chaebol.5 That strategy 
combined selective import-substitution with forceful 
export promotion, protecting and subsidizing targeted 
industries that were chosen to provide the main exports. 
The government sought to keep control firmly in local 
hands and foreign direct investment (FDI) was allowed 
only where considered necessary (UNCTAD, 2003). The 
most significant aspect of this formative stage of the Korean 
experience —until the financial crisis of 1997— was 
the unorthodox development strategy employed by the 
Government of Korea to coordinate investment decisions 
during the first rapid growth phase. 
The most unique aspect of the development strategy 
was the “government-business risk partnership”,6 under 
which domestic private firms engaged in government-
monitored export bidding processes in order to secure 
government-guaranteed loans, thereby becoming agents of 
the State in carrying out its economic development plans 
(Lim, 2000). Or, viewed from another perspective (Rodrik, 
2001, 1994), the country’s coherent national strategy 
sought to raise the return on national private investment 
by awarding subsidies (loans at negative interest rates, 
government guarantees, export benefits), providing protective 
import tariffs, nationalizing the domestic banking sector, 
condoning the reverse engineering of foreign patented 
products and imposing performance requirements (trade 
balancing and domestic content requirements) on foreign 
companies operating in the economy.7 While the initial 
vision of development did not formally exclude FDI, 
the government was unwilling to depend on it, clearly 
preferring foreign loans as the main form of external 
financing in order to build up national companies as the 
principal economic agents. 
Another unique aspect of the Republic of Korea’s 
development strategy was the way it went about promoting 
inward technology transfer and developing domestic 
absorptive capacity to digest, assimilate and improve 
upon transferred technologies. According to Chung, S. 
(2006), the government contracted foreign loans on a large 
scale and allocated them to major investments in selected 
industries, which led to massive importation of foreign 
capital goods and turn-key plants. This, in turn, helped 
Korean companies to reverse engineer imported capital 
goods in order to acquire the technologies necessary for 
the development strategy.
The business-government risk partnership and 
the technology transfer policies were consolidated by 
the emblematic Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) 
policy of the 1970s, since the intermediate products 
—petrochemicals and steel— manufactured by State 
enterprises formed the principal inputs for the textile and 
apparel, automotive and shipbuilding industries which led 
the export boom. In the late 1970s, investment in these 
industries accounted for almost 80% of all fixed investment 
in the manufacturing sector, even though they accounted 
for only half that percentage of manufacturing output (Lim, 
2000). And, indeed, the State picked winners. During the 
first three five-year economic development plans (1962-
1976), the government focused on State-led planning by 
designing sectoral investment plans and mobilizing and 
allocating domestic and external resources to support their 
implementation. Thereafter, during the next three five-year 
economic development plans (1977-1991), the government 
shifted to more indicative planning by affording a larger 
role to private initiative (Woo, 2006). 
3
 This orthodox view has been strongly criticized for its neoliberal bias and for failing to recognize the developmental role of the State in East 
Asia’s successes (Amsden, 1994; Kwon, 1994; Lall, 1994; Chang, 1993 and Stiglitz, 1996).
4
 Doner, Ritchie and Slater (2005) define a developmental State as an organizational complex in which expert and coherent bureaucratic agencies 
collaborate with an organized private sector to spur national economic transformation. They apply the term to the experiences of the Republic 
of Korea, Taiwan Province of China and Singapore.
5
 Chaebol refers to the original core of Korean “big business”, consisting of several dozen large, family-controlled corporate groups that became 
the privileged agents of government industrialization and export policy. This process began with the Park Chung Hee military government in 
1961 and was deepened by the Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) policy in the 1970s. The chaebol were in many ways similar to the Japanese 
keiretsu, but there are important differences. For instance, the former are still largely controlled by the founding families while the latter tend 
to be controlled by professional managers. The former are more centralized in ownership, while the latter are more decentralized and, until 
recently, connected by cross-shareholdings. The former were prohibited from owning private banks (to facilitate government leverage via credit 
allocation), while the latter historically relied on an affiliated bank. 
6
 According to Lim (2003), the government-business risk partnership was the core of the Korean model and consisted initially of the public 
management of private risk. Investment risk was shared through government loan guarantees for international lenders providing credit for private 
Korean companies and by way of direct government credits and incentives for dynamic exporters based on export market performance. 
7
 Many of these policy instruments are no longer available to developing countries because they are either prohibited under multilateral and 
bilateral agreements or disapproved of by international financial institutions, or both (Chang, 2002).
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Many of the dynamic manufacturing industries 
peaked as a percentage of manufacturing GDP during 
this period. Figure III.1 shows that textiles and wearing 
apparel peaked at 21.3% in 1975 and domestic appliances 
reached a high point of 4.1% in 1990. General machinery 
and automobiles reached their highest level, at 3.1% and 
9.0%, respectively, in 1995 and industrial chemicals, iron 
and steel, and shipbuilding did so in 1998, at 7.0%, 8.2% 
and 5.8%, respectively. Only the more modern elements of 
the electronics industry (semiconductors and computers) 
continued to expand as a percentage of manufacturing 
GDP after that time. Thus, while the Republic of Korea’s 
success was built on cumulative bursts of growth by a 
handful of dynamic industries, the rate of expansion began to 
decline, and these sectors’ evident efficiency did not spread 
throughout the overall economy to the extent required, and 
especially not to services. Moreover, even in industries in 
which the country was among the global leaders, its labour 
productivity often fell significantly behind that of market 
leaders such as Japan and the United States (I-J. Lee, 2005) 
and domestic wage rises began to outpace productivity 
gains (Hussain, 2006), thus weakening the international 
competitiveness of many of the simpler exports. 
The Korean economy was in need of a fresh set of 
dynamics. For Korean firms, this implied seeking out new 
growth opportunities —beyond exports— by establishing 
global production networks (Park, 2005). For the economy 
as a whole, it required the development of an effective 
globalization strategy to improve the competitiveness of 
non-export sectors (Cho and Kim, 2005; Kim and Choo 
2002) and to deepen the incipient knowledge-intensive 
phase of development (Lee, 2000).
In this context, the Korean development strategy faced 
a very significant dilemma with regard to the principal 
economic agents driving the capital-intensive phase of 
accelerated growth. The huge scale of the investment 
effort absorbed by the outward-oriented industrialization 
process obliged the State to prefer the chaebol as its primary 
economic agents. For that reason, the government felt the 
need to guarantee the stability of the chaebol-based system, 
since the bankruptcy of any large national conglomerate 
would destabilize the entire national financial system. This 
implicit guarantee also encouraged competing chaebol to 
undertake excessive investments, however (Lim, 2001), 
which undermined the efficiency of the Korean economic 
system based on the government-business risk partnership, 
in spite of its evident dynamism as seen in the growth of 
the manufacturing sector. Finally, the financial crisis that 
erupted in 1997 —stemming from the over-indebtedness 
and consequent bankruptcy of many of the dominant 
Korean companies— forced policymakers to rethink the 
development strategy.
The move towards partial market liberalization and 
democracy during the 1980s had the unintended effect 
of actually strengthening the chaebol with respect to the 
government. By the 1990s, the top 30 family conglomerates 
in the Republic of Korea generated more than 46% of 
industry revenues, their combined assets accounted 
for 47% of the entire economy (Kim, Kandemir and 
Cavusgil, 2004) and the indebtedness of the top chaebol 
was manifested in debt-equity ratios in excess of 500%. 
Thus, the financial crisis coincided with mounting pressure 
to break away from past practices and face up to new 
development challenges.
2. The 1997 financial crisis
Eventually, a series of bankruptcies among prominent 
chaebol drained the confidence of international lenders, 
who called in their short-term loans. In effect, although the 
Korean development strategy based on the government-
business risk partnership proved an efficient choice 
during the 1960s, given the country’s political economy 
and resource endowment at the time (Lim, 2001), the 
1997 financial crisis revealed that model’s limitations 
as regards corporate governance, especially in terms of 
“crony capitalism” (Lee and Hobday, 2003), and inefficient 
financial resource allocation.
The devastating effects of the financial crisis, in which 
nonperforming loans reached the equivalent of 28% of 
GDP, made clear the need for a new round of drastic policy 
changes. The sheer scale of the crisis forced the government 
to seek financial assistance from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)8 in November 1997. The economic conditions 
imposed by the international financial institutions (IMF 
8
 IMF extended resources to the Government of the Republic of Korea on the order of US$ 19.5 billion, consisting of a supplementary reserve 
facility of US$ 13.5 billion (which was repaid by September 1999), and a standby loan of US$ 6 billion (which was repaid in August 2001).
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and the World Bank) encompassed five major market 
reforms (Tcha, 2006). The financial reform package was 
based on restructuring and prudential regulatory measures 
aimed at shifting the Korean financial system to a more 
market-based (less bank-based) and more arm’s-length 
(rather than relationship-based) model. The corporate sector 
reform was directed at improving corporate governance, 
eliminating overcapacity, improving bankruptcy procedures 
and removing regulations that stifled competition. The 
labour market reform sought to introduce flexibility and 
stability while reducing economic and social disparities. 
The objective of the public sector reform was to achieve 
a more market-oriented economy by improving the 
institutional regime and privatizing public corporations. 
Lastly, the Republic of Korea was encouraged to open up 
more to the international economy and to globalization. 
Ultimately, the Korean Government took these measures 
much further of its own accord.
The recuperation was quite impressive. The country 
soon regained a growth trajectory, with GDP expanding 
by 6.7% in 1998 and 10.7% in 1999 (Woo, 2006). The 
government put its financial house in order, accumulating 
over US$ 200 billion in international reserves by 2004. 
The financial sector was reorganized: the number of banks 
fell from 33 in 1997 to 20 in 2001 (Woo, 2006), bad loans 
dropped from 66.7 trillion won to 31.8 trillion won between 
1999 and 2002, the proportion of nonperforming to total 
loans fell from 11.3% to 3.9% (Tcha, 2006) and the debt-
equity ratios of Korean companies decreased from 396% 
in 1997 to 111% in 2005 (M-S Chung, 2006). 
Inward foreign investment became a significant new 
element of the evolving Korean development strategy. 
The reforms included vastly increased access for foreign 
direct investors to the Korean economy through firm 
measures to open the capital account and liberalize the 
capital market (Lim and Hahn, 2006). The results of 
government liberalization of FDI legislation were soon 
evident: over US$ 90 billion entered the country in 1998-
2005, compared to only US$ 25 billion in 1962-1997, and 
the market share of foreign banks in the Korean banking 
sector rose from less than 9% to almost 22% over the 
same period (Invest Korea, 2005a). Numerous national 
companies, including State corporations, were sold to 
foreign investors. Moreover, the foreign-held share of 
the stock market jumped from 27% to over 40% in 2000-
2004. The traditionally restrictive treatment of foreign 
capital by Korean policymakers (Hill, 2004) underwent 
a dramatic transformation, for which there were also two 
other important reasons. One was that foreign capital 
gained new credibility in the Republic of Korea for its 
significant contribution to effective corporate restructuring 
and debt resolution (Sohn, 2002; Ha, 2004). Another was 
the need to design and implement a globalization policy, 
which pushed Korean policymakers to accommodate 
international standards, given that the country had become 
a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
1995 and of OECD in 1996 (Kim and Choo, 2002; Lee, 
Kim and Choi, 2004).
One of the most impressive results was the change 
in the chaebol themselves (see table III.1). The corporate 
reform saw some of the main conglomerates decline 
(for example, Samsung and Hyundai) or disappear as 
independent entities (this happened to Daewoo, as well 
as Kia, Hanla, Jinro, Hanbo, Sammi, Haitai and some 
others) and many of their competitive core elements, 
such as Samsung Electronics Company, Hyundai Motor 
Company and LG Electronics, became more independent 
or were sold to competitors (as occurred with Kia Motor 
and Hynix). A number of relative newcomers entered the 
top 10 (Kookmin Bank, SK Networks and S-Oil).
Table III.1
TOP 10 KOREAN COMPANIES, 1995 AND 2005
(Trillions of Korean won)
 Rank
 1995 2005
 Company Total sales Company Total sales
 1  Samsung Corporation 19.3 Samsung Electronics Company 57.4 
 2  Hyundai Corporation 16.7 Hyundai Motor Company 27.4 
 3  Samsung Electronics Company 16.2 Korea Electric Power a 25.1 
 4  Daewoo 15.0 LG Electronics 23.8 
 5  LG International Corp. 10.4 SK 21.9 
 6  Hyundai Motor Co. 10.3 Posco 21.7 
 7  Korea Electric Power  10.0 Kookmin Bank b 17.9 
 8  Posco 8.2 Kia Motor c 16.0 
 9  SK 6.6 SK Networks 14.9 
 10  LG Electronics 6.6 S-Oil 12.2 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA), “A survey of Korean listed companies”, 
2006.
a Korea Electric Power Corp. was split into six generating companies in 2001. The Korean Power Exchange and the Korean Electricity Commission were established to oversee 
competition in the industry, especially the separation of the generation, distribution and sales sectors.
b
 Kookmin Bank emerged as the result of a series of large acquisitions. 
c
  The Kia chaebol went bankrupt and Kia Motor was eventually acquired by Hyundai Motor Company after a number of government auctions.
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But perhaps the most notable impact of the financial 
crisis was that Korean officials became increasingly 
convinced that it was again necessary to adopt drastic 
decisions to reorient the development strategy, above and 
beyond that entailed by the demands of the international 
financial institutions. For that reason, the financial crisis 
has been referred to as a blessing in disguise (M-S 
Chung, 2006).
3. Shifting the base of growth towards the knowledge economy
The Republic of Korea shifted its development strategy 
more forcefully towards higher value, knowledge-based 
activities in an attempt to extract itself from the sandwich 
between the rapidly advancing fast followers and R&D 
upstarts of developing Asia, especially China, on the 
one hand, and the dominant economic powers of Japan, 
North America and Europe, on the other (World Bank, 
2000; Ernst, 2003). In short, the country was losing wage 
competitiveness without gaining advanced technology 
(An, 2005). Hence, the government opted to promote 
a knowledge economy9 in order to make the transition 
from technology follower to innovator.
The differences between the central aspects of the 
new innovation-driven strategy (versus the old capital-
driven one) were spelled out in the 2010 Industrial Vision 
(see table III.2).
The Republic of Korea plans to become one of the 
world’s top four industrial powers by shifting the capital- 
and external-growth-driven development strategy to one 
driven by innovation and qualitative growth. This means 
it will have to promote faster technology development 
than the industrialized countries do in future strategic 
industries (digital electronics, electronic medical equipment, 
bioindustry, environmental industry and aviation, 
for example) and promote upgrading, specialization 
and knowledge information in manufacturing-related 
services (such as business services and e-business), while 
also maintaining its position among global leaders in 
major basic industries (shipbuilding, semiconductors, 
automobiles, textiles, petrochemicals, steel, and machine 
parts and materials).
9
 According to the World Bank (2006), a knowledge economy is one in which the sustained use and creation of knowledge are at the centre of 
the economic development process; one in which knowledge becomes the key engine of economic growth. The four pillars of the knowledge 
economy are: (i) an economic incentive and institutional regime that provides good economic policies and institutions, which promote efficient 
allocation of resources and stimulate creativity and incentives for the efficient creation, dissemination, and use of existing knowledge; (ii) an 
educated and skilled labour force that continuously upgrades and adapts skills to efficiently create and use knowledge; (iii) an effective innovation 
system of firms, research centres, universities, consultants and other organizations that keeps up with the knowledge revolution, taps into the 
growing stock of global knowledge, and assimilates and adapts new knowledge to local needs; and (iv) a modern and adequate information 
infrastructure that facilitates the effective communication, dissemination and processing of information and knowledge.
Table III.2
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: COMPARISON OF CAPITAL- AND 
INNOVATION-DRIVEN STRATEGIES
Growth strategy Capital-driven strategy Innovation-driven strategy
Productivity - low-cost labour - knowledge-information-driven
  management  human resources management
 - automation - advanced production and
 - economies of scale  management
 - sales after production - knowledge-, technology- and
    information-intensive
   - flexible production on demand
Value added - mass production - small quantity batch production
 - assembling and  - high-technology parts and
  processing-centred  materials
 - “Korea Discount” brand - “Korea Premium” brand
Technology - imitation and imported - developing source and core
  technology  technology
 - no link between basic - strengthening the combination of
  science and industrial  sciences and industrial technology
  technology - concentrating on strategic
 - production technology  development of next-generation
  development centered  technology
 - insufficient combination - focusing on combining
  of technologies  technologies
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy (MOCIE), “Toward 2010” 
[online] http://english.mocie.go.kr.
In the past, the Republic of Korea has experienced 
remarkable success as a technology importer. Its challenge 
now is to make the leap from technology importer to 
technology leader and, in a broader context, from an 
industrial to a knowledge society (Dahlman, 2005). 
The achievements in this field are already noteworthy 
(Invest Korea, 2005a). The country’s R&D capability is 
ranked sixth in the world, it generates the eighth largest 
total R&D expenditure and holds third place in terms of 
patent productivity. The Republic of Korea’s technological 
upgrading is now firmly based on competitive and financially 
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stable large national corporations (Lee, 2005). Its world-
class electronics companies have demonstrated high 
productivity (Woo, 2006) and gained impressive global 
market shares.10 The ICT industry alone came to account 
for one third of GDP growth after the financial crisis 
(Hong, 2005) and its competitiveness is demonstrated by 
indicators of extensive diffusion throughout the economy, 
such as Internet use (61% of the population), broadband 
penetration (23%) and mobile phone subscribers (78%). 
According to Lee and Kim (2001), the Republic of Korea 
has demonstrated three different kinds of successes in 
technological catch-up: (i) path-following catch-up in 
consumer electronics, personal computers and machine 
tools, (ii) path-skipping catch-up in the case of DRAM 
semiconductors and automobiles; and (iii) path-creating 
catch-up in CDMA telephony and mobile handsets.
The Republic of Korea’s growing international 
competitiveness is evident from the data reported in 
table III.3. During the period 1985-2004, Korean exports 
continuously gained international market share, rising 
from 1.46% to 2.80% of world trade. This market share 
demonstrated a positive evolution in that non-natural-
resource-based manufactures, which are more dynamic 
within international trade, grew faster than commodities 
and natural-resource-based manufactures did and, within 
this category, the medium- and high-technology products 
gained market share while low-technology manufactures 
declined. This technological and industrial upgrading of the 
Korean export structure has been central to its improved 
international competitiveness. All of the top 10 exports, 
which represent over half of the country’s total exports, 
gained international market shares and 8 of the 10 are 
among the 50 most dynamic products in international trade 
(out of 239). Moreover, most are items easily identifiable 
with the knowledge economy, such as semiconductors, 
telecommunications equipment, computers and their parts, 
even though some are still clearly based on consolidated 
industries, such as refined petroleum, polymerization and 
steel products.
The industrial vision of the Korean Institute for 
Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) for 2020 
contemplates an even more focused approach to 14 
promising sectors, such as next-generation semiconductors, 
10
 For example, in 2005, Samsung Electronics Company held the second largest global market share in semiconductors (6.9%) after world leader 
Intel and was the world leader in DRAM (32.6%) and NAND Flash memory (55%). In the display industry, Samsung Electronics Company 
(TFT-LCD), LG Electronics (PDP), Samsung SDI (PDP and CRT) and LG Philips (TFT-LCD and CRT) were all world leaders.
11
 In that context, free trade agreements (FTAs) could be an important instrument for accessing foreign markets and protecting Korean companies 
investing abroad and Korean owners of intellectual property. In 2004, Korea signed its first FTA with Chile. This was followed in 2005 by the 
signature of FTAs with Singapore and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and a Framework Agreement with the Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). During 2006, Korea was negotiating FTAs with ASEAN and the United States and an Economic Complementation 
Agreement with Mexico, and was engaged in continuing conversations with Canada, India, Japan, China and MERCOSUR. 
new biodrugs and bio-organs, ubiquitous networks, 
next-generation display, new-concept computers, next-
generation vehicles, contents industry, health-care services, 
next-generation power production, robotics, high-tech 
chemical materials, advanced air and marine transport, 
hyperprecision equipment parts, and high-tech machinery 
and systems (Song and Lim, 2006). In other words, the 
Republic of Korea is making headway in evolving from 
imitation to innovation (Kim, 1997).
In general, with regard to the Korean development 
trajectory, it would seem reasonable to conclude that 
when the country embarked on a fast follower trajectory 
it possessed a development strategy adequate for the task. 
Now that it has evolved into a competitive stakeholder in 
the international economic system and aspires to become 
a technology leader, its development strategy has been 
altered accordingly. Its economic policy has become 
more traditional or orthodox and focuses on objectives 
associated with the knowledge economy.11
The public policy focus on FDI evolved with the 
changes in the Korean development strategy. During 
the initial growth phase, inward FDI by transnational 
corporations tended to be viewed as a necessary evil 
in some situations but not to be relied upon: instead, 
the primary focus of the development strategy was on 
strengthening national conglomerates and accessing 
foreign technology. Outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) by Korean companies was for the most part 
dissuaded for balance-of-payments reasons, except 
as much as was strictly necessary to secure natural 
resources and move into export markets. As the focus 
of the Korean development strategy shifted towards 
innovation and R&D, particularly after the financial 
crisis, inward FDI was viewed much more positively 
and was actively promoted in order to access new 
technologies and improve the efficiency of the domestic 
economy and to facilitate its further integration into the 
international market. OFDI was promoted to the extent 
that the balance of payments improved and as it became 
increasingly apparent that such investment was needed 
to consolidate the international production networks of 
Korean companies and backstop their efforts to acquire 
world class R&D.
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Table III.3
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: COMPETITIVENESS IN THE WORLD MARKET, 1985-2004
(Percentages)
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
I. Market shares   1.46 1.87 2.19 2.52 2.80
 1. Natural resources a   0.30 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.16
 2. Manufactures based on natural resources b   0.70 0.77 1.21 2.00 1.89
 3.Manufactures not based on natural resources c   2.28 2.62 2.86 3.13 3.64
  - Low-technology d   5.01 4.72 2.97 2.69 2.23
  - Medium-technology e   1.11 1.54 2.21 2.50 3.07
  - High-technology f   1.80 2.53 3.82 4.14 5.35
 4. Other g   0.53 0.68 1.43 1.19 1.26
II. Export structure   100 100 100 100 100
 1. Natural resources a   4.8 3.3 1.9 1.6 0.8
 2. Manufactures based on natural resources b   9.3 7.4 9.2 12.3 10.6
 3. Manufactures not based on natural resources c   84.6 88.0 86.7 84.3 87.0
  - Low-technology d   48.9 41.8 22.5 16.7 11.9
  - Medium-technology e   21.6 25.6 31.3 30.2 32.4
  - High-technology f   14.4 20.7 33.0 37.5 42.7
 4. Other g   1.1 1.2 2.2 1.8 1.7
III. 10 main exports   17.7 24.0 42.3 52.2 57.5
 776-Thermionic valves and tubes, other semiconductors * + 4.8 7.4 16.7 15.1 13.6
 764-Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s. * + 3.2 3.4 3.8 7.4 12.5
 781-Passenger motor cars (excl. public service type) * + 1.4 3.2 5.1 7.4 9.1
 759-Parts n.e.s. of and accessories for 751 and 752 * + 0.7 1.1 3.4 3.4 4.3
 871-Optical instruments and apparatus * + 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 3.4
 752-Automatic data processing machines, units thereof * +  0.9 3.5 3.5 6.6 3.4
 334-Petroleum products, refined  + 2.1 0.6 1.9 4.5 3.4
 583-Polymerization and copolymerization products * + 0.7 1.2 2.9 3.1 3.0
 778-Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s. * + 1.2 1.3 2.5 1.7 2.5
 674-Universals, plates and sheets, of iron or steel  + 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of “TradeCAN 2006” [CD-ROM Database], January 2006.
Note: Groups of products are based on the United Nations Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 2. The abbreviation “n.e.s.” stands for “not elsewhere 
specified”.
a
 Contains 45 simply processed commodities, including concentrates.
b
 Contains 65 items: 35 agricultural/forestry groups and 30 others (mostly metals other than steel, plus petroleum products, cement, glass, etc.). 
c
 Contains 120 groups that represent the sum of d/ + e/ + f/. 
d
 Contains 44 items: 20 groups in the textiles and wearing apparel cluster, plus 24 others (paper products, glass and steel, jewellery). 
e
 Contains 58 items: 5 groups in the motor vehicle industry, 22 in the processing industry and 31 in the engineering industry. 
f
 Contains 18 items: 11 groups in the electronics cluster plus 7 others (pharmaceuticals, turbines, aircraft, instruments). 
g
 Contains 9 unclassified groups (mostly from section 9). 
* Denotes groups that are among the 50 most dynamic in world imports, 1985-2004. 
+ Denotes groups in which the Republic of Korea gained (+) market share in world imports, 1985-2004.
The rest of this chapter examines the nature of OFDI 
by the Republic of Korea in the context of its development 
trajectory. Section B contains an analysis of the evolution 
of and motivations for Korean OFDI. Section C focuses 
on the dominant corporate strategies in the main industries 
in which OFDI has been important (electronics, textile, 
apparel, automotive, and natural resources and natural-
resource-based manufactures). Section D examines the 
principal operations of Korean transnational corporations 
(TNCs) in those industries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The final section draws together the different 
analyses and draws the pertinent conclusions. 
B. The drivers of Korean OFDI
OFDI from emerging economies is playing an increasingly 
important role in enhancing their integration into the 
global economy and improving the competitiveness 
of their companies. OFDI can help strengthen firms’ 
competitiveness by securing natural resources and 
consolidating export markets, assisting them to improve 
their efficiency by establishing export platforms in lower-
cost sites, and permitting their access to strategic assets 
(such as technology and skills). Thus, at a certain level 
of progress, OFDI becomes more relevant in a successful 
emerging economy’s development trajectory. 
The main purpose of this section is to survey the trends 
in Korean OFDI and the motivations for it, and thereby better 
understand its role in the country’s development trajectory. 
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1. The evolution and nature of Korean OFDI
Korean OFDI began to gain momentum in the late 1980s, 
prompted by changing legal and economic circumstances. 
The Export-Import Bank of Korea (Korea Eximbank) 
possesses a sophisticated system for tracking the evolution 
of Korean OFDI (see table III.4); however, official OFDI 
statistics suffer from certain shortcomings as regards 
reliability and interpretation which must be taken into 
consideration (see box III.1). Before the 1980s, Korean 
development was constrained by serious balance-of-
payments problems, so that, except for OFDI needed to 
access natural resources, open export markets or support 
special activities (foreign-currency-generating construction 
projects in the Middle East, for example), such outward 
investment was generally prohibited by the Korean 
government. For that reason, up to 1980, only 400 cases, 
involving OFDI in the order of US$ 274 million, had been 
requested and only 352 cases, representing OFDI worth 
US$ 145 million, had been registered. However, by 2006, 
over 37,000 cases, representing about US$ 106 billion, 
had been requested and over 33,000 cases, totalling almost 
US$ 70 billion, had been registered.
The second phase of Korean OFDI was triggered by 
the changing domestic and international environment in 
the late 1980s. An important turning point came in 1986 
when the country recorded remarkable export growth and 
enjoyed a sizeable current-account surplus. The success 
of Korean exports provoked a response in the form of 
new trade barriers and restrictions in several major export 
markets; hence, there was a growing need to establish plants 
in those markets. At the same time, rapid domestic wage 
increases eroded the cost-competitive advantages of domestic 
production in foreign markets. These examples suggest that 
global pull and domestic push factors made it increasingly 
necessary for Korean firms to internationalize. During the late 
1980s, various initiatives were taken to strengthen Korean 
competitiveness, from relocating production to low-wage 
countries to relaxing somewhat the existing regulations and 
restrictions on inward FDI in order to increase competition 
for Korean companies in their own market.
The globalization strategy of Korean firms in the 
1990s drove an increase in OFDI flows. In line with 
the government’s globalization policy, the top chaebol 
embarked on ambitious globalization strategies aimed at 
increasing their overseas share of production and sales in 
order to catch up with global leaders.12 However, in some 
cases, premature and excessively bold internationalization 
strategies proved unsustainable, as exemplified by Daewoo’s 
bankruptcy and the problems experienced by Kia. These 
firms embarked on internationalization without building 
up strong enough competitive advantages first.
Table III.4
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: OFDI FLOWS
(Number of cases and billions of current dollars)
Year
 Authorizations requested Actual investments
 Number Amount Number Amount
 of cases  authorized of cases transferred
Until 1980 400 0.27 352 0.15
1981 64 0.29 49 0.03
1982 54 0.82 49 0.10
1983 67 0.83 56 0.11
1984 49 0.19 46 0.05
1985 42 0.22 38 0.11
1986 73 0.36 49 0.18
1987 109 0.37 91 0.41
1988 248 0.16 171 0.21
1989 369 0.97 269 0.57
1990 514 2.27 341 0.96
1991 526 1.80 444 1.11
1992 630 2.03 497 1.22
1993 1 052 2.00 689 1.26
1994 1 946 3.63 1 487 2.30
1995 1 572 5.22 1 332 3.10
1996 1 818 7.02 1 472 4.46
1997 1 608 6.10 1 330 3.71
1998 719 5.83 617 4.81
1999 1 268 5.10 1 095 3.33
2000 2 286 6.08 2 082 5.07
2001 2 327 6.36 2 153 5.16
2002 2 747 6.25 2 490 3.70
2003 3 079 5.58 2 809 4.06
2004 3 924 7.90 3 764 5.99
2005 4 555 9.03 4 389 6.56
2006 5 250 18.46 5 185 10.74
Total 37 296 105.88 33 346 69.46
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the Export-Import Bank of Korea.
12
 This approach was manifested in a best-selling book entitled It’s a Big World and There’s Lots to be Done, written by Chairman Kim of Daewoo 
group. Around the same time, UNCTAD listed Daewoo Corporation as the second largest developing-country TNC ranked by foreign assets in 
1998 (UNCTAD, 2000). Another powerful example was Samsung Electronics Company’s semiconductor investment in California. The company 
established a laboratory in Silicon Valley as part of its catching-up strategy, in order to develop a series of DRAMs: 64K (1983-1984), 256K 
(1984-1986) and 1M (1985-1987). Thanks to the investment of the 1980s, Samsung Electronics Company emerged as the global market leader 
in DRAMs with a 32% market share, thereby demonstrating that it had become a technology pioneer.
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Box III.1
KOREAN OFDI STATISTICS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
The Export-Import Bank of Korea (Korea 
Eximbank) is the only authoritative source 
of statistics for Korean OFDI. However, as 
it is based on company reporting, some 
of the qualitative as well as quantitative 
aspects of this investment are very difficult 
to trace.
First, only the initial destination of the 
investment is registered and no subsequent 
follow-up is conducted with regard to the 
final destination. Therefore, this reporting 
system does not adequately capture 
projects which are financed offshore. This 
means that no adjustment is made to the 
official statistics when a company relocates 
overseas assets from one host country to 
another. There are numerous examples 
of such situations. One is LG Electronics’ 
investment in the Netherlands in 2001 
using capital withdrawn from China and 
Indonesia. Another is Korean investment 
flows to the Latin American and Caribbean 
region in 2004. These were 87% up on the 
previous year, mainly as a result of large 
investments of capital —US$ 85 million and 
US$ 82 million, respectively— by Hyundai 
Motor Company (HMC) and NHN, the 
country’s largest Internet portal company, 
in the Cayman Islands tax haven. HMC 
subsequently transferred these resources 
to China to acquire a local subsidiary. 
NHN established a holding company for 
further investment in the Internet games 
industry (Suh, 2005a). Some investments 
by Samsung Electronics Company and LG 
Electronics in Mexico are financed from 
these firms’ United States subsidiaries 
and are thus not counted as Korean OFDI 
in Latin America in the Korea Eximbank’s 
statistics. Most of the big Korean TNCs 
treat their activities in Mexico as part of 
their North American operations.
Second, another challenge for Korean 
OFDI statistics is the lack of reliable 
sources for the sectoral distribution of 
such investment. Although numerous 
associations cover the major industries, 
such as textiles, electronics, automotive and 
construction, few of them maintain data on 
overseas investment. Above all, the country 
lacks a nationwide industrial standard for 
investment data collection. In contrast 
to foreign investment statistics, Korean 
trade statistics provide sectoral and other 
information because there is a specialized 
institution, the Korea International Trade 
Association (KITA), for that purpose.
Third, one new characteristic of the 
late 1990s and the first few years of the 
new decade was the sharp increase in 
OFDI withdrawals. The total amount of OFDI 
withdrawn during 1998-2002 was US$ 8 
billion, which was no less than 64.5% of all 
OFDI withdrawn between 1968 and the end 
of 2005. In a country whose OFDI is relatively 
small, the amount withdrawn warrants 
special attention. If it is reinvested, it counts 
as a new investment in the official statistics. 
This means that the magnitude of Korean 
OFDI might really be smaller than the total 
amount indicated, hence the usefulness of 
the net investment figure. For instance, the 
fact that LG Electronics launched a massive 
investment in Netherlands with the resources 
withdrawn from Asia partly explains the 
huge gap between total investment and net 
investment in 2001. The official information 
is shown in the table below. 
To compensate for the limitations 
of the official statistics, it is necessary to 
complement that information with company 
case studies based on direct interviews 
with headquarters firms as well as offshore 
subsidiaries. 
KOREAN OFDI: INVESTMENT AND WITHDRAWALS, UP TO 2004
(Billions of dollars)
 Year up to Amount invested Amount withdrawn Net amount
 1992 5.2 0.8 4.4
 1993 1.2 0.2 1
 1994 2.3 0.3 2
 1995 3.1 0.3 2.8
 1996 4.5 0.7 3.8
 1997 3.7 0.3 3.4
 1998 4.8 1.1 3.7
 1999 3.3 1.1 2.3
 2000 5.1 1.5 3.6
 2001 5.1 3.3 1.8
 2002 3.7 1.1 2.6
 2003 4.0 0.7 3.3
 2004 5.9 0.8 5.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Hee-Jung Suh, “Trend of Korean OFDI in 2004”, Exim Overseas Economic 
Reviews, Seoul, The Export-Import Bank of Korea, 2005 and B. Ha, “Korea’s foreign direct investment policies: evaluation and implications”, Industrial Economic 
Review, vol. 9, No. 4, Seoul, July-August 2004.
The 1997 financial crisis caused Korean OFDI to 
decline dramatically. Korean firms went through extensive 
post-crisis restructuring, which included such measures 
as closing down foreign subsidiaries and cancelling or 
delaying investment plans amid liquidity problems. Failure 
of foreign-asset management on the part of financial 
institutions has been widely condemned for provoking 
the crisis and had a strong psychological effect. In 2003, 
when the economy emerged from that crisis, Korean OFDI 
began to recover. Notably, 54% of overseas affiliates have 
been established since 2000, which means that the profile 
of Korean OFDI is recent and changing rapidly. In effect, 
Korean OFDI started over in a much more considered and 
cautious manner. 
The Korean OFDI/GDP indicator is relatively small, 
at only 1.8% in 2005. This is far lower than that of 
neighbouring economies such as Japan (5.7%) and Singapore 
(21.8%). In this regard, the Korean institutional framework 
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has recently taken some noteworthy OFDI-promoting 
initiatives. First, the Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) 
was officially launched on 1 July 2005. The role of KIC 
is to manage foreign-exchange reserves, initially US$ 20 
billion, to achieve a sustainable return on foreign-currency 
assets and help the country’s financial industry to attain 
global standards. Second, the government and public 
enterprises are in the process of selecting a financial 
company to manage funds for overseas oil development. 
Investment in an oilfield has long been an unattainable 
prospect for individuals or smaller companies. It has only 
been viable as a pan-national project or for large energy 
conglomerates. However, oil field development is now 
open to individual investors, which will naturally lead to 
more OFDI in this area (Maekyung Business Newspaper, 
2006; Seoul Economy, 2006). In other words, the Korean 
government is now actively promoting OFDI by way of 
various institutional mechanisms. 
(a) Geographical distribution of Korean OFDI
The Republic of Korea’s OFDI stock is heavily 
concentrated in Asia (46%), North America (26%) and 
Europe (15%), according to official statistics for 1968-
2006 (see figure III.2). Latin America is in an intermediate 
position as a recipient region with about 7%. The Middle 
East (2%), Africa (2%) and Oceania (2%) are barely on 
the map. Figures for 2000-2006 indicate that Asia’s share 
has risen to 50% and Latin America’s to 8%, while all the 
other regions have lost ground (see table III.5).
Figure III.2
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: OFDI STOCK, BY DESTINATION REGION, 
1968-2006
(Percentages of OFDI)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 












REPUBLIC OF KOREA: OFDI, BY REGION, 2000-2006
(Millions of dollars)
Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Asia 1 575.6  1 386.2  1 748.1  2 422.7  3 390.9  3 931.9  6 059.3  20 514.8 
Middle East 30.2  23.1  37.2  17.1  28.7  130.2  391.2  657.7 
North America 1 420.4  1 486.5  574.5  1 066.5  1 385.0  1 277.1  2 141.8  9 351.7 
Latin America 1 505.3  102.1  275.3  213.4  344.6  307.2  527.3  3 275.2 
Europe 291.0  2 128.8  965.4  220.9  712.0  644.6  1 195.1  6 157.8 
Africa 156.2  16.5  18.1  28.9  51.3  113.4  214.1  598.6 
Oceania 89.6  20.5  78.6  91.9  76.2  152.8  202.3  711.9 
Total 5 068.5  5 163.7  3 697.1  4 061.5  5 988.6  6 557.2  10 731.0  41 267.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, Seoul, 
2006.
In terms of individual recipient countries, Korean OFDI 
is very concentrated. The top 10 recipient countries accounted 
for 72.2% of total OFDI, and the top 25 received 88.8%. China 
(24.4%) and the United States (24.1%) alone represented 
close to half of Korean OFDI in 1968-2006. Apart from 
two financial centres (the Netherlands (3.5%) and Bermuda 
(2.3%)) and the United Kingdom (2.8%), all the rest of the 
top 10 recipient countries are Asian economies: Hong Kong, 
SAR (4.3%), Indonesia (3.4%), Viet Nam (3.1%), Singapore 
(2.1%) and Japan (2.1%). Three Latin American countries 
—Brazil, Peru and Mexico— are found towards the end of 
the top-25 list with shares of around 0.7%-0.8%.
From 2001 onward, 75% of total new OFDI in the 
manufacturing sector has been invested in China. Textile 
and apparel industries comprise the largest proportion of 
investments in China, accounting for 20.8% of the total 
number of projects. In terms of investment volume, metal 
components, at 31.3%, represent the largest category. In 
recent years, Korean firms’ investments in China have 
mainly been in the information technology (IT), petroleum, 
chemical, steel and automotive industries. The focus of Korean 
investment is currently being shifted from manufacturing 
to service sectors and from the coastal areas to inland 
areas (Zhang, 2004). The average amount per investment 
project is only US$ 1.5 million. The level of investment 
per project is highest in Latin America (US$ 11 million), 
while per-project investment amounts in Asian countries 
average US$ 1.2 million. This suggests that Korean OFDI in 
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Latin America and the Caribbean is concentrated in major 
natural-resource projects and large-scale export platforms, 
while in Asian countries it is primarily undertaken by 
smaller-scale investors and SMEs (Suh, 2005b). 
(b) Sectoral distribution of Korean OFDI
As mentioned above, early OFDI was export-facilitating 
and resource-seeking in such areas as mining and forestry. In 
the late 1980s, the primary sector accounted for 50.6% of the 
total amount invested while the manufacturing and trading 
industries represented 14.4% and 14.7%, respectively. 
During the 2000-2006 period (see table III.6 and figure 
III.3), the manufacturing sector represented the largest 
portion of Korean OFDI, with US$ 21.4 billion (51.8%), 
followed by services (40.7%) and mining (7%). Within 
services, the most significant branches were wholesale 
and retail trade (17.7%), real estate (2.9%), construction 
(2.8%), hotels and restaurants (2.2%), and telecoms (1.8%). 
The concentration of OFDI in the manufacturing sector 
confirms that the country’s international competitiveness 
lies there, rather than in services. A breakdown of Korean 
investment in manufacturing in 2006 shows the electronics 
and telecoms equipment sectors with US$ 1.5 billion 
(29.1% of total investment in manufacturing). Second place 
was taken by motors and equipment with US$ 1 billion 
(20.6%). Another important sector was the petrochemical 
industry, which had a 13.6% share.
(c) Distribution of Korean OFDI by company size
One novel feature of the current increase in OFDI is 
that not only are large companies engaging in OFDI, but 
SMEs are doing so as well (see figure III.4). Currently 
there are more than 20,000 Korean firms operating in 
overseas territories. Although this number is relatively 
small given the size of the Korean economy, every year 
around 3,000 Korean FDI firms are setting up overseas, 
suggesting that many investments are undertaken by 
SMEs. 
Table III.6
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: OFDI BY SECTOR, 2000-2006
(Millions of dollars)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
1. Agriculture and fisheries 18.1  8.5  19.3  27.1  34.4  30.0  42.9  180.0 
2. Mining 92.6  66.0  200.0  321.0  308.2  470.5  1 426.9  2 885.2 
3. Manufacturing 1 542.3  3 833.7  1 744.2  2 160.3  3 379.9  3 659.5  5 067.2  21 387.3 
4. Services  3 414.0  1 255.6  1 733.5  1 553.0  2 265.3  2 397.2  4 194.1  16 812.7 
- Construction 97.4  43.6  60.6  49.2  78.2  156.5  675.7  1 161.2 
- Retail and wholesale 833.3  880.2  1 211.0  942.8  1 161.2  997.9  1 286.7  7 313.2 
- Logistics 35.5  9.6  15.2  15.3  20.5  122.5  197.1  415.8 
- Telecoms 158.4  45.9  37.9  62.5  80.9  135.3  207.4  728.3 
- Banking and insurance 1 384.6  1.6  2.7  1.8  0.4  2.8  1.4  1 395.3 
- Hotels and restaurants 248.0  27.2  39.0  78.7  110.4  205.2  208.5  917.0 
- Real estate 97.6  38.2  81.4  99.3  187.6  158.8  521.3  1 184.2 
- Other services 559.0  209.3  285.7  303.4  626.1  618.1  1 096.1  3 697.7 
5. Others 1.6  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.7  0.0  0.0  2.6 
Total 5 068.5  5 163.7  3 697.1  4 061.5  5 988.6  6 557.2  10 731.0  41 267.7 
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Figure III.3
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: OFDI STOCK, BY SECTOR, 1968-2006
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 































REPUBLIC OF KOREA: OFDI BY COMPANY SIZE, 2000-2006
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics 
Yearbook, Seoul, 2006.
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In 2006, OFDI by large enterprises reached US$ 6.3 
billion, while SMEs accounted for US$ 3.4 billion. 
The proportion of OFDI conducted by SMEs increased 
constantly up to 2005, then dropped off in 2006. The 
investment pattern of SMEs is different from that of large 
conglomerates. Whereas big companies like Samsung 
Electronics Company, LG Electronics and Hyundai 
Motor Company have traditionally invested overseas 
primarily to secure local markets and establish export 
platforms, SMEs tend to go abroad to reduce production 
costs by using cheap and abundant labour (Lee, 2006). 
Although not classified as SME investments, OFDI by 
individual emigrants has also risen sharply. Over 1,440 
cases of individual investment were reported during 
the first half of 2006, which is a 23.5% increase on 
the same period of 2005. Total OFDI by individuals 
2. Motivations for Korean OFDI
According to the Korea Eximbank’s research into 
the principal motivating factors behind OFDI (see 
table III.7), the primary reason was to acquire and 
develop export markets (39.7%), while avoiding 
trade barriers (3.7%), and the secondary factor was 
to secure (1.2%) or develop (9.8%) natural resources 
in the host country. Taking advantage of low labour 
costs (9%) came in third place. Fourth came the 
acquisition of advanced technology (3.1%). Until the 
mid-1990s, the development of natural resources was 
the main objective of OFDI. Thereafter, it began to lose 
ground dramatically to the new dominant motivation
—market-seeking— and, shortly thereafter, to the next 
most important incentive, efficiency-seeking.
Table III.7
MOTIVATIONS FOR KOREAN OFDI, 2000-2004
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000-2004
Acquire export markets 1 423 4 223 3 197 1 687 2 351 12 881
 (23.6) (66.5) (50.7) (29.1) (29.6) (39.7)
Develop natural resources 451 296 504 1 149 784 3 184
 (7.5) (4.7) (8.0) (19.8) (9.9) (9.8)
Take advantage of low wages 297 452 563 739 871 2 922
 (4.9) (7.1) 8.9) (12.7) (11.0) (9.0)
Avoid trade barriers 238 82 160 299 418 1 197
 (3.9) (1.3) (2.5) (5.2) (5.3) (3.7)
Acquire advanced technology 362 146 141 77 265 991
 (6.0) (2.3) (2.2) (1.3) (3.3) (3.1)
Secure raw materials 59 46 62 125 108 400
 (1.0) (0.7) (1.0) (2.1) (1.4) (1.2)
Others 3 205 1 108 1 672 1 731 3 146 10 862
 (53.1) (17.4) (26.5) (29.8) (39.6) (33.5)
Total 6 037 6 353 6 300 5 806 7 942 32 438
 (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook. 
2005 and Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, 2006.
According to Ha’s survey (see table III.8), which offers 
a different view of Korean OFDI determinants, offshore 
investments appear to be determined primarily by cost-
reduction motives, since 40.2% of the surveyed companies 
cited labour and other cost reduction as their main investment 
motivation. This factor was followed by market-seeking 
(34.5%), the overseas relocation of partner companies 
(9.9%), and opening up third markets (4.9%). With regard 
reached US$ 480 million between January and June 
of 2006. 
With regard to the target industry, large corporations 
and SMEs follow a similar pattern, since 558 out of a 
total of 1,443 individual investments (38.7%) went to 
manufacturing. Wholesale and retail trade occupied 
second place (22.1%). Hence, these two areas were the 
preferred activities (60.8%) for Korean investors (Naeil 
Daily, 7 September 2006). Although China is the preferred 
destination, with 648 cases, followed by the United States, 
with 483 cases or 33.5%, investments in emerging markets 
such as India, Indonesia and Viet Nam are increasing. 
Another trend in individual investment is the growing 
popularity of the overseas real estate market. The United 
States is the largest provider of overseas real estate for 
Koreans, but China is catching up in that respect. 
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to China in particular, labour and other cost reduction was 
fundamentally important to Korean companies, representing 
42.6% of the total respondents —more than the average 
for all respondents regardless of the target region. The 
second main incentive is to open up new markets (33%). 
As for company size, larger enterprises are driven more by 
market-seeking motivations, while SMEs appear to lean 
towards labour and other cost reduction (43.4%). 
Classified by industry types, most of the labour-intensive 
industries (textile and apparel, footwear and leather, non-metallic 
minerals, etc.) chose cost-efficiency as their major OFDI 
motivation, unlike more technology-oriented industries, such 
as transportation equipment, petrochemicals, machinery and 
primary metals, whose main driver was market-seeking.
This analysis of Korean OFDI indicates that it has been 
reactivated since the resolution of the financial crisis. It began 
mainly as natural-resource-seeking OFDI in Asia and market-
seeking OFDI in the major markets (North America, Europe 
and Asia); however, efficiency-seeking OFDI is growing 
fast, especially in China and other Asian countries. Korean 
OFDI is conducted primarily in manufacturing activities 
where the Korean economy possesses its main competitive 
advantages. While both TNCs and SMEs have participated 
in Korean OFDI, the global strategies of the former are 
the force shaping the evolution and nature of these capital 
outflows. Although the official statistics indicate that little 
Korean OFDI targets strategic assets, it will become evident 
that this reflects a failure of the information gathering system 
more than an absence of asset-seeking investment; indeed, 
the catching-up strategies of what are today Korean TNCs 
were partly based on this strategy.
Table III.8
DETERMINANTS OF KOREAN OFDI, BY INDUSTRY
Category Industry type First motive Second motive Third motive
Heavy and chemical 
industries




Overseas relocation of partner companies 
(20.2%)
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Entrance to developing country market 
(5.2%)
Food and beverages Market-seeking
(54.3%)








Shortage of national labour force
 (6.1%)










Overseas relocation of partner companies 
/Entrance to developing country market/
Shortage of national labour force
(8.3%)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of B. Ha, “Korea’s foreign direct investment policies: evaluation and implications”, 
Industrial Economic Review, vol. 9, No. 4, Seoul, July-August 2004.
a
 The 8.3% for paper and printing reflects the response of one company only. 
As is the case for other emerging markets, the Korean 
experience suggests that overseas investment is determined 
by various factors, both domestic and global. Rising domestic 
wages, interest rates, exchanges rates, an appreciating 
national currency, a limited domestic market and considerable 
regulation are relevant domestic push factors. The need for 
natural resources, export markets, technology and improved 
efficiency are important global pull factors.
As regards the future, a number of trends can be perceived. 
First, while large conglomerates will continue to make massive 
investments, micro-investments (each under US$ 1 million) 
will increase as Korean suppliers and individual investors 
move offshore. Second, although China will continue to be 
the most favoured destination for Korean OFDI, wage rises 
and mounting competition there will push some companies 
to consider alternative destinations such as India or Viet 
Nam. Third, even as companies invest according to prime 
motivations, such as efficiency- or market-seeking, they will 
increasingly integrate their separate motivations into a global 
strategy to improve their international competitiveness. Thus, 
the continuous relocation of investments to benefit from more 
appropriate host country conditions will become a central 
aspect of their activities.
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3. Korean OFDI policy
The growth of Korean OFDI might suggest that there is 
a coordinated OFDI policy to promote it; however, this is 
not necessarily the case, since there seems to be room for 
improvement in this regard. A number of policy changes 
have taken place since the first rather restrictive law of 
December 1968 and especially since liberalization began in 
July 1981. The changes dealt mainly with four basic aspects 
(Moon, 2005). With regard to finance, the main changes 
concerned access to loans from the Korea Eximbank and the 
Economic Development Co-operation Fund, the negotiation 
of investment protection agreements (now numbering 62) 
with host governments and the establishment of foreign-
exchange management rules. In terms of taxation, the most 
important measures involved the negotiation of double 
taxation agreements (of which there are now 57) with host 
countries and specific measures for resource industries. A 
third aspect had to do with access to the overseas investment 
insurance offered by the Korean Export Insurance Company. 
Lastly, different kinds of administrative and information 
support were offered by the Korea Overseas Company 
Assistance Center, the FDI Information Network, the Korea 
Overseas Information System of the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy, the Korea Eximbank and the Korean Institute 
for Industrial Economics and Trade. Starting in February 
1994, notable advances were made in liberalizing Korean 
OFDI policy, by setting up a one-stop service on the part of 
transaction banks, allowing OFDI from all sectors, raising 
the individual investor limit, and encouraging strategic 
alliances with foreign firms. As of December 2003, more 
active assistance was offered and the OFDI problems of 
Korean TNCs began to be studied in depth. 
As has been suggested, all these changes in the 
existing rules and regulations and activities by different 
Korean institutions are welcome but do not necessarily 
add up to a coherent and coordinated OFDI policy. What 
is missing is an overarching policy framework which ties 
OFDI in with Korean national development goals. Such 
an outlook could be expected to involve coordinated and 
coherent actions on the part of the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Energy, the Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 
and the Korean Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade. 
This explains why —in the context of a strengthening 
Korean won, which is undermining the international 
competitiveness of Korean products— there is currently a 
flurry of activity to put together a comprehensive package 
of measures aimed at promoting overseas investment and 
further reduce the existing restrictions. Perhaps this will 
help develop the many instruments dealing with Korean 
OFDI into a coherent and coordinated OFDI policy.
C. The dominant corporate strategies driving
 Korean OFDI
This section will examine specific, representative company 
experiences that have driven the Republic of Korea’s 
industrial and technological advances. The corporate 
strategies of leading companies will be analysed in 
order to better comprehend the nature of the shift from 
an export-based industrialization to a knowledge-based 
economy in the principal industries and the role played 
by OFDI in establishing global networks. 
1. The international expansion of the electronics industry
The electronics industry has been one of the most dynamic 
catalysts of global economic change during the last 
half-century. Recently, advances in integrated circuits 
and digitalization have been driving the industry. By 
2005, the structure of the global industry was based on 
telecoms and networks (25.6% of production), computers 
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and data processing (24.1%), and audio-visual and home 
appliances (21%), followed by industrial and medical 
electronics (14.5%), automotive electronics (8.1%) 
and aerospace and defence (6.6%) (Decision, 2006). 
The ability to break global value chains into discrete 
segments, combined with the growing convergence of 
computers, telecoms and consumer electronics, permitted 
the outsourcing of mass-produced components and final 
products to achieve ever-lower production costs, such 
that the geographical centres of consumption became 
progressively separated from those of production (see 
table III.9). This opportunity was seized primarily by 
Asian countries, first Japan, then other Asian economies 
such as Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province 
of China, Singapore and, most recently, China. The 
production of electronic goods is shifting from high-
cost to low-cost production sites. Asian assemblers, 
then Asian manufacturers and, finally, Asian designers 
subsequently made their appearance on the global 
corporate map of electronics.
Table III.9
WORLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF ELECTRONICS, 




 2005 Projection 2005 Projection
  2010  2010
North America 30.8 28.3 22.1 19.9
Europe 27.3 25.1 21.1 19.0
Japan 10.9 9.5 15.5 13.5
China 9.9 12.3 22.6 27.6
Other Asian countries 11.0 13.1 14.6 15.3
Rest of the world 10.2 11.7 4.0 4.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Decision, “World electronic industries, 2005 - 2010” [online] July 
2006 http://www.decision-consult.com.
Table III.10
PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS OF THE KOREAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY, 2005
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Segment Production Percentage Exports Percentage
1. Information and communications equipment 78 249 37.1 45 731 44.5
 - mobile phones 33 719 16.0 18 883 18.3
 - computers and peripherals 25 775 12.2 14 117 13.7
 - LCD monitors 8 668 4.1 6 352 6.2
2. General parts and components 60 273 28.5 10 871 10.6
 - LCDs 35 436 16.8 4 684 4.6
 - printed circuit boards 8 250 3.9 1 346 1.3
3. Semiconductors  37 192 17.6 29 996 29.2
4. Digital home appliances 29 240 13.8 14 656 14.2
 - white goods 7 194 3.4 2 966 2.9
 - digital televisions 2 630 1.2 1 431 1.4
5. Industrial equipment 6 174 2.9 1 450 1.4
Total 211 128 100.0 102 704 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Korean Electronics Association.
The Asian region’s electronics industry became its 
principal growth engine and set it apart from all other 
regions, although there was considerable diversity within 
Asia. In general, the Asian new entrants followed in Japan’s 
footsteps. However, they did so in distinct ways with 
regard to the principal agents involved and with different 
degrees of success. In semiconductors, for example, the 
Korean chaebol, the SMEs in Taiwan Province of China 
and TNCs in Singapore and Malaysia demonstrated that 
the principal economic agents could vary appreciably. 
Within the ICT industry in Asia, distinct specializations 
emerged: Japan specialized in product technology for core 
components and sophisticated materials, the Republic of 
Korea in process technology for large-scale components 
and China in assembly technology, initially for analogue 
electronics (Joo, 2005). 
The electronics industry became a showcase for 
the Republic of Korea’s industrial and technological 
progress. It currently ranks fourth in the world in terms 
of electronics production (KEA, 2006). Computers and 
their components, mobile phones, home appliances and, 
especially, semiconductors, have been among its more 
dynamic manufactures (see figure III.1). The proportion of 
GDP generated by the electronics industry shot from less 
than 1% in 1970 to 6.6% in 2004 and the industry’s share 
in exports rose from less than 7% to 38.1% over the same 
period (Kim, 1998; Joo, 2005). Table III.10 indicates the most 
important segments of the electronics industry from the point 
of view of production and exports in 2005. Items with a larger 
share in exports than in production include semiconductors, 
mobile phones, computers and peripherals, LCD monitors 
and digital televisions. Appropriately enough, semiconductors 
and digital electronics figure prominently in the Republic 
of Korea’s 2010 Industrial Vision (MOCIE, 2006) and “a 
modern and adequate information infrastructure” is one of 
the four pillars of the knowledge economy framework as 
defined by the World Bank (World Bank, 2006). 
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2006 105
The Korean electronics industry has evolved from 
the simple to the complex (Joo, 2005). In the 1960s, the 
industry was based on the mass assembly of simple products 
(radios, black and white television sets, electronic tubes 
and other parts). The 1970s brought the manufacture of a 
wider range of electronic goods. The 1980s witnessed the 
use of more sophisticated technologies for semiconductor 
design and production, which was manifested in a sharp 
improvement in the quality of Korean products. The 1990s 
saw world-class technologies in terms of digital circuit 
designs, semiconductor processes and miniaturization, 
encompassed in large colour television sets, VCRs, 
microwave ovens, CDPs, DVDPs, PCs, CD-ROMs and 
memory chips. By 2000, the Korean electronics industry 
held the lead in technology and development of VLSI 
semiconductors and had a competitive global product 
line-up that included mobile phones, digital televisions, 
MP3 players, TFT-LCDs and PDPs, flash memory and 
DRAM. The two largest Korean TNCs —Samsung 
Electronics Company and LG Electronics— became 
world-class competitors in the electronics industry. 
Their corporate experiences reflect the core aspects of 
the evolution of the Korean electronics industry.
(a) Samsung Electronics Company (SEC)13
The Samsung chaebol has its roots as the Samsung 
General Store started in 1938 in Daegu, Korea. It became 
Samsung Corporation in 1948 and evolved into one of the 
largest and most dominant Korean business conglomerates. 
The Samsung Electronics Company (SEC) subsidiary 
was founded in 1969 and is one of a host of electronics 
subsidiaries of Samsung Corporation (including joint 
ventures such as Samsung Electro-Mechanics, Samsung 
SDI, Samsung SDS, Samsung Networks, Samsung Corning 
and Samsung Corning Precision Glass). It has other 
joint endeavours with Intel and Microsoft. SEC stands 
out as the largest and most important single element of 
the Samsung Group and it has become the best-known 
South Korean TNC, ranking forty-sixth in the world by 
sales (US$ 78.7 billion) in 2005 (Fortune Global 500). 
In terms of developing country TNCs, SEC was ranked 
fourth by external assets (US$ 14.6 billion) in 2004 
(UNCTAD, 2006). 
In 2005, SEC possessed the largest global market 
shares in electronic items such as DRAM semiconductors 
(32%), SRAM semiconductors (24%), flash memories 
(34%), NAND memories (50.7%), TFT-LCD (18%), 
DDIs (18%), computer monitors (22.3%) and televisions 
(9.4%; 14.6% in the second quarter of 2006). It was also 
among the leaders in laser MFPs (18%), after Hewlett 
Packard, and in hand-held phones (12.6%) after Nokia 
and Motorola. SEC experienced strong growth after the 
1997 financial crisis, reflected in the doubling of its 
sales between 2000 and 2005.14 Its sales come mainly 
from Asia (42%), Europe (24%), the Republic of Korea 
(18%) and the Americas (15%). Its brand value swelled 
to US$ 16.2 billion in 2006 (up from US$ 8.3 billion in 
2002), making it number 20 in the world (ahead of arch-
rivals Sony, Motorola and Panasonic). In terms of R&D 
efforts, it was ranked ninth in the world by expenditure 
(US$ 5.9 billion), sixteenth by technological innovation 
and sixth by patent management.15 About 32,000 of the 
corporation’s 138,000 employees work on R&D-related 
activities and most of these possess advanced university 
degrees (12,600 hold Masters degrees and 2,900, PhDs). 
The strategy adopted by SEC since the financial crisis 
was to restructure from volume-based to quality-based 
growth in order to transform itself from a fast follower 
into an “industry shaper”.
SEC is organized into five basic businesses: Digital 
Appliances, Digital Media, Liquid Crystal Display, 
Semiconductors and Telecommunications Networks. The 
Digital Appliances unit accounted for 7% of consolidated 
revenue16 in 2005, down from 16% in 2000. The principal 
products of this business group include refrigerators, 
washing machines, air conditioners, microwave ovens 
and home networking, as well as dishwashers, oven 
13
 This section is based on interviews at Samsung headquarters in Seoul and Samsung Electronics Company’s Suwon Digital Complex, as well as 
Samsung (2005), Samsung Electronics Company (2006a, 2006b, 2006c and 2006d), Samsung Electronics Company (2005a), The Economist 
(2005), Yun (2005), Lee, G. (2005), Lee, Y-W (2005), Lee, K-T (2005), Choi (2005), Hwang (2005), and Lee, S-W (2005).
14
 The financial crisis dealt the Samsung chaebol a harsh blow. It was obliged to sell about half of its defence equipment assets to Thomson CSF and 
took a severe hit on its new automobile assembly plant, of which 80% was sold to Renault. Altogether, it divested more than 100 non-essential 
businesses, cutting about 30% of its workforce. SEC gained greater independence as a result of the restructuring process.
15
 In 1995, SEC purchased a United States firm, AST Research, for US$ 438 million, in order to gain access to its technology. Unfortunately, 
United States and Korean business management styles clashed and the firm soon lost many of its valuable human resources. This experience 
taught Samsung an important lesson about the limitations of its catch-up strategy and the best approach to R&D (Eun, 2002).
16
 The Korean stock market requires listed firms to disclose the performance of Republic of Korea-based operations only. This represents a severe 
information challenge as regards the analysis of the total operations of global players, such as SEC and LG Electronics. In this particular case, 
the figures used are the consolidated revenues for all SEC operations (including international operations, but not financial affiliates) rather than 
the parent’s operations in the Republic of Korea, as SEC is one of the few Korean global players to report consolidated figures. For insight into 
this problem, see Ramstad (2006).
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ranges, vacuum cleaners, and so forth. SEC has been 
working to improve the performance of these relatively 
traditional products by consolidating overseas assembly 
operations in lower-wage countries and upgrading 
its products towards higher-margin markets.17 SEC 
is focusing increasingly on fewer but higher-margin 
products, such as system air conditioners, drum washing 
machines and side-by-side refrigerators. Another aspect 
of this upgrading is a large R&D project for Silver Nano 
Health System technology and the Homevita total home 
network solution initiative.
The Digital Media business contributed 22% of 
consolidated revenue in 2005, down from 31% in 
2000. The main products of this business group include 
televisions (35% of sales), monitors (26%), audio-visual 
and optical equipment (17%), personal computers 
(11%) and printers (11%). Sales were concentrated in 
large markets such as Europe (37%) and the Americas 
(28%), such that this business group’s offshore revenue 
represented 85% of its total revenue in 2005. Because 
of the low margins associated with many analogue 
product categories, SEC made a strategic decision 
to exit these in order to focus solely on digital ones. 
As was the case for the Digital Appliances business 
group, SEC established a new manufacturing base 
for Digital Media in Eastern Europe (Slovakia and 
Hungary) to supply the European market. SEC is ranked 
first globally in televisions, computer monitors and 
DVD-VCR combos, second in projection televisions, 
DVD players and monochrome laser printers, third in 
LCD television sets and fourth in plasma televisions 
and camcorders. Its strategy seems to focus on raising 
its global rank in higher-margin, more sophisticated 
products, such as LCD and plasma televisions, which 
are providing strong revenues for the company.
The Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) business group 
accounted for 11% of the consolidated revenue of SEC 
in 2005. It was separated from Digital Media in 2004, 
after sales soared following aggressive production cost 
reductions (from US$ 20 per inch in 2000 to US$ 7 per 
inch in 2005) achieved through large investments and 
technological advances in design, process and materials. 
This business unit produces LCD panels for mobile 
phones, notebooks, desktop PCs and television sets. In 
2004, together with its rival, Sony, SEC entered into 
the S-LCD venture. This partnership invested in the 
world’s first seventh-generation fabrication facility for 
television LCD panels in its Tangjeong complex.18 The 
LCD business group has become a new growth engine 
for SEC.
The Semiconductors business group accounted for 
25% of SEC total consolidated revenues in 2005. Its 
product line-up includes DRAM, flash memory, multichip 
packages, DDIs, CMOS image sensors and mobile CPUs, 
among others. SEC ranks second in the world in this 
industry, after Intel, and enjoys dominant global market 
shares in DRAM (31%), SRAM (28%) and flash memory 
(27%). It possesses the world’s leading 300-millimetre 
wafer production line and is the only company capable 
of conducting flexible operations for both DRAM and 
flash. While this business group is often viewed as the 
cash cow of SEC, it faces two challenges. On the one 
hand, a good part of the semiconductor business in which 
SEC operates is based on commodities, in which price 
swings are sharp and demand variable, which makes it 
very risky. On the other hand, the most dynamic segment 
requires huge R&D investment to maintain technological 
advantages and thus appropriate higher prices for 
leading-edge products. In that vein, SEC is investing in 
the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturing facility 
at its Hwasung complex. This facility is expected to 
generate US$ 61 billion in revenue by 2012. The SEC 
semiconductor product repertoire includes memory, 
storage and its large scale integration system (system 
LSI), which encompasses five strategic products: DDI, 
mobile CPU, integrated circuits for chip cards (chip card 
IC), CIS and system-on-a-chip for multimedia (media 
player SoC). Within its main memory line-up, SEC 
has classified products as leading edge (GDDR3 and 
8Gb NAND), mainstream (DDR2 and 2/4Gb NAND), 
trailing edge (128Mb Sync and 64Mb Sync) and specialty 
(XDR, mobile DRAM and graphic), which suggests 
that the company has a clear vision of the evolution and 
competitiveness of its semiconductor product repertoire. 
SEC prides itself on maintaining high R&D investment 
in this business in spite of cyclical prices, on becoming 
a total solution provider fully encompassing mobile 
memory, flash memory, DDI, application processors, 
image sensors and software and on generating a strategic 
portfolio of key patents to maintain its technological 
advantage.
The Telecommunications Networks business group 
contributed 26% of total consolidated revenue in 2005. 
Its product line-up is based on mobile phones, network 
17
 For this reason, microwave production in the Republic of Korea was recently transferred to Malaysia and Thailand and from the United Kingdom 
to Slovakia.
18
 SEC expects the burgeoning digital television industry (60-70 million units by 2010) to be dominated by the LCD models, ahead of projection 
and plasma models, and has positioned itself accordingly with clear investment, manufacturing and technological advantages. 
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systems, core systems, wireless systems, broadband 
equipment and home and office products. SEC claims 
the global lead in CDMA phones and is ranked number 
three overall in the global mobile phone market (12.7%) 
behind Nokia and Motorola. It considers itself leader 
in the mid- to high-tech segment of that market, where 
the quality and technological sophistication of its hand-
held phones fetch premium prices. SEC hand-held 
phones have seen explosive growth: sales exceeded 100 
million units worldwide in 2005. In this field, in which 
it is building on the convergence of broadcasting and 
communications and the integration of wired and wireless 
communications, SEC has advantages in terms of both 
technology —such as TD-SCDMA in China, as well as 
HSDPA and WiBro— and design, with its clamshell, 
sliding and landscape models. 
Within the five-business-unit organization of SEC, 
two units (Digital Appliances and Digital Media) are 
currently showing quite slow growth, relatively mature 
technologies and small profit margins. Two others, LCD 
and Telecommunications Networks, are fast-growing 
and have dynamic technologies and significant profit 
margins. Lastly, the Semiconductors unit performs 
variably according to cyclical market demand and is 
very demanding in terms of R&D. Thus, the SEC global 
production network currently appears to be focused on 
improving the efficiency of the Digital Appliances and 
Digital Media business groups by offshoring assembly 
to lower-wage platforms to supply the main markets 
(Europe, North America and Asia). The numerous 
international expansion strategies employed by SEC
—efficiency-seeking (reducing production costs), securing 
natural resources, accessing markets and obtaining 
strategic assets (technology, strategic locations and so 
forth)— have varied in importance as the company has 
evolved (Moon, 2005). As regards OFDI, however, the 
most important is the establishment of an international 
system of integrated production on the part of the Digital 
Appliance and Digital Media business groups.
Table III.11 sets out the SEC international system, 
which accounts for 43% of its total assets. The less 
dynamic business groups (Digital Appliances and Digital 
Media) are quite broadly internationalized, whereas the 
production of the other three, more dynamic business 
groups is still very much centred in the Republic of 
Korea. The major exceptions involve the activities of the 
Semiconductor, LCD and Telecommunications Networks 
business groups in China, which SEC is developing into 
a centre for high-tech production, and the semiconductor 
activities in the United States. Other minor exceptions 
include LCD and hand-held phone activities in large 
emerging markets, such as China, India and Brazil. 
R&D and design centres seem to be located in major 
markets (Europe, North America and Asia). The large 
markets of Brazil, Russia, India and China (which are 
collectively termed “Brics”) are a particular focus of 
the corporation’s international expansion.
SEC possesses a clearly defined view as to its current 
growth engines (memory, display, mobile communications 
and digital television), its upcoming growth engines (printers, 
system LSI, mass storage and air control systems) and 
emerging growth engines (personal multimedia devices, 
home networks, U-health and home care robots). The 
future growth of this TNC is evidently associated with the 
knowledge economy. That clarity of vision will help the 
company to face the challenges ahead and will determine 
the future trends in terms of the internationalization of 
production facilities. The organization and experience of 
SEC suggests that the company designed and implemented 
an appropriate corporate strategy to shift its core business 
from quantity to quality and to transform itself from a 
fast follower to an innovator.
(b) LG Electronics (LGE)19
Lucky Goldstar was founded in 1946 and its business 
was electronics (under the name of Lucky, until it was 
changed to LG Electronics in 1958) and household goods 
(under the name Goldstar, which was later changed to LG 
Chemicals). After the financial crisis, it was reorganized 
into three separate groups: LG Group, GS Group and LS 
Group. LG Corp. became a holding company with three 
principal business activities: electronics and telecoms; 
chemicals and energy; and services. LG Corp. owns 
34.8% of LG Electronics, which is its principal electronics 
affiliate. In turn, LG Electronics has important holdings 
in associates, such as LG Philips Display (37.9% capital 
share holding),20 LG Philips LCD, LG Innotek (69.8%), 
LG Micron (33%), LG Nortel Networks and LG Data 
Storage (with Hitachi). 
19
 This section is based primarily on interviews at LG Electronics headquarters in Seoul and LG Corp. (2006), LG Electronics (2006a), (2006b), 
(2006c), (2005), LG Innotek (2006), LG Micron (2006), LG Philips LCD (2006a), (2006b). 
20
 Another consequence of the financial crisis was that LG Electronics sold a major stake of its flat screen business to Philips in 1999.
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Table III.11
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS COMPANY: GLOBAL NETWORK OF MANUFACTURING SUBSIDIARIES AND R&D/DESIGN CENTRES
Business group Republic of Korea China South Asia East Asia Europe/CIS Americas
Digital appliances Gangue-refrigerators, 
vacuum cleaners, washing 
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Gumi- hand-held phones Suzhou- LCD 
Semiconductors Giheung/Hwaseong, Suzhou United States- 
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R&D centers Suwon (3) Suzhou India Japan United 
Kingdom
United States (2)
Giheung (3) Nanjing Russia Brazil
Beijing Israel




Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Samsung Electronics Company, official site [online] http://www.
samsungelectronics.com.
LG Electronics was ranked number 115 in the world 
by consolidated sales (US$ 45 billion) in 2005 (Fortune 
Global 500). Its parent, LG Corp., was ranked number 
72. Among developing country TNCs, LG Corp. was 
seventh in terms of external assets (US$ 10.4 billion) 
in 2004 (UNCTAD, 2006). Overall sales are made 
mainly in the Republic of Korea (25%), North America 
(23%), Europe (19%), and Asia (17%). LGE is similar 
to Samsung Electronics Company in its product line-up 
and business organization, except that it is not a world 
leader in semiconductors, it has a somewhat different 
international market focus and its brand value and R&D 
effort are considerably lower than those of its principal 
Korean rival. LGE considers itself the world leader in 
market shares for optical storage (29%), home theatre 
systems (16%), CDMA handsets (21%), residential air 
conditioners (7.4%) and DVD players (10%). It is ranked 
second in plasma panels (27%) and plasma television 
sets (15%). Its vision is to become one of the top three 
electronics and telecommunications TNCs by 2010. LGE 
has refocused on its core businesses, principal markets 
and higher value, premium priced products. It aims to 
innovate 30% faster than its rivals by raising the proportion 
of its R&D-related employees from 40% to 60% of its 
total workforce.
LGE is organized into four main business units: Digital 
Appliances, Digital Media, Digital Display and Mobile 
Communications. The Digital Appliances business accounted 
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for 25% of sales in 2005. Its product line-up comprises 
air conditioners (34%), refrigerators (26%), washing 
machines (23%) and other household appliances (17%). 
Its strategy is to surpass its global competitors (Whirlpool 
and Electrolux) by taking advantage of opportunities to 
evolve from low-margin to higher-margin home appliances, 
on the one hand, and from home appliances to higher 
value-added mobile and automobile units, on the other. 
With this aim, LGE is deploying three initiatives. First, its 
production system is set up in such a way that the more 
expensive, high-end products are manufactured in the 
Republic of Korea (35% of production) and the rest are 
made in China (50%), other Asian countries (10%) and 
the rest of the world (5%). Second, it targets the high-end 
market for its three principal products in order to secure 
premium prices. Third, its R&D is focused on vertical 
integration of key components (for example compressors 
for air conditioners and refrigerators). In 2006, the second-
quarter sales of the Digital Appliances business unit were 
distributed as follows: Republic of Korea (45%), North 
America (21%), Europe (13%), Asia and Middle East 
(15%) and the rest of the world (6%). 
The Digital Media business accounted for 13% of sales 
in 2005. Its principal products are based on the integration of 
various digital audio-visual appliances into a single device, 
such as home theatre and car “infotainment” systems, 
as well as personal computers (desktop and notebook), 
mobile appliances (PDAs and MP3) and optical storage 
devices (CD-ROMs, CD-RWs, DVD-ROMs, CD-DVDs, 
DVD-Ws). Sales are grouped into three categories: optical 
storage (44%), media (33%), and personal computers 
(23%). The strategy in this group is to expand premium 
product sales, taking advantage of opportunities arising 
from the digitalization of information and audio-visual 
equipment, and to move out of the more price competitive 
segments (i.e., low-end personal computers). 
The Digital Display business unit provided 22% of 
total sales in 2005. Principal products include plasma 
and LCD television sets (40%), LCD monitors (29%), 
plasma display panels (25%) and other applications (6%). 
This unit of LGE is well placed to compete in the rapidly 
evolving digital television industry. It has region-specific 
production, R&D and marketing facilities for its flat 
panel displays in the Republic of Korea, China, Poland 
(for the European market) and Mexico (for the Americas 
market). The strategy of the Digital Display business 
unit is to maintain its technological edge by combining 
proprietary resources for modules, chips and total software 
solutions.21 This activity represents a significant engine 
of growth for LGE.
The Mobile Communications business unit accounted 
for 40% of LG Electronics’ 2005 sales. This unit’s main 
product groups are CDMA handsets (50%) and GSM 
handsets (40%), with networks and other appliances 
contributing 10%. In 2005 LGE ranked fourth in global 
mobile handset sales, in general, and it ranks itself first in 
CDMA handsets (as does SEC). In the second quarter of 
2006, sales were concentrated in North America (28%), 
Asia and the Middle East (22%), Central and South America 
(21%), Europe (17%), the Republic of Korea (5%) and 
other countries (7%). Sales of CDMA handsets reached 
30 million units and those of the GSM handset were in 
the order of 25 million units. The “Chocolate” model 
was a best seller with sales of over 5 million, mainly in 
North America (40%), Europe (28%), Asia (20%) and 
Central and South America (12%). The strategy of this 
business unit is to continue to win market share based on 
intensive R&D and innovative designs. It uses an operator-
centric marketing strategy for its CDMA handsets and 
an open-market approach for GSM handsets and seeks 
to place the LG brand above competitors such as Nokia 
and Motorola. Mobile Communications is the principal 
engine of growth for LGE. 
A significant role in LG Electronics’ global network 
is played by its associates, including LG Philips LCD, 
LG Innotek and LG Micron. LG Philips LCD is one of 
the world’s leading merchant suppliers of TFT-LCDs for 
notebook computers, desktop monitors and television 
sets, as well as hand-held consumer products such 
as PDAs, and mobile phones, and other applications 
(entertainment systems, automobile navigation systems, 
aircraft instrumentation and medical diagnostic equipment). 
LG Philips LCD has manufacturing subsidiaries in China 
and Poland. LG Innotek manufactures components, such 
as analogue and digital tuners, motors for optical disk 
drives and modulators for mobile, display, network and 
automotive electronics. It has overseas manufacturing 
facilities in China, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Poland 
and the United States, as well as an R&D operation in 
Russia. LG Micron produces CPTs for colour television 
sets and computer monitors. It has one overseas subsidiary 
in China. 
Together, LGE and its associates have built up an 
extensive global production, R&D and design network (see 
21
 LG Electronics became associated with the United States company Zenith in 1995 for the purpose of improving its brand and accessing advanced 
technologies. Similar to Samsung Electronics Company’s experience with AST Research, differences in management styles led to the loss of 
important human resources and LGE took over as of 2000. Important lessons were learned from this experience about approaches to R&D and 
technological catch-up (Eun, 2002). 
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table III.12). This international system encompasses 56% 
of total LGE assets. LGE clearly bases the manufacture 
of many of its lower-range products in China and, to a 
lesser extent, in other Asian countries. In its main markets 
—North America and Europe— it maintains primarily 
R&D operations, with smaller regional manufacturing 
facilities located in nearby lower-wage countries, such 
as Poland, in the case of Europe, and Mexico, in the case 
of North America. Many of the higher-range products 
are still manufactured in the Republic of Korea and 
exported to final markets. About 44% of the 66,652-
strong workforce of LGE is located in the Republic 
of Korea, the rest overseas. The establishment of LGE 
Table III.12
LG ELECTRONICS: GLOBAL NETWORK OF MANUFACTURING SUBSIDIARIES AND R&D/DESIGN CENTRES
Region Main Divisions Associates
1. China Taizhou- refrigerators, refrigerator compressors LG Micron: Fuzhou, China- Manufacturing
Hangzou- digital recording media LG Innotek: Huizhou, China- optical disk drives, tuners, 
LCD modules, ICs
Huizhou- digital storage, digital audio and video LG Innotek: Shanghai, China- all products
Nanjing- monitors, washing machines, digital televisions, PDPs LG Innotek: Shenzhen, China- all products
Qinhuangdao- casting of parts for equipment LG Innotek: Beijing China- all products
Shanghai- digital audio and video LG Philips: Nanjing, China- assembly of TFT-LCDs
Shenyang- televisions
Tianjin- microwave ovens, residential air conditioning, motors, 
magnetron, PVC, rotary compressors, R&D
Yantai- hand-held phones (CDMA)
Kunshan- PCs
Qingdao- hand-held phones (GSM)
Sandongsheng, China- R&D
Beijing, China- R&D, design
2. Other Asian
 economies
New Delhi, India- televisions, refrigerators, washing machines, 
air conditioning, microwave ovens, monitors, design 
LG Innotek: Japan- all products
Bangalore, India- R&D LG Innotek: Taiwan- all products
Jakarta, Indonesia- televisions, refrigerators, air conditioning, 
VCRs, monitors
LG Innotek: Jawa, Barat, Indonesia- tuners, VCR motors 
and heads
Bangkok, Thailand- televisions, residential air conditioning, 
washing machines
Hanoi, Viet Nam- televisions, monitors, digital audio and
video, digital storage, hand-held phones (GSM)
Tokyo, Japan- R&D, design 





Mlawa, Poland- PDP televisions LG Philips: Kobierzyce, Poland- backend modules
LG Innotek: Wroclaw, Poland- inverters, television tuners 
and power supply units 
Moscow, Russia- refrigerators, washing machines,
televisions, audio equipment
LG Innotek: Nizhny Novgorad, Russia- R&D
Moscow, Russia- R&D
St. Petersburg- R&D
Almaty, Kazakastan- colour televisions, washing machines, 
VCRs, audio equipment
Istanbul, Turkey- air conditioning
4. Americas United States- R&D (2), design LG Innotek: United States- all products
Mexicali, Mexico- monitors, LCD televisions, hand-held
phones
LG Innotek: Mexicali, Mexico- tuners, radio frequency 
modules
Reynosa, Mexico- colour televisions, PDP televisions
Monterrey, Mexico- refrigerators
Manaus, Brazil- colour televisions, VCRs, DVDs, air 
conditioning
Taubate, Brazil- monitors, hand-held phones, CDRs
5. Rest of the world Cairo, Egypt- deflection yokes, fly back transformers, tuners
Herzelia, Israel- R&D
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Lockwood Greene, official site [online] http://www.lg.com.
subsidiaries in the United States (1981), Germany (1986), 
Thailand (1989), China (1993), India (1997) and Mexico 
(2000) marked some of the main steps in the group’s 
internationalization process. Other milestones were the 
association with Zenith in 1995 and the establishment 
of LG Philips LCD in 1999 and LG Philips Display in 
2001. Like Samsung Electronics Company, LGE has 
deployed numerous strategies for creating its global 
network, including increasing efficiency (by reducing 
production costs), accessing markets and securing 
strategic assets (technology, strategic locations and so 
forth), which have varied in importance in the course of 
its evolution (Moon, 2005).
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The direction of the group’s R&D efforts suggest 
that its current growth engines revolve around mobile 
handsets, digital displays (including television sets), 
appliances and retail air conditioners. New hand-held 
phones, larger LCD/PDP displays and television sets 
and commercial packages of air conditioners are being 
developed. Further down the line, LGE is placing its 
stakes on organic light-emitting diode displays, flexible 
displays, its car ‘infotainment’ system and non-electrode 
plasma lighting systems. Its 14 research laboratories in 
the Republic of Korea and 16 overseas and its design 
centres in major markets (China, Europe, India, Japan 
and the United States) are coordinating efforts in that 
regard. LGE is another Korean global electronics TNC 
which is actively working to shift its operations towards 
the knowledge economy.
In summary, two world-class electronic TNCs 
with quite similar characteristics in terms of evolution, 
corporate strategies, organizational structure, and 
internationalization processes have emerged from the 
Korean development trajectory. According to the Japan 
Electronics and Information Technology Industries 
Association (JEITA, 2005), SEC and LGE compete 
head-to-head in specific product groups, such as digital 
television sets (SEC market share: 9.4%, LGE: 9.3%), 
computer monitors (SEC: 22.3%; LGE: 13.7%), TFT-
LCDs (SEC: 18%; LGE: 17%) and hand-held phones 
(SEC: 12.6%; LGE: 6.7). It is expected that the digital 
revolution will be complete by 2010, insofar as the share 
of digital electronics products will have reached 96%, 
up from 57% in 2004, and analogue products will have 
slumped to only 4%, from 43% in 2004, in a global 
market that will have expanded from US$ 109 billion to 
US$ 178 billion. Within those two groups of electronics 
products, digital television sets (PDP, LCD and CRT-PJ 
with digital tuners) will rise from 22% to 54% of the 
total, while analogue television sets (CRT-PJ without 
digital tuners) will fall to zero from 34% in 2004. SEC 
believes it has a one-year lead over its competitors in 
40-inch LCD television sets and 60-inch PDP sets (Choi, 
2005). This suggests that R&D efforts, on the one hand, 
and the nature of the internationalization process for 
digital displays, on the other, will be crucial factors in the 
competition between these two electronics TNCs.22
22
 In the case of SEC, one of the key questions is how it can best calibrate its international competitiveness by way of the internationalization of digital 
displays. For example, its strategic partners, such as Samsung Corning Precision (glass), Samsung Corning (back light), Samsung Electro-Mechanics 
(LED, PCB, etc.), Cheil Industries and Samsung Fine Chemicals (sheet, film, chemicals), and its in-house production to supply components and 
materials (driver IC, LCD/PDP modules) will need to coordinate their internationalization processes in order to supply strategic-partner final product 
assemblers, such as Samsung Electronics Company-Sony (TVs), or in-house final product assembly processes TVs, monitors, Note PC, HHP and 
multimedia. A key question is when and if Samsung Electronics Company will internationalize its production of LCD/PDP modules, as its current 
plants have been constructed exclusively in the Republic of Korea (Giheung/Hwaseong and Cheonan/Tangjeong complexes).
Initially, SEC and LGE followed trajectories similar 
to such Japanese electronics giants as Sony and Masushita. 
The main differences between the two Korean TNCs 
lie in the higher brand value of SEC and the scale of its 
semiconductor activities, both of which far surpass those 
of LGE, although the latter is more internationalized in 
terms of overseas assets. Both engaged in technological 
upgrading with path-following activities (consumer 
electronics, personal computers) and path-creating ones 
(CDMA telephony and mobile phones), but only SEC 
achieved a significant path-skipping technological advance, 
in the form of DRAM. 
The two companies’ internationalization processes 
have followed a certain common logic. Initially, they 
undertook large market-seeking investments to gain access 
to the major markets, such as North America and Europe, 
followed by initiatives in Asia, especially China. Then they 
made very significant efficiency-seeking investments in 
export processing zones in lower-wage Asian countries, 
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam, and 
lower-wage countries that were close to major markets: 
Mexico in the case of North America and CIS countries 
in the case of Europe. Strategic asset-seeking investments 
—to purchase companies with technological advantages 
or to set up R&D or design centres— are undertaken 
mainly in the major markets. Both of these electronics 
TNCs seem to be showing a fresh interest in the emerging 
market BRICs. OFDI has been an important mechanism 
for the implementation of their corporate strategies. 
These two Korean electronics giants face challenges 
if they are to maintain their competitive advantages. The 
appreciation of the won makes exporting from the Republic 
of Korea increasingly difficult. They find themselves in an 
Asian nutcracker between lower-wage fast followers and 
technological upstarts, especially China, and competitive 
TNCs from developed countries. SEC and LGE are 
being obliged to extend and calibrate their international 
production systems in order to compete effectively in 
both mature and emerging markets. At the same time, 
they must also undertake ever-increasing R&D efforts 
to push deeper into those activities associated with the 
knowledge economy. As a result, these two companies 
have become the Republic of Korea’s principal agents 
in that area.
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2. The international expansion of the automotive industry
In 2005, the world’s 10 leading automobile assemblers 
accounted for almost three quarters of the world-wide 
production of 66.5 million vehicles (up from 58 million 
units in 2000). The principal changes in the industry 
recently have been the rise of Asian manufacturers Toyota 
Motor Company, Honda Motor Company and Hyundai 
Motor Company (HMC) and the relative decline of United 
States companies, such as General Motors (GM) and 
Ford Motor Company.
According to the International Organization of Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA), HMC of the Republic 
of Korea reached ninth in the global ranking, measured 
by production. Measured by sales, HMC is ranked sixth 
by the website Automobile.com (see table III.13). In the 
J.D. Power Associates initial quality study conducted in 
June 2006, HMC surpassed Toyota and Honda, rising to 
third place in terms of number of problems (102) per 100 
vehicles and overtaking Nissan to gain sixth place in terms 
of sales (J.D. Power and Associates, 2006). Thus, in the 
space of three decades, a Korean automobile assembler 
established a prominent position among the top 10 firms 
of the global automotive industry. The dimension of that 
success reflects the fact that the Republic of Korea is the 
only country that has been able to simulate the success 
of the Japanese automotive industry by transforming an 
export business based primarily on national champions 
into a global competitor (Lautier, 2001; Ravenhill, 2001). 
HMC is a major global TNC —the eightieth largest in 
the world by sales (US$ 57.4 billion) in 2005 (Fortune 
Global 500). Among developing country TNCs, HMC was 
ranked thirteenth by external assets (US$ 5.9 billion) in 
2004 (UNCTAD, 2006).
Table III.13
TOP 10 AUTOMOBILE TNCs, BY PRODUCTION AND SALES, 2005
(Millions of vehicles)
 According to OICA According to Automobile.com
Automotive TNC 2005 Production Automotive TNC 2005 Sales
General Motors (includes Opel, Vauxhall, GM Daewoo) 9.1 General Motors 8.4
Toyota Motor Co. 7.3 Toyota Motor Co. 8.1
Ford (including Jaguar and Volvo) 6.5 Ford Motor Co. 6.2
Volkswagen group 5.2 Volkswagen AG 5.2
DaimlerChrysler (including Evobus) 4.8 DaimlerChrysler AG 4.9
Nissan Motor Co. 3.5 Hyundai Automotive Group 3.7
Honda Motor Co. 3.4 Nissan Motor Co. 3.6
PSA Peugeot Citroën 3.4 PSA Peugeot Citroën 3.4
Hyundai (including Kia) 3.1 Honda Motor Co. 3.4
Renault (including Dacia and Samsung) 2.6 Renault 2.5
 Subtotal top 10 48.9  Subtotal top 10 49.4
 World 66.5  World ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers official site [online] 
http://www.oica.net and Automobile, official site [online] http://www.automobile.com.
In the Republic of Korea, the automotive sector 
contributes 9.4% of the manufacturing industry’s value-
added and production, accounts for 8.3% of national exports 
and employs 7.4% of the gross national workforce (http://
www.korea.net). Automotive production was expected to 
exceed 4 million units in 2006 (KAMA, 2006). In 2005, 
exports reached almost 2.6 million units and were worth 
about US$ 27 billion. Imports were rising too, but from a 
very small base (46,000 units). In the same year, domestic 
sales accounted for 31% of total sales while exports made 
up 69%, indicating that the Korean automotive industry 
has become highly export-oriented (KAMA, 2006). 
The success of the Korean automotive industry was 
not easily achieved.23 Its evolution may be visualized in 
23
 In many ways, Korean automotive manufacturing reflected the systemic crisis that affected the country’s development trajectory as a whole, 
insofar as the ongoing dispute between “techno-nationalists” (in favour of State-led industrial policy) and “techno-rationalists” (more comfortable 
with market-led initiatives) was played out in the evolution of the industry. The industry underwent a fundamental shift as a result of the 1997 
financial crisis (Ravenhill, 2001), as did the Republic of Korea’s development trajectory in general.
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five principal stages: the assembly of imported knocked 
down kits (1960s); the development of the first proprietary 
models, such as the Pony (1970s); mass production and 
export (1980s); the development of independent models 
(1990s); and, after the financial crisis, the globalization of 
the industry (post-2000). In the first two stages, State-led 
industrialization policies in the form of import protection 
for the domestic market, preferential credit allocations, 
domestic content regulations and export incentives, as well 
as a particular geopolitical context, were very influential 
in shaping the industry (Lautier, 2001; Ravenhill, 2001). 
Towards the later stages, however, indirect initiatives to 
support the development of high-tech and core technologies 
were more representative of Korean automotive industry 
policy (Invest Korea, 2003). Free trade agreements (FTAs) 
could play a more important role in the international 
expansion of this industry in the future.
Most of the original Korean automobile assemblers 
were initially associated with global auto TNCs by way of 
minor capital shareholdings, acquired for the purpose of 
accelerating their catch-up processes (for example, HMC 
with Ford, then with Mitsubishi; Daewoo with General 
Motors and Isuzu; Kia with Ford and Mazda). However, 
continuing difficulties in achieving significant technology 
transfer led Korean government officials to back more 
independent efforts by these national producers.
Between 1979 and 1997, the principal assemblers 
ramped up domestic production capacity sharply: HMC 
from 104,000 to 1,347,000 units; Daewoo from 39,000 to 
845,000 units and Kia from 59,000 to 760,000 units. The 
three companies had also increased their overseas production 
capacity significantly by 1997: Daewoo to 831,000 units, Kia 
to 228,000 units and HMC to 170,000 units (Nam, 2005). 
Daewoo focused mainly on acquiring existing operations 
in Eastern European countries, such as Romania, Poland 
and the Czech Republic. Kia tended to establish licensing 
agreements with knocked down kit assemblers in Asian 
countries (such as Iran, Pakistan, Philippines and Taiwan 
Province of China). HMC built a major greenfield plant 
in Bromont, Canada in 1989; however, this proved to be 
a strategic error (Nam, 2005) and the plant was closed in 
1993. Thus, very aggressive internationalization strategies 
were deployed by these Korean automobile assemblers. 
The rapid expansion of the industry’s production 
capacity could not hide the fact that it suffered from a number 
of significant problems. Among its main shortcomings was 
its weak international competitiveness, which was due to 
continuing difficulties in accessing the best technology 
from foreign partners, coupled with Korean firms’ limited 
technology generation capabilities of their own, as well 
as poor quality products, costly or poor quality locally-
produced parts and components, rising local labour costs 
and premature internationalization (Lautier, 2001; Lee 
and Pai, 2004). In the 1990s, the combined effects of 
these problems eventually led to huge and unsustainable 
debt-equity levels —in the order of 640%— among the 
principal Korean automobile assemblers. Kia Motors 
alone had debts in excess of US$ 6 billion.24
Some of the strongest impacts of the 1997 financial crisis 
in the Republic of Korea were felt precisely in the automotive 
industry. First, only those companies in a position to rapidly 
increase exports when domestic sales collapsed —such as 
HMC and Kia— had a chance of surviving intact. In the 
case of Kia, the firm’s excessive foreign debt caused it to 
founder. Second, each of the other three producers, none of 
which had a proprietary model, were acquired by foreign 
automobile companies: General Motors (USA) purchased 
a major interest (44.6%, now 50.9%) in Daewoo Motor in 
2002, Renault (France) acquired a controlling stake (70.1%) 
in the automotive wing of Samsung in 2000 and SAIC (China) 
bought 48.9% of Ssangyong in 2005. The industry leader in 
the Republic of Korea, HMC, acquired both Kia and Asia 
Motors in 1998.25 Thus, the financial crisis devastated the 
Korean automotive industry by destabilizing producers and 
collapsing domestic sales (see figure III.5).
Figure III.5
THE KOREAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY, 1970-2005
(Numbers of units)
24
 Government indecision about how to deal with Kia (first declining to intervene, then nationalizing the company, followed by two unsuccessful 
auctions of its assets) weakened market confidence in its ability to handle the debt crisis and negatively affected credit ratings. The bankruptcy 
of Daewoo compounded these problems (Ravenhill, 2001). 
25
 HMC had recovered from the failure of the Bromont venture and had investment funds available, partly because the Korean government did not 
actively support its overseas investment projects in 1993-1997 after the President of HMC unsuccessfully entered the running for the presidency 
of the Republic of Korea. As a result, HMC was not as internationally exposed as its Korean competitors, such as Kia and Daewoo.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (KAMA), Annual 
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The structure of the Korean automotive industry 
changed dramatically after the financial crisis. Whereas 
domestic sales had driven growth during the 1980s and 
early 1990s, the heavy slump in these sales made exports 
the new engine of growth. By 2005, exports accounted 
for almost 70% of overall sales. Reflecting the tastes of 
foreign consumers, medium-sized passenger cars and 
SUVs increasingly replaced small vehicles as the dominant 
outputs of the Korean automotive industry. The principal 
export markets were North America and Europe; however, 
emerging markets gathered momentum after the year 2000, 
especially for knocked down kits. HMC and Kia were 
able to weather the dislocation of the financial crisis and 
continue to grow by specializing in higher-value-added 
medium-sized passenger cars and SUVs and by increasing 
exports. HMC raised its production from 770,558 units in 
1998 to 1,683,760 units in 2005. Kia’s production jumped 
from 362,947 units in 1997 to 1,105,170 in 2005. Daewoo 
rapidly recovered its 1997 level of production; however, 
its export performance was erratic until General Motors 
(GM) acquired control of the company. Thereafter, it did 
successfully export vehicles assembled in the Republic of 
Korea and knocked-down kits, exceeding the 500,000 unit 
milestone in 2005 with the assistance of the GM international 
system. Ssangyong floundered until its takeover by SAIC, 
and even then suffered a 22.8% drop in sales in 2005. 
Samsung recovered after it was purchased by Renault; 
however, its export performance was poor. 
In spite of the sharp rise in foreign participation in the 
Korean automotive industry, HMC consolidated its presence 
with a market share of about 50%, in addition to the 23% 
corresponding to Kia (Hyundai Motor Company, 2006b). Its 
share of exports reached 43.7% in 2005, plus Kia’s 32.4%. 
These two companies were able to utilize a far higher proportion 
of their production capacity than their competitors in the 
Republic of Korea. For that reason, the recent history of the 
Korean automotive industry is mainly about the evolution 
of HMC (see table III.14). The company’s success has 
been described as “one of the most surprising turnabouts in 
automotive history” (TimeAsia, 25 April 2005). 
Table III.14
KOREAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE, BY MANUFACTURER, 2005
(Number of units and percentages)
Producers/Aspect Production capacity Production Domestic sales Exports
 (KARI) (KAMA) (KAMA) (KAMA)
HMC 1 850 000 41.1 1 683 760 45.5 570 814 50.0 1 131 211 43.7
Kia 1 250 000 27.7 1 105 170 29.9 266 508 23.3 838 513 32.4
 Subtotal HMC Kia 3 100 000 68.8 2 788 930 75.4 837 322 73.3 1 969 724 76.2
GM Daewoo 1 060 000 23.5 648 788 17.5 107 583 9.4 544 809 21.1
Ssangyong 220 000 4.9 135 901 3.7 75 527 6.6 65 521 2.5
Renault-Samsung 125 000 2.8 118 438 3.2 115 425 10.1 3 610 0.1
Others n.a. n.a. 9 293 0.3 6 705 0.6 2 424 0.1
Total 4 505 000 100.0 3 699 350 100.0 1 142 562 100.0 2 586 088 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Korea Automotive Research Institute (KARI), 2006 Korean Automotive Industry, 
Seom, Hyundai Motor Co., 2006 and Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (KAMA), Annual Report 2006- Korean Automobile Industry, Seoul, 2006.
(a) Hyundai Motor Company (HMC)26
The Hyundai Motor Company (HMC) was established 
in 1967 as part of the Hyundai chaebol. It was actively 
involved in the Republic of Korea’s Heavy and Chemical 
Industries (HCI) initiative. It evolved in three clear phases: 
(i) the development of an independent proprietary model; 
(ii) the establishment of large scale production; and (iii) the 
establishment of a global network (Nam, 2005). In the first 
phase, starting in the 1960s, HMC assembled knocked-down 
United States models (New Cortina and Ford 20M) in the 
Republic of Korea, with the technical assistance of Ford. 
But this was not a satisfactory experience for HMC and it 
adopted a self-reliant, export-oriented strategy, developing 
26
 Based on interviews at HMC and Kia headquarters in Seoul, as well as Hyundai (2006a, 2006b, 2005 and 2004) and Nam (2005).
its own models. In 1974 HMC designed and manufactured 
the Republic of Korea’s first independent car model, the 
Pony, which it exported to Latin America and the Middle 
East in the mid-1970s. In the case of the Middle East, HMC 
piggybacked on the presence of Hyundai Heavy Industries 
there. Production rose from 10,000 units in the early 1970s to 
140,000 in 1984 and the company attained a 90% localization 
rate for the Pony model by 1976. Nevertheless, those exports 
peaked in 1980 and HMC developed its second proprietary 
model, the Stellar, in 1983.
The company’s initial success with its own proprietary 
models allowed it to contemplate the second phase of 
expansion. This consisted of a huge increase in economic 
scale, the development of its own proprietary engine, increased 
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exports and the beginnings of FDI-driven internationalization 
in the mid-1980s through to the 1990s. Much of the success 
of HMC in coming to dominate the Korean automotive 
industry derived, first, from its technical cooperation 
agreement with Mitsubishi, which was more satisfactory 
than the previous arrangement with Ford. Mitsubishi 
purchased 10% of the shares in HMC and the HMC plant 
built in 1980 was based on Japanese technology.27 Second, 
rising demand by Canadian and United States customers 
for Korean vehicles was also a driver in the company’s 
success.28 HMC production capacity in the Republic of 
Korea rocketed from 240,000 units in 1985 to 1,347,000 in 
1997. HMC also sought to increase its overseas production. 
Low quality products and rising labour costs caused a 
sharp fall in United States sales between 1989 and 1993, 
however, and the Canadian factory in Bromont was closed 
in 1993. HMC became much more cautious than its Korean 
competitors about further internationalization in the form 
of FDI, even though it did maintain small knocked down 
kit plants in Botswana, Egypt, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Zimbabwe. Given its difficulties with FDI 
as a channel of internationalization, HMC concentrated 
its production expansion in the Republic of Korea itself, 
where it possessed several world-class plants, such as 
Ulsan (which became one of the world’s largest automobile 
factories), Asan (which became the world’s most automated 
factory) and Chonju. Nevertheless, the 1997 financial crisis 
destabilized HMC, at the same time as it presented the 
company with the strategic opportunity to acquire the assets 
of Asian Motors and Kia. In view of the new situation that 
developed after the financial crisis, HMC set its sights on 
becoming a global automobile TNC.
Seeking to boost its sagging international sales, build 
trust in its products and demonstrate its seriousness about 
vehicle quality, HMC became the first carmaker to offer a 
10-year warranty in the United States market. Its success in 
this gave it a basis from which to extend its technological 
independence to higher-value-added vehicles, which, in 
turn, increased profits. Nonetheless, although HMC is 
expected to be the fastest-growing assembler of light 
vehicles among all the major automotive TNCs in 2005-
2010, it still has to catch up in terms of its R&D effort, 
which, at 1.5% of total revenues, is about one quarter 
of the resources allocated by other leading automotive 
TNCs (Autofacts, 2006). With renewed confidence, HMC 
embarked on a new and more coordinated strategy of 
internationalization through FDI, including the integration 
of the Asia Motors and Kia assets.29 
The logic of HMC global business is evident in 
the structure of its assets. Its Korean manufacturing 
assets consist of the Ulsan, Asan and Jeonju plants. 
Ulsan, the principal manufacturing hub, consists of 
five independent manufacturing facilities with 34,000 
employees and a production capacity of 1,530,000 units 
(the Accent and Getz models are made in plant one; the 
Santa Fe, Centennial, and Tucson models in plant two; 
the Elantra, Hyundai Coupe, and Matrix models in plant 
three; the H-1, Trajet, H-100 and H-1 trucks in plant 
four; and the Terracan and Tucson SUVs in plant five). 
The Asan plant makes mainly passenger cars for export 
and possesses a production capacity of 290,000 units. 
The Jeonju plant specializes in heavy duty commercial 
vehicles, including buses and trucks, and has a capacity 
of 60,000 units.
The company’s main international manufacturing 
facilities are located in China, India, Turkey and the 
United States. In the first three, HMC was a first mover 
and achieved significant national market shares. The 
Hyundai plant in Turkey, Hyundai Assan Otomotiv Sanayi 
(HAOS), represents a transitional facility towards the 
new global business. Established in 1993, it was a joint 
venture with the Kibar Group, a small-scale undertaking 
aimed at making inroads into Turkey’s domestic market 
and taking advantage of its bilateral treaties with Middle 
Eastern countries and in the belief that Turkey would 
soon become a member of the European Union. Seeing 
great potential, HMC eventually started producing the 
Accent small passenger vehicle (capacity 50,000 units) 
and the Grace van (20,000 units) at HAOS, but sales 
and exports were poor. HMC then set about revitalizing 
the facility, strengthening the product line-up with 
the launch of the Verna model, expanding the dealer 
network to 80 agents and aiming to increase capacity 
to 100,000 by 2007.
The Hyundai Motor India (HMI) plant near Chennai was 
a US$ 457-million greenfield investment with a production 
capacity of 120,000. It began making the Santro and Accent 
models in 1990 (80,000 and 40,000 units, respectively). 
Much of the machinery and equipment for Chennai came 
from the failed Bromont plant in Canada. HMC has reached 
a localization rate of 70% for parts by convincing 13 Korean 
parts suppliers to enter into joint ventures with local operators 
27
 In 1982 that technical cooperation evolved into a strategic alliance.
28
 HMC entered the Canadian market in 1984 and the United States market two years later. In 1986, HMC exported 300,000 cars to the United States.
29
 Kia owned plants in the Republic of Korea at Sohari, Hwasung, Kwangju and Suhsan. Its main manufacturing facility abroad is in Slovakia, although 
it also has knocked down kit plants in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Indonesia, Iran, Namibia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Taiwan Province of 
China and Viet Nam. HMC and Kia share overseas R&D facilities in Germany, Japan and the United States. On 6 September 2005, Kia announced 
plans to build a new plant with capacity for 400,000 units, worth US$ 1.2 billion, in Georgia, United States.
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and 38 local suppliers to set up within 50 kilometres of the 
HMI plant. This plant has been very successful. The Santro 
was named “Car of the Year” in India in 1999 and the HMI 
plant began to turn a profit by 2000. It was later upgraded 
to regional headquarters for exports to developing countries 
and made a source of core components, such as engines and 
transmissions. HMI has a very significant share of the Indian 
market. Recently, HMC decided to strengthen the product 
line-up by adding the Verna and Getz models, increase 
the number of dealers to 220, add a third shift and build a 
second plant. In 2006, it sold 280,000 units, 189,000 in the 
domestic market and 91,000 as exports.
The Beijing Hyundai Motor Company (BHMC) joint 
venture with Beijing Automotive Holding Company was 
the first stage of a major commitment in China. The main 
objective was to secure a strong market share there. It 
began in 2002 as a relatively small US$ 200-million plant 
with a production capacity of 50,000 units for the Sonata 
model. It was later upgraded with a US$ 430-million 
investment to increase production to 200,000 units, half 
for the Sonata and half for the Elantra. Lastly, a fresh 
investment extended production capacity to 500,000 units 
and prepared for production of the Tucson and Verna 
models. This plant has been exceptionally successful. An 
engine-manufacturing plant with a capacity of 150,000 
was added. The BHMC plant has the highest single market 
share in China, at 9% in 2006. Plans are under way for a 
second plant with a 300,000 production capacity. 
The Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama (HMMA) 
plant in the United States was the new HMC local 
production base for North America. Its was intended to 
increase the firm’s market share in the United States and 
avoid trade disputes with the United States government. 
The US$ 1 billion investment was a fully-fledged plant 
complete with testing facilities and a production capacity 
of 235,000 units. It was to manufacture the Sonata model 
to compete with the most popular vehicles in the United 
States market: the Toyota Camry and the Honda Accord. The 
HMMA plant has a automation rate and ratio of modular 
production superior to the Asan plant in the Republic of 
Korea. It has won awards for quality and its 2006 sales 
reached 275,000, of which 242,000 were local sales and 
34,000 were exports. Now the Santa Fe model is to be 
added to the line-up. Interestingly enough, HMC (and Kia) 
undertook major investments in the United States market 
at the same time that an FTA between the two countries 
was being considered by the two governments.
HMC intends to further expand its overseas capacity 
from 910,000 units to 1,820,000 units by increasing capacity 
in China to 600,000 units, in India to 250,000 units, in 
Turkey to 120,000 units and in Europe (Czech Republic) 
to 300,000 units. HMC consolidates its global business 
by way of R&D centres in the main markets: the United 
States (California and Michigan), Europe (Germany) and 
Asia (Japan). In other words, although HMC may initially 
have simulated the trajectories of Japanese automobile 
TNCs, today it is rapidly consolidating as an innovative 
global automobile manufacturer.
In sum, the automobile industry represents another 
prime example of successful industrial and technological 
upgrading to create a Korean-based global TNC. It began 
by following the Japanese trajectory but soon developed its 
own characteristics in terms of models, markets and global 
production networks. From the perspective of technological 
catch-up, the industry may be considered to have adopted a 
path-skipping trajectory (Lee and Kim, 2001). The success of 
HMC is all the more noteworthy because it was capable not 
only of recovering from a disastrous initial internationalization 
process, in which it lacked clear competitive advantages 
(Nam, 2005), but of learning from that experience in order to 
construct a truly competitive global business thereafter. As it 
evolved, HMC has demonstrated several internationalization 
objectives —accessing markets, reducing production costs, 
obtaining technology and strategic locations— and has 
pursued these with varying degrees of vigour at different 
stages (Moon, 2005).
The Korean automobile industry is now facing a 
number of challenges related to the globalization process. 
The rapid appreciation of the Korean won is placing 
limits on future automobile exports and increasing the 
attractiveness of models imported into the Korean market 
(especially from Japan and Germany). Manufacturers are 
being pressed to further raise the quality of their products 
in order to improve their brands and it is probable that 
Korean automobile manufacturers will expand further 
by way of OFDI.
3. The international expansion of the textile and apparel industry
The textile and apparel industry has played a significant 
role in the Republic of Korea’s national industrialization 
process, even though its contribution to manufacturing 
GDP has declined sharply since it peaked at over 20% 
in the 1970s (see figure III.1). Apparel provided early 
export earnings and synthetic textiles were a key part of 
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the HCI initiative, which laid down a solid petrochemical 
industry in the country. The industry’s staying power 
as a driver of the Korean development trajectory is 
attributable to its ability to adapt to the changing rules 
and restructuring process of the international textile 
and apparel industry. However, in view of the current 
challenges, especially the heightened competition from 
China and India, the Republic of Korea will have to 
consider accelerated upgrading of the industry and its 
technology if textiles and apparel are to continue to play 
a significant role in the future.30 
Following Japan’s example, the Republic of Korea and 
other newly industrializing South-East Asian economies 
(such as Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan Province of China) 
experienced notable success by latching onto the textile and 
apparel industry to initiate exports and take the first steps 
towards forming a national industrial base. The spectacular 
success of Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) 
in winning international market shares in the leading 
industrial economies elicited a harsh response from the 
respective governments in the form of restrictive trade 
practices and preferential trade agreements that blunted 
this export drive. Recently, however, new multilateral 
rules have brought fresh —and stiffer— competition 
into the international textile and apparel industry (see 
box III.2). Many Korean firms adapted to the changing 
rules by opting for new corporate strategies involving 
OFDI (see box III.3). 
30
 Along with industrial and technological upgrading, in the case of textiles and apparel the FTA currently being negotiated with the United States 
could also boost the industry by lowering import tariffs and improving market access (KOFOTI, 2006a).
Box III.2
THE INTERNATIONAL TEXTILE AND APPAREL INDUSTRY: DEALING WITH THE EFFECTS OF DISTORTED TRADE
In response to the rapid success of 
developing country apparel exporters, many 
industrialized countries tried to recover 
lost market shares or slow the decline of 
their own textile and apparel industries by 
implementing restrictive trade practices. 
For example, the Multifibre Arrangement 
of 1974 authorized the major importing 
countries to impose quotas on the principal 
exporters of apparel. This led producers, 
from both importer and the major exporting 
countries, to establish assembly operations 
in third countries where they could use the 
local quotas to export to large markets, 
even if those countries lacked absolute 
comparative advantages. Such assembly 
operations were usually located in export 
processing zones in lower-wage countries. 
Thus, some developing countries that 
foreign investors would not otherwise have 
considered for apparel assembly suddenly 
became important FDI destinations. 
Some of the principal importer 
countries followed up with bilateral trade 
agreements containing rules of origin, 
which provided incentives for the use 
of domestically-produced textile inputs 
and made those of the exporters’ local 
industry relatively uncompetitive. For 
example, the Government of the United 
States designed and implemented such 
mechanisms as “production sharing” under 
section 807 of the Tariff Schedules of the 
United States (TSUS) and, later, heading 
9802 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
of the United States (HTSUS), as well as 
preferential trade agreements (such as the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
of 1983, which evolved into the Caribbean 
Basin Trade Partnership Act of 2000, and, 
later, the Dominican Republic —Central 
America— United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2005, and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1994). Such arrangements 
supported the United States’ national textile 
industry by encouraging the duty-free 
incorporation of United States components, 
such as cloth, thread, buttons, and so on. 
Mexico and many Caribbean Basin countries 
thus became principal suppliers to the 
United States market, but in the process 
confined their activities to apparel assembly 
using the more expensive United States 
inputs, which complied with the respective 
rules of origin. Many of the Asian apparel 
exporters who were thus disadvantaged 
saw their direct United States market 
shares fall, although some adeptly used 
“triangular manufacturing” arrangements 
to establish apparel assembly facilities in 
developing countries with unfilled quotas 
or special access, including Mexico and 
Caribbean Basin countries.
A new Agreement on Clothing and 
Textiles negotiated in the context of the trade 
liberalizing agenda of the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (later, the World Trade 
Organization) and implemented in 1995 
required the phasing out and elimination 
of quotas over the following 10 years. This 
made the textile and apparel industry even 
more intensely competitive and the main 
beneficiaries will undoubtedly be those 
countries that possess competitive integrated 
textile and apparel industries, most notably 
China and India and a small number of other 
countries, such as Pakistan, the Republic of 
Korea and Taiwan Province of China, which 
can offer buyers the “full service package” 
through their global networks. Thus, market 
economics are being re-established in the 
global textile and apparel industry and the 
existing distortions are being reduced. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Cotton USA, “Cotton USA sourcing program” [online] 2006 http://www.
cottonusasourcing.com; G. Gereffi, “International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 48, 1999; 
Michael Mortimore, “Illusory competitiveness: the apparel assembly model of the Caribbean Basin”, INTECH Discussion Paper Series, No. 2003-11, Maastrict, Institute 
for New Technologies, United Nations University, November 2003 and “When does apparel become a peril? On the nature of industrialization in the Caribbean Basin”, 
Free Trade and Uneven Development: The North American Apparel Industry after NAFTA, G. Gereffi, D. Spener and J. Bair (eds.), Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 
2002; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “TNCs and the removal of textiles and clothing quotas”, UNCTAD Current Studies on FDI and 
Development, No. 1, New York, 2005 and The Competitiveness Challenge: Transnational Corporations and the Industrial Restructuring of Developing Countries, New 
York, October 2000; International Trade Commission (ITC), “The impact of the Caribbean Basin economic recovery act- seventeenth report 2003-2004”, Investigation 
332-227, ISITC Publication, No. 3804, Washington, D.C., September 2005 and “Textiles and apparel: assessment of the competitiveness of certain foreign suppliers 
to the U.S. market”, Investigation 332-448, USITC Publication, No. 3671, Washington, D.C., January 2004.
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Box III.3
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL INDUSTRY
The fact that the value chain of the textile 
and apparel industry could readily be 
broken into its principal components 
facilitated its early internationalization. 
The key elements of these (now global) 
value chains are the supply of textiles for 
yarn production (i.e., natural fibres like 
cotton, wool, silk, and so on, synthetic 
fibres such as polyester, nylon and acrylic, 
and artificial fibres like rayon or acetate), 
the provision of components (cut or uncut 
fabrics, thread, buttons, and so forth), the 
assembly of the apparel, the definition 
of the export channel, and the marketing 
carried out at the final point of sale. The 
first four components of the value chain 
could be located geographically to work 
around trade distortions in the form of 
quotas or preferential trade agreements 
with strict rules of origin. 
THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL VALUE CHAIN
Taking the United States market as an 
example, United States manufacturers (such 
as Sara Lee, Levi Strauss, Warnaco or Fruit 
of the Loom) could thus move the assembly 
of apparel offshore in order to reduce costs 
and tackle import competition from Asia. 
New economic agents also emerged to 
take advantage of the evolving situation. 
“Lean” retailers and branded marketers 
were able to improve their negotiating 
relations with manufacturers to such an 
extent that previously producer-driven value 
chains became increasingly buyer-driven. 
Branded marketers, such as Liz Claiborne, 
Donna Karan, Nike and Reebok possessed 
very few production facilities because they 
outsourced to offshore assemblers. Such 
retailers as JC Penney, Sears and so forth 
emulated branded marketers by employing 
their own private labels or brand names 
which were assembled abroad. 
This provided important opportunities for 
developing-country companies that were in a 
position to service the new needs of United 
States retailers and branded marketers. The 
most successful were those that went beyond 
final product assembly in low-wage sites using 
buyer-provided components and began to 
provide “full package” services. In the case 
of Asian companies, full package services 
typically included product development, 
fabric sourcing and cutting, garment sewing, 
packaging, quality control, trade financing and 
logistics arrangements. Successful examples 
include Li & Fung and Yue Yuen / Pou Chen 
Industrial Holdings (both Hong Kong SAR 
and China), Nien Hsing (Taiwan Province 
of China) and Sae-A (Republic of Korea), 
which often assembled final products in third 
countries from which they exported to end 
markets (“triangular manufacturing”). Coupled 
with the return of market economics to the 
global apparel industry, lean retail provided 
opportunities for Asian full package providers 
in China, Hong Kong SAR, the Republic of 
Korea and Taiwan Province of China.
In other words, the textile and apparel 
value chain’s separability into its component 
parts allowed for new corporate strategies 
employing offshore sourcing in the form 
of efficiency-seeking FDI. United States 
apparel manufacturers typically established 
offshore assembly operations in Mexico 
and the Caribbean Basin in the context 
of trade restrictions established by the 
United States to help them —as well as 
United States textile manufacturers such 
as Burlington Industries, Cone Mills, 
Parkdale Mills and Guilford Mills— face 
up to competition from Asia. United States 
retailers and branded marketers typically 
outsourced to Asian assemblers with 
assembly sites both in Asia and Mexico 
and in the Caribbean Basin. In turn, 
the more successful Asian companies 
usually developed full package facilities 
to satisfy their United States customers 
and to upgrade their own business into 
original design and brand manufacturing. 
In this way, internationalization played a 
significant role in the evolution of the Asian 
textile and apparel industry.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Trade Commission (ITC), “Textiles and apparel: assessment of the 
competitiveness of certain foreign suppliers to the U.S. market”, Investigation No. 332-448, USITC Publication 3671, Washington, D.C., January 2004.; R. Applebaum, 
“Assessing the impact of the phasing-out of the agreement on textiles and clothing on apparel exports on the least developed and developing countries”, May 2004, 
unpublished; Cotton USA, “Cotton USA sourcing program” [online] 2006 http://www.cottonusasourcing.com; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2003 (LC/G.2226-P), Santiago, Chile, April 2004, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.04.II.G.54 
and Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean. 1999 Report (LC/G.2061-P), Santiago Chile, January 2000, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.00.
II.G.4; G. Gereffi, “International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 48, 1999; International Trade 
Commission (ITC), “The impact of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act- seventeenth report 2003-2004”, Investigation 332-227, ISITC Publication, No. 3804, 
Washington, D.C., September 2005; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “TNCs and the removal of textiles and clothing quotas”, UNCTAD 
Current Studies on FDI and Development, No. 1, New York, 2005 and World Investment Report 2002. Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness, New 
York, August 2002.
Historically, the textile and apparel industry was 
considered the mother of the Republic of Korea’s 
modernization drive (KOFOTI, 2005). Although it now lags 
behind the more dynamic sectors of the Korean economy, it 
still represents a significant part of the manufacturing sector: 
16.2% of firms, 12% of employment and 6.5% of value-
added (see table III.15). The international competitiveness 
of the Korean textile industry is reflected in its world 
ranking as the largest exporter of synthetic fibres and the 
fourth largest exporter of both synthetic textiles and textiles 
overall. Notably, the Republic of Korea accounts for over 
10% of global exports of polyester filaments. Nonetheless, 
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the principal Korean textile companies are not global 
heavyweights as the Korean electronics and automotive 
industries are and the apparel companies are currently 
hard-pressed to remain internationally competitive against 
the rise of China, India and other major producers.
Table III.15
STRUCTURE OF THE KOREAN TEXTILE AND APPAREL INDUSTRY, 
2003
Segment / Industry Number of Employees Value-added
 firms (thousands)  (billions of won)
1. Synthetic fibres 89 185 1.8
2. Textile processing a  9 397 12 9.3
3. Apparel 8 729 132 5.6
Textile and apparel industry 18 215 329 16.7
All manufacturing 112 662 2 735 255
Textiles and apparel as
 a percentage of 
 manufacturing 16.2% 12.0% 6.5%
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of National Statistical Office, 2003 Statistical Survey Report on Mining 
and Manufacturing Industries, Seoul.
a  Includes weaving, knitting, fabrics manufacturing, dyeing, and so forth. 
Figures III.6 and III.7 indicate that the competitiveness 
of both textiles and apparel slipped considerably during 
the 1990s. In the case of apparel, imports to the Republic 
of Korea grew significantly as well, thus lessening the 
favourable balance-of-payments impact that the sector had 
generally achieved. The Republic of Korea’s international 
market share of textiles had grown from 4% to 8.2% in 
1980-2000, but by 2004 this share had declined to 5.6%. 
The international market-share loss of the Korean apparel 
segment was even more dramatic: having stabilized around 
7.3% in 1980-1990, it had fallen precipitously to just 1.3% 
by 2004 (Choi, 2006). In 2005 alone, the United States 
market share of Korean apparel fell by 26% and that of 
textiles by 4.5%. The market share of Korean textiles and 
apparel in the European Union declined by an astounding 
58.2% in that same year (Park, 2006).
Figure III.6
KOREAN EXPORTS OF TEXTILES AND APPAREL, 1977-2005
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Korea Federation of Textile Industries (KOFOTI), Textile and Fashion. 
Annual Edition, March 2006.
Figure III.7
KOREAN IMPORTS OF TEXTILES AND APPAREL, 1977-2005
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Korea Federation of Textile Industries (KOFOTI), Textile and Fashion. 
Annual Edition, March 2006.
A host of factors were involved in the loss of 
international competitiveness of Korean textiles and 
apparel. Among the most important were increasing 
wage rates in these industries in the Republic of Korea, 
the appreciation of the Korean won, rising international 
petroleum prices, labour shortages in these sectors, the 
emergence of China as a strong competitor with the 
abolition of export quotas in major markets, weak export 
marketing strategies and the lowering of design standards 
(Park, H., 2006). The apparel and spinning and weaving 
sectors were particularly badly hit by competition from 
lower-wage Asian countries (Choi, 2006). 
To revert the decline in its international competitiveness 
in the textile and apparel sector, the Republic of Korea 
prepared a five-year technology innovation plan in the 
context of the shift towards the knowledge economy. 
The detailed roadmap associated with the five-year plan 
is summarized in table III.16.
In essence, the new strategy is to move into higher-
value-added segments by restructuring “losers”, through 
fierce price competition played out in downsizing and 
offshoring, and promoting “winners”, as a function of 
design and quality and through new product development 
and improved marketing strategies (Oh, 2002; KOFOTI, 
2005; Park, H., 2006). In the textile industry, this involves 
moving into new materials, such as nano-fibres, industrial 
textiles and smart fabrics, and the use of modern techniques 
for digital dyeing and printing. The Korea Institute of 
Industrial Technology (KITECH) set up a research and 
development centre to help achieve these goals. In the 
apparel segment, it is necessary to enter the fashion industry 
by way of product and brand development and to continue 
to reduce manufacturing costs through improved supply 
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2006). The focus would thus move towards the manufacture 
of original designs. The success of the new strategy will 
depend on the textile and apparel companies investing 
in new technologies, restructuring their existing assets 
and establishing competitive internationally integrated 
production systems to service major markets.31 
31
 Korean companies are investing in high-tech or smart fabrics and sophisticated dyeing techniques. Sojin TNA Co. developed breathable 
fabrics, notably its Brespo PCM smart fabric that automatically controls temperature for sports, casual and outwear clothes. Similarly, GNTX 
developed functional fabrics, such as Dupore-X Megafeel, which are used in garments designed to protect the wearer against cold and snow 
while permitting perspiration to evaporate (KOFOTI, 2005). YoungShin Textile Co. became a leading textile dye processor by acquiring patents 
as well as developing its own patented processes. It also began using its own brands (Single Player and Foo) and established a relatively large, 
state-of-the-art plant in Guatemala (Young Shin Textile, 2006 and company interview). Many Korean textile companies are investing in plants 
in China, some in order to export from a low-wage base, others to meet domestic demand in that market.
Table III.16
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: ROADMAP FOR TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TASKS
Vision  Production of world’s first super-class, smart, intelligent and high-tech textile goods
Future prospects  Textile products to be used in world’s cutting-edge industries
  Grafting of IT, industrial textiles and dyeing and processing technologies
  Development of future-oriented, smart and intelligent apparel products
Core technologies  Super-high-tech industrial textiles, IT-ization of dyeing and processing and    
  intelligent apparel products
Technologies to  High-function textiles using Automatic temperature control textiles made by melt spinning of PCMs   
develop industrial  phase changing materials Textiles with applications of different kinds of functional materials, such as
textiles and new state- (PCM)  sensitizing dyes, thermochromic dyes, aromatics and vitamins
of-the-art materials
 Environmentally friendly Dyeing and processing of polylactic acid (PLA) textiles, bean textiles and 
 biodegradable complex polyester-modified biodegradable textiles
 textiles
 High-clean, environment- Super-efficient filters for air and water purification 
 improving complex textiles Filters for electron waves, acoustic and dust absorption and deodorization
 Biocompatible health care Medical textiles, blood filter textiles, textiles for moisturization of artificial skin,
 textiles and products skin-care textiles with wound-treating properties
 New biotech-fusion  Bio-textiles using animal-derived collagen (ADC), bio-polyester, spider silk,
 environmentally dyeing and processing for bio-textiles
 friendly materials
 High-function textiles for use Tyre cord yarns superior to existing polyethylene terephthlate (PET) materials,
 in tyre cord development and application of polyethylene naphthalate (PEN) textiles and
  modified cellulose for tyre cord
Digital, intelligent Digital-technology-enabled  Systems for 3D cyber space filling and 3D tailoring; technology for computer
fashion apparel fashion apparel simulation, for artificial-intelligence control and management and for image
technologies  processing and sensor applications; and technology for cyber fashion show
  materials and applications
 Intelligent textile apparel Intelligent textile apparel that can monitor the wearer’s physical condition and
  actions, transmit data and report on monitored results for military and medical
  applications and for the elderly or infirm
 Internet-based fashion Application Service Provider (ASP) solutions for web-based and computer-aided 
 apparel products design (CAD) and patterns for apparel, fashion-oriented web-enabled PDAs (for
  manufacturing of fashion materials and products and processing of logistics),
   bar-code systems for next-generation fashion products
 Design/manufacturing Apparel that can sense changes in the external environment and react
 technologies for intelligent intelligently, for use in extreme sports (e.g., motorcycle racing, skydiving, hang
 special protection clothes gliding, paragliding, skin diving, wind surfing, rock climbing), airbags and military
  applications, among others
 Smart apparel for daily life New kinds of apparel integrating various digital devices and functions, flexible 
 in the future digital devices that can be grafted onto apparel and applied products
 New textiles incorporating  New textiles and fashion apparel products created through biometrics 
 biometrics technology applications, unique synthesized super-bulky-feel fabrics
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Table III.16 (concluded)
Vision  Production of world’s first super-class, smart, intelligent and high-tech textile goods
State-of-the-art dyeing High-value-added textile products Digital textile printers, digital textile printing dyestuffs and textile products 
and processing made with next-generation clean manufactured using these applications
technologies digital textile printing systems
 Wear-comfort, easy-care, high- Wrinkle-free natural textiles, wash-and-wear natural textile products with  
 fashion products and high-tech  excellent stability for washing, dyeing and technological processing
 dyeing and processing
 IT-grafted dyeing and processing IT-grafted dyeing automation facility, creation of standardized facilities and an 
 technology and products integrated system, automatic inspection systems and high-tech textile products 
  applicable to these systems
Policy suggestions  Textiles and fashion must be seen not as a declining industry but as a    
  knowledge industry that is grafting the latest technology, culture and information.   
  Awareness and active support is needed from the government to facilitate the   
  development and production of the world’s super-first-class, smart, intelligent
  and highly advanced textile products by inducing the industry to create unlimited   
  value-added through utilization of its intangible knowledge assets —design,    
  fashion, cutting-edge technology, marketing, informationization, and so forth. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Korea Federation of Textile Industries (KOFOTI), Textile and Fashion. Annual Edition, 
March 2006.
Apparel sector investments typically take the form 
of OFDI, as confirmed by the existence of over 2,500 
overseas projects worth US$ 2.6 billion (Newsweek, 
2006). Some examples are:
Sae-A Trading Co. Ltd,32 which considers itself 
the Republic of Korea’s top apparel manufacturer 
and export company, lists its principal competitive 
advantages as global sourcing, with 19 plants in 
China, Guatemala, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Saipan 
(Northern Marianas Islands) and Viet Nam, as well 
as quality assurance enforced through rigorous 
controls and product development based on design 
and fabric R&D.
ShinWon Corporation33 defines itself as a leader 
among Korean apparel exporters. Its competitive 
advantages include a specialized and vertically 
integrated international production system with plants 
in China (handbags and leather jackets), Guatemala 
and Viet Nam (knits) and Indonesia (sweaters), as well 
as Gaeseong in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea34 (whose output is marketed in the Republic of 
Korea); its own sweater designs and brand management 
(besti belli, SI, VIKI, SIEG and KOLHaaS), and its 
own commercial outlets in China. 
Hansoll 35 describes itself as one of the leading 
circular knits companies in the Republic of Korea. 





 Based on interviews at Sae-A headquarters in Seoul.
33
 Based on interviews at Shin Won headquarters in Seoul.
34
 ShinWon plans to assemble 15%-20% of its total production in this plant.
35
 Based on interviews at Hansoll headquarters in Seoul.
36
 Based on interviews at Hansae headquarters in Seoul.
based on a two-region international production system, 
its own designs and R&D in new yarn and fabric. 
Its global operations take place in an Eastern group 
of plants located in Cambodia, Indonesia, Saipan 
and Viet Nam, which produces more complicated 
products in vertically integrated operations, and a 
Western group in Guatemala and Honduras, which 
mainly assembles simpler articles.
Hansae Co. Ltd 36 competes mainly through 
competitive pricing, based on its global sourcing 
and production systems. Hansae owns plants in 
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Nicaragua and Viet Nam. 
It also has substantial subcontracting relationships 
in Guatemala.
Youngwon Trade Co. built up its overseas production 
facilities with 20 plants in Bangladesh, three in China, 
and one each in El Salvador, Mexico, Turkey and Viet 
Nam, in order to achieve a more competitive cost 
structure, production flexibility and a high-speed 
response ability (KOFOTI, 2006a).
The Korean textile and apparel industry has been an 
important part of the country’s development trajectory, 
since it initiated the export drive, impacted favourably 
on the balance of payments and helped to kick-start the 
Korean industrialization process (as had been the case 
for Japan previously). The industry’s loss of international 
competitiveness has obliged the Republic of Korea to 
•
•
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restructure the weaker elements and to undertake significant 
industrial and technological upgrading to reduce production 
costs, develop new products and establish its own brands. 
The success to date has been partial and differs from the 
Japanese experience, insofar as many Japanese producers 
essentially withdrew from the industry when international 
competitiveness flagged. The internationalization of the 
Korean textile and apparel industry through OFDI has 
been crucial in enabling the industry to adapt to increased 
international competition.
4. The internationalization of natural-resource-based
 manufacturing industries
From the beginning, securing natural resources was an 
important development goal for the Republic of Korea, 
since it was an extremely resource-poor country. Many 
of its principal natural-resource companies began as 
wholly or partly State-owned enterprises whose assigned 
purpose was to acquire natural-resource inputs for the 
industrialization drive. Indeed, this remains an important 
feature of the present development strategy. In 2001, the 
country initiated a new 10-year basic plan —which is 
revised every three years— for securing a steady supply 
of energy and mineral resources vital for economic 
development (Hwang, 2006). Nonetheless, for many of 
these companies now seeking to become major global 
players, international expansion has come to involve more 
than simply accessing natural resources. This section looks 
at examples of Korean companies that process petroleum 
(SK Corp.), refine copper (LS-Nikko), manufacture steel 
(Posco) and manufacture forestry products (Eagon).
SK Corp.37 is the Republic of Korea’s leading petroleum 
refiner and the fourth largest in Asia. It owns important 
assets in petroleum and gas exploration and production, 
petrochemicals, and lubricants. It was ranked number 111 
in the world in 2005, with sales in the order of US$ 47.1 
billion (Fortune Global 500). SK Corp. forms part of the 
SK Group, which is the fourth largest conglomerate in the 
Republic of Korea.38 In 1982, Sunkyoung Ltd acquired 
the assets held by Gulf Oil Corp. in Korea Oil Corp., 
whose name was then changed to Yukong Ltd. In 1998, 
after the financial problems it experienced, Sunkyoung 
Group was renamed SK Corp. It currently possesses the 
37
 This section was based principally on interviews at the company’s headquarters in Seoul, as well as Hwang (2006) and SK Corp. (2006a).
38
 SK Group was known as the Sunkyoung Group until the crisis of the late 1990s. It consists of 52 subsidiaries, of which SK Corp. is the largest, 
in a range of energy and telecommunications activities. Twelve of the subsidiaries are listed on the Korean Stock Exchange.
39
 SK Corp. implemented a share buyback plan in 2005, also suggesting that it might finance more aggressive international investments.
40
 This analysis was based primarily on interviews at the company’s headquarters in Seoul, as well as LS Nikko Copper Inc. (2006a and 2006b), 
LS Group (2006), LS Cable (2005), Bloomberg (2006), Stockhouse (2006), Chariot Resources (2006), United States Department of the Interior 
(2005) and Marcobre (2006).
world’s second largest single complex oil refinery (Ulsan, 
with a capacity of 840,000 barrels per day) and a total 
refining capacity of 1,115,000 barrels per day (after the 
acquisition of Inchon Oil in 2005), which represents one 
third of total Korean refining capacity. SK Corp. exports 
about 40%-45% of its production (65% in the case of 
petrochemicals). Already heavily involved in acquiring 
natural resources around the world through natural-resource-
seeking OFDI, SK Corp. intends to increase its foreign 
trade intermediation in natural resources beyond mere 
importation: the company aspires to become a leading 
energy player in the Asia-Pacific region.
SK Corp. possesses 19 petroleum or gas blocks in 12 
natural-resource-rich countries, including Australia, Brazil 
(3), Cote d’Ivoire (2), Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Indonesia (2), Libya, Peru (3), Russia, the United States 
and Viet Nam, plus LNG gas projects in Peru, Yemen 
and other Middle Eastern countries. It has also invested 
heavily in China, which absorbs 20% of its exports. SK 
Corp. intends to raise its refining capacity and increase its 
proven reserves from 420 million barrels of oil equivalent 
to 700 million by 2010. Thus far, one of the features of 
SK Corp.’s OFDI is its passivity: in order to minimize 
risks in new markets it has often formed partnerships 
with key local players rather than operating alone. Higher 
international petroleum prices may now provide it with 
the opportunity to become more aggressive.39 
LS Nikko Copper Inc.40 operates Korea’s principal 
copper smelter and is Asia’s fourth largest producer of 
copper after firms in China, Japan and India, with sales 
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of US$ 2.7 billion in 2005. It produces mainly copper 
(76.7%), as well as chemicals and precious metals 
deriving from copper refining. The Onsam Smelter and 
Refining Co. was part of the LG chaebol until that group 
was divided into the LG, GS and LS groups in 2004. LS 
Nikko Copper was founded in 1999 as a joint venture 
between LG Metal (today LS Cable) and Japan-Korea 
Joint Smelting Co. Ltd. At present, it is one of the principal 
subsidiaries of the LS Group, along with LS Cable, LS 
Industrial Systems, Gaon Cable, E1, Yes’co and others 
and it secured a solid consumer base in the Republic 
of Korea through long term contracts with these other 
subsidiaries. LS Nikko Copper Inc. has sourced copper 
(through “materials transactions”) from numerous countries, 
although about 55% of its copper ore comes from just 
three South American nations: Brazil, Chile and Peru. It 
has also acted as an intermediary for copper transactions 
with many other countries. The demand for copper in the 
relatively small Korean market constrained its expansion 
and made internationalization a necessity. The timing of 
the firm’s establishment —during the Korean financial 
crisis— seriously constrained its initial internationalization 
possibilities and explained its interest in establishing a joint 
venture with a more internationalized Japanese partner. 
Its internationalization strategy to date has been very 
cautious, based on quite passive shares in large projects 
as a means to secure natural resources. LS Nikko Copper 
Inc. may now be in a position to internationalize more 
aggressively, however, thanks to the high international 
prices for the metal. 
The Pohang Iron and Steel Co. (Posco)41 was founded 
as a State company in 1968 and played a very important 
role in the HCI phase of Korean development. It was 
privatized between 1998 and 2000. In 2005, it ranked 
number 236 in the world, with sales of US$ 25.7 billion 
(Fortune Global 500), and eighth in the global steel industry. 
In the same year it possessed total assets of US$ 21.3 
billion, of which 14.6% were located overseas. Posco has 
a production capacity of 32 million tons (about two thirds 
of the Republic of Korea’s total), which is concentrated in 
hot rolled steel (35.7%), cold rolled steel (28.9%), plate 
steel (11.5%), wire rods (7%), stainless steel (6.7%) and 
electrical steel (2.4%), sold mainly to the automotive 
and shipbuilding industries. Posco also constructs steel 
plants. Its exports go mainly to Asia (60%, mostly to 
China and Japan) as well as North America and Europe 
(25%). Posco is the only Korean company listed on the 
Tokyo stock exchange (as of 2005).
Posco’s main strategy was to focus on sales volume in 
order to produce price-competitive steel products. However, 
that strategy was weakened by mounting competition in the 
steel market, especially from China, a low-cost producer. 
For that reason, the company set out to become one of the 
world’s most technically-advanced steelmakers, aiming 
to move upmarket by concentrating on higher-value-
added products that would fetch premium prices and be 
distinguished by their quality. The new strategy relies on 
making 80% of its products “strategic” ones by 2008 (up 
from 45% in 2005), increasing its manufacturing capacity 
(including raising its overseas capacity to 10 million 
tons), extending its global network and diversifying its 
international investment portfolio, as well as securing 
natural resource supplies for its operations. That effort 
will be supported by an R&D effort equivalent to 1%-2% 
of sales and an investment fund in the order of US$ 16 
billion dollars up to 2009. 
Posco’s international system was traditionally built 
on two primary elements. One was securing natural 
resources (iron ore, coal and energy), as is demonstrated 
by its joint ventures for that purpose in Australia, Brazil, 
Canada and South Africa. The other was to gain access to 
competitive markets, which it did through its affiliates in 
Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, the United 
States and Viet Nam. Like several other Korean natural 
resource companies, Posco also formed strategic alliances 
with Japanese companies, in this case steelmakers Nippon 
Steel and JFE Steel. The new aspects of Posco’s strategy 
are reflected in the huge investments it is undertaking in 
large markets, such as China and India. An investment of 
US$ 3.2 billion in China went into 14 strategic ventures, 
especially the steel complex at Zhangjiagong. The 
company’s venture in India is a US$ 10-billion complex 
encompassing port infrastructure, mine development 
and a steel complex at Orissa. Posco also targets steel as 
part of its internationalization process, specifically for 
the automotive industry. It has plants for this purpose in 
China (6), South-East Asia (5), Japan (2), and India and 
is starting up new ones in China, Japan and Mexico in 
2007. In other words, the company’s internationalization 
strategy continues to be based on a mixture of natural-
resource-seeking and market-seeking FDI, with the 
emphasis shifting towards the latter. It has been staking 
out an international market position between technology 
leaders from Japan and price competitors in China, by 
using a new strategy to move upmarket while operating 
in both those countries.
41
 Based primarily on interviews at Posco headquarters in Seoul, as well as Posco (2006a, 2006b and 2006c), and KOSA.
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Eagon Industrial Co.42 is a small company compared 
to the others discussed in this section. It was created in 
1972 to produce forestry products, after which two shocks 
strongly influenced the way it evolved. First, in 1979, a 
shortage of natural resource inputs —trees— in the Republic 
of Korea led the company to work towards becoming an 
integrated operator in the industry, spanning plantations, 
manufacturing activities and trading. That decision had a 
direct effect on its internationalization process. Second, 
in 1997, the financial crisis in the Republic of Korea 
caused upheaval in the company, prompting a management 
decision to reorganize, modernize and globalize.
As part of its effort to secure natural resources 
through internationalization, Eagon Industrial Co. set up 
a trading operation (for plywood, veneer moulding, and 
so forth) in Indonesia in 1987, a manufacturing operation 
(pine plywood and veneer for shuttling) in Chile in 1993, 
a plantation and manufacturing plant (sawn logs) in 
Solomon Islands in 1995, and a manufacturing operation 
(veneer, plywood for flooring, specific plywood) in China 
in 1996. The financial crisis severely destabilized the 
company and it chose to meet the challenge head-on by 
focusing on higher-value-added products. Subsequently 
it reorganized into five more modern divisions: Eagon 
Living, Eagon Interiors, Eagon Industrial, Eagon Window 
and Door Systems and Eagon Overseas. The company’s 
global activities became associated with knowledge-
based activities such as R&D in improving wood species, 
designing environmentally-friendly products, and energy-
saving windows. 
At present, Eagon offers a wide array of forestry 
products and building systems. It has moved from simple, 
low-price manufactures based on natural resources to 
more sophisticated, higher-value-added manufactures. 
Its principal markets are in still in Asia (90%), but its 
sales are expanding in the United States and Chile, as 
well as other markets. This case demonstrates that even 
relatively small Korean companies have been obliged to 
internationalize in order to remain competitive. 
Earlier in this chapter, the discussion focused on 
the competitive position of many of the leading Korean 
companies in some of the industries most closely involved 
in the country’s development process. It is apparent that 
Korean corporate internationalization is highly concentrated 
in a relatively small number of manufacturing companies. 
In general, most of these firms are caught in a kind of 
sandwich between their original technological leader 
(Japan) and other Asian fast followers and technological 
imitators (especially China). Korean firms have been 
losing competitiveness in traditional low-cost commodity-
related activities and are obliged to enter into more 
knowledge-intensive activities, moving from industries and 
technologies which rely on volume and low production 
costs to those characterized by quality, value-added and 
premium prices. The competitive situation is somewhat 
distinct in each major industry; nonetheless, the direction of 
change is similar. Some Korean firms, such as SEC, LGE 
and HMC, are world-class transnationals. They already 
possess sophisticated globalization strategies and are well 
advanced in the transition to more sophisticated products, 
many of which are associated with the shift towards the 
knowledge economy. Others are smaller (textile and 
apparel producers) or operate in very traditional activities 
(SK Corp., LS Nikko Copper, Posco), or both (Eagon) 
and have been obliged to globalize in order to remain 
competitive —even in their home market. This has entailed 
industrial upgrading, technological innovation and the 
establishment of a solid global network through OFDI. 
In different ways, all are defining and implementing more 
aggressive corporate strategies for this purpose.
The internationalization processes of these dominant 
Korean companies have spanned numerous objectives, 
including natural-resource-seeking, market-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking. In the 
rush to internationalize, several Korean TNCs ran into 
serious problems, which caused them to be more cautious 
thereafter.43 While the situation varies from industry to 
industry and firm to firm, it is evident that the last two 
FDI strategies are becoming more important than the first 
two in the context of the shift towards the knowledge 
economy and in relation to the evolution of each firm’s 
global network. 
42
 Based on interviews with Eagon Industrial Co. in Seoul, as well as Eagon (2006).
43
 Some, like Daewoo and Kia, were severely destabilized by the overindebtedness associated with their internationalization when the financial crisis 
set in. Others, such as SEC, LGE and HMC, experienced very specific problems (i.e., the purchase of AST by SEC and of Zenith by LGE, and 
the failure of the Bromont plant in the case of HMC). Those that survived exercised much greater caution in their subsequent internationalization 
plans.
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D. Korean FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean
As noted in Section B, official Korean statistics on OFDI 
suffer from certain failings that limit their analytical value. 
These statistics must therefore be complemented with 
additional data, particularly information on corporate 
strategies, which is best obtained by way of direct company 
interviews. The biggest statistical problems associated 
with the official OFDI data have to do with distortions 
of recipient country information arising from the use of 
financial centres or tax havens, the non-registration of 
investments undertaken by major overseas subsidiaries (for 
example, United States subsidiaries of Korean companies 
that invest in Mexico using capital raised offshore), and 
distortions resulting from the practice of not subtracting 
OFDI “withdrawals” from the database. Nevertheless, 
when complemented by company interviews and other 
additional information, official OFDI statistics can provide 
important insights for the analysis of Korean FDI in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
As has been mentioned, Korean OFDI data suggest 
that, with a share of roughly 7%, Latin America and 
the Caribbean have played a rather small role in the 
internationalization process of Korean firms, although 
this figure has risen somewhat during 2000-2006. A major 
distortion in this statistical information is that financial 
centres (especially Bermuda, with 34%) account for 48% 
of the total OFDI flows. Brazil (12%), Peru (11%) and 
Mexico (10%) are the major non-financial-centre country 
recipients in the region in terms of their shares of Korean 
OFDI. Thus, just four countries account for two-thirds of 
the total in the region. When OFDI is measured by the 
number of firms, the situation changes somewhat: Mexico 
(17%), Panama (11%), Brazil (11%), Guatemala (11%), 
Honduras (7%) and Argentina (7%).
In terms of activities, the Korean OFDI in the region 
is concentrated in a few major industries: manufacturing 
(59%), trade (24%) and natural resources (6%). The original 
focus on natural resources shifted to manufacturing activities, 
especially electronics (37.8% of the investing firms), textiles 
and apparel (34.2%), iron and steel (9.7), and petroleum 
and petrochemicals (7.3%). Most of the investments in 
electronics, iron and steel, and petroleum were carried 
out by large Korean firms, while Korean SMEs played a 
relatively larger part in textile and apparel investments. 
This information points to major focal points for Korean 
OFDI in manufacturing in Mexico, Central America and 
Brazil and in natural resources in Peru. In terms of OFDI 
strategies, there is evidence of natural-resource-seeking, 
market-seeking and efficiency-seeking strategies. 
1. Korean activities in the Latin American and Caribbean    
 electronics industry
The electronics industry is one of the main areas of 
international expansion for Korean companies and this 
is reflected in Korean OFDI in Latin America and the 
Caribbean as well. The two dominant Korean TNCs 
—Samsung Electronics Company (SEC) and LG Electronics 
(LGE)— have made very substantial investments to 
establish assembly plants in Mexico and Brazil.
(a) The Mexican electronics industry 44
The electronics industry is an important part of the 
Mexican economy, representing about 5% of manufacturing, 
employing 342,000 technicians and engineers (Padilla 
and Iammarino, 2005; Secretariat for Economic Affairs, 
2007) and generating an impressive volume of exports, 
44
 Based on interviews with the SAMEX, Samsung SDI and SSD Plásticos plants in the Tijuana complex, the LGE plants in Mexicali (LGEMX) 
and Reynosa (LGERS), and the LG Innotek plant in Mexicali.
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which rocketed from US$ 21.1 billion in 1996 to over 
US$ 50 billion in 2006. However, the industry has recently 
swung from being a solid foreign-exchange earner (in the 
order of US$ 3 billion a year), to returning a trade deficit 
of about the same magnitude. The Mexican electronics 
industry has three primary segments: computers (31.2%), 
consumer electronics (30.3%) and telecoms (21.3%). It 
has two main hubs —the consumer electronics industry in 
the State of Baja California and the computer industry in 
the State of Jalisco— both of which are export platforms 
for the United States and Canadian and, to a lesser extent, 
the Latin American, markets. The first electronics hub 
functions with FDI by TNCs mainly from Japan (Sony, 
Matsushita, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, JVC, Sharp, Sanyo and 
Pioneer), the Republic of Korea (SEC, LGE, Daewoo 
Orion) and elsewhere (Thomson, Bosé, Fender). The 
second has been built up by FDI mainly from the United 
States (IBM,45 Hewlett-Packard, Intel, Sanmina-SCL, 
Jabil) and other countries (Siemens, Flextronics). FDI 
inflows between 1994 and 2004 reached US$ 7.5 billion 
and went mainly to three segments: telecoms (39.5%), 
consumer electronics (33.9%) and computers (23.3%). 
These flows were concentrated in four Mexican states: 
Baja California (28.2%), Jalisco (18.1%), Chihuahua 
(13.5%) and Tamaulipas (12.9%). 
The Mexican electronics industry is now facing a 
number of severe challenges (Ordoñez, 2006). The television-
manufacturing industry reflects those challenges (Carillo 
and Hualde, 2006) in the form of falling market shares 
in the North American market and declining localization 
of Mexican-assembled televisions as a consequence of 
technological change (see box III.4). 
45
 In 2004, IBM sold its computer operations to the Chinese firm Lenovo.
Box III.4
THE RISE AND FALL —AND RISE?— OF MEXICAN TELEVISION EXPORTS TO THE NORTH AMERICAN MARKET
The Mexican television set industry 
grew up in the 1970s and 1980s, simply 
assembling imported components to produce 
conventional cathode ray tube (CRT) colour 
televisions for the United States market. 
Many of the Asian television-manufacturing 
TNCs that dominated the industry began 
to assemble their products in Mexico for 
export to the United States rather than 
export from their home countries (Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China) 
in the face of increasing tariff and non-tariff 
restrictions and for logistical reasons. Mexico 
soon became the principal foreign supplier 
to the North American market (Canada 
and United States), with import market 
shares over 60% in 1995-2000. Moreover, 
for reasons relating to both United States 
trade rules and transport logistics, many 
of the components that went into those 
colour televisions began to be localized 
in Mexico. The rules of origin of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
beginning in 1994 provided a strong boost 
for that process. Thus, towards the end of 
the twentieth century, Mexican television 
exports to the North American market were 
voluminous and contributed significant 
value-added through the local assembly of 
components (CRTs, deflection yokes, fly 
back transformers, tuners, cabinets, and 
so on), as well as final products.
Unfortunately for the Mexican television-
manufacturing industry, with technological 
change in the form of digitalization, 
United States consumers increasingly 
preferred liquid crystal display (LCD) and 
plasma display panel (PDP) televisions, 
which offered significant advantages 
(especially larger, slimmer screens) over 
the conventional CRT models in which the 
Mexican industry had specialized. As a result, 
although Mexico still is the main source of 
North American television imports, its import 
market shares shrivelled considerably to 
44% in 2004 and the annual production of 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of “TradeCAN 2006” 
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colour television sets in Mexico crashed 
from about 30 million to some 19 million 
units. Projections for 2009 suggest that the 
LCD and PDP versions will considerably 
outsell CRT televisions in the United 
States market, further compounding that 
problem for the Mexican television industry. 
The main television-manufacturing TNCs 
are shipping more of these high-priced 
models directly from their plants in Asia 
and are investing in hugely expensive LCD 
and PDP plants in their home countries. 
Moreover, any future internationalization 
in this area seems to favour China as the 
primary investment site. 
The assembly of LCD and PDP 
television sets is now expanding in Mexico, 
which suggests that the Mexican television 
product cycle is moving back onto a growth 
phase and away from mature or obsolete 
conventional products. The question is 
whether this represents a “higher-quality” 
rebirth of the Mexican television industry. 
There is no doubt that the shift from 
conventional to digital televisions entails 
technological upgrading, but this will need 
to be accompanied by the localization in 
Mexico of digital components, especially the 
LCD and PDP panels, if it is to make a more 
tangible contribution to Mexican industrial 
development. Hence, the PDP plant opened 
by LGE in Reynosa, Tamaulipas in October 
2006 is highly significant, especially if it 
represents the beginning of a new trend 
in Mexico. 
Box III.4 (concluded)
UNITED STATES FACTORY ORDERS FOR TELEVISION SETS, 2000-2005 AND PROJECTION FOR 2009
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of S. de los Santos and Elías, J. Gilberto, “Análisis de la industria del televisor en 
Baja California y su transición tecnológica”, La industria del televisor digital en México. Retos ante la transición tecnológica, el aprendizaje y el empleo, A. Hualde and 
J. Carrillo (coords.), Tijuana, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 2007, forthcoming; J. Carrillo, “The evolution and reorganization of maquilas”, document presented at the 
seminar of the Center on Globalization, Governance and Competitiveness, Duke University, 5 June 2006; Environmental Protection Agency; Consumer Electronics 
Association, “Table 1004-consumer electronics and electronic components, factory sales by product”, Electronic Market Data Book 2006 [online] http://www.ce.org; 
Research and Markets, “Large-sized TFT-LCD industry report, 2006” 2006 [online] http://www.researchandmarkets.com; Yahoo! News, “Global flat TV makers brace 
for industry shakeout” [online] 10 January 2007 http://news.yahoo.com.
SEC and LGE are two of the principal producers of 
electronics goods, especially television sets, in Mexico. 
SEC began in Mexico with a market-seeking investment 
in a microwave oven plant in Mexico City in 1978. Ten 
years later, it made an efficiency-seeking investment in a 
television plant in Tijuana, State of Baja California. In 2002, 
a white goods plant in Queretaro was inaugurated. With 
the signing of NAFTA in 1994, the company shifted the 
focus of its Mexican operations to assembling electronics 
goods for export to the United States market. The Tijuana 
complex became the heart of those operations. 
The SEC Tijuana complex was similar to the firm’s 
other three global television production complexes in 
Suwon, Republic of Korea, and Tianjin and Suzhou in China. 
These were all SEC subsidiaries assembling television 
sets from inputs provided by subsidiaries of SEC joint 
ventures with other Korean firms, such as Samsung SDI 
(CRTs), Samsung Electro-Mechanics (components) and 
SSD (plastic cabinets). The SEC television assembler in 
Mexico —SAMEX— was established in 1988 and the 
cabinet-maker subsidiary, SSD, was set up in 1993. Then 
the subsidiary of parts supplier Samsung Electro-Mechanics 
was established and the operations of the CRT producer 
Samsung SDI were opened in 1995. The SEC Tijuana 
complex enjoyed spectacular growth: production shot 
from 1 million units in 1990 to 6 million units in 2005; 
sales went from US$ 125 million to US$ 2.1 billion and 
employee numbers rose from 1,000 to 4,500, according 
to company sources. Its products are exported primarily 
to the United States and Canada (80%) and Latin America 
(12%), with the remainder sold in Mexico (8%). In other 
words, the Tijuana complex is the principal export platform 
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for several SEC digital media and visual display products 
in the Americas.
SEC has progressively increased the degree of 
localization of its television operations in Mexico in 
response to supply chain needs and the rules of origin of 
NAFTA. However, the rising demand for large-screen digital 
televisions (PDP and LCD) and the declining demand for 
conventional colour television sets in the United States 
market are creating tensions for the SEC partners in the 
Tijuana complex. The shift to the newer technology digital 
televisions would require them to make very significant 
investments and some appear unwilling to do so. The 
Samsung Electro-Mechanics subsidiary in Mexico shut 
down its plant, because it could not compete with the 
conventional colour television parts sourced from China. 
The SSD subsidiary declined a request from SAMEX 
to raise its production level because future demand was 
unclear. The Samsung SDI subsidiary continues to produce 
CRT modules for conventional colour televisions, aimed 
increasingly at the second television and children’s television 
market, and apparently will not shift to flat models for 
another two years. It has cited the bad experience of the 
LG Philips Display factory in Gomez Palacio, Durango 
State, as an example of the high risk of new technology 
investments. The PDP and LCD televisions assembled 
by SEC in Mexico utilize imported panels and therefore 
have a much lower localization rate. These televisions 
have much higher unit prices but contribute relatively 
little to local cluster formation.
LGE also arrived in Mexico in 1988, when it invested 
in an efficiency-seeking assembly plant for conventional 
colour televisions in Mexicali (LGEMX), Baja California 
State, to export primarily to the United States market. 
LG Innotek established a neighbouring plant (LGITMX) 
to supply electronic components to LGEMX. In 1995, 
LGE formed a partnership with the Zenith television-
manufacturing facilities in Reynosa, Tamualipas State. 
Later, in 2000, it took over the operations of that plant 
to create the LGERS operation. The Mexicali colour 
television operations were then transferred to LGERS.46 
In 2001, LGE set up a new refrigerator production plant 
in Monterrey (LGEMM), State of Nuevo Leon.
The LGERS complex in Reynosa represents one 
of the main LGE television-manufacturing operations, 
like its complexes in Poland (for the European market), 
China and the Republic of Korea. The Reynosa complex 
targets the North American, Latin American and Mexican 
markets (60%, 30% and 10%, respectively). It operates 
out of four plants: one makes conventional televisions 
(superslim, flat CTVs), one surface-mounts electronic 
components onto printed circuit boards, another manufactures 
plastic cabinets and the fourth, a new plant, makes PDP 
modules and PDP televisions. This complex produces 
approximately 2.5 million television sets (70% digital 
and 30% conventional), records sales of about US$ 850 
million and employs some 2,500 people. Having recently 
convinced four Korean suppliers to establish operations in 
Mexico, LGE brought in new technology in order to test it 
in the United States market. In contrast, its plans to export 
to the European market from Mexico were shelved when 
the European Commission required that digital tuners be 
European-sourced.
The shift of the Mexicali CTV operations to Reynosa 
allowed the LGEMX plant to focus on the assembly of 
new technology LCD televisions and monitors (the LCD 
modules are imported from Asia), as well as hand-held 
phones (HHPs). By 2005, it was assembling 2.2 million 
LCD televisions and 1.7 million HHPs, with sales of 
US$ 862 million and 1,200 employees. It was still operating 
well below capacity, however, especially for HHPs. Most 
of its sales are made in the United States and Canadian, 
Mexican and Central American markets (70%, 20% and 
10%, respectively). Thus, the LGE television-manufacturing 
operations in Mexico show two different tendencies, with 
the Mexicali plant assembling LCD television sets from 
imported LCD modules and the Reynosa plant producing 
its own plasma display panels for its PDP televisions.
Both SEC and LGE have made large efficiency-seeking 
investments in Mexico to supply the North American and 
Latin American markets with televisions, other visual 
display items and home appliances. Both of these large 
Korean electronics TNCs are shifting their visual display 
operations towards LCD and PDP televisions, away from 
conventional CRT-based colour televisions. However, there 
are two sharply diverging trends in the Mexican television 
industry. On the one hand, the SEC Tijuana complex and 
the LGE Mexicali plant (LGEMX) both import display 
panels from Asia and these plants’ localization rate for 
television components has declined considerably. They 
are thus producing relatively less local value-added than 
46
 One unintended consequence of the transfer of the conventional colour television operations to Reynosa was that the LG Innotek plant in Mexicali 
was severely dislocated. Because it had other clients as well as LG Electronics (Sanmina, TC Network, DirectTV, and so on), a move to Reynosa 
was considered uneconomical and it was forced to shift its production away from the original television components (tuners) to another line of 
activity (radio frequency components for television sets, set-up boxes, satellite receivers). Between 2000 and 2005, its production fell from 1 
million to 800,000 units (well below its capacity of 2 million), sales fell from US$ 1.8 million to US$ 1.2 million and the number of employees 
from 400 to 300.
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they did with conventional colour televisions. On the 
other hand, in October 2006 the LGE complex in Reynosa 
(LGERS) opened a new plant to manufacture plasma 
panels, which significantly increased localization and 
raised the value-added of its PDP television assembly 
activities in Mexico. 
While the unit price of both companies’ products has 
risen substantially, the local content is being seriously 
eroded in the case of SEC. This suggests that there is a 
role for Mexican national policy in promoting the local 
production of LCD and plasma panels in order to further 
the industrial and technological upgrading of digital 
television operations in the country. Undoubtedly, it 
makes sense for Mexican policymakers to take action to 
turn the second trend —localization— into the stronger 
one, so that these goods’ increasing United States and 
Canadian market shares will translate into more significant 
component localization in Mexico.
(b) The Brazilian electronics industry 47
In 2006, the Brazilian electronics industry 
generated sales equivalent to US$ 49 billion (up 14% 
from 2005), exports of US$ 9.2 billon and imports of 
US$ 18.7 billion and employed a workforce of 143,000. 
ICT products form the industry’s largest segment, 
with sales up by 22% in 2006 to US$ 30 billion. In 
Brazilian statistics, the electronics industrial cluster 
encompasses producers of equipment for both electronics 
and electric power, comprising IT equipment (29%), 
telecommunications equipment (17%), household 
appliances (16%), industrial equipment (13%), related 
components (9%), electricity generation, transmission 
and distribution equipment (8%), installation materials 
(6%) and industrial automation (2%).48 Although the 
recent growth of the industry has been impressive, it 
had to overcome obstacles created by the Asian crisis 
in the 1990s and the Brazilian crisis at the start of the 
new decade. 
The Brazilian electronics and electrical equipment 
industry generates a large trade deficit (US$ 9.5 
billon), owing to the fact that it is largely based on 
the assembly of imported components (electronic 
components constitute 64% of imports). Unlike the 
Mexican electronics industry, in which imported 
inputs are transformed into exports for the United 
States and other foreign markets, in Brazil, imported 
inputs go mainly into products for the domestic market. 
Semiconductors and components for telecommunications 
equipment are the principal imports. The main source 
of imported products is now Asia (62.5%), which has 
displaced the European Union as the largest supplier 
of electronic products to Brazil. 
Exports are limited. The single largest export item 
was telecommunications equipment (especially mobile 
phones), which accounted for 32% of the cluster’s exports. 
Most exports go to the Latin American region, followed 
by the United States, which is the largest single country 
recipient (ABINEE, 2006).
Some of the largest electronics and electrical 
equipment companies in Brazil are world-class TNCs, 
such as Siemens (ICTs, automation and control, medical 
equipment, power, transportation and lighting products), 
General Electric (GE) (electric equipment and motors, 
household appliances and medical equipment), SEC and 
LGE (both electronics and telecommunications products), 
and Ericsson (telecoms products). The siting of such 
firms within Brazil depends on a number of factors. In 
the telecoms segment, for example, the main producers 
of mobile phones are located in the Manaus Free Trade 
Zone (MFZ) (Nokia, Siemens, Gradiente, Vitelcom and 
Evadin) or the São Paulo area (Motorola, Sony Ericsson, 
LGE, SEC, Telemática, Kyocera and Huawei) (http://www.
teleco.com.br).
Much of the Brazilian electronics industry involves the 
assembly of imported components in a special free trade 
area. Electronic consumer goods are assembled mainly in 
MFZ, where operations benefit from tariff and tax discounts 
(see box III.5). As well as the legislation on MFZ, the 
Informatics Law of 2001 fosters the industry by providing 
tax rebates for companies that invest the equivalent of 4% 
of revenues in specified R&D activities and which localize 
components or other inputs (for example batteries and 
battery chargers for hand-held phones). More recently, 
Law 11.196 (passed in November 2005) exempted PCs 
and notebooks under a certain price level from different 
categories of taxes. Thus, the Brazilian government offers 
a number of tariff and tax benefits, requiring in exchange 
certain R&D activities and localization to promote the 
electronics industry. 
47
 Based on interviews with the SEC head office in São Paulo, the Samsung Electronics da Amazônia Ltda (SEDA) plants in Campinas and Manaus 
and the Samsung SDI plant in Manaus, and with the LGE head office in São Paulo and its LGESP plant in Taubaté.
48
 Accordingly, the Brazilian electronics and electricity equipment industry is not directly comparable to the Mexican electronics industry.
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Box III.5
THE ADVANTAGES OF THE MANAUS FREE TRADE ZONE
The Manaus Free Trade Zone (MFZ) was 
established as a free port in 1957. In 1967, 
the government set about transforming it 
into an industrial pole by creating fiscal 
incentives for a period of 30 years, which 
was later extended to 2023. From 1967 
to 1976, activity in MFZ was mostly 
commercial, based on the import of goods 
—especially electronics— that were 
prohibitively expensive to import outside the 
free trade zone. The second phase, from 
1976 to 1990, was more industrial. Local 
content requirements were established 
for products assembled in MFZ for sale 
in the domestic market, and some limits 
were imposed on imports. A third phase 
began in 1991, when the Brazilian market 
opened further to imports and competition 
from foreign products increased. The 
companies operating in MFZ were obliged 
to improve both productivity and quality. 
Regulations were established for the 
main industries, governing the production 
process that companies had to implement 
in Manaus in order for qualify for incentives 
(this replaced the previous local content 
requirements). Currently, the incentives 
system includes the reduction of up to 
88% of import tariffs on goods that are 
to be assembled in MFZ and sold in the 
local market; the waiver of the industrial 
products tax (IPI) and social security 
contributions, among other exemptions 
from federal, state and municipal taxes. 
Land can be obtained at nominal cost 
within the industrial district. There are 508 
companies established in MFZ, with total 
sales of US$ 21 billion in 2006. These 
companies employ approximately 105,000 
people and are thought to generate a further 
400,000 jobs indirectly. The electronics 
industry is responsible for 55% of the 
State of Amazonas’ industrial income. 
The main products assembled in MFZ 
are colour televisions, mobile phones 
and motorcycles. Exports have risen by 
60% since 2002.
MFZ is dominated by its 10 largest 
firms. One of the main differences in the 
corporate strategies of these major players 
in the Brazilian electronics industry is 
their degree of localization and cluster 
formation. Honda and Nokia, for example, 
have established an elaborate network of 
local suppliers, while others, such as SEC 
and Samsung SDI, prefer to assemble 
imported inputs.
Company Type Sector Registered investment  Number of
   (millions of dollars) employees
Moto Honda da Amazona Ltda TNC Automotive 870.6 7 130
Samsung Eletronica da Amazona Ltda TNC Electronics 618.7 2 302
Nokia do Brasil Tecnologia Ltda TNC Electronics 500.4 2 339
Samsung SDI Brasil Ltda TNC Electronics 479.6 1 709
CCE da Amazonia SA National Electronics 471.0 2 356
Ocrim SA Produtos Alimenticios National Food Products 407.6 111
Siemens Eletroeletronica SA Filial TNC Electronics 350.0 708
Philips da Amazonia Ind. Eletronica Ltda TNC Electronics 264.1 1 375
Sonopress-Rimo Amaz. Ind. Com. Fonog. TNC Electronics 195.8 213
Gradiente Eletronica SA National Electronics 192.8 1 759
Top 10 total   4 350.6 20 002
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Superintendency of the Manaus Free Trade Zone.
According to the Brazilian Central Bank, the principal 
destination of Korean FDI in Brazil between 2001 and 
2006 was the electronics sector (electronics materials, 
communications equipment, office machines and IT 
equipment), which accounted for 37.3% of FDI from 
that country. SEC and LGE, two of the largest foreign 
investors, are attracted to Brazil more by its market size 
and growth prospects (market-seeking FDI) than by its 
possibilities as an export platform (efficiency-seeking 
FDI). In themselves, the assembly processes within the 
industry are not that different, but much depends on the 
scale of production and the technology supporting it. 
Through Samsung SDI and Samsung Electro-
Mechanics, SEC made its first investments in production 
facilities in Brazil in the mid-1990s; however, these 
operations were not integrated in the same manner 
as other SEC complexes in China, Mexico and the 
Republic of Korea. Samsung Electronics da Amazônia 
Ltda (SEDA), the principal SEC subsidiary in Brazil, 
had a rocky beginning owing to its inexperience in the 
country. Samsung Electro-Mechanics subsequently shut 
down its operation in Brazil, as it could not compete with 
imported components from Asia, and the Samsung SDI 
venture there has recently encountered difficulties. Thus, 
SEC and its associates have experienced problems with 
the running of their Brazilian operations. 
SEDA overcame its initial difficulties and between 
2000 and 2005 its sales grew from US$ 225 million to 
US$ 1.072 billion and its workforce increased from 800 
to 1,500 (193 in the São Paulo office, 740 in the Manaus 
plant and 596 in the Campinas plant). The utilization of 
plant capacity was relatively low, however, and there 
was considerable product volatility. Its plant in Manaus 
was established in 1995 to assemble colour televisions. 
The assembly of VCRs and monitors was added in 1998; 
however, colour television assembly was terminated in 1999 
owing to the Brazilian crisis. Also that year, SEDA started 
producing hand-held phones (HHPs) and in 2002 added 
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hard disk drives (HDDs).49 In 2004, the company resumed 
conventional television assembly in Manaus and established 
its Campinas plant, to which the Manaus HHP assembly 
operation was then transferred, to lock into the benefits 
available under the IT law and the relative development 
of the nearby science and technology infrastructure. In 
2005, SEDA expanded its existing plants for television 
sets, DVD players and recorders, monitors, HHPs and 
HDDs and introduced new technologies for PDP, LCD 
and DLP digital televisions and CDT and LCD monitors. 
In 2005, the company had gained significant market 
shares for HDDs (50%), monitors (31%), television 
sets (12%) and mobile phones (11%). In the television 
market, SEC now mainly assembles digital models from 
imported components, especially LCD panels. SEC is also 
contemplating increased investments in digital television 
technology, with a view to beginning production in 2008 
(Folha de São Paulo, 2006).
In 2006, SEC announced the expansion of its range 
of locally-assembled products to include air-conditioning 
equipment and printers. The firm is also considering the 
production of refrigerators, washing machines and notebooks. 
These products, which SEC currently imports, account for 
3% of its sales in Brazil and the company hopes to increase 
this figure to 20% (Valor online, 2006a). SEC has also started 
producing digital cameras through Samsung Techwin.50 
Currently, only some 10% of the corporation’s 
Brazilian production is exported, including 20% of its 
HHPs and monitors. Ninety percent of these exports go to 
Argentina, with the rest destined for Colombia and Peru. 
SEC exports from Brazil were valued at approximately 
US$ 125 million in 2005 (Samsung Brazil website; Gazeta 
mercantil, 2006; América economía, 2007). 
Samsung SDI set up its Manaus operation, Samsung 
SDI Brasil Ltda (SDIB), in 1996. SDIB experienced some 
start-up problems owing to the Asian and Brazilian crises 
and to the cessation of colour television assembly by 
the main SEC subsidiary in Brazil, SEDA, in 1999, but 
prospered between 2000 and 2005. In this period its sales 
went from US$ 169 million to US$ 353 million and its 
employees came to number almost 1,100. Nevertheless, 
SDIB does not have its own glass plant (as its competitor, 
Philips, does) and is now having difficulty in competing 
against CRT imports from China. It will not return a profit 
in 2007, which will make its investment programme in 
Brazil more difficult.51
From June 1998, Samsung SDI produced mid-sized 
CRTs for television sets, for the Latin American market. 
In 2000, it reconstructed the existing production line and 
added CDTs, so it currently has an annual CRT capacity of 6 
million units. The company’s main products are now CRTs, 
monitors and deflection yokes for television sets. In 2006, it 
dropped the production of LCD modules for HHPs. 
As has been mentioned, similarly to the situation in 
Mexico, Samsung Electro-Mechanics closed its operations 
in Brazil, as it was unable to compete effectively with 
Asian imports and saw no clear role to play in the transition 
from analogue to digital television. 
In contrast to its Mexican operations, SEC established 
two R&D centres in Brazil, to develop products and 
technology for the Latin American market. Samsung Instituto 
para Desenvolvimento de Informática (SIDI), located in 
Campinas, develops and tests mobile communications 
software technologies for Samsung HHP to be sold in Latin 
America. Samsung Instituto de Desenvolvimento para a 
Informática da Amazônia (SIDIA), in Manaus, focuses on 
high-resolution and digital image technologies (http://www.
sidi.org.br). SEC announced in August 2006 that it would 
invest US$ 15 million to develop technology for the digital 
television standards recently adopted in Brazil. Investments 
are also to be made over a 30-month period in research 
centres in Brazil, China, Japan, Poland, the Republic of 
Korea and the United Kingdom, which will be supervised 
by the R&D operation in Brazil. These investments are 
49
 SEC is the only producer of HDDs in Brazil and, in turn, its Brazilian operation is the only HDD production facility SEC has outside the Republic 
of Korea, which makes it very special. Apparently, the decision to site the plant in Brazil was part of the resolution of a tax dispute there. SEC has 
rendered an impressive performance in the HDD market in Brazil, with its market share rising from 5% to 25% between January and September 
2006. Besides having been able to market a lower-cost product by assembling it in Brazil, the company benefited from a change made to the 
national legislation in July. Previously, computer manufacturers were entitled to tax benefits when they acquired Brazilian-produced batteries 
and PC boxes as inputs. In July, HDDs were included as a third option, so that producers could choose any two of these three components to 
qualify for the benefit. Brazilian-made PC boxes were price-competitive anyway, and many companies started buying Brazilian-made HDDs 
and importing batteries (which can be sourced more cheaply from Asia) (Valor, 2006a).
50
 This is the company’s first investment in the production of digital cameras outside Asia. After an investment of US$ 5 million, the plant was 
inaugurated in the State of Minas Gerais in July, with a capacity of 70,000 units per month (production is currently between 15,000 and 20,000). 
Tax benefits were granted by the municipality of Varginha (Valor online, 2006b).
51
 In 2006, Samsung SDI announced a new investment of US$ 10 million in its Manaus plant, in order to start producing display tubes for computer 
monitors. The initial aim was to produce approximately 1 million units (in addition to current capacity), 80% of which would be sold in Brazil 
and 20% exported. This venture was related to a negotiation among MERCOSUR members in 2005, in which it was decided to postpone the 
elimination of the 8% import tariff on display tubes: otherwise these products would be unable to compete against Chinese-made ones (Tribuna 
da Imprensa, 2006; Valor, 2006b).
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)132
intended to free SEC of the need to acquire technology 
for television sets and converters for the Brazilian digital 
television market, which is based on the Japanese system, 
ISDB (Folha de São Paulo, 2006).
Compared to its export platform operations in Mexico, 
in Brazil SEC operates in a much smaller market that is 
less demanding in terms of technological change. SEC 
assembles some products in Brazil, such as HHPs and 
HDDs, that it does not assemble in Mexico. It also has two 
R&D centres in Brazil, but none in Mexico. Some of these 
differences may be explained by Brazilian industrial and 
technological policy, others by corporate strategies.
LGE investments in Brazil were mainly channelled 
through its subsidiaries and the LG Philips joint venture. 
LG Electronics made Brazil one of its core countries as of 
2005. It had moved into the country in 1995 with a head 
office in São Paulo and two subsidiaries: LG Electronics da 
Amazonia in Manaus, State of Amazonas, and LG Electronics 
de São Paulo in Taubaté, São Paolo State. The plant at the 
Manaus subsidiary initially assembled television sets, VCRs 
and microwave ovens while the Taubaté plant assembled 
monitors. The line-up at the Manaus plant was later expanded 
to DVDs, projection televisions, air-conditioners and PDP 
televisions and the Taubaté plant added CDMA and GSM 
hand-held phones, CD-ROMs and CDR-Ws to its product 
repertoire. CD-ROM assembly was later terminated. LGE 
assembles most of the products it sells in Brazil locally 
(http://br.lge.com). The company’s operations there were 
severely disrupted by the Asian and Brazilian crises, which 
raised the question of whether or not to continue in Brazil. 
LGE persisted and its sales rose from US$ 630 million in 
2003 to US$ 1.3 billion in 2006.
In 2005, LG Electronics de São Paulo had invested a 
total of some US$ 90 million in the Taubaté plant, where 
it employed a workforce of 2,333. This plant assembles 
monitors and HHPs (with an annual capacity of 3 million and 
9.6 million units, respectively), provides logistical support 
for distribution of the Manaus plant’s production and carries 
out mobile telephony R&D. In 2005, approximately US$ 60 
million was invested in a new HHP plant in Taubaté, for 
the production of both CDMA and GSM phones. While 
monitors still represent a higher share of production at the 
Taubaté plant, HHP sales are growing faster. Production 
from Taubaté is sold in Brazil and in other Latin American 
markets, including Argentina, Chile and Peru. LGE has a 
strategic partnership with Vivo, the largest CDMA operator 
in Brazil. It currently ranks first in the Brazilian CDMA 
segment, with 25% of the market, and third in the GSM 
sector, with a 10% market share (KOTRA, 2006). 
LG Electronics da Amazonia (LGEAZ) has invested 
about US$ 100 million in its three Manaus plants, which 
employ 2,196 people. It possesses an annual production 
capacity of 2.5 million televisions, 1.5 million VCR/
DVDs, 500,000 audio units and 300,000 air-conditioners. 
Planned investments will enable the company to expand 
television-manufacturing to 3 million units per year 
(equivalent to 30% of Brazilian demand), offering both 
conventional and LCD/PDP television sets, and to expand 
capacity in air-conditioners to 500,000 units by 2007 
(Valor online, 2006b). 
LGEAZ has a head office and an R&D centre 
in São Paulo and has forged partnerships with local 
research centers. One example is an agreement signed 
in 2006 with Centro de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento em 
Telecomunicações (CPqD) in Campinas, to develop an 
environmentally-friendly technology to recycle the lithium 
batteries used in cell phones. This is partly a response 
to a government measure requiring HHP manufacturers 
to adopt environmentally-friendly recycling or disposal 
procedures. 
LG Philips has plants in Brazil making CRTs, deflection 
yokes, glass, electron guns and other display components. 
Its plant in Capuava and glass-making facility in Suzano 
(both São Paulo State) employ workforces of 450 and 370, 
respectively. In 2006, LG Philips announced that its Capuava 
plant, which already produced glass for television screens, 
was to become the first manufacturer of glass for monitor 
screens in Latin America. The investment is being made 
mainly in response to changing demand in the Brazilian 
monitors market and will cost an estimated US$ 5 million, 
essentially for upgrading the furnace. LG Philips will sell to 
monitor manufacturers, including its LGE competitor, SEC 
(which has thus far imported these parts). The investment 
will also free capacity and enable the company to increase 
production of glass for television screens, which is produced 
in Manaus for the larger television sets that the Brazilian 
market is increasingly demanding (Gazeta mercantil, 2006). 
Most sales are made in the Brazilian market, with Central 
and South American sales accounting for less than 7% of 
all sales by LG Philips’ Brazilian plants. 
Conversely to the situation in Mexico, in Brazil LGE 
manufactures more white goods (home appliances) than 
brown goods (electronic equipment), although televisions, 
monitors and HHPs are among the principal products in both 
locations. The LGERS Reynosa plant has a larger annual 
capacity for television sets (3 million PDP and conventional 
televisions) than does LGEAZ in Manaus (2.5 million, mainly 
conventional, televisions). The latter is larger than the Mexicali 
(LGEMX) operation, however, which specializes in LCD 
televisions. The Taubaté plant assembles more monitors and 
HHPs than the Mexicali plant (3 million monitors compared 
to 2.2 million and 9.6 million HHPs compared to 1.7 million). 
The main differences between LGE operations in Mexico 
and Brazil have to do with the degree of localization in the 
plasma module plant in Reynosa and the R&D activities 
undertaken in Brazil. 
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These two Korean electronics corporations —SEC 
and LGE— have similar options as regards selling their 
goods in the Americas and they have, for the most part, 
made similar choices. Until now, market access through 
NAFTA has made Mexico the best choice for their 
electronic goods export platforms, even though this trade 
arrangement’s rules of origin call for a significant degree of 
localization of principal inputs (CRTs, deflection yoke, fly 
back transformers, and so on, in the case of conventional 
televisions). Mexico is one of the main assembly sites 
of both corporations’ international production systems, 
targeting the United States market in this case. Both TNCs 
have indicated that Mexico’s advantages are based mainly 
on lower labour costs and good geographical location, 
coupled with acceptable logistics and preferential access to 
the United States and many other markets of the region via 
FTAs. Mexican industrial or technological policy has not 
played an important role in the evolution of the industry: 
even the notable advances made by the LGERS PDP module 
plant in Reynosa as regards localization of digital television 
components seem to reflect corporate strategy more than 
Mexican industrial or technological policy. At the same 
time, both the Korean corporations have experienced a host 
of problems in their Mexican operations, including very 
high labour rotation, scarcity of skilled workers, increased 
competition from Asia (especially China), a weak supplier 
base, a need to improve physical and IT infrastructure and, 
most of all, heightened personal insecurity. 
In Brazil, the higher level of import protection on final 
products, the relatively large size of the domestic market and 
the tax and tariff advantages of MFZ led these companies to 
opt for local assembly. Consumer demand is clearly lower and 
less sophisticated in the Brazilian market than in the United 
States. Moreover, host country industrial and technological 
policies have a stronger influence on company activities by 
providing tax incentives for the local production of certain 
inputs or R&D activities. Curiously enough, although there is 
a nascent shift from cheaper, simpler CRT-based televisions 
to LCD and PDP models in Brazil, government policy does 
not seem to promote the localization of digital components, 
such as LCD and plasma panels, since the import tariffs on 
these goods are low in comparison to CRTs for conventional 
televisions. The main advantages of Brazil for these companies 
are its large and growing market, the MFZ tax benefits, the 
availability and quality of skilled human resources and the 
R&D infrastructure. The main problems have to do with the 
complicated and frequently changing tax system, “Brazil 
cost”,52 the weak legal system, the limited local supplier 
base, the “spaghetti bowl” of FTAs in the region that limits 
exports from Brazil, quotas set for Brazilian television sets in 
the Argentine market and, most of all, the frequent changes 
to local policies on required components, IT requirements 
and so forth. 
The SEC and LGE operations in Mexico and Brazil 
may well be the largest foreign direct investments by 
Korean TNCs in the region. Hence, they strongly symbolize 
the nature and impact of Korean FDI in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Although industrial and technological 
upgrading may be presumed to be national priorities in 
both Mexico and Brazil, the internationalization of the 
two Korean electronics giants has not, apparently, resulted 
in any such upgrading in their host countries, to judge 
by recent developments in the digital television industry 
—for all that the evolution of the products they assemble 
in the region reflects the technological advances they have 
achieved. In that line of reasoning, a clearer definition of 
the role of FDI in the evolution of the electronics sector is 
called for and, consequently, so too is closer coordination 
of national FDI, industrial, technological and other 
policies. For example, it would be necessary to coordinate 
—including between the federal government and the state 
level— the promotion of specific industries, local content 
requirements, import protection, human resource training, 
R&D requirements, the targeting of TNC suppliers and 
after-service for foreign investors, among others, in order 
to produce improved results. 
52
 “Brazil cost” refers collectively to factors unrelated to internal productivity that dampen the efficiency of firms operating in Brazil. It encompasses 
a large number of variables, ranging from the tax burden to costs arising from shortcomings in infrastructure.
2. Korean activities in the Latin American and Caribbean    
 automotive industry
Compared to the international expansion of Korean 
electronic TNCs and their operations in Latin America, 
the Republic of Korea’s largest automotive corporation, 
Hyundai Motor Company (including Kia), surprisingly 
has virtually no significant presence in the region. 
Hyundai Motor Company (HMC) seems to be content 
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to operate in Latin America with small volumes of 
knocked down kits assembled by local partners and it 
exports from the Republic of Korea where possible. 
Since the automobile industry in Latin America is 
dominated by TNCs and is concentrated in just two 
countries, Mexico and Brazil, the question is why 
HMC has limited interest in the auto industry there. 
The Mexican and Brazilian automobile industries are 
quite distinct (ECLAC, 2004), so it would appear that 
there is no single common explanation.
(a) The Mexican automotive industry
The Mexican automotive industry is usually considered 
one of the great efficiency-seeking FDI success stories, as 
its evolution represented the transformation of a “sitting 
duck” into a kind of “flying goose” (Mortimore, 1995). 
As of the 1990s and in the context of NAFTA, FDI 
(mainly from the United States) in new plants converted 
an uncompetitive industry focused on the national market, 
which assembled antiquated, overpriced and poor quality 
vehicles, into a highly-competitive export platform for 
the United States and Canadian markets. United States 
automotive TNCs (General Motors, Ford, Chrysler53 and 
Volkswagen)54 were the main movers, taking advantage 
of the geographical proximity of Mexico, its relatively 
lower wages and its preferential access to the United 
States market via NAFTA to establish modern export 
operations to supply that market with lower-cost vehicles 
and thus compete on better terms there with imported 
or locally assembled Japanese and Korean vehicles 
(Mortimore, 1998, 1997). Between 1985 and 2000, the 
production capacity of the Mexican automotive industry 
rose from 400,000 to almost 2 million units. Production 
and exports peaked at 1,889,500 and 1,434,100 units, 
respectively, in 2000. These Mexican plants came to 
account for about 14% of vehicle imports to the United 
States and Canada. However, dependence on a single 
—North American— market created instability when 
that market entered recession and production and exports 
declined to 1,607,400 and 1,186,300, respectively, by 2005. 
Even so, in 2005, the automotive industry represented 
16% of manufacturing GDP, 21% of exports and 18% 
of employment in Mexico (Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs, 2007b).
At the same time, Mexico also depends excessively 
on auto parts imported from just one source —the United 
States— and lacks a broad enough supplier network to 
comply with the rules of origin set out in its various 
FTAs with other markets, especially the arrangements 
with the European Union and Japan and those being 
negotiated with the Republic of Korea. A key issue in the 
Mexican automotive industry, therefore, is the difficulty 
of establishing an auto parts supplier network that is 
sufficiently integrated, competitive and sophisticated to 
support efforts to position its output in the global market 
as well as in its NAFTA partner countries (Mortimore 
and Barron, 2005). 
To successfully compete in major world markets, the 
Mexican automotive industry must design and implement 
appropriate strategies to make the shift from export 
platform —based on low wages and privileged access 
and geographical proximity to a single market— to 
integrated manufacturing centre able to compete on 
the basis of skilled human resources, technological 
capabilities and an integrated chain of world-class 
suppliers (Mortimore and Barron, 2005). Soon after 2000, 
the Mexican Automotive Manufacturers Association and 
the Secretariat for Economic Affairs proposed doubling 
Mexico’s automotive production capacity by 2010. 
However, the industry stalled. The new FDI that has 
entered the country has continued to come mainly from 
United States auto TNCs that are closing less efficient 
plants in the United States and Canada and opening new 
more efficient ones in Mexico (Rozenberg, 2006; Carrillo, 
2006). The Mexican automotive market is expected to 
grow by 35%, to a capacity of over 2 million units, by 
2010 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006). Mexico is clearly 
taking advantage of the restructuring of the United 
States automotive industry (USITC, 2002), yet it is not 
attracting large investments by the most competitive 
global automotive industry leaders, such as Toyota, Honda 
and HMC (Mortimore and Vergara, 2006). Honda has a 
plant with a 25,000-unit capacity which assembles the 
Accord sedan model, mostly for export, and Toyota has 
a plant with a capacity of 35,000 units, which assembles 
the Tacoma model solely for export. But HMC has no 
plant in Mexico to date, although it has appears to have 
decided to invest in a small one.
Hyundai Motor Company’s apparent lack of interest 
in investing in Mexico until now may be attributed to four 
main factors. First, any operation intending to sell on the 
domestic market faces quite severe competition from 
established assemblers, vehicles imported by established 
assemblers and the import of used cars from the United 
States. This relegates the domestic market to a relatively 
minor role in the decision to invest in a vehicle assembly 
plant or not. 
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 Before its purchase by the German automotive TNC, DaimlerBenz.
54
 The German automotive TNC, Volkswagen, moved its United States plant to Mexico to supply the United States market from there.
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Second, any export operation would have to meet 
the regional rules of content for the corresponding FTAs. 
HMC seems to be in a similar situation to the world 
automobile industry leader, Toyota. Toyota began to 
invest in Mexico (a light truck plant was set up close to 
Tijuana in 2005 to make the Tacoma model and truck 
beds) only once it had consolidated its vehicle assembly 
and supplier network in the United States and Canada 
by way of an FDI effort in the order of US$ 15 billion. 
Toyota’s hyper-competitiveness in the North American 
market has been largely responsible for obliging the 
United States auto TNCs to ramp up their assembly in 
Mexico in order to lower the production costs of the 
vehicles they sell in their home market. This suggests 
that HMC might be in a position to consider investing 
in Mexico after the consolidation of its huge vehicle 
assembly plants in Georgia (Kia) and Alabama (Hyundai) 
and the corresponding auto part supplier network in the 
United States. The use of United States-based imports 
in Mexican assembly would place the company better to 
meet the regional content requirement of 62.5% for any 
vehicles assembled in Mexico and sold in Canada and 
the United States.
Third, the lack of Korean suppliers in Mexico has 
also inhibited investment. Until now there has been 
a total absence of Korean auto part and components 
suppliers in Mexico. What has changed recently —and 
represents a major advance in this regard— is that 
Pohang Iron and Steel Company (Posco) has begun 
to construct a US$ 200-million facility to produce 
specialized galvanized steel for the automotive 
industry in a 400,000-ton-per-year plant in Tampico, 
Tamaulipas State. Posco is one of the six or seven 
major world-class TNCs specialized in this product. 
This new plant in Mexico aims to service the Mexican 
market, the southern United States market (where 
the new Hyundai and Kia plants, as well as those of 
Toyota, Honda and Nissan, are located) and, possibly, 
the Brazilian market. The Mexican automobile industry 
requires approximately 600,000 tons of galvanized steel 
a year and currently produces only about one third of 
that amount. Hence, the new Posco plant provides the 
opportunity to increase Mexican value-added, which 
could play a role in a number of export options within 
the context of Mexico’s numerous FTAs. 
Fourth, up to this point in time, HMC has had more 
attractive opportunities for its investment funds in the 
major markets (the Alabama and Georgia plants for 
the United States market and the Czech Republic and 
Slovakian plants for Europe), as well as in the larger, 
more promising and less competitive emerging markets, 
such as China, India and Turkey. Having consolidated 
those investments in markets that are large, fast-growing 
or both, HMC is now showing greater interest in Mexico 
as an investment option.
This suggests that the time may be ripe for a more 
active Mexican FDI policy to target HMC and avoid 
replicating the case of Toyota: although explicitly interested 
in establishing a North American manufacturing centre, 
Toyota did not consider Mexico as a site because the 
Mexican authorities did not have an effective FDI policy 
for that purpose (Mortimore and Vergara, 2006). Hyundai 
Motor Company’s major investments in the Georgia and 
Alabama plants in the United States suggest that the 
company is now in a position similar to Toyota’s five or 
so years ago.
(b) The Brazilian automotive industry
The automotive industry in Brazil also began 
as an import-substituting initiative which produced 
antiquated, overpriced and poor quality vehicles. 
The principal differences with regard to Mexico’s 
automotive industry is that it has not been transformed 
into an export platform; rather it attracts much more 
market-seeking than efficiency-seeking FDI. For that 
reason, it specializes in small, economical passenger 
vehicles —particularly those that run on both ethanol 
and gasoline— for the domestic market rather than 
cars designed to meet the tastes of higher-income 
consumers in export markets (ECLAC, 2004). For the 
same reason, the Brazilian automotive industry is less 
competitive than Mexico’s in terms of export orientation 
and product sophistication.
The new macroeconomic stability achieved by the 
Real Plan in Brazil in the 1990s, coupled with aggressive 
incentives for new automotive industry investments by 
various Brazilian states, gave rise to the modernization 
of Brazil’s automotive industry —including new 
technologically-sophisticated modular plants— by 
bringing new investments from existing producers (General 
Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Volkswagen and Fiat) and from 
new entrants (mainly Renault-Nissan and PSA Peugeot 
Citroën), which raised annual production capacity to over 
3 million vehicles. With the macroeconomic crisis of 
1999, capacity utilization plummeted from over 90% in 
1996-1997 to just 50% in 2000, as local demand collapsed 
(ANFAVEA, 2006). Several of the automotive TNCs 
operating in Brazil then tried to shift their production to 
export markets.
One of the major economy-wide challenges faced by the 
Brazilian automotive industry, apart from macroeconomic 
stability, is the appreciation of the national currency. This 
could complicate the continued expansion of the automotive 
industry and its growing export orientation. Between 2000 
and 2005, while the Mexican automotive industry stagnated 
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owing to slow growth of the United States market, Brazil’s 
production rose from 1,691,200 to 2,528,300 units and its 
exports jumped from 371,300 to 897,100 units (equivalent 
to 35.5% of national production). The appreciation of the 
currency has not increased automobile imports, because 
the industry is strongly protected by import tariffs of 
some 35% on goods originating outside MERCOSUR. 
Accordingly, imports were equivalent to only 3.5% of 
national production. 
The Brazilian authorities have also attempted to 
attract world automotive industry leaders and, like Mexico, 
have had only relatively minor success. Honda assembles 
its Civic model in a relatively small plant (45,000-unit 
capacity) in Sumaré, and Toyota assembles its Corolla 
model in a 60,000-unit plant in Indaiatuba, both in São 
Paulo State. Neither of these has earned the Japanese 
assemblers significant market shares in Brazil. HMC has 
not entered the competitive market for domestic demand 
in Brazil in any significant way, apparently because it 
has had better options for its investments, as well as 
doubts about Brazil’s macroeconomic performance and 
unresolved legal problems stemming from the period of 
strong state incentives (see box III.6). Thus, Brazilian 
FDI policy did not succeed in convincing HMC, one of 
the leading global automobile TNCs, to finalize any new 
vehicle assembly plant in Brazil. 
Box III.6
HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY, KIA AND ASIA MOTORS IN BRAZIL
Asia Motors, Kia and Hyundai Motor 
Company (HMC) started up in the Brazilian 
market by selling imported knocked-down 
kits in association with local business 
groups. Even after HMC acquired Asia 
Motors and Kia in the late 1990s, separate 
local partnerships were maintained. In the 
1990s, projects for local assembly of Asia 
Motors, Hyundai and Kia brand vehicles were 
started up but subsequently suspended. 
The situation evolved as follows:
Asia Motors began an automobile 
assembly project in Brazil through its local 
partner in the 1990s. Federal and state 
incentives were obtained for the construction 
of a plant in the State of Bahia. However, 
the project stalled and the company 
withdrew, leaving a US$ 280-million debt 
in fines and losses. Subsequently, HMC 
acquired Asia Motors’ brands and assets 
in the Republic of Korea.
The local partner of HMC, CAOA, 
started building a plant in Bahia State but, 
owing to environmental and other problems, 
transferred the project to the State of Goiás 
in 2004, after being included in an investment 
promotion scheme that included tax rebates 
and the provision of infrastructure. The 
project was to be an assembly operation 
financed and managed by CAOA under 
a licensing agreement from HMC. The 
company also received fiscal incentives 
from the federal government (equivalent 
to 32% of the industrial tax charged on 
vehicles, including imported ones, sold in 
the country, which could be used to pay 
other federal taxes). In May 2005, the federal 
government suspended the incentives, 
arguing that the company had fallen behind 
in the implementation schedule to which 
it had agreed. Production is estimated to 
begin by 2007; if it does not, the company 
will have to return the financial equivalent 
of the tax benefits already received.
Kia had a project for a commercial 
vehicle plant to be built, as in the case of 
the HMC project, by the local partner (in this 
case, the Gandini group, after a partnership 
initially planned with Usipart, a subsidiary of 
Usiminas, did not materialize). The project 
was subsequently suspended. According to 
the media, the reasons for the suspension 
were volatility in exchange rates and import 
tariffs for auto parts.
Unlike the tax dispute between the 
Brazilian government and Samsung 
Electronics Company (SEC), which had 
a positive outcome in the setting up of 
the firm’s only HDD plant outside of the 
Republic of Korea, the controversy between 
the government and HMC has still not 
been brought to a positive resolution. On 
20 February 2007, ValorFuturo reported 
that the CAOA group was to finance a new 
US$ 250-million plant in Anapolis, south 
of Brasilia, to assemble 50,000 small SUV 
and Porter model light trucks per year. This 
suggests that HMC has finally decided to 
relegate Brazil to a minor position within its 
international production system by operating 
through intermediaries assembling entirely 
knocked-down kits.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade; Agência Estado, “Projeto da 
Hyundai em Goiás pode ser suspenso”, 5 June 2005; ValorFuturo, 20 February 2007. 
In sum, neither the Mexican automotive industry 
based on efficiency-seeking FDI nor the Brazilian 
industry based on market-seeking FDI were effective 
in attracting major investments from world industry 
leaders. While Toyota and Honda have recently made 
relatively minor investments in new plants in both 
countries, HMC has not done so. In Brazil, it became 
embroiled in a tax dispute with local authorities, which 
led it to back off from its planned investment there, 
leaving the impression that industrial and FDI policies 
could have been better coordinated. In Mexico, the 
situation seems auspicious yet no official decision to 
invest in a new plant has been announced. It would seem 
that the long delay in achieving results is due in part to 
lack of focus in the national authorities’ FDI attraction 
policies which, moreover, did not specifically target 
HMC, in spite of its position among the automotive 
industry leaders.
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3. Korean activities in the Latin American and Caribbean textile and 
 apparel industry
The textile and apparel industries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean have undergone a sharp transformation from 
relatively uncompetitive national industries surviving 
behind elevated import tariffs to export-oriented assembly 
activities focused on the United States market. That shift 
was first triggered by new United States import quotas 
imposed under the Multifibre Arrangement. Mexico and 
the Caribbean Basin gained special advantages under 
the Arrangement, in the form of United States trade 
preferences: first, both Mexico and the Caribbean Basin 
gained such preferences under the production-sharing 
mechanism; the Caribbean Basin was advantaged by the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983, the 
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act of 2000 and the 
Dominican Republic – Central America – United States 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) of 2005; and, lastly, 
Mexico benefited from the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994. The aim of the United 
States government was to help United States textile 
producers and apparel companies to compete better in 
their home market against Asian imports, by granting 
non-tariff access to goods assembled abroad using United 
States components (cloth, thread, buttons and so on). The 
advantages of Mexico and the Caribbean Basin in this 
respect stemmed from geographical proximity, relatively 
low wage rates and export processing zone facilities 
designed to complement the United States initiative.
Three main types of apparel companies took advantage 
of the opportunity to export to the United States market 
from Mexico and the Caribbean Basin (Mortimore and 
Zamora, 1999). First, larger United States own-brand 
apparel manufacturers often set up assembly operations in 
a number of different locations, typically Mexico, a Central 
American country (El Salvador, Guatemala or Honduras) 
and a Caribbean country (the Dominican Republic or 
Jamaica). This allowed them to add or drop assembly lines 
as the competitive advantages of each individual location 
evolved, without having to withdraw completely from 
any of them, except in extreme circumstances. Second, 
medium-sized intermediaries offering assembly services 
to United States buyers or manufacturers often set up a 
single assembly operation in the area to take advantage 
of the new framework. These firms sometimes had to 
move from place to place as local competitive advantages 
changed. Lastly, national apparel companies, normally 
with no international operations of their own, also 
attempted to operate as contract assemblers for United 
States buyers and manufacturers. If the national economy 
lost competitive advantage in apparel, these firms were 
obliged to internationalize or shift to another activity. For 
many of the Caribbean Basin countries, apparel sales to 
the United States market became the backbone of their 
export repertoire. For Mexico, clothing assembly was 
not nearly as important an activity as the electronics and 
automotive export platforms, but it did compete effectively 
with the export platforms of the Caribbean Basin.
The phased elimination of import quotas under the 
trade liberalizing agenda of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, later, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) evaporated most of the special 
advantages of Mexican- and Caribbean Basin-based 
assembly operations, particularly after the last tranche 
of liberalization in 2005. That tranche included the 
basic goods in which Mexico and the Caribbean Basin 
specialized (knit shirts, pants, underwear and nightwear), 
made in large and standardized runs, with relatively simple 
sewing operations and few styling changes. With improved 
access to the United States apparel market, the import 
market shares of Asian producers, especially China and 
India, rose precipitously while those of Mexico and the 
Caribbean Basin countries began to decline. 
(a) The Mexican textile and apparel industry
The textile and apparel industry is still important to 
the Mexican economy (Zaga, 2006; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2006; Molina, 2006). The textile industry accounted 
for 3.2% of manufacturing GDP, generated US$ 5 billion 
in exports and provided 122,000 jobs in 2005. The 
apparel industry contributed 2.8% of manufacturing GDP, 
generated US$ 5.2 billion in exports and provided 400,000 
jobs. Together, these industries accounted for 15% of 
employment in manufacturing. The textile industry was 
located primarily in the States of Mexico (22.5%) and 
Puebla (21%). The apparel industry was more dispersed, 
with focal points in the States of Coahuila (11.6%), Mexico 
(9.1%) and Puebla (8.8%) and the Federal District (9.8%). 
The apparel industry was much more directly involved in 
assembly operations for export to the United States market, 
since the production-sharing mechanism precluded the 
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incorporation of non-United States components. That 
changed under the NAFTA rules of origin, which allowed 
Mexican inputs within certain limits. Fully 77.7% of the 
US$ 1.8 billion in FDI that entered Mexico’s apparel 
industry in 1999-2005 came from United States investors, 
most seeking to use Mexico as a production or assembly 
base to compete on better terms against Asian imports in 
their home market.
Mexico became the number one supplier of textiles 
and apparel (taken together) to the United States 
market in 1998-2001, in part as a result of its NAFTA 
advantages. However, as of 2000, Mexico’s exports 
to the United States began to fall far behind those of 
China. Apparel is one of the segments most fiercely 
contested by Mexico and China in the United States 
market, even though China tends to specialize more 
in lightweight, labour-intensive items and Mexico in 
heavier items that require a quick turnaround and less 
complicated sewing (Watkins, 2006). In 2005, China 
placed US$ 19.9 billion of apparel exports in the United 
States market (26.1%) while Mexico’s exports of such 
goods declined to US$ 6.3 billion (8.3%). At the same 
time, the Mexican textile and apparel sector shed 
286,668 jobs (240,682 in apparel and 45,986 in textiles) 
between 2000 and 2005. Mexican competitiveness 
in apparel declined fundamentally because of wage 
rates (the average hourly rate in Mexico is US$ 2.30, 
compared to US$ 0.69 in coastal China and US$ 0.41 
in inland China) and an appreciating national currency. 
Mexico had difficulty in competing with China as 
regards other factors too: assuming China to have an 
index of 100, Mexico was uncompetitive in energy cost 
(283), water cost (250), depreciation (120) and interest 
rates (225). In other words, Mexico’s chief economic 
advantage in comparison to China was reduced solely 
to geographical proximity (including the associated 
rapid response capability). 
The problem is not only that China’s assembled 
apparel is out-competing Mexico’s. Even some of the 
more integrated parts of the Mexican textile and apparel 
industry seem to be suffering a significant loss of United 
States import market share. The area of La Laguna, which 
is well known as the principal source of denim jeans for 
the United States market and whose ability to upgrade to 
full package provider using mostly locally-produced denim 
(Bair, 2002) has often presented it as a NAFTA success 
story (Gereffi, 2000), has seen its exports nosedive and 
economic activity slow significantly due to competition 
from Asia (Gereffi, citing Rosenberg, 2006). One United 
States textile producer, Cone Mills Corporation (which 
later went bankrupt and was acquired by International 
Textile Group), closed plants in the United States and set 
up a joint venture with a major Mexican textile producer, 
Parras, to form Parras Cone, in the framework of NAFTA. 
However, the Mexican partner came close to receivership 
as a result of declining denim exports, which were blamed 
on Chinese competition (Parras, 2006). The International 
Textile Group is currently investing US$ 100 million in a 
new denim plant in Nicaragua (Business Latin America, 
24 July 2006). This suggests that even the additional 
advantages available to the Mexican textile and apparel 
industry under NAFTA have been insufficient to lay 
the basis of sustainable international competitiveness. 
Moreover, national policies were not very supportive 
during this period.
Information from the Korean Trade-Investment 
Promotion Agency (KOTRA) indicates that there are 
about 40 Korean firms operating in Mexico’s textile and 
apparel sector. These consist mostly of traders located 
in Mexico City (20), component manufacturers linked 
to the footwear industry in Guanajuato (11) or apparel 
firms located in Puebla (6). These figures suggest that 
Mexico’s textile and apparel industry is no longer an 
important focal point for Korean FDI in Mexico. Korean 
FDI in this industry is very small compared to that in 
the electronics industry in Baja California, for example. 
Moreover, Korean firms represent a very small element 
of the Mexican apparel industry. Two Korean firms were 
interviewed in the town of Atlixco in Puebla State, in order 
to ascertain the position of Korean firms in this industry 
in Mexico (see box III.7).
Thus, Korean firms did not play a front-line role in 
the evolution of the Mexican textile and apparel industry; 
however, they were very much affected by it. Many were 
attracted to Mexico by its geographical proximity to 
the United States market in the context of the quotas 
allowed under the Multifibre Arrangement. They opted 
to export to the United States market in the framework 
of the production-sharing mechanism, limiting their 
activities to assembling higher-priced United States 
inputs, which was a viable option immediately after the 
huge devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994. Under 
the new NAFTA rules, some adapted by developing 
local production facilities in order to develop full 
package capabilities for just-in-time operations rather 
than continuing to compete on a strictly price basis in 
an increasingly uncompetitive local environment. Thus, 
the more integrated firm in box III.8 prospered while 
the other did not.
With regard to any impact in Mexico of the new, 
higher-technology activities currently being pursued by 
the principal Korean textile and apparel TNCs in their 
home economy, there seems to be none. The Korean textile 
and apparel operations in Mexico and the new activities 
in the Republic of Korea do not seem to be connected in 
any manner. 
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Box III.7
A TALE OF TWO KOREAN APPAREL FIRMS IN ATLIXCO, PUEBLA STATE
Two Korean apparel firms were established 
in Atlixco at approximately the same time 
in 1998-1999. One was the subsidiary of 
a medium-sized Korean apparel TNC with 
international operations in Bangladesh and 
Indonesia. The other was a joint venture 
between a Korean firm resident in Mexico 
and a Korean trader located in Los Angeles, 
California, the latter with subcontracting 
relations with other assemblers in Guatemala 
and El Salvador. Both companies produced 
similar products (T-shirts, sweat-shirts and 
so forth) for export to the United States 
market, but they did so in radically different 
ways. The first had a flexible production 
process, since it possessed an integrated 
operation producing its own cloth from 
United States yarn, while also assembling 
goods using inputs imported from both 
Asia and the United States. Its products 
entered the United States market duty-free 
or paid duty on Asian inputs, as the case 
might be. The second firm assembled only 
United States-sourced inputs. The contrast 
between the experiences of the two Korean 
apparel companies reflects many of the 
central aspects of the changing situation 
of the Mexican apparel industry.
The first firm had a successful 
experience in that it more than doubled 
production and sales between 2000 and 
2005, while increasing its workforce by only 
82%. This company opted to complement 
its sewing operation with a US$ 35-million 
investment to produce and dye its own cloth 
in Mexico in order to possess in-house full 
package capability. This capability, in the 
context of the NAFTA rules and along with 
geographical proximity, gave it a special 
just-in-time competitive advantage within 
its own corporate framework, even as it 
progressively lost its low-cost advantage 
owing to rising wages in Mexico.
The second firm started out using 
full capacity for its sewing operations 
and experienced a significant boom in its 
operations until 2003, when its competitive 
edge in the United States market was 
blunted by rising wage levels, changes in 
the Temporary Import Programme for the 
Production of Export Items (PITEX) and 
an appreciating Mexican peso. Apparently, 
the partner in Los Angeles, California 
began to send more of its United States 
orders to firms in Guatemala and El 
Salvador. By 2006, this firm was forced 
to subcontract its services to the first firm 
in order to survive. 
Both of these firms faced similar 
problems. They faced loss of international 
competitiveness due to rising wage rates, 
an appreciating peso and certain other 
local problems, including high labour 
turnover, excessive bureaucracy by 
Mexican administrative officials, the theft 
of containers and their contents and public 
safety issues. The interesting point is that 
the firm that opted to adapt its production 
to changing local circumstances was more 
successful, while the firm that simply 
continued with the strictly “sewing” option 
was less so.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of interviews and plant visits with the companies in Atlixco. 
(b) The Guatemalan textile and apparel industry
Korean FDI in the Central American textile and 
apparel industry is heavily concentrated in Guatemala. 
The Guatemalan textile and apparel industry consists 
of 508 companies and employs a workforce of 121,916 
(Vestex, 2006). The textile segment comprises 50 textile 
mills employing 18,500 workers, while the apparel 
segment consists of 198 companies providing 88,416 
jobs, with the accessories and services sector making up 
the rest. The textile segment generated an annual output 
of 135 million pounds (69.3% knits and 30.7% woven). 
The apparel segment had an installed capacity of 76,875 
sewing machines and its output was mainly cotton knit 
shirts and blouses for women and girls (category 339) 
(25.5%), cotton trousers and shorts for men and boys 
(category 347) (10.4%), man-made-fibre trousers and 
shorts for women and girls (category 648) (6.6%), and 
other manufactures of man-made fibres (category 669) 
(Hanson, 2005). In 1989-1994, the Guatemalan apparel 
industry concentrated on cotton yarns, cotton woven 
shirts and cotton trousers and over 60% of exports to 
the United States enjoyed preferential entry through 
the production-sharing mechanism. By 2000-2005, 
the industry had shifted its focus towards cotton knit 
shirts, cotton trousers and man-made-fibre items and 
the proportion of Guatemalan apparel products entering 
the United States market via Caribbean Basin Trade 
Partnership Act (CBTPA) preferences had dropped to 
about 30%. The Guatemala apparel industry stands out 
from the industry in the rest of Central America for three 
reasons. First, the industry has a large proportion of 
Korean companies, both subsidiaries of Korean textile 
and apparel TNCs and the small local firms owned by 
resident Koreans to whom they subcontract. Second, 
about two thirds of apparel exports, especially cotton 
trousers for women and girls and other manufactures of 
man-made fibre, enter the United States market without 
CBPTA preferences. That is, duty is charged at the 
United States border because non-United States yarn 
or cloth is used in the final product. Third, the share of 
production and exports associated with local artisans 
is considerably larger in Guatemala than in the rest of 
Central America. The first two aspects are relevant for 
this analysis.
The Guatemalan textile and apparel industry became 
more competitive in the United States market over the 
1989-2005 period, raising its import market share for 
textiles and apparel from number 33 in the ranking 
(0.62%) to number 20 (1.18%). For apparel alone it 
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moved up from number 22 (0.81%) to number 16 
(2.52%) (Hanson, 2005).55 The Caribbean Basin apparel 
suppliers to the United States market were subjected to 
changing rules. Import quotas were eased in the United 
States market in 1989-1994, through the special access 
programme under the production-sharing mechanism, 
which guaranteed access levels for United States-formed 
and cut fabrics. However, NAFTA brought in a major 
competitor —Mexico— with more favourable benefits (in 
particular, duty-free entry and rules of origin) that were 
not available to the Caribbean Basin apparel suppliers. 
The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) 
of 2000 helped to reduce that disadvantage by providing 
duty-free benefits for United States yarn-based apparel 
and some regionally-formed fabrics and by permitting 
local cutting operations. The benefits of the rules of origin 
—which allowed more vertically-integrated production, 
similar to that of Mexico— were not extended to the 
Caribbean Basin until CAFTA-DR was negotiated in 
2005. This has produced a curious situation in which 
Guatemalan apparel producers are progressively less 
inclined to utilize the preferences offered by the United 
States government for Caribbean Basin apparel producers, 
even though the apparent benefits from those preferences 
are increasing. 
The end of import quotas in the United States market 
in 2005 enabled Asian —especially Chinese— firms to 
mount much stiffer competition for Caribbean Basin 
countries there (Hernandez, Romero and Cordero, 2006). 
Guatemala has lower wage rates in apparel than do 
competitors such as Mexico and Costa Rica; nonetheless, 
it is considerably more expensive than other Central 
American countries and far more expensive than China 
(Milian, 2005; Amenábar, 2006). Furthermore, some 
Central American countries (Nicaragua and Costa Rica) 
enjoy some special trade preferences under CBPTA. One 
possible competitive advantage of Guatemala is that its 
textile and apparel industry is relatively larger (111 of 
200 principal TNCs operating in export processing zones 
in Central America are apparel companies in Guatemala) 
and the industry’s main employers are Asian (mainly 
Korean) companies, many of which already offer full 
package services (Amenábar, 2006; Milian, 2005). In 
other words, the Korean-based apparel companies in 
Guatemala apparently had a competitive advantage in 
facing the Chinese challenge.
Six Korean textile and apparel companies were 
interviewed in Guatemala.56 One was a textile firm which 
dyed cloth on commission for local Korean companies. 
Another operated exclusively by subcontracting local 
apparel firms owned by resident Koreans. The remaining 
four were large apparel companies from the list of the 
200 largest in Central America (two were in the top five). 
Five of the six were founded in the 1997-2003 period and 
the sixth began in 1989. Their sales ranged from US$ 14 
million to US$ 311 million in 2005. Excluding the apparel 
company that solely subcontracted and the textile firm, 
their employee numbers ranged from 1,200 to 6,000.
The principal differences in the performance of these 
companies had to do with their access to the United States 
market. Some accessed that market in the framework of 
the production-sharing mechanism or CBTPA, using 
United States-formed cloth and limiting local activity to 
cutting and sewing. Others did so without preferences, 
employing Asian-sourced yarn or cloth and paying duty 
upon entry to the United States. Two offered full package 
services while the others did not. Another difference had 
to do with subcontracting. One firm only subcontracted 
and another did no subcontracting. The other three apparel 
firms subcontracted to local Korean assemblers primarily 
to respond to variable demand which sometimes exceeded 
the capacity of their own plants. While these differences 
are important, it is the overall similarity of the firms’ 
activities that stands out. 
These companies shared many key features. Leaving 
aside the textile firm, all of the apparel companies produced 
knits, mainly T-shirts, tops, and trousers. They all also sent 
at least 90% of their production to the United States market. 
They shared many principal clients, such as Target, Wal-Mart, 
K-Mart, Sears, JC Penney and Liz Claiborne. The subsidiaries 
formed part of international production systems that were 
strikingly similar in that they tended to include Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua in Central America and China, 
Indonesia, Saipan and Viet Nam in Asia. The more complex 
goods were assembled in Asia and the simpler ones in Central 
America. For most, the Guatemalan operations represented 
a significant part of their international production network. 
The apparel companies all saw the Guatemalan operation 
as a cost centre to supply the United States market, based 
on Guatemala’s competitive advantages. Originally, these 
advantages consisted mainly of geographical proximity (rapid 
response), low cost (relatively low wages), preferential access 
55
 Over the same period, the Republic of Korea saw its rank as apparel supplier to the United States fall from third place to below tenth, although 
it was able to conserve its place as a combined textile and apparel supplier (slipping only from third to fifth place). In 2006, as a supplier to 
the United States market, the Republic of Korea was ranked fourth in yarn (US$ 61.8 million), third in fabric (US$ 597.4 million), and ninth in 
made-up goods (US$ 99.6 million) (IDS, 2006). 
56
 These firms are Hansae Guatemala Office, Hansoll Guatemala SA, Young Shin Guatemala SA, Shin Won Guatemala SA, CimaTextiles SA, and 
Sae A International SA.
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to the United States market, the presence of other Korean 
textile and apparel companies, the availability of relatively 
skilled labour, the availability of local inputs and a climate 
that they considered conducive to higher productivity than 
the rest of Central America. 
Perhaps the most important finding was that most 
shared the opinion that Guatemala was losing international 
competitiveness in apparel exports and, given that 
CAFTA-DR was apparently not going to resolve that 
problem before the United States safeguards against 
Chinese apparel imports expired in 2008, their parent 
firms’ future FDI priorities were now turning towards 
Asian countries. The principal problems they mentioned 
with respect to their Guatemalan operations were rising 
wages, the appreciating national currency, insecurity, theft 
of goods during transportation, administrative bureaucracy 
and political instability. In combination, these negative 
factors reduced Guatemala’s competitive advantage to 
rapid response for less price-sensitive products, as was 
the case for Korean apparel firms in Mexico. 
Two main conclusions emerge from the analysis of the 
Korean textile and apparel industry in Guatemala. First is 
the paradox that Guatemala should be losing international 
competitiveness in this industry, since it appeared to be the 
Central American country best prepared for the opening 
up of the United States market to global competitors in 
the context of the multilateral Agreement on Clothing and 
Textiles. Indeed, proportionately more apparel producers in 
Guatemala already offered full package services utilizing 
fabrics both locally-produced from United States yarn 
and imported from Asian countries. The new rules of 
origin under CAFTA-DR should have represented a new 
opportunity for these companies. Second, as was the case 
for Korean apparel firms in Mexico, here again, none of 
the technological upgrading taking place in the Korean 
headquarters is being reflected in their subsidiaries’ 
operations in Guatemala.
In conclusion, national policy action is needed 
to avoid the Korean plants in Latin America and the 
Caribbean becoming examples of what has been 
termed “illusory competitiveness” (Mortimore, 2003), 
whereby increased apparel exports are accompanied by 
high import content and the decline of the local textile 
industry, which in the end condemns the industry to 
falling market shares in a more competitive world. The 
objective of such policy action would be to build on 
the more integrated nature of the Korean textile and 
apparel industry in the region to take advantage of 
the new opportunities available under the CAFTA-DR 
rules of origin.
4. Korean activities in the Latin American and Caribbean natural
 resources industry
With few exceptions, Korean TNCs operating in natural 
resources and natural-resource-based manufacturing have 
historically maintained extremely passive strategies in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Their natural-resource-seeking 
strategies originally sought to ensure natural resource 
supplies through long-term contracts or minority capital 
shares in natural resource projects, or both. 
As noted earlier, SK Corp. is ranked number 111 
among TNCs by sales and it is the Republic of Korea’s 
principal petroleum refiner. Its initial OFDI was undertaken 
mainly to secure sources of petroleum and offshore 
exploration and production operations continue to be 
among its principal activities. It possesses 19 petroleum 
or gas blocks in 12 different countries around the world. 
Today, it engages in exploration and production both for 
its own use and for trading. In Latin America, SK Corp. 
is exploring for petroleum in three blocks each in Brazil 
and in Peru, in association with other TNCs. 
The huge Camisea natural gas production and export 
project in Peru is a very important initiative for SK Corp. 
in Latin America (del Solar, 2006; SK Corp., 2006b). 
The project consists of three elements. Upstream, there 
is a US$ 550-million investment to explore and operate 
blocks 56 and 88 over a 40-year period under contract. 
This investment began in August 2004 and should come on 
stream in 2008. The project is run by a consortium led by 
Pluspetrol (27.2%), Hunt Oil (25.2%), SK Corp. (17.6%), 
Repsol (10%), Sonatrach (10%) and Tecpetrol (10%). The 
second component of the initiative is a US$ 820-million 
investment to construct two pipelines for transporting 
natural gas and associated liquids: a 729-kilometre natural 
gas duct to Lima and a 548-kilometre liquids pipeline to 
the port of Pisco. This is being undertaken by a consortium 
comprising Tecgas (23.6%), Hunt Oil (22.4%), Sonatrach 
(21.2%), Pluspetrol (12.4%), SK Corp. (11.2%), Suez-
Tractebel (8.1%) and Graña y Montero (1.2%). Lastly, 
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the third aspect is product distribution. This involves 
the construction of a US$ 2.8-billion LNG plant on the 
Peruvian coast in a venture run by Hunt Oil (50%), SK 
Corp. (30%) and Repsol (20%). The LNG plant possesses 
significant geographical advantages for the Chilean, 
Mexican and United States markets in comparison to its 
principal global competitors.
The only cloud on the horizon for this project is the 
increasingly active stance seen in the region with regard to 
public-sector intervention in large-scale, natural-resource 
export projects (Ruiz-Caro, 2006). This is evident in 
moves towards energy integration via interconnections 
in the petroleum, gas and electricity field, a growing role 
for revitalized State petroleum companies and changes in 
pricing policies. However, this trend is less evident in Peru 
than in other petroleum and gas producers in the region, 
such as Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Ecuador (see chapter I). 
In sum, the financial dimension of its Latin American 
project demonstrates that SK Corp. is willing to take on 
greater risks; nevertheless, it continues to operate with 
local partners to spread that risk. Thus, the magnitude of 
its investments has increased, even if its corporate policy 
in the region is still somewhat passive. 
LS Nikko obtains over half of its copper from just 
three countries in Latin America: Brazil, Chile and Peru. 
Currently high international copper prices have allowed this 
company to undertake more active internationalization and 
it has set its sights primarily on Latin America. First, it has 
sought to integrate upstream by way of natural-resource-
seeking FDI to purchase mines in Peru (Marcona)57 and, 
possibly, Chile and Mexico. Second, LS Nikko Copper 
Inc. has considered further downstream integration by way 
of market-seeking FDI in cable activities in China, one of 
its biggest customers, and, possibly, a new copper smelter 
in either Chile or China. Another internationalization 
initiative is the company’s association with Pan Pacific 
Copper Co. Ltd, an alliance established in 2000 by 
Japanese producers Nippon Mining and Metals (65%) 
and Mitsui Mining and Smelting Co. Ltd (35%), and 
which is now ranked as the world’s third largest copper 
refiner, after Codelco of Chile and Phelps Dodge Corp. 
In other words, LS Nikko seems to be internationalizing 
more aggressively; nevertheless, it still does so mainly 
with Japanese partners and in a relatively passive way. 
The smelter project represents an opportunity for the 
company to become more independent in that regard, in 
the favorable context of high copper prices.58
Posco ranks at number 236 in the world by size, and 
is the fourth largest steelmaker. Jolted by stiff competition 
from low-cost steel production in China, Posco has been 
obliged to move up-market and undertake huge projects 
in China and India, as discussed earlier. In Latin America, 
the effects of the firm’s internationalization have been 
quite modest. For years, it has been a passive partner in 
a joint venture known as Companhia Coreano-Brasileira 
de Pelotização (Kobrasco), together with Companhia 
Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), whose purpose is to produce 
iron ore pellets in Brazil and thus ensure its own supply 
for steelmaking. Only recently has Posco committed to 
a more active internationalization process in the region 
by investing in a US$ 200-million galvanized steel plant 
in Tampico, Mexico, to supply the automotive industry. 
Thus, although Posco initiatives in Latin America are 
quite small in comparison to those it has undertaken in 
other parts of the world, they do represent a shift from 
a strictly natural-resource project to a natural-resource-
based manufacturing one. Box III.8 discusses the case of a 
small competitor of Posco, which began internationalizing 
by way of OFDI in Latin America in order to produce 
lower-cost steel plate for the Korean market.
Eagon Industrial Co. Ltd59 is one of the few 
small companies analysed in this report. As has been 
mentioned, it initiated its outward FDI due to a shortage 
of raw materials and rising labour costs at home. It 
established natural-resource-seeking subsidiaries in 
Malaysia (1980), Solomon Islands (1983), Indonesia 
(1987), Chile (1993) and China (1996). The 1997 Asian 
crisis produced dramatic problems for Eagon in the 
Republic of Korea, as the huge devaluation of the Korean 
won forced it to refocus on its core competences. As a 
result, it began to source natural resources exclusively 
from Asia and to rethink its corporate strategy to attain 
global standards.
57
 The Marcona copper mine was purchased in 2004 from Rio Tinto for US$ 33.5 million, as a joint enterprise between the Canadian firm Chariot Resources 
(70%) and two Korean partners, Kores and LS Nikko Copper Inc. (both 15%), and will take a further US$ 248 million to develop. LS Nikko Copper 
Inc. acquired the right to purchase the majority of output (70% of cathodes and 90% of concentrates) for 10 years on market terms. It is expected to 
come on stream in March 2009 (Chariot Resources, 2006, United States Department of the Interior, 2005).
58
 One of the new policy issues to arise in Latin America as a result of vastly increased international prices for minerals is the definition of the 
tax take of host governments. For example, Chile and to a certain extent Peru have raised the royalties charged to mining companies, though 
without affecting project ownership (Sánchez-Albavera and Lardé, 2006). 
59
 Based on interviews at Eagon Industrial Co. headquarters in Seoul, Republic of Korea, and its subsidiary in Lautaro, Chile, plus information 
from the Eagon official site [online] http://www.eagon.com.
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Box III.8
DONGKUK STEEL IN BRAZIL: FROM TRADE TO OFDI IN ORDER TO REDUCE PRODUCTION COSTS
Dongkuk Steel, incorporated in 1954, has 
grown into a group of interrelated affiliates 
including Dongkuk Steel Mill Co. Ltd, Union 
Steel Mfg. Co. Ltd, Kukje Machinery Co. Ltd, 
Kukje Transportation Co. Ltd and Cheunyang 
Transportation Co. Ltd. Dongkuk Steel had 
total sales of US$ 3.5 billion in 2005, of which 
over 90% were domestic. Its core business is 
still the supply of steel plate for shipbuilding, 
LNG tanks, oil pipelines and other branches of 
construction. Its steel plate plants in Pohang 
have a capacity of 2.5 million tons.
Facing stiff competition in the steel 
plate industry, Dongkuk Steel contracted 
the Italian firm, Danieli SpA, to modernize 
its steel plate technology in Pohang but, 
even so, the rising won and cheaper steel 
imports severely challenged Dongkuk’s 
competitiveness in the Korean market. 
In 2005, Dongkuk Steel decided to 
internationalize in order to produce steel 
plate offshore for export back to the 
Republic of Korea and thus compete on 
a better footing in its home market. For 
that purpose, it joined up with Danieli SpA 
and a Brazilian firm, CVRD, in order to 
establish a new steel plate factory, Usina 
Siderurgica do Ceara (USC), in Brazil. 
Dongkuk owns 50% of the voting capital, 
will invest US$ 100 million in the project and 
will directly purchase 50% of the venture’s 
1.5 million tons of steel plate produced for 
export to the Republic of Korea. Before 
joining this venture, Dongkuk Steel had 
long-term contracts to purchase 1 million 
tons of steel plate from another Brazilian 
producer, Companhia Siderúrgica de 
Tubarão (CST). By internationalizing, 
Dongkuk Steel has assured itself of a 
long term supply of lower-cost steel plate 
for its Korean customers from its own 
offshore facilities.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Dongkuk Steel, “Annual Report, 2005” [online] 2006 http://www.dongkuk.co.kr; 
Dongkuk Steel, “Dongkuk Steel Group” [online] 2006 http://www.dongkuk.co.kr; Valor econômico, “Brasil sera base de suprimento de usinas da Dongkuk na Coréia”, 
19 October 2005.
In the short term, its Chilean subsidiary, known as 
Eagon Lautaro SA, was left stranded by the situation of its 
parent firm in the Republic of Korea during the financial 
crisis. Originally established to provide pine veneers to 
that firm, Eagon Lautaro SA faced immediate bankruptcy 
when that role disappeared and it was obliged to rebuild 
itself. It began to specialize in higher-value pine plywood 
(such as sanded and knotless) for furniture, for export 
primarily to the United States and Mexico. This astute 
transformation proved a winning strategy for several 
reasons: (i) it exited the Asian market, where it could no 
longer compete due to the huge devaluations associated 
with the Asian financial crisis; (ii) it took advantage 
of the recent development of the United States market 
by major Chilean plywood producers, such as Arauco; 
(iii) it piggybacked on the existing import operations of 
the Eagon subsidiary in the United States market until 
it came to account for 70%-80% of that subsidiary’s 
imports; (iv) it consolidated its competitive advantages 
in the United States and Mexican markets thanks to the 
FTAs Chile had signed with those countries; and (v) by 
specializing in the higher-value furniture plywood, rather 
than higher-volume, lower-quality plywood, it was able 
to coexist with the principal Chilean producer, Arauco, 
which accounted for about 80% of plywood exports 
and, more importantly, with the two Chilean companies 
—Arauco and Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles y 
Cartones (CMPC)— that controlled about 80% of the 
raw materials inputs for plywood in Chile. Eagon Lautaro 
SA was so successful with its new strategy that it became 
one of the most profitable units of Eagon Industrial Co. 
Ltd and is now in a position to consider expanding into 
the production and export of native plywood for furniture 
—and may even purchase the Eagon subsidiary in the 
United States in order to consolidate its position there.
In other words, Eagon Lautaro SA provides an example 
of subsidiary survival when the altered circumstances of 
the head office made it uncompetitive within the corporate 
organization. It did so to a large degree independently of 
its Korean corporate headquarters and not only survived, 
but became one of the more dynamic components in the 
corporation.
Korean TNCs were relative latecomers to the region. 
It would appear that their initial experience did not meet 
the original expectations and these firms consider they 
have better investment opportunities elsewhere. The top 
Korean electronics TNCs seem hesitant to transform 
their assembly plants into manufacturing centres (with 
the partial exception of the LG Electronics Reynosa 
complex) and prefer to channel their OFDI to China 
and other Asian countries. The top Korean automotive 
TNC —Hyundai Motor Company— has only recently 
demonstrated an interest in extending its international 
production system to the region, having done so in Asia, 
the United States and Europe first. The numerous textile 
and apparel TNCs already present in the region are reluctant 
to modernize their assets there and have refocused their 
OFDI on Asian countries, especially China. TNCs seeking 
natural resources or natural-resource-based manufactures 
continue to display passive investment strategies in 
the region, even in the recent era of high international 
prices for their commodities. All this suggests that Latin 
American policymakers have a huge job ahead of them 
to enhance the region’s attractiveness to foreign investors 
in a manner that can contribute materially to its industrial 
and technological upgrading. 
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The foregoing analysis suggests that the 
internationalization process of these Korean TNCs is 
still limited to relatively simple functions associated 
with the first phase of the Korean development trajectory 
—outward-looking industrialization— such as securing 
supplies of natural resources, gaining access to markets 
or establishing export platforms to service third markets. 
The analysis of the principal focal points of Korean FDI 
in Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrates that 
Korean TNCs, in general, do not consider the region to be 
of primary importance with regard to their international 
production systems. Therefore, there is no direct link between 
the current phase of the Korean development trajectory
—advancing towards a knowledge-based economy— and 
the industrial and technological upgrading of their 
investments in the region. 
E. Conclusions and policy recommendations
The development trajectory of the Republic of Korea has 
been one of the most impressive of all the developing 
countries and the country became a showcase for the East 
Asian Miracle. The Korean experience, which was mainly 
a policy-driven success, demonstrated the feasibility of 
shifting from outward-oriented industrialization towards a 
knowledge-based economy, from fast follower to technology 
leader, from imitator to innovator. In the process, the role 
of inward and outward FDI —FDI and OFDI— changed 
considerably. The former, which was restricted during 
the outward industrialization stage, came to be viewed 
as a source of technology and other strategic assets in the 
context of the transition to a knowledge economy. The latter, 
originally discouraged for balance-of-payments reasons, 
came to be promoted to facilitate the internationalization 
of the Republic of Korea’s emerging TNCs in their quest 
to become world-class players. 
The internationalization of Korean TNCs was 
concentrated in relatively few companies, in a handful of 
industries —especially electronics, automotive, textile and 
apparel, and natural resources and the manufactures based 
thereon— and focused primarily on the major markets: 
North America (especially the United States), Europe 
and Asia (especially China). As Korean firms began to 
lose competitiveness in traditional low-cost, commodity-
related activities, they were obliged to shift their operations 
towards those identified with a knowledge-based economy, 
moving from industries and technologies that rely on 
volume and low production costs to those characterized 
by quality, value-added and premium prices. Essentially, 
many of the leading Korean companies found themselves 
caught, competitively speaking, in a kind of sandwich 
between their original technological leaders (Japanese 
TNCs) and other Asian fast followers and technological 
imitators (especially Chinese firms), and this was what 
drove their internationalization. 
The competitive situation of each major industry 
varies somewhat; nonetheless, the direction of change is 
similar. Some Korean firms are world-class TNCs, such 
as Samsung Electronics Company, LG Electronics, and 
Hyundai Motor Company. They already possess intricate 
globalization strategies and are well advanced in the 
industrial and technological upgrading of their assets 
at home and abroad, specializing in progressively more 
sophisticated products. Others are smaller (textile and 
apparel producers) or operate in more traditional activities 
(SK Corp., LS Nikko Copper and Posco), or both (Eagon 
Industrial Co.). These firms were obliged to globalize in 
order to remain competitive —even in their home market. 
Their response was to establish a global network through 
OFDI in an effort to become global players. 
The internationalization processes of these dominant 
Korean companies have spanned numerous objectives, 
including natural-resource-seeking, market-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking, and their 
priorities have varied over time. In their initial rush to 
internationalize several Korean TNCs ran into serious 
problems, which caused them to be more cautious and 
selective thereafter. While the situation varies from industry 
to industry and firm to firm, it is evident that the last two 
FDI strategies (efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset-
seeking) are becoming more important for internationalizing 
Korean TNCs than the first two (natural resource-seeking 
and market-seeking), in the context of the shift towards 
the knowledge economy and relative to the evolution of 
each firm’s global network.
The detailed analysis of the principal focal points 
of Korean OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 
demonstrates unequivocally that Korean TNCs do not 
consider this region to be of primary importance and 
most feel that they possess better investment opportunities 
elsewhere. Many Korean TNCs have experienced problems 
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in Latin America and the Caribbean and consider that host 
countries have not extended them adequate treatment. As 
a result, these Korean TNCs still limit their involvement 
in the region to relatively simple functions associated 
with the first phase of the Korean development trajectory 
—outward-looking industrialization— such as securing 
supplies of natural resources, gaining access to markets 
or establishing imported-component-driven export 
platforms to provide the United States market with final 
products. 
Few of the leading Korean TNCs are currently 
contemplating major investment initiatives in the region. 
With the significant exception of the new plasma panel 
plant of LG Electronics in Reynosa, Mexico, the top Korean 
electronics TNCs seem hesitant to transform their Latin 
American assembly plants into manufacturing centres. 
Rather, they continue to focus their OFDI mainly on 
China and other Asian countries. The top automotive TNC, 
Hyundai Motor Company, is only recently considering 
new investments to extend its international production 
system to include Latin America, having preferred thus 
far to concentrate on Asia, North America and Europe. 
The company’s decision not to include Brazil in its own 
international production system is not auspicious. The 
numerous textile and apparel TNCs already present 
in the region are reluctant to modernize their assets 
there and are reorienting their OFDI towards Asian 
countries, especially China. TNCs seeking natural 
resources or natural-resource-based manufactures, 
with few exceptions, continue to display rather passive 
investment strategies in the region, even in the recent 
era of high international prices for their commodities. 
As a consequence, there is little evidence of any surge 
in Korean FDI in the region and still less of a direct link 
between the current phase of the Korean development 
trajectory —advancing towards a knowledge-based 
economy— and the activities of Korean TNCs in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The Korean OFDI in the 
region does not serve as a transmission belt to bring the 
industrial and technological successes of the Korean 
economy to Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Can country policy make a difference? The Korean 
experience suggests that policymakers in Latin America 
and the Caribbean could obtain better policy results from 
“FDI-assisted economic development” (Lall and Narula, 
2006; ECLAC, 2005), by way of improved policies to 
attract the TNCs that mesh best with their own national 
development priorities and to obtain better benefits 
from the investments they do attract (Mortimore, 2004; 
ECLAC, 2005). Better policies can help to realize the 
potential of FDI to assist with economic development in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, especially in the case 
of Korean investment. 
In a world in which the competition for higher-quality 
FDI is increasing and the policies of potential host countries 
are becoming more and more sophisticated (see chapter II 
and Gligo, 2007), most Latin American countries still rely 
on the original horizontal incentives from the economic 
reform period of the 1990s, such as opening up the economy, 
liberalizing, deregulating, privatizing and the like. Few, if 
any, of these countries currently employ the kind of strategies 
that have been most successful in other regions, especially 
in Asia and Europe. Many countries in these regions have 
successfully attracted the kind of FDI they considered most 
suitable to their purposes by employing more active or 
integrated FDI policies, often by using targeting strategies. 
That is, they prioritized the kind of investment they wanted, 
identified the main investors that fitted the profile, then 
actively concentrated their FDI promotion efforts to attract 
them (Lowendhal, 2001). Countries as different as the Czech 
Republic, France, Ireland, Malaysia and Singapore have 
demonstrated how focused and targeted FDI policies can 
produce better results in terms of FDI-assisted economic 
development. 
There is no doubt that the economies of Latin America 
and the Caribbean have benefited from FDI, but they 
have not done so in the same proportion as other regions 
in which optimizing the impacts of FDI is a conscious 
policy concern. Passive policies in this matter in the 
region have either not produced the benefits expected 
from inward FDI or have not done so to the desired degree 
(Mortimore, 2006). 
An example demonstrates this situation. It is well-
known that efficiency-seeking FDI can potentially 
produce concrete benefits with regard to technology 
transfer, production linkages, human resource training and 
enterprise development (UNCTAD, 2002), although it is 
recognized that those benefits are far from automatic. In 
Latin America and the Caribbean, passive policies based 
on horizontal incentives (especially tax exemptions in 
export processing zones) have not effectively integrated 
investment activities into the local industry in any of the 
areas examined (Mortimore, 2004, 2006). The result is 
enclave-like operations that produce impressive export 
earnings but do not contribute in any fundamental way 
to the continual technological and industrial upgrading of 
the host economy (UNCTAD, 2002; Mortimore, Vergara 
and Katz, 2001; ECLAC, 2005, 2006a). The situation of 
the electronics industry —the principal focal point of 
Korean FDI in the region— would seem to confirm that 
observation, especially in the context of the digitalization 
process, as does the virtual absence of Hyundai Motor 
Company from the regional automotive industry, the 
declining international competitiveness of the Guatemalan 
operations of Korean textile and apparel firms, and the 
comparatively passive and risk-averse corporate strategies 
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of Korean natural resource firms and natural-resource-
based manufacturers in the region. More active and integral 
policy frameworks on the part of Latin American host 
countries could help heighten the presence and impacts of 
the principal Korean TNCs in the context of their national 
development priorities.
Home-country government policy can also play a 
role. The Government of the Republic of Korea can play 
a role by further improving relations with Latin America 
and the Caribbean. It was unfortunate that the honeymoon 
period of renewed Republic of Korea-Latin American 
relations in the early 1990s was chilled by the Asian 
financial crisis, such that the original expectations were 
frustrated and the objectives of Korean foreign policy 
in Latin America became less clear (Kim, 2005). As a 
result of certain difficulties, such as intra-bureaucracy 
complications and limited coordination of public and 
private sector activities, Latin America resumed a low 
profile within the Korean foreign policy environment 
(Kim, 2005). In this respect, the Korean government 
could manifest a clear interest in the region and thereby 
pursue a clearer and more consistent Latin American and 
Caribbean policy. 
A recent initiative in Latin America holds out certain 
potential to change this situation. In June 2001, the Republic 
of Korea and Mexico established a 21st Century Commission 
with the purpose of launching a new strategic partnership 
in 2005. That has not happened; however, the diagnosis 
of the Commission’s analysis is worthy of examination 
in this light. The partnership was to be comprehensive in 
scope but strategically-oriented towards several mutually 
complementary long term goals.
In that context, a few lines bear citation:
“In particular, Korea possesses strong international 
competitiveness in the engineering technologies 
for many sophisticated industrial products while 
Mexico has attained international competitiveness 
in the processing of raw materials, parts and 
components for many consumer and industrial 
products. These complementarities make ample 
room for industrial cooperation and technology 
transfer, involving Korea’s direct investment in 
Mexican industries as the most important means 
of such cooperation.
Labor-intensive assembly operations have been 
the main area for such relations. The time has 
come for the upgrading of Korea’s investment 
in Mexico towards higher technological content 
and higher value-added. 
[…] Given the lack of integration in Mexico’s 
productive chains, particularly in the maquiladora 
industry, Korea and Mexico should engage in a 
program to develop the supporting industry in 
Mexico. There is no doubt that such a program 
would offer benefits to both countries, since 
Mexican exports would have more domestic value 
added, and Korean investments in Mexico would 
benefit from the availability of timely, cheaper, 
world quality local inputs.” (Mexico-Korea 21st 
Century Commission, 2005).
To be effective, such a programme must be based 
on concrete initiatives to deal with both the particular 
problems faced by the investing TNCs and the development 
aspirations of the host countries in the areas of technology 
transfer, production linkages, human resource training 
and enterprise development.60 
For example, joint efforts in the Mexican and Brazilian 
electronics industry might focus on the implications of the 
digitalization of the television industry, such that initiatives 
like the new LG Electronics plasma panel plant in the 
Reynosa complex can be identified early and supported, so 
that others follow suit. In the automotive industry, it would 
be useful to enhance cooperation to define the best ways 
to foment local supplier networks in Mexico or Brazil in 
order to attract more inward FDI from the leading Korean 
automotive TNCs. In the textile and apparel industry, host 
countries should cooperate with local industry to see how 
the competitive advantages of Korean assemblers can be 
best used in the context of CAFTA-DR. The purpose of 
active and integrated policies is precisely to deal with 
such situations in a coherent fashion. Success here could 
provide the basis for extending such cooperation to other 
focal points of Korean FDI in the region.
In other words, there is a real need for a renewed 
agenda on Korean FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
That agenda could be defined by means of face-to-face 
meetings of Latin American policymakers with Korean 
TNCs and policymakers to produce greater transparency, 
build confidence and identify opportunities for effective 
cooperation. Such cooperation holds the promise of 
converting Korean FDI in the region into a transmission belt 
for the successes of the Korean development trajectory.
60
 In the case of Mexico, for example, cooperation with the Government of Japan appears to be far more advanced in the area of developing suppliers 
for the automotive and electronics industries. With regard to the latter industry, the Director–General of Bancomext, the Mexican foreign trade 
bank, concluded that it is necessary to attract the principal manufacturers of flat panels and semiconductors and their main suppliers to Mexico 
(Reyes, 2006). 
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Chapter IV
Portugal: investments and corporate 
strategies in Latin America and
the Caribbean
In the early fifteenth century, Portugal began a fruitful process of exploration and territorial 
expansion that cemented its position as a naval and commercial power. Its activities spanned the 
Atlantic and Indian Oceans and its presence extended from the coast of east Africa to India. Not 
long after the arrival of the Spanish in America, Portuguese explorers discovered the territories 
that would later be known as Brazil and the result was that, along with Spain, Portugal became 
the leading commercial power of the time. Later, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, 
Portugal lost a great many of its colonies in Africa and Asia, and the independence of Brazil in 
1822 marked a significant reduction of the country’s international presence.
Portugal has experienced a particularly positive development 
pathway over the last 40 years, stimulated by its 1986 entry 
into the European Union and the period of far-reaching 
reform, modernization and infrastructure investment that 
followed. All this was reflected in rapid economic expansion 
and a GDP growth rate that was among the highest in the 
OECD. It was against this background that large Portuguese 
firms began to seek out new growth opportunities outside 
the country’s borders, particularly in South America and 
former colonies in Africa and Asia.
Portuguese direct investment in Latin America grew 
very strongly in the latter half of the 1990s, with annual 
flows rising from virtually nothing in the first half of the 
decade to an average of almost US$ 1.8 billion in 1996-
2000. The leading investment destination was Brazil, 
which received over 95% of flows into the region.
As the economic situation in South America worsened 
towards the end of the 1990s, however, Portuguese 
investors, and large companies in particular, began to 
slacken the pace. In 2001, Portuguese outward direct 
investment was still at record levels, but the share of Latin 
America fell significantly. From that time on, Portuguese 
companies began consolidating their operations in the 
region. The original outward investment drive, centred on 
Brazil, had provided Portuguese businesses with valuable 
experience which they now drew upon to extend their 
operations to more sophisticated markets, especially in 
other countries within the European Union.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)148
A. Portuguese outward direct investment: an overview
exceeding inward FDI for much of the period, even 
though this also grew considerably (see figure IV.1).2 
Between 1995 and 2000, outward direct investment by 
Portuguese companies rose from 525 million euros to 
an all-time high of 8,827 million euros (see table IV.1). 
During the same period, the total stock of Portuguese 
outward direct investment grew more than sevenfold to 
21,012 million euros (see figure IV.2). The strong rise in 
outward investment gave Portuguese companies a more 
solid foothold in their traditional markets in Europe and 
Africa, but the fastest growth occurred in Latin America, 
essentially because of the success of the Real Plan and 
the start of the privatization programme for public-sector 
enterprises in Brazil.
Figure IV.1
PORTUGAL: OUTWARD AND INWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT, 
1990-2006 a
(Millions of dollars)
Traditionally, Portugal was always a net recipient of FDI 
and its companies had only a very limited presence in 
international markets. The little foreign investment that 
was undertaken by Portuguese companies went almost 
exclusively to other countries in Europe (France, Spain 
and the United Kingdom) and the United States.
With the consolidation of the European integration 
process and adoption of the euro as the single currency, 
the Portuguese economy matured and risk levels fell 
accordingly, making it easier to internationalize (Braz, 
2002). At the same time, the size of the domestic 
economy, growing external competition and certain 
regulatory obstacles forced the leading private-sector 
business groups and some of the State enterprises then 
being privatized to seek new opportunities for growth. 
Faced with the possibility of being taken over by larger 
companies from elsewhere in Europe, many firms 
diversified their businesses and began to explore the 
possibility of expanding beyond the country’s borders. 
In these circumstances, the Portuguese government 
threw its weight firmly behind the internationalization 
of the country’s leading business groups.1
Broadly speaking, the Portuguese companies that 
expanded abroad most vigorously had a large domestic 
market share (in some cases they were natural monopolies in 
certain business), enabling them to generate large surpluses. 
These resources were supplemented by the financing they 
were able to raise for their internationalization efforts 
thanks to favourable stock market conditions. In an initial 
phase, Portuguese firms entered markets in neighbouring 
countries (chiefly Spain), Portuguese-speaking former 
colonies in Africa, and Brazil. Between 1991 and 1995, 
Spain was the leading destination for Portuguese outward 
direct investment, accounting for over 40% of the total.
Portuguese outward direct investment experienced 
an unprecedented upsurge in the latter half of the 1990s, 
1
 On 15 April 1997, Council of Ministers Resolution No. 61/97 established guidelines and a system of support for the internationalization of 
Portuguese companies. This process was described by the resolution as a fundamental strategic element in the economic development of Portugal 
within a very challenging three-dimensional (global, European and national) environment.
2
 Between 1996 and 2003, Portuguese outward direct investment increased 11-fold while inward FDI virtually sextupled.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of statistics from International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment 
Statistics [CD ROM], January 2007.
a
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Table IV.1
PORTUGAL: OUTWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY DESTINATION COUNTRY, 1995-2006 a
(Millions of euros)
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 a
European Union b 410 156 783 1526 -1 623 3 781 5 454 2 679 3 070 5 360 1 664 940
 Denmark 0 0 1 -2 0 0 1 1 2 207 2 222 42 4
 Netherlands 2 4 112 526 -1 256 1 575 1 139 4 266 -114 804 736 498
 Spain 265 55 253 366 -706 1 817 3 116 -1 104 928 2 182 399 424
 Other European Union 143 97 417 636 339 389 1 198 -484 49 152 487 14
Africa 25 72 89 315 307 940 156 -580 -3 89 55 43
Latin America 26 247 594 4 091 1 522 2 962 1 169 -2 373 -17 327 -978 -100
 Brazil 24 289 574 4 082 1 501 2 926 1 122 -2 325 -22 292 -987 -118
Other 64 86 362 -2 312 2 789 1 144 218 116 4 063 633 181 304
Total 525 561 1 828 3 620 2 995 8 827 6 997 -158 7 113 6 409 922 1 187
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Bank of Portugal, Estatísticas Online, BPStat, Eurosistema [online] http://www.






PORTUGAL: STOCK OF OUTWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY 
DESTINATION COUNTRY, 1996-2006 a b
(Millions of euros)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Bank of Portugal, Estatísticas Online, BPStat, Eurosistema [online] 
http://www.bportugal.pt, 25 January 2007.
a
 The breakdown by destination country for the stock of Portuguese outward direct 
investment is not available for 2005 and 2006.
b
 January-November 2006.
Thus, with conditions in the Portuguese economy 
favourable, and in the face of a saturated and highly 
competitive European market, Brazil, one of the world’s 
top 10 economies by GDP and a country that offered all 
the advantages of a shared history and language, began 
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3
 The memory of earlier setbacks for some large Portuguese groups in Angola and Mozambique held back Portuguese outward investment in 
Africa (Braz, 2002).
firms.3 Brazil was particularly attractive not just because 
it was a gateway to Latin America, but also because it 
had a large domestic market and high growth potential 
in its own right. The result was that the destinations of 
Portuguese capital flows became more geographically 
diverse. Between 1995 and 2000, the European Union 
share fell from 78% to 42% and Brazil emerged as the 
preferred market of Portuguese investors (see table 
IV.1). Portuguese outward direct investment in other 
Latin American countries also increased, but remained 
at relatively modest levels (Braz, 2002).
Between 1995 and 2000, flows of Portuguese direct 
investment into Brazil quickly increased from 24 million 
euros to some 3 billion euros, peaking at 4 billion euros in 
1998 (see table IV.1). During this period, Brazil received 
51.2% of all Portuguese outward direct investment flows, 
followed a long way behind by Spain with 11.2% (see 
table IV.1). Between 1996 and 2000, Brazil’s share in 
the stock of Portuguese outward direct investment rose 
from 6% to 44% to stand at almost 9.2 billion euros (see 
figure IV.2). Driving these figures was the great interest 
aroused among Portuguese investors by the Brazilian 
privatization programme. Meanwhile, Portugal’s share of 
Brazil’s FDI stock rose from 0.3% to 4.4% between 1995 
and 2000, making it the country’s sixth-largest external 
investor after the United States, Spain, the Netherlands, 
France and Germany, and the largest in per capita terms 
(see table IV.2).
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Table IV.2
BRAZIL: STOCK AND FLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 
BY GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN, 1995-2006 a
(Percentages and millions of dollars)
 Stock a Flows (annual average)
 1995 2000 1996-2000 2001-2006
United States 26.0 23.8 24.4 19.3
European Union 31.0 42.5 46.1 47.4
 France 4.9 6.7 8.4 6.2
 Germany 14.0 5.0 1.8 4.5
 Italy 3.0 2.4 1.3 1.8
 Netherlands 3.7 10.7 9.2 18.1
 Portugal 0.3 4.4 6.4 3.5
 Spain 0.6 11.9 17.2 6.7
 United Kingdom 4.5 1.4 1.8 1.7
Switzerland 6.8 2.2 1.1 2.7
Japan 6.4 2.4 1.6 3.7
Other 30.0 29.1 26.9 29.9
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total (millions
 of dollars) 41 696 103 015 20 739 19 475
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from the Central Bank of Brazil (http://www.bancocentral.
gov.br).
a
 Data from the foreign capital censuses of 1995 and 2000.
The upsurge of Portuguese direct investment in Brazil 
was driven by companies that occupied a monopoly position 
in their home market and had only recently been privatized 
(wholly or partially) or were still under State control. The 
largest investments were in telecommunications (Portugal 
Telecom (PT)), electricity, water and sewage (Electricidade 
de Portugal (EDP); Águas de Portugal (AdP)), cement 
(Cimentos de Portugal (CIMPOR)) and banking (Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos (CGD)). Of these, AdP and CGD are 
State-owned companies, while PT, CIMPOR and EDP were 
mainly or wholly privatized. Later, some private-sector 
firms, ranging from large groups to small and medium-
sized enterprises, followed in the footsteps of the first 
companies to internationalize, many of them partners 
of public-sector enterprises in Portugal. Investments in 
electricity and telecommunications attracted cable and 
software suppliers (Braz, 2002).
In sectoral terms, the internationalization of Portuguese 
firms took place mainly in those areas where the Brazilian 
privatization programme was most attractive, namely 
telecommunications and electricity. This is where the 
major investments by PT and EDP went. Although these 
were the businesses that attracted the largest and most 
visible investments, there were a great many smaller-scale 
operations that helped increase sectoral and geographical 
diversification (Braz, 2002). In fact, the official Portuguese 
statistics give a somewhat distorted picture, particularly 
when it comes to real-estate activities and business-
to-business services, which account for over 80% of 
Portuguese outward direct investment (see table IV.3). 
Nonetheless, figures from the Central Bank of Brazil 
confirm, for this country, what was said above regarding 
the concentration of Portuguese FDI in services (see table 
IV.4). In 2000, telecommunications, electricity, gas and 
water and retailing accounted for some 70% of Portugal’s 
FDI stock in Brazil.
Table IV.3
PORTUGAL: OUTWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT,
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1996-2006 a
(Percentages)
 1996-2000 2001-2006 1996-2006
Manufacturing 4.1 3.2 3.6
Trade 1.8 4.3 3.2
Transport and communications 1.5 0.1 0.7
Electricity, gas and water 4.8 -0.3 2.0
Financial activities 2.7 9.3 6.4
Real-estate activities and
 business-to-business services 83.0 80.6 81.6
Other 2.3 2.7 2.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Bank of Portugal, Estatísticas Online, BPStat, Eurosistema [online] 
http://www.bportugal.pt, 25 January 2007.
a
  January-November 2006.
Table IV.4
BRAZIL: STOCK OF PORTUGUESE FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT, BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1995-2000 a
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
 1995 2000
 Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
Commodity extraction
 activities 138 0.1 3 488 0.1
Manufacturing 2 039 1.9 427 065 9.5
Chemicals 26 0.0 169 993 3.8
Non-metallic mineral
 products 0 0.0 155 739 3.5
Rubber and plastic products 0 0.0 33 125 0.7
Other manufactures 2 013 1.9 68 207 1.5
Services 104 433 98.0 4 081 550 90.5
Telecommunications
 and mail 5 229 4.9 1 753 431 38.9
Retailing 2 077 1.9 756 967 16.8
Electricity, gas and water 0 0.0 696 557 15.4
Information technology
 and related activities 21 156 19.8 342 596 7.6
Financial intermediation 0 0.0 272 986 6.1
Business-to-business
 services 41 856 39.3 168 934 3.7
Wholesaling 29 529 27.7 47 314 1.0
Other services 4 586 4.3 42 766 0.9
Total 106 610 100.0 4 512 102 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of statistics from the Central Bank of Brazil (http://www.bancocentral.
gov.br).
a
 Data from the foreign capital censuses of 1995 and 2000.
The official statistics could be misleading in some 
ways and might actually be understating the scale of the 
phenomenon. Some Portuguese investment abroad was 
carried out through subsidiaries in other countries (mainly 
Spain and the Netherlands) or financial centres such as 
the Cayman Islands. The Netherlands is a case in point, 
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since most Portuguese investment in that country does 
not remain there but goes on to other destinations.4 The 
distortions produced by financial centres can be appreciated 
both from Portugal’s outward investment figures and from 
the amounts of foreign investment received by Brazil (see 
tables IV.1 and IV.2). Furthermore, some subsidiaries 
of Portuguese companies raised financing locally or 
reinvested some of the profits generated in the recipient 
economies. In the case of Brazil, currency instability led 
many Portuguese firms to raise funds in the local market, 
sometimes in dollars, because of predictions that the local 
currency would appreciate over the medium term. Lastly, 
a substantial proportion of Portuguese outward direct 
investment is hard to identify because many medium-
sized and small businesses invest outside of Portugal as 
natural persons, mainly in real-estate and tourism projects. 
Initiatives of this type have become increasingly important 
in recent years.
At the start of the present decade, a new pattern of 
Portuguese outward investment became apparent. In 2001, 
Portuguese direct investment abroad began to contract 
as a result of the deteriorating international economic 
situation and its local and regional repercussions, with 
a particularly sharp downturn in 2002 (see figure IV.1). 
The economic and political crisis in Argentina and the 
uncertainty associated with the presidential elections in 
Brazil undermined confidence in Latin America, and 
corporate strategies were altered accordingly. Furthermore, 
many Portuguese firms found that they needed to strengthen 
the large investments made, especially in Brazil, rather 
than expand. In these circumstances, investment began 
to be concentrated predominantly in European Union 
countries, while other destinations such as Latin America 
and Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa fell sharply 
down the ranking. Between 2001 and 2006, the European 
Union share was 85%, the main destinations being the 
Netherlands (33%), Spain (27%) and Denmark (20%) (see 
table IV.5). In this period, the Latin American expansion of 
Portuguese firms was abruptly discontinued, and in fact a 
great deal of investment was withdrawn, especially from 
Brazil (see tables IV.1 and IV.5).
Between 2001 and 2006, according to statistics from 
the Central Bank of Brazil, Portugal’s share of FDI inflows 
into Brazil fell from 8% to 1.3% (see figure IV.3).5 Given 
the characteristics of Portuguese outward direct investment 
and the difficult international circumstances, the sharp 
contraction of flows to Brazil is no great surprise. In 
fact, following an initial phase of major investment led 
by the largest Portuguese groups (PT, EDP, CIMPOR and 
Sonae) and a second stage driven by smaller companies 
(Grupo Cintra, Grupo Pestana and others), a very probable 
explanation is that companies have been concentrating 
on maturing and consolidating the investments made in 
earlier years. Also, many Portuguese companies have used 
local sources, reinvested profits and Brazilian government 
incentives to finance their investments (ICEP Portugal, 
2005, p. 14). Another feature of the situation has been the 
arrival in particularly attractive sectors such as tourism 
of new investors differing greatly in size and corporate 
culture from their forerunners.
Table IV.5
PORTUGAL: OUTWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY DESTINATION 
COUNTRY, 1995-2006 a
(Percentages)
 1995-2000 2001-2006 a 1995-2006 a
European Union b 27.4 85.3 59.3
Denmark 0.0 19.9 11.0
Netherlands 5.2 32.6 20.3
Spain 11.2 26.5 19.6
Other European Union 11.0 6.3 8.4
Africa 9.5 -1.1 3.7
Latin America 51.4 -8.8 18.3
Brazil 51.2 -9.1 18.0
Other 11.6 24.5 18.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Bank of Portugal, Estatísticas Online, BPStat, Eurosistema [online] 
http://www.bportugal.pt, 25 January 2007 and EUROSTAT, Statistics in Focus 
[online] http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int, 25 January 2007.
a
  January-November 2006.
b
  European Union of 25 countries.
Figure IV.3
BRAZIL: PORTUGUESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, ANNUAL 
INFLOWS AND SHARE OF THE TOTAL, 1996-2006
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
4
 This is because of the special treatment given by the Dutch authorities to conglomerates, which they term “special purpose entities”. This has 
turned the Netherlands into a major recycling centre for Portuguese investment. In 2003 alone, Portuguese companies sent some 1.3 billion 
euros of funds through the Netherlands to other destinations (Expresso, 28 August 2004).
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from the Central Bank of Brazil (http://www.bancocentral.
gov.br).
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Certain major qualitative changes are now becoming 
apparent in Portuguese investments in Brazil. Gradually, 
a large percentage of Portuguese firms have succeeded in 
positioning brands of their own in the Brazilian market, 
especially PT (with Vivo) and Grupo Pestana. Other 
companies never used local brands to advance their 
businesses, examples being Logoplaste, Grupo Cintra 
and, more recently, Grupo Vila Galé (Portugal Digital, 
25 October 2005). Meanwhile, a great many companies 
have brought in major strategic changes, strengthening or 
redefining their core businesses in Brazil. Companies have 
concentrated on the businesses that have yielded the best 
returns for the lowest risk, thus ensuring the sustainability 
of their presence in the Brazilian market. This is the case 
with the Portuguese financial groups that moved from 
commercial banking to the investment banking segment 
and thence to direct involvement in property and tourism 
projects. Thus, the Brazilian experience has been very 
valuable for Portuguese companies and over time has 
undoubtedly helped them improve their strategies and the 
way they operate in difficult and complex markets.
One of the most significant features of Portuguese 
investment in Brazil is its geographical distribution. 
Unlike other foreign investors, the Portuguese have given 
the preference to less traditional locations. Although 
the State of São Paulo has hosted more subsidiaries of 
Portuguese companies than any other single state, it is 
the north-eastern states as a group, and particularly the 
State of Ceará, that have received the most Portuguese 
investment (see figure IV.4). This tendency has been the 
result of two main factors: the surge of investment in 
tourism-related real-estate projects, and the incentives 
provided by state authorities to attract Portuguese capital 
(ICEP, 2005, p. 12).
During the period of economic and political 
uncertainty, some Portuguese companies like EDP stayed 
in the country and took the opportunity to adjust their 
corporate strategies. Others have recently pulled out of 
Brazil, either because they had become discouraged by 
the difficulty of doing business there or because better 
investment opportunities came up in other regions of the 
world. In future, Portuguese companies would probably 
be well advised to identify market niches carefully and 
develop a strategy suited to the local environment, since 
the great majority of them are not large enough to operate 
in mass markets. The cases of PT, EDP, CIMPOR and 
Sonae can be seen as exceptions.
In summary, Portuguese outward direct investment 
grew strongly in the second half of the 1990s, with Brazil 
as the epicentre. On the whole, these investments were 
chiefly made for business expansion purposes (using brands 
that were not well known internationally or, preferably, 
acquired brands) by companies which in most cases did 
not yet have a truly international dimension, although 
some were important in their home market.
Figure IV.4
BRAZIL: PORTUGUESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
BY STATE, 2005 a
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of statistics from Instituto das Empresas para os Mercados Externos 
(ICEP), Os investimentos portugueses no Brazil, São Paulo, 2005.
a
 Number of Portuguese subsidiaries established in different parts of the country.
The experience was not an easy one for Portuguese 
firms, particularly in Brazil. Many companies did succeed 
in grasping the realities of the country and making the vital 
adjustments to their corporate strategies required for their 
plans to be sustainable. Others failed to adapt to what is a 
very difficult market, however, and were forced to withdraw 
from the country. It is very clear that a great deal more 
than a (partially) shared language, history and culture is 
required to ensure the success of a business venture. Indeed, 
the force driving the Portuguese outward direct investment 
boom was the modernization of the Portuguese economy 
in the context of European integration and the economic 
liberalization policies introduced in Brazil.
Thus, Portugal is still at a very early stage in its 
internationalization. Generally speaking, the companies 
involved have been motivated by the desire to increase 
their scale or to take advantage of opportunities as they 
arise. In some cases, however, Portuguese investors have 
opted strategically for more ambitious goals. This is the 
case with more recent investments in the European Union, 
particularly Spain.
North-eastern
states 42% Rio de Janeiro 13%
São Paulo 30%
Other states 15%
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B. The main attractions for Portuguese direct investment
 in Latin America and the Caribbean
at least two groups of companies can be distinguished. 
First, there are large enterprises in which the State plays 
or has played a central role. Generally speaking, the 
internationalization of their activities coincided with 
privatization and with the growth of competition in their 
domestic market. For these companies, the size of the 
local economy and the vigorous worldwide trend towards 
consolidation and concentration in many industries made 
international expansion not so much an opportunity as an 
imperative for survival. Second, diversified private-sector 
groups made investments in different business areas in 
both manufacturing and services, particularly retailing, 
financial services, property development (mainly for 
tourism), engineering and construction, plus some processing 
activities with little technological content.
Some characteristics of Portuguese outward direct 
investment can be identified from this overview: it is a 
recent phenomenon, centring on a handful of business 
areas in a limited number of countries, and it has been led 
by a small group of major companies. These are some of 
Portugal’s largest firms, enjoying positions of leadership 
in their respective businesses in the domestic market. 
Furthermore, there are overlapping interests in the ownership 
of the largest Portuguese companies, which means that the 
decision-making core is even smaller (see table IV.6).
The fact that this is such a circumscribed phenomenon 
may make it easier to understand. To see what has been 
happening, it is necessary to look more closely at the 
corporate strategies of the companies driving these 
international capital movements. In the Portuguese case, 
Table IV.6
PORTUGAL: LARGEST NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES, BY SALES, 2005
(Millions of euros)
Company Business Main shareholders Sales
1 GALP Energia, SPGS SA Oil Portuguese State (7%), ENI (33%), Amorim Energia 
(33%), Iberdrola (4%), CGD (1%)
11 137
2 Energias de Portugal SA (EDP) Electricity Portuguese State (20%), Iberdrola (10%), Caja de 
Ahorros de Asturias (6%), CGD (5%), Banco Comercial 
Português (3%)
9 677
3 Rede Eléctrica Nacional SA (REN) Electricity Portuguese State (50%), EDP (30%), CGD (20%) ...
4 Sonae SGPS Retailing, property, 
manufacturing and 
telecommunications
Efanor Investimentos SGPS (53%) 6 392
5 Portugal Telecom SGPS SA (PT) Telecommunications Telefónica (10%), Brandes Investment Partners (9%), 
Banco Espírito Santo (8%), CGD (5%)
6 284
6 Jerónimo Martins SGPS SA Retailing and foods Sociedade Francisco Manuel dos Santos, SGPS (56%) 3 828
7 Transportes Aéreos Portugueses SA (TAP) Air transport Portuguese State …
8 Cimentos de Portugal SGPS SA (CIMPOR) Cement Teixeira Duarte (23%), Manuel Fina (19%), Lafarge 
(13%), Credit Suisse (13%)
1 535
9 Teixeira Duarte Engenharia e Construções SA Construction Teixeira Duarte family (52%) 629
10 Brisa Auto-Estradas de Portugal SA Construction Jose de Melo Investimentos SGPS (31%), Banco 
Comercial Português SA (10%), Abertis (10%)
560
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The following section will analyse the experiences 
of some of Portugal’s leading companies, grouped by 
business area, with the aim of uncovering the basic 
factors driving the internationalization of Portugal’s 
business elite and the role played by Latin America in 
this process.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)154
1. An alliance with a regional leader in the highest-growth
 segment of telecommunications services:
 the experience of Portugal Telecom
Portugal Telecom (PT) is currently one of the largest 
private-sector business conglomerates in Portugal, with 
total sales of 6.3 billion euros in 2005 (see table IV.6). The 
company provides fixed and mobile telephony, Internet, 
cable television and other related services to over 40 million 
customers around the world, most of them in two strategic 
markets, Portugal and Brazil. PT is the leader in Portugal, 
offering a full range of voice, multimedia and data services, 
and it is also the market leader in the mobile telephony 
segment in Brazil where, in partnership with Telefónica of 
Spain, it operates the largest mobile telecommunications 
company in Latin America, Vivo.6 The Portuguese firm is 
also strongly positioned in a number of African countries 
(Angola, Cape Verde, Morocco and São Tomé and Principe) 
and Asia (Macao Special Administrative Region and Timor-
Leste), many of them former Portuguese colonies. PT has 
become one of the European Union’s leading integrated 
telecommunications operators (see table IV.7).
Table IV.7
EUROPEAN UNION: LARGEST TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
COMPANIES, BY SALES, 2005
(Millions of euros)
 Company Country of origin Total sales
1 Deutsche Telekom  Germany 59 604
2 France Télécom  France 49 038
3 Vodafone  United Kingdom 43 031
4 Telefónica  Spain 37 882
5 Telecom Italia SpA  Italy 29 919
6 British Telecom Plc (BT) United Kingdom 28 610
7 Royal KPN NV Netherlands 11 811
8 Portugal Telecom Portugal 6 284
9 TDC A/S Denmark 6 252
10 Belgacom SA Belgium 5 384
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Bloomberg and the companies themselves.
International investment has become a key factor in 
the growth and consolidation of PT within its regional and 
global context. This process has also helped strengthen 
Portugal’s role as a link between Europe, Latin America 
and Africa (PT, 2005, p. 12).
6
 Telefónica holds a 9.7% equity stake in PT (PT, 2006a, p. 60).
7
 At that time, the telecommunications network in Portugal was run by three operators: Empresa Pública Telefones de Lisboa e Porto (TLP), 
which operated the telephone service in the Lisbon and Porto areas; Telecom Portugal, which had inherited the telephony assets of Correios, 
Telégrafos e Telefones (CTT) and was responsible for all other communications within the country and to Europe and the Mediterranean area; 
and Companhia Portuguesa Rádio Marconi (CPRM), which handled intercontinental traffic. In 1991, Teledifusora de Portugal (TDP) was created 
with the mission of operating and maintaining the transmission and distribution infrastructure.
8
 As of 2006, the largest shareholders in PT were Telefónica (9.7%), Brandes Investment Partners (8.5%), Banco Espírito Santo (8.4%) and Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos (5.1%).
Consolidation of the telecommunications assets owned 
by the Portuguese State intensified in the early 1990s, 
when they were grouped into Comunicações Nacionais 
(CN).7 A single national telecommunications operator 
was created in 1994 by the merger of Telecom Portugal, 
Empresa Pública Telefones de Lisboa e Porto (TLP) and 
Teledifusora de Portugal (TDP) to form Portugal Telecom 
(PT). The privatization of the company, which was planned 
in a number of stages, began shortly thereafter.
During the first phase of privatization in 1995, 
27.3% of the company’s equity was transferred to private 
investors by floating shares on the Lisbon, London and 
New York stock exchanges. A further 21.7% was sold 
off a year later, leaving 49% of PT in private hands. In 
1997, following approval of the sectoral delimitation 
law that allowed the State to reduce its holding in PT, 
the private-sector share of the company’s equity rose 
to 75%. In 1999, a further 13.5% held by the State was 
sold off and there was a capital increase. Following 
these two operations, the State reduced its holding in the 
company from 25.2% to about 11%. Lastly, in December 
2000, the fifth and final phase of the privatization was 
concluded, leaving virtually the whole of PT’s equity in 
private hands, the exception being 500 class A shares held 
by the State (golden share). The purpose of the State’s 
retaining a golden share was to protect the public interest 
in a business deemed to be strategic.8
Even as it was being privatized, PT began to face 
growing competition in the domestic market following 
the granting of licences to private-sector mobile telephony 
operators (Braz, 2002, p. 280). And while it already had 
something of an international presence in the form of 
small operations in former Portuguese colonies, PT started 
to project itself more vigorously abroad with a view to 
freeing itself from the constraints of the domestic market 
and projecting itself as a global player in one of the world’s 
most dynamic markets (see table IV.8).
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Table IV.8
PORTUGAL TELECOM: MAIN ASSETS, 2006
(Millions of euros and thousands of customers)
Company Business Stake Sales Customers
Europe
 Portugal Rede Fixa Fixed-line 100.0 2 050 4 418
Telecomunicações Móveis Nacionais (TMN) Mobile 100.0 1 455 5 493
PT Multimedia Multimedia 58.4 627 2 412
Latin America
 Brazil Brasilcel (Vivo) Mobile 50.0 2 037 28 726
Telesp Celular Mobile 66.1 … …
Tele Centro Oeste Mobile 52.5 … …
Global Telecom Mobile 100.0 … …
Tele Sudeste Celular Mobile 91.0 … …
Celular CRT Mobile 68.8 … …
Tele Leste Celular Mobile 50.7 … …
UOL Internet 25.0 … 1 540
Africa
 Morocco Médi Télécom Mobile 32.2 … 4 259
 Cape Verde Cape Verde Telecom (CVT) Fixed-line and mobile 40.0 … 171
 Angola Unitel Mobile 41.1 … 1 700
São Tomé and Principe Companhia Santomense de 
Telecomunicações
Fixed-line and mobile 51.0 … 25
 Namibia Mobile Telecommunications Limited (MTC) Mobile 34.0 … 556
Asia
 Timor-Leste Timor Telecom Fixed-line and mobile 34.0 … 45
 Macao Special Administrative Region
 of the People’s Republic of China
Companhia de Telecomunicações de Macau 
(CTM) Fixed-line and mobile 28.0 … 465
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Portugal Telecom (PT), 2006 third quarter results, Lisbon, 9 November 2006 (http://
www.telecom.pt).
Paulo SA (Telesp) worth approximately US$ 77 million (PT 
press releases, 19 March 1998). It then acquired a minority 
stake in Companhia Riograndense de Telecomunicações 
(CRT), the main operator in the state of Rio Grande do Sul 
in the fixed-line and mobile telephony segments.10 CRT, 
controlled by Telefónica, was one of the four Brazilian 
telecommunications companies that were outside the Telebrás 
system, and the first to be wholly privatized. PT spent 
US$ 375 million on this operation, the largest acquisition 
by a Portuguese company on the American continent up 
to that time (PT press releases, 25 June 1998).
Thus, when the sell-off of Telebrás began, PT’s 
presence in the Brazilian market and its partnership with 
Telefónica proved particularly important to its successful 
participation in this process (see table IV.9). In July 1998, 
PT took control of Telesp Celular, the largest mobile 
telephony operator in São Paulo, Brazil and Latin America, 
and bought a large equity stake in the São Paulo fixed-
line telephony company Telesp Fixa, for which it paid 
US$ 3,124 million. This operation was by far the largest 
With this in view, PT signed a number of agreements 
with other global operators to enhance its international 
competitiveness. In early 1997, the company signed up to a 
cooperation accord with Telefónica of Spain, an agreement 
with Telecomunicações Brasileiras SA (Telebrás) and a 
strategic alignment with Concert, an alliance involving 
British Telecom (BT) of the United Kingdom and MCI 
of the United States.9 The collaboration agreement with 
Telefónica and the creation of the Aliança Atlântica with 
Telebrás sought to achieve mutual cooperation, a common 
strategy, and joint international investments in Latin America 
and Africa in order to develop their competitive advantages 
and natural interests in these markets (PT, 1998, p. 7).
A vital phase in the company’s internationalization 
strategy began in 1998 when it participated successfully 
in the telecommunications privatization process in Brazil. 
To prepare for its arrival in the country and in compliance 
with earlier commitments, PT carried out a number of 
operations. First, it acquired 1% of Telefónica and bought 
ordinary shares in Telebrás and Telecomunicações de São 
9
 These agreements involved the acquisition of 6.25% of PT during the third privatization phase by Telefónica (3.5%), BT (1%), Telebrás (0.75%), 
MCI (0.5%) and Aliança Atlântica (0.5%). PT also undertook to acquire a financial stake in Telefónica (1%) and Telebrás (PT, 1998, p. 7 and 
PT press releases, 16 April 1997).
10
 The creation of a subsidiary, Celular CRT SA, was approved in June 1998, and all the assets and liabilities associated with the mobile telephony 
business were transferred to this company. This was done to comply with the requirement that fixed-line and mobile telephony operators should 
be different companies.
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acquisition abroad ever by a Portuguese company (PT 
press releases, 29 July 1998).
For US$ 3,085 million, PT acquired a majority stake in 
the holding company (Telesp Celular Participações) which 
controlled Telesp Celular. Telesp Celular had a 90% market 
share in the State of São Paulo, the country’s richest with 
1.6 million users and a waiting list of about 3.5 million 
people (PT press releases, 29 July 1998). Although PT’s 
offer was for 100% of Telesp Celular’s controlling position, 
the Portuguese company quickly began negotiations to 
reduce its share and tried to bring in other strategic partners. 
PT kept 51%, transferring 36% to Telefónica and the 
remaining 13% to Brazilian groups, whose involvement 
was particularly valuable because of their knowledge of the 
local market (PT press releases, 3 August 1998). In these 
circumstances, PT had high expectations of being able to 
capitalize on the rapid growth of mobile telephony and repeat 
in Brazil the successes it had achieved in Portugal, where 
it had introduced groundbreaking services —particularly 
prepayment, in which it was a global pioneer. 
At the same time, as part of the same consortium as 
controlled CRT, PT acquired a stake in the holding company 
(Telesp Participações) which controlled fixed-line telephony 
in the State of São Paulo. Telesp Participações controlled two 
operators, Telesp Fixa and Companhia de Telecomunicações 
do Brazil Central (CTBC). This investment was particularly 
attractive because of the low penetration (16%) of fixed-line 
telephony in the State of São Paulo and the enormous pent-
up demand reflected in a waiting list of more than 5 million 
applications (PT press releases, 29 July 1998). This acquisition 
would also allow PT to generate major synergies with its 
other operations in Brazil, particularly Telesp Celular.
Table IV.9
COOPERATION BETWEEN PORTUGAL TELECOM AND TELEFÓNICA
1997 Collaboration agreement for exploring and developing investment opportunities in Latin America and Africa
1998 Establishment of a joint venture to enter markets in northern Africa and eastern Europe, plus emerging markets
in Asia
Joint participation in the privatization of the Telebrás system in Brazil
1999 Second mobile telephony licence in Morocco, through the Médi Télécom consortium
2000 Equity swap between Telesp (fixed-line) and Telesp Celular (mobile)
2001 Partnership in Brazil to create a mobile telephony joint venture, pooling all the assets owned by the two firms in the country, with 50% 
apiece
2002 Migration to the new regulatory systems for PCS mobile telephony (SMP). Formalization of the joint venture in Brazil (BrasilCel) with the 
transfer of all PT’s and Telefónica’s holdings in mobile telephony operators to BrasilCel. Acquisition of Tele Centro Oeste (TCO) and the 
decision to implement a wide-ranging investment plan including incorporation of CDMA technology
2003 Reorganization of BrasilCel and launch of Vivo to replace local brands in Brazil
2004 Telefónica increases its stake in PT significantly, from 4.8% to 9.7%
To improve and extend their management control, PT and Telefónica launch a public tender offer for the shares of some of their subsidiaries 
in Brazil
2005 New company structure created by grouping all Brazilian subsidiaries under a single brand, Vivo
2006 The public tender offer by Sonae SGPS for PT raises some doubts about the survival prospects of this cooperation partnership
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Thus, PT’s first large international equity holding 
proved highly successful for the company. In fact, 
this small European telecommunications firm had 
achieved a solid position in the economic and industrial 
heart of Latin America’s largest country, in a market 
with excellent growth prospects. Activities in Brazil 
were extremely dynamic in the early months, and the 
importance of PT’s international operations increased 
as a result, particularly those linked to Telesp Celular 
(see figure IV.5).11
In these circumstances, PT initiated a wide-ranging 
investment plan (US$ 660 million in 1999) which included 
network modernization and the incorporation of CDMA 
digital technology. This enabled it to improve service 
quality and launch new products and services, particularly 
prepayment systems, significantly increasing its customer 
base (PT, 2000, p. 21) (see figure IV.6). In 1999, Telesp 
Celular brought in two prepayment plans: Baby, the first 
to be available in Brazil, and Peg&Fale, aimed at lower-
income segments (PT, 2000, p. 20).12
11
 Between 1997 and 1998, the mobile telephony penetration rate in the State of São Paulo rose from 3.8% to 7.8% (PT, 1999). In 1998, Telesp 
Celular’s mobile telephony subscriber base grew by 41% to 1.8 million, giving it a market share of 67% in the concession area.
12
 By late 1999, the two prepayment programmes had over 863,000 customers, representing 79% of all new customers and 30% of all Telesp 
Celular users (PT, 2000, p. 20). By December 2000, the company had over 4.3 million customers, more than half of them using the prepayment 
system (PT, 2001, p. 21).
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Figure IV.5
PORTUGAL TELECOM: TOTAL SALES BY BUSINESS SEGMENT,
1996-2006 a
(Percentages)
market, PT’s acquisitions in Brazil allowed it to move 
further towards its goal of steady, diversified growth 
through a strategy of maximizing synergies between 
different geographical and business areas.13 In addition, 
PT had some unique cultural, linguistic and historical 
advantages, experience with mobile telephony in competitive 
environments and synergies (bilateral traffic and investment) 
that allowed it to compete successfully in Brazil.
In the early part of the present decade, PT sought to 
carry on strengthening its position in the Brazilian market 
by increasing its stake in Telesp Celular, acquiring new 
assets to complement its existing ones and deepening its 
relationship with the Spanish company Telefónica (see 
table IV.9).
In the first half of 2000, PT increased its stake in Telesp 
Celular to 30% through a number of market operations, 
including a public tender offer for all the shares not held by 
the controlling group. This cost the company some US$ 900 
million (PT press releases, 21 January and 13 June 2000).
In the second half of the year, PT and Telefónica 
agreed to swap the stakes they held in Telesp Celular and 
Telesp (fixed-line telephony), respectively.14 In addition, PT 
carried out a capital increase for Telesp Celular, subscribing 
to almost the entirety of the new issue. Thus, once the 
National Agency of Telecommunications (ANATEL) had 
approved both operations, the Portuguese company’s stake 
in Telesp Celular rose from 30% to 41% (PT, 2001).
Simultaneously, acting through Telesp Celular, PT 
came to terms with Centrais Telefônicas de Ribeirão Preto 
(CETERP), controlled by Telefónica, to acquire CETERP 
Celular, a Band A mobile telephony operator in the Ribeirão 
Preto region located in the north-east of the State of São 
Paulo (PT press releases, 20 July 2000).15 Once acquired, 
CETERP Celular was absorbed by Telesp Celular, and the 
Portuguese company was able to offer its mobile telephony 
service throughout the State of São Paulo. PT also sold its 
stake in the fixed-line telephony company CRT, for which 
it received US$ 183 million, although it retained its interest 
(7.3%) in CRT Celular (PT, 2001).
In January 2001, acting through Telesp Celular, PT 
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Thus, even as it was itself being privatized, and ahead 
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13
 Fixed-line telephony began to be liberalized in Portugal in 2000, when new operators were allowed to enter the market and access customers 
directly using their own infrastructure and indirectly by selecting a national and international long-distance carrier (PT, 2001, p. 12).
14
 Under the agreement, Telefónica swapped its 35.8% stake in Portecom Participações, the consortium controlling Telesp Celular, for the 23% 
indirectly owned by PT in SP Telecomunicações Holding (which controlled Telesp). Telefónica also paid the Portuguese company US$ 59.8 
million (Telefónica, 2001, p. 158 and PT press releases, 20 July 2000).
15
 In December 1999, Telesp, controlled by Telefónica, acquired 73% of CETERP, a fixed-line and mobile telephony provider, for US$ 183 million 
(Telefónica, 2001, p. 161). In October 2000, Telesp made a public tender offer for the remaining equity as required by the privatization rules. 
Subsequently, in compliance with the rules applying to the Brazilian telecommunications market, CETERP sold its CETERP Celular subsidiary 
to Telesp Celular, controlled by PT. In addition, CETERP was merged into Telesp. The CETERP operation was one of the measures taken to 
meet the service quality and expansion targets set by the regulator before the deadline, putting Telesp, and thus Telefónica, in a position to offer 
other services and enter other regions of Brazil rapidly (Telefónica, 2001, p. 21).
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)158
(second operator) in the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina, 
which adjoin the State of São Paulo and are among the 
richest areas in Brazil, for US$ 1.21 billion. GT operated 
with CDMA technology, making it fully compatible with 
Telesp Celular, and this meant that tried and tested products 
and services (such as the Baby prepayment system) could 
be introduced, generating major synergies (PT, 2002).
Lastly, PT took some steps towards further 
diversification of its activities in Brazil. During 2000, the 
Portuguese company entered the multimedia segment and 
acquired Internet businesses such as Zip.net, Banco1.net 
and Investnews for 489 million euros (PT, 2001, p. 176).16 
PT also controls 21.1% of the Folha UOL consortium, 
which publishes the Folha de São Paulo newspaper and 
owns stakes in DEDIC and PrimeSys.
In this way, PT reaffirmed its strategy of concentrating 
on mobile telephony, a segment with high growth potential, 
in the State of São Paulo, the region with the greatest urban 
density and highest level of industrial development in South 
America. With these acquisitions, PT further consolidated 
its leadership position, scaled up its business and reaped the 
synergies from the good geographical and technological fit 
between its assets (both used CDMA). It also succeeded in 
establishing a platform for the development of new businesses 
in the Brazilian telecommunications market, as well as 
creating major synergies between related segments.
Early in 2001, PT took a great step forward with its 
expansion in the Brazilian telecommunications market. In 
January, PT and Telefónica signed a strategic agreement 
to create a 50-50 joint venture that would run the two 
companies’ assets in the Brazilian mobile telephony 
segment (see table IV.9). The partnership comprised Telesp 
Celular and Global Telecom on the PT side, Tele Sudeste 
Celular in Rio de Janeiro and Tele Leste Celular in Bahia 
and Sergipe on the Telefónica side, and CRT Celular, in 
which the two companies were partners, in Rio Grande 
do Sul (see table IV.10). Furthermore, to strengthen the 
agreement, Telefónica undertook to purchase a further 5% 
of PT’s equity, bringing its stake up to 10%; and PT had the 
option of raising its stake in Telefónica to 1.5% (PT press 
releases, 24 January 2001). However, the deteriorating 
global and regional economic situation, exacerbated by 
the Argentine crisis and the devaluation of the Brazilian 
currency, delayed the creation of the joint venture.
Table IV.10
STRUCTURE OF THE STRATEGIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
PORTUGAL TELECOM AND TELEFÓNICA, JANUARY 2001
(Percentages)
 Portugal Telecom - Telefónica
 Telesp Celular Tele Sudeste Celular CRT Celular Tele Leste Celular
 41.2 a 81.6 a 36.6 a 10.8 a




Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Portugal Telecom, Annual Report 2000, Lisbon, 2001, p. 15.
a
 Percentage economic interest.
b
 Percentage voting rights.
In these circumstances, PT explicitly chose to centre 
its strategy on organic growth, strengthening its leadership 
in the Portuguese market and trying to make its Brazilian 
operations profitable (PT, 2003, p. 9). The company 
continued to be the leader in Portuguese telecommunications, 
positioning itself as one of the best operators in Europe 
(see table IV.7). Besides this, its growing presence in 
Brazil was clear evidence of its determination to improve 
its position in geopolitically favourable markets with 
significant cultural affinities (PT, 2004, p. 10).
Anticipating greater competition in the future,17 PT 
sought to improve its position in the Brazilian market by 
drastically rationalizing costs, expanding its customer 
base (essentially with prepayment products), developing 
new products and services such as WAP and encouraging 
customers to migrate from the analogue to the digital service 
(PT, 2002, pp. 15-16). In so doing, Telesp Celular produced 
a sound operating performance and carried on increasing 
its market share in the State of São Paulo (PT, 2003, p. 38). 
In addition, PT went ahead with the capital increase it had 
announced for Telesp Celular to reduce its debt and allow 
it to implement an aggressive business plan. In mid-2002, 
Telesp Celular increased its capital and most of its shares 
were purchased by PT, allowing the Portuguese company 
to increase its stake in its Brazilian subsidiary from 41% 
to 65% (PT press releases, 9 September 2002).
As the overall economic situation shifted, opening up 
good prospects for the mobile telephony business in the 
Brazilian market, and new rivals made their appearance, 
an effort was made to establish the joint venture as quickly 
as possible. Acting through Telesp Celular, PT acquired the 
16
 In December 2000, PT established a strategic alliance with two financial institutions, Banco Bradesco SA (Bradesco) and União de Bancos 
Brasileiros SA (Unibanco), with a view to strengthening its position in the Brazilian telecommunications market. As part of this agreement, PT 
paid US$ 281 million for 100% of Unibanco Sistemas SA (BUS), the company which took over the telecommunications networks of Unibanco 
and Bradesco, along with the respective licences to provide these services (PT, 2001, pp. 55-56). In June 2000, PT paid US$ 35 million for 50% 
of Investnews, a company that owns the exclusive Internet rights over all news content produced by the financial newspaper Gazeta mercantil 
(PT, 2001, p. 66).
17
 In 2002, the Mexican firm América Móvil bought out its partners in Telecom Américas and concentrated on expanding strongly in Brazil (ECLAC, 
2006a, p. 147).
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remaining 17% of GT for US$ 82 million while, to keep 
the two companies’ stakes in the new firm equal (50%), 
Telefónica acted through Telefónica Móviles to buy 15% 
of Telesp Celular from the Portuguese firm for 200 million 
euros (PT, 2003, p. 7).18 In December 2002, ANATEL 
finally approved the creation of the joint venture, and both 
companies transferred their stakes in the Brazilian mobile 
telephony operators to the new firm, named BrasilCel (PT 
press releases, 6 and 30 December 2002). The new firm thus 
became the largest provider of mobile telephony services 
in Brazil (with three times as many customers as its nearest 
rival) and Latin America, with some 17 million subscribers 
and a potential market of over 90 million inhabitants, and 
with a market share of over 60% in the states it served, 
which represented more than 70% of Brazil’s GDP (PT, 
2003, p. 12) (see figure IV.7).
Figure IV.7
PORTUGAL TELECOM: TOTAL MOBILE TELEPHONY CUSTOMERS 
IN BRAZIL, 1998-2006 a b
(Millions of customers)
did much to offset the cost of migrating from the existing 
mobile concessions to the new PCS licences.
PT and Telefónica quickly acted to achieve greater 
geographical coverage in the Brazilian market. In early 
2003, BrasilCel took over Tele Centro Oeste (TCO), the 
leading operator in the centre-west and north of the country 
(see map IV.1).19 With this acquisition, BrasilCel was able 
to cover all the country’s main cities. PT and Telefónica set 
out to establish a homogeneous identity for their mobile 
telephony businesses in Brazil by creating a new name 
that would cover all their assets in the country. Thus, 
Vivo became a single brand in 20 states and the Federal 
District of Brasilia, covering 85% of Brazil’s territory 
and 74% of its population, or 86% of the country’s GDP. 
This gave the joint venture a market share of some 50% 
nationally and 57% in the concession areas (see figures 
IV.7 and IV.8 and map IV.1) (PT, 2004, pp. 14 and 34). 
Indeed, just nine months after its launch, Vivo was already 
the largest mobile operator in the southern hemisphere 
(PT press releases, 10 December 2003).
Map IV.1
PORTUGAL TELECOM-TELEFÓNICA ALLIANCE IN BRAZIL: 
GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE OF THE VIVO BRAND, 2005
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Portugal Telecom, Annual Report, various issues, Lisbon; Agência 
Nacional de Telecomunicações (ANATEL), Relatório anual 2005, Brasilia, 
December 2005; and TELECO, Informação em Telecomunicações [online] 




 The joint venture with Telefónica (BrasilCel) was created in December 2002, after 
which it began to operate under the Vivo brand.
This alliance consolidated PT’s leadership of the 
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in the region and to benefit from substantial operating 
synergies. The economies of scale and solid leadership 












1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Portugal Telecom Other operators
18
 The joint venture thus came to hold a 65.1% financial stake and 99.7% of voting rights in Telesp Celular (PT, 2003, p. 7).
19
 The acquisition of 100% of Tele Centro Oeste (TCO) was carried out by Telesp Celular in three stages: (i) the acquisition of ordinary shares 
owned by a Brazilian company, Fixcel, which represented 61.1% of TCO voting rights, at a cost of 404 million euros; (ii) a subsequent public 
tender offer for the remaining ordinary shares; (iii) the integration of TCO into Telesp Celular by incorporating the remaining shares (PT, 2004, 
p. 14). TCO is present in 11 states and the country’s capital, Brasilia. TCO was formed by two operators: (i) TCO, the leader in the centre-west 
region, which includes the cities of Brasilia and Goiania; (ii) Norte Brasil Telecom (NTB), which holds a Band B licence in the north of the 
country, covering cities such as Manaus and Belém.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of TELECO, Informação em Telecomunicações (http://www.teleco.
com.br).
Note:  NBT: Norte Brasil Telecom; TCO: Tele Centro Oeste; CRT: Companhia 
Riograndense de Telecomunicações; Telefónica Celular SE/BA: Tele Leste 
Celular; Telefónica Celular ES/RJ: Tele Sudeste Celular.
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Despite having more than 20 million customers, 
more than any other company in Brasil’s entire 
telecommunications sector, Vivo began to lose market 
share to its main rivals, Telecom Italia (TIM), América 
Móvil (Claro) and Grupo Telemar (Oi) (see figure IV.8). 
In a market that was growing explosively, the complexity 
of the alliance between PT and Telefónica may have 
contributed to this performance. A decision-making 
system that had to coordinate the objectives of both 
firms, identify and remove duplications of functions and 
seek out new synergies certainly complicated the first 
phase of their joint operations in Brazil. Other companies 
achieved better results and began to challenge Vivo’s 
hitherto undisputed leadership in Brazil (see figure 
IV.8). To cope with this situation, BrasilCel carried 
on investing in new forms of provision, concentrating 
particularly on launching innovative products and services 
based on CDMA technology as a way of expanding its 
customer base.20
Figure IV.8
BRAZIL: MARKET SHARES OF THE LEADING MOBILE 
TELEPHONY OPERATORS, 2003-2006 a
(Percentages)
During 2004, the Spanish company undertook a number 
of market operations that raised its stake in PT from 4.8% 
to 9.7% at a cost of some 475 million euros (Jornal de 
Negocios, 12 April 2005). Increasing its stake in this 
way brought Telefónica close to the limit set by the two 
companies in their 2001 agreement, which provided that 
the Spanish company could take ownership of up to 10% 
of PT (PT, 2006a, p. 60).
In these circumstances, BrasilCel and Telesp Celular 
acted in concert to launch public tender offers for some 
of their subsidiaries in Brazil as a way of enhancing and 
extending their management control.21 The intention was 
to strengthen Vivo’s position in the Brazilian market and 
give it a greater stake in the growth of its subsidiaries. In 
October 2004, the joint venture between PT and Telefónica 
acquired more than 99% of the shares targeted by the public 
tender offer, at a cost of US$ 215 million to BrasilCel and 
US$ 320 million to Telesp Celular (PT press releases, 9 
October 2004). The cost of these offers was split equally 
between PT and Telefónica. In addition, Telesp Celular 
approved a capital increase of more than US$ 1.1 billion 
and used some of these funds to raise its stake in Tele 
Centro Oeste Celular.22 The new asset structure turned 
Vivo into the world’s tenth-largest mobile telephony 
operator (PT, 2005, p. 70).
In late 2005, the business was restructured once again 
with a view to simplifying the organizational structure of 
the Brazilian subsidiaries operating under the Vivo brand 
name and thus enhancing operational efficiency and 
generating synergies. In this operation, all the subsidiaries 
were taken over by Telesp Celular, which was renamed 
Vivo Participações SA (PT press releases, 5 December 
2005). At a time of growing competition, this corporate 
restructuring would allow the Vivo brand to consolidate 
as the leader in the Brazilian mobile telephony market. 
Nonetheless, the company was unable to turn the situation 
around, basically because it did not operate with GSM 
technology, the most widely used in the country. To 
remedy the situation, it announced an ambitious plan to 
invest 400 million euros in the development of a GSM 
mobile telephony system in parallel with its CDMA 











2003 2004 2005 2006
Vivo (PT-Telefónica) TIM (Telecom Italia) Claro (América Móvil) Oi (Grupo Telemar) Other
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of TELECO, Informação em Telecomunicações (http://www.teleco.
com.br), 25 January 2007.
a
 January-November 2006.
To cement the alliance between the two Iberian 
companies, Telefónica also increased its stake in PT. 
20
 PT also transferred its experience in the Portuguese market to its international operations. Indeed, Telecomunicações Móveis Nacionais (TMN) 
was the first operator to provide video calling services on third generation (3G) devices in Portugal (PT, 2005, p. 66). In 2004, Vivo launched a 
number of new services and products that served to differentiate it from its rivals and place it at the forefront of innovation in the Brazilian mobile 
telephony market. Capitalizing on the technological advantages of the CDMA network, Vivo invested in expanding 1xRTT, a 2.5G technology, 
and began to roll out EV-DO, a third generation services network (PT, 2005, p. 75).
21
 BrasilCel launched public tender offers for Tele Sudeste Celular, Tele Leste Celular and Celular CRT. At the same time, Telesp Celular made a 
public tender offer for Tele Centro Oeste Celular (PT press releases, 25 August 2004).
22
 The capital increase was completed in January 2005. The resources were used to: (i) pay off a bridging loan made by Banco ABN Amro Real to 
finance the public tender offer for some of Tele Centro Oeste Celular’s equity, and (ii) pay off other short-term borrowings. Following official approval 
of the capital increase, the controlling group increased its stake in Telesp Celular from 65.1% to 65.7% (PT press releases, 5 January 2005).
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31 July 2006).23 By late 2006, Vivo had a market share 
of about 29.5% in Brazil (39.3% in the regions where it 
operated), giving a total of 28.7 million customers (PT, 
2006c, p. 38) (see figure IV.8).
Notwithstanding the drop in its market share, it is 
important to emphasize the degree of customer loyalty 
achieved by the new Vivo brand. In this phase of rising 
penetration, recognition and acceptance of the brand by the 
Brazilian population has been essential, basically because 
the rapid growth in the mobile telephony market has been 
driven by prepayment customers, accounting for 81.7% 
of the company’s total user base as of late 2006.
PT’s good results and successful international 
expansion caught the interest of international investors. 
In early 2006, Sonaecom SGPS SA, a subsidiary of one 
of Portugal’s largest industrial groups, Sonae SGPS, 
launched an unsolicited and thus hostile bid for PT shares 
with a view to gaining control of the company (PT press 
releases, 7 February 2006).24
The PT board took the view that Sonaecom’s offer of 
16.3 billion euros (including PT’s liquid debt) substantially 
undervalued the company (PT, 2006b, p. 2). The argument 
against the offer highlighted the lack of information about 
its financing and the excessive debt that would have to be 
taken on by the new controllers of the company, jeopardizing 
its future capacity and perhaps leading to the break-up 
of PT (40 million customers and 30,000 employees in 
14 countries).25 According to analysts, Sonaecom might 
well liquidate PT’s assets in Brazil (50% of Vivo) if its 
offer were successful. Again, the Sonaecom bid would 
create an unprecedented degree of concentration in the 
Portuguese mobile telephony market, giving rise to great 
regulatory obstacles. Lastly, it was emphasized that the 
bidders did not have a long-term strategy for the company 
(or much international experience in the business) in 
what was a highly competitive, dynamic sector requiring 
high levels of investment. In late 2006, the Portuguese 
competition authority announced that it had no objection 
to the operation (Público, 5 December 2006).
In early 2007, Sonaecom improved its offer from 
9.5 to 10.5 euros per share, conditional upon its securing 
at least 50% plus one of the shares and a change in the 
company’s articles of association.26 The Portuguese firm 
once again rejected the offer, however, and adopted a 
more vigorous strategy, outlining plans for a generous 
dividend and a share buyback worth 6.2 billion euros if 
the bid should fail.
PT’s main shareholders took up opposing positions. 
Telefónica aligned itself with Sonaecom and favoured an 
end to the limitations imposed by the company’s articles 
of association. This support showed Telefónica’s belief 
that the bid would succeed and that it would be able to 
acquire the other 50% of Vivo as a result. Ever since the 
bid was launched, analysts had been speculating that 
Telefónica would sell its stake in PT and acquire the 
company’s assets in Brazil, in order to consolidate its 
corporate image in Latin America.
In March 2007, however, an extraordinary general 
meeting of PT rejected the proposed change in the articles 
of association and thereby condemned the Sonaecom bid to 
failure. Telefónica was left in an awkward position vis-à-vis 
the other shareholders and the PT directors, which could 
affect the strategic relationship the two companies have 
been building up in recent years, particularly in Brazil.27
To sum up, even as it was itself being privatized, this 
small Portuguese telecommunications company saw in 
the Brazilian privatization programme the opportunity 
it needed to free itself from the constraints it was under 
because of its lack of international experience. In an 
industry that was beginning to show signs of vigorous 
consolidation and concentration, the company urgently 
needed to expand beyond the borders of Portugal.
In Brazil, PT took control of the main mobile 
telecommunications company in the State of São Paulo, 
among other assets. In this way, the Portuguese firm began 
to specialize in the wireless segment of the country’s 
wealthiest markets, and set out to achieve national 
coverage. It was aided in this by a fruitful alliance with 
the Spanish company Telefónica. It quickly scaled up its 
business, taking advantage of the synergies yielded by 
the good geographical fit of its businesses and its use of 
a single technology.
23
 The European GSM technology is the undisputed world leader in mobile telephony. Three out of every four mobile telephony subscribers in the five 
continents, or more than 1.3 billion people, use this standard. In early 2005, there were 151 million mobile telephone users in Latin America. Of 
these, 68 million were connected to networks using the old United States TDMA standard and 44 million to infrastructure employing the European 
GSM standard, while 39 million were on networks operating the new United States CDMA mobile standard (Cinco Días, 31 July 2006).
24
 Sonaecom manages the Sonae group businesses in the communications and telecommunications segments in Portugal, including Público 
newspaper and three operators, Optimus (mobile telephony), Novis (fixed-line telephony) and Clix (Internet).
25
 Sonaecom announced that it would carry out a 1.5 billion euro capital increase to support the public tender offer, leaving doubts as to how it 
would finance the remaining 14.8 billon, representing over 90% of the value of the transaction (PT, 2006a).
26
 PT’s articles of association limit voting rights to 10% of shares, meaning in practice that a new shareholder acquiring a majority equity stake 
would not control the company.
27
 The failure of this operation was due mainly to the part played by the Mexican magnate Carlos Slim, the controlling shareholder of TELMEX 
and América Móvil, who used his 3.7% shares in PT to block the bid, thus preventing the new controllers from selling their 50% shareholding 
in Vivo to Telefónica.
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The global crisis in the industry and the deterioration 
of the regional economic situation forced PT to concentrate 
on its domestic market, temporarily shelving its plans 
for expansion in Brazil. In the latter country, PT sought 
to increase the returns on its operations, keep ahead of 
rising competition (the entry of América Móvil into 
the market), increase its customer base (with growth 
coming essentially from prepayment plans) and develop 
new products.
In sum, it was when it clinched its alliance with 
Telefónica that the company really consolidated in the 
Brazilian market. Working within a common corporate 
identity (the Vivo brand), the two companies strengthened 
their stakes in local subsidiaries through public tender 
offers and extended coverage to most of the country. 
However, the frictions resulting from Sonaecom’s bid 
have raised doubts about the continuity of the strategic 
alliance between PT and Telefónica in Brazil.
2. Energy firms: internationalization strategies centred on
 neighbouring countries
As in the great majority of European countries, Portugal’s 
electricity sector used to operate as a State monopoly. In 
1976, Electricidade de Portugal (EDP) was created from 
the merger of 13 companies that had been nationalized the 
year before. In the early 1990s, in line with the reforms 
that were beginning elsewhere in the European electricity 
sector, EDP began a profound restructuring, changing its 
legal status to that of a limited-liability company (sociedade 
anónima) and creating independent subsidiaries to operate 
in the areas of electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution (EDP, 2006b, p. 18). In 1997, the Portuguese 
Government began privatizing the company. As part of 
these developments, in October 2004 the company changed 
its name to Energias de Portugal SA (EDP). By 2006, six 
phases of the privatization process had been completed 
and the State controlled about 25% of the company’s 
equity through various mechanisms.28
EDP is currently the largest electricity generator and 
distributor in Portugal. It also owns 30% of Rede Eléctrica 
Nacional SA (REN), Portugal’s electricity transmission 
company.29 Internationally, the firm has become a significant 
player in Brazil and Spain. Thus, EDP has rapidly become 
one of Portugal’s largest business groups and one of the 
leading European operators in the electricity sector, with 
an installed capacity of over 13,290 MW and sales of 
some 9.68 billion euros (see table IV.11).
In the late 1990s, profound structural changes took 
place in the European electricity sector, forcing companies 
to act in a highly dynamic environment and conduct their 
operations in very different circumstances, including both 
28
 The Portuguese State holds 20.5% of EDP’s equity directly through Participações Públicas (SGPA) SA, known as Parpública, and 4.9% indirectly 
through the State-owned bank Caixa Geral de Depósitos (EDP, 2006a, p. 148). Other major shareholders include Iberdrola (9.5%), Caja de 
Ahorros de Asturias (CajAstur) (5.5%) and Banco Comercial Português (BCP) (2.9%) (EDP, 2006b, p. 16).
29
 In 2000, during the period of change in the electricity sector, the Portuguese State retained ownership of 70% of REN, leaving the remaining 
30% for EDP (EDP, 2001, p. 25).
regulated and competitive markets. With the experience 
it had acquired as a service provider in the electricity 
sector and the progress it had made in terms of efficiency 
and competitiveness, EDP implemented a strategy of 
consolidating and retaining its leadership in the Portuguese 
market, internationalizing its operations and diversifying 
into other business areas. EDP’s goal was to work its 
current assets and capabilities harder by participating in 
high-growth markets, and to continue building a multi-
utility platform so that it could capture synergies between 
the electricity, water and natural gas businesses. In an 
increasingly liberalized electricity market, furthermore, it 
sought to enhance customer loyalty and diversify the risks 
associated with the regulation affecting its activities.
Table IV.11
EUROPEAN UNION: LARGEST ELECTRICITY COMPANIES,
BY SALES, 2005
(Millions of euros)
 Company Country of origin Total sales
1 E.ON AG  Germany 51 854
2 Électricité de France (EDF)  France 51 051
3 RWE AG  Germany 40 518
4 Enel SpA Italy 32 272
5 Endesa SA  Spain 17 508
6 Vattenfall AB Sweden 13 898
7 Electrabel SA Belgium 12 218
8 Iberdrola SA  Spain 12 060
9 Energie Baden-Württemberg
  AG (EnBW) Germany 10 769
10 Energias de Portugal (EDP) Portugal 9 677
11 Essent NV Netherlands 6 325
12 Unión Fenosa SA Spain 6 099
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from Bloomberg and the companies themselves.
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To make this multi-utility strategy a reality, EDP 
looked for strategic partnerships with other companies 
that would allow it to operate competitively in segments 
where it had no previous experience (see box IV.1). 
Locally, the main agreements were those with GALP 
Energia, Águas de Portugal (AdP), Brisa (the country’s 
largest motorway operator) and the financial group Banco 
Comercial Português (BCP), while internationally it 
entered into agreements with the Spanish electricity 
company Iberdrola and the United Kingdom’s largest 
public water supply and sewage company, Thames 
Water.
Box IV.1
ÁGUAS DE PORTUGAL: EXPANDING CAUTIOUSLY ABROAD
30
 On 1 January 2000, the Portuguese market was opened up to fixed-line telephony operators (EDP, 2000, p. 45). As of mid-2006, the main shareholders 
in ONI were: EDP (56.6%), BCP (23.1%), Brisa (17.2%) and GALP Energia (3.2%) (EDP press release, 22 June 2006, http://www.edp.pt). 
31
 In January 2000, EDP increased its stake in GALP Energia from 3.3% to 14.3%. GALP Energia is a consortium created as part of the restructuring 
of the Portuguese energy sector (EDP, 2001, p. 43).
Águas de Portugal (AdP) was created in 
1993 to develop municipal water supply and 
sewage systems. In the late 1990s, AdP 
began to diversify by entering new market 
segments and initiating the international 
expansion of its operations. Almost 
simultaneously, the Portuguese company 
began operating in Brazil, Cape Verde, 
Mozambique and Timor-Leste.
Like other Portuguese companies 
that were beginning to expand beyond the 
country’s borders, AdP sought to establish 
partnerships with other companies to help it 
remedy its lack of international experience 
and improve its ability to adapt to the 
peculiarities of national markets. Some 
of its largest operations were in former 
Portuguese colonies in Africa. In Cape 
Verde, acting in partnership with Energias 
de Portugal (EDP), it emerged as the 
winner in the privatization of ELECTRA, 
an electricity production and distribution 
and water and sewage services firm. In 
Mozambique, AdP took part in a public 
tender process jointly with the French firm 
Saur and won the contract to run water 
supply systems in the cities of Maputo, 
Beira, Quelimane, Nampula and Bemba, 
serving a population of 2 million.
In Brazil as in Africa, AdP looked for a 
partner to help it break into the world’s largest 
Portuguese-speaking market. Accordingly, 
it went into partnership with the local group 
Monteiro Aranha and created Empresa 
Brasileira de Águas Livres SA (EBAL), in 
which each partner held 50% of the equity. 
The purpose of EBAL was to grow with 
the Brazilian market and participate in the 
concession and privatization process that 
was then beginning in the country’s water 
sector. In 1998, the Portuguese company 
formed part of the consortium that won a 
25-year concession to run the water supply 
and sanitation system of the Região dos 
Lagos and the State of Rio de Janeiro (the 
concession includes the urban areas of the 
municipalities of Búzios, Cabo Frio, Iguaba 
Grande, São Pedro da Aldeia and Arraial 
do Cabo, and involves the provision of 
services to 390,000 people). The winning 
consortium was led by local investors, 
namely Monteiro Aranha with 32.5%, PEM 
Engenharia with 20% and PLANUP with 
40%, while AdP, acting through EBAL, had 
a minority stake (7.5%). Monteiro Aranha 
chose to reposition its business, however, 
and as a result AdP came to control 100% 
of EBAL. In 2001, lastly, the Portuguese 
company bought out its Brazilian partners 
and took control of PROLAGOS, the 
company set up to run operations in the 
concession area. In 2002, all AdP activities 
in Brazil were grouped into a newly formed 
company, Águas do Brazil (AdB).
To sum up, AdP implemented 
a cautious strategy of international 
expansion in those markets where it 
found the strongest affinities of culture 
and language. Alliances with other 
operators were crucial in freeing AdP 
from the constraints imposed by its lack 
of international experience.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
EDP thus embarked upon new ventures in the areas 
of telecommunications, water distribution and sewage, and 
natural gas. Taking advantage of the opportunities offered 
by the liberalization of the Portuguese telecommunications 
market, EDP went into partnership with BCP and GALP 
Energia to initiate fixed-line telephony operations through 
ONI, subsequently extending these to the mobile segment.30 
Given the powerful synergies between its different activities, 
EDP looked for new business opportunities in the water and 
sewage sector, both in Portugal and abroad (EDP, 2000, 
p. 47). Thus, the Portuguese company and its strategic partner 
Thames Water created Águas e Saneamento de Portugal 
SA (ValorÁgua) to bid for public service concessions in 
the domestic market, and acquired 51% of Empresa de 
Servicios Sanitarios del Libertador (ESSEL) in the VI 
Region of Chile, a stake which they shared equally between 
them (EDP, 2001, p. 44). Lastly, EDP strengthened its 
position in the Portuguese natural gas sector by taking an 
equity stake in GALP Energia.31 With this operation, EDP 
sought to boost the development of electricity production 
projects and consolidate its position as a service provider 
in the business of household natural gas distribution, as 
well as strengthening its presence in the energy market of 
the Iberian peninsula (see box IV.2).
In terms of internationalization, EDP set its strategic 
sights on markets with critical mass and high growth 
potential where the company could capitalize on its 
competitive advantages. In an initial phase, the Portuguese 
firm focused on Latin America (basically the electricity 
sector in Brazil, although Chile and Guatemala were also 
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Box IV.2
GALP ENERGIA: TOWARDS AN IBERIAN ENERGY MARKET?
In 1999, GALP Energia was created as part 
of the restructuring of the Portuguese energy 
sector, to operate in the areas of oil and 
natural gas. The following year, the company 
was partly privatized and two international 
strategic partners were selected: ENI of 
Italy and Iberdrola of Spain. Like most of 
the world’s hydrocarbon companies, GALP 
Energia set out to improve its oil position (oil 
being its main production input) through a 
policy of selective investments focused on 
the acquisition of stakes in high-potential 
blocks, preferably in Portuguese-speaking 
countries and in partnership with other 
international oil companies (GALP Energia, 
2006, p. 22).
At the beginning of the present decade, 
GALP Energia obtained its first significant 
results in oil production in Angola. In Brazil, 
the Portuguese firm worked with Petróleo 
Brasileiro SA (Petrobras) to acquire some 
stakes in blocks situated in the Santos 
Basin.
Nonetheless, GALP Energia chose 
to take advantage of its experience and 
installed capacity in the fuel refining 
and distribution segment by focusing its 
expansion strategy on the Iberian peninsula. 
Its first step was to acquire 5% of Compañía 
Logística de Hidrocarburos SA (CLH), 
which facilitated the development of a 
strategy in this area in the Spanish market. 
In 2004, it strengthened its presence in 
the neighbouring economy by acquiring 
a subsidiary of the British firm BP, which 
brought it an active customer base and a 
logistical platform that allowed it both to 
extend the value chain and to come closer 
to the end user. In the same area, it carried 
out a swap with Compañía Española de 
Petróleos SA (CEPSA) and Total of France, 
exchanging 79 sales outlets in Spain for 78 
service stations in Portugal. Lastly, GALP 
Energia acquired 100% of Empresa de 
Petróleos de Valencia, owner of the logistics 
area in the port of Valencia, from Total of 
France. In 2005, GALP Energia had 837 
service stations in Portugal and 223 in 
Spain (GALP Energia, 2006, p. 26).
To sum up, GALP Energia is building 
on its experience in fuel refining and 
distribution by moving towards the creation 
of an integrated logistical network in the 
Iberian peninsula. With support from the 
company’s strategic partners (ENI and 
Iberdrola), further progress can be expected 
in the coming years.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Map IV.2
ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL (EDP): INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE, 2006
32
 In Macao Special Administrative Region, EDP became the largest individual shareholder in the Companhia de Electricidade de Macau (CEM). 
In Morocco, where it acted in concert with the Spanish group Dragados, it succeeded in winning the concession to supply electricity, water and 
sewage services in Rabat, the country’s capital. EDP subsequently sold its stake in that consortium to the French group Vivendi (EDP press 
release, 22 October 2002). In Cape Verde, acting in partnership with Águas de Portugal (AdP), it emerged as the winner in the privatization of 
51% of ELECTRA, a company that produces and distributes electricity and water and provides sanitation services (EDP, 2000, p. 43).
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of EDP, Annual Report 2005, Institutional Report and Report on Corporate Governance, 
Lisbon, 30 March 2006 [online] http://www.epd.pt.
Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
included), Africa (Cape Verde, Morocco and Mozambique) 
and Asia (Macao Special Administrative Region), most of 
the markets concerned being former Portuguese colonies.32 
In a second stage, EDP concentrated on Spain, seeking to 
capitalize on the opportunities arising from full liberalization 
of the Spanish market and the future Iberian Electricity 
Market (MIBEL) (see map IV.2). Thus, EDP quickly took 
a position of leadership in the effort to internationalize the 
Portuguese economy (EDP, 2000, p. 9). In the late 1990s, 
EDP’s operations beyond the country’s borders began to 
acquire significant scale, representing some 10% of total 
assets and more customers than the firm had in Portugal 
itself (EDP, 2000, p. 39). This tendency strengthened over 
the following years (see figure IV.9).
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Figure IV.9
ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL (EDP): SALES BY ACTIVITY
AND COUNTRY, 2000-2005
(Percentages)
in. First, EDP began to concentrate more on its traditional 
core business, the electricity sector, and on the Iberian 
peninsula, an area which the company now treats as its 
domestic market because of the ongoing integration there 
(see box IV.3). Internationally, meanwhile, EDP sought to 
expand its presence in the companies in which it owned 
equity in the Brazilian market (EDP, 2003, p. 5).
The growing importance of electricity as a target sector 
for the company’s operational investment, to the detriment 
of other activities such as telecommunications, is a clear 
reflection of the new emphasis in EDP’s corporate strategy 
(see table IV.12). Also evident is the growing importance 
of the Iberian peninsula as the epicentre of the company’s 
investment effort, of particular note being the large 
investments in Spain that gave it control of electricity assets 
(Hidrocantábrico) and natural gas distributors (Naturgas) 
(see box IV.3). Outside this subregion, Brazil continues 
to play a prominent role in the strategy of the Portuguese 
company, which has increased its stakes in electricity 
distributors and developed new generating capacity. The 
Iberian peninsula has now become the main centre of the 
company’s operations, however (see table IV.13).
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Energias de Portugal (EDP).
a
 Operations in the telecommunications area are confined to the Portuguese domestic 
market.
The start of the present decade brought another clear shift 
in the corporate strategy of EDP, based on the reorganization 
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Box IV.3
LOOKING TO EUROPE? THE CREATION OF AN ELECTRICITY MARKET IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA
Since 1996, when it began the process with 
the publication of a European Union directive, 
the European Commission has been working 
to liberalize the energy sector and promote 
the creation of a single market for electricity 
in the European Union. The process has 
continued, and from 1 July 2007 member 
States are required to open up their markets 
for all users, allowing them to choose their 
electricity supplier freely (Official Journal of 
the European Union, 15 July 2003).
A number of physical and administrative 
barriers to the integration of electricity markets 
have arisen, however, such as a lack of 
cross-border interconnection capacity and 
incompatibility between local regulations for 
the sector. The initial result has been the 
creation of subregional markets, like that 
of Spain and Portugal. In late 2001, the two 
countries’ governments signed a protocol 
adopting a number of measures to integrate 
the Iberian market for electricity. The Iberian 
Electricity Market (MIBEL) was originally 
supposed to come into force on 1 January 
2003, but technical and regulatory issues 
and changes of government have repeatedly 
delayed the basic agreements needed 
to implement it. With MIBEL, the Iberian 
peninsula will become a single domestic 
market for electricity companies in the two 
countries. EDP began its preparations for 
this well in advance.
EDP was quick to realize that 
establishing operations on both sides of the 
border would give it substantial competitive 
advantages. In 1998, as a first measure, 
EDP entered into a strategic partnership 
with the Spanish electricity firm Iberdrola. 
Two years later, however, the announcement 
of a possible merger between Iberdrola and 
another Spanish company, Endesa, put an 
end to the agreement with EDP. Between 
September and October 2003, EDP sold 
its shares in Iberdrola, completely cutting 
its ownership links with the company.
After a period of analysis, EDP 
entered into a new agreement with Caja 
de Ahorros de Asturias (CajaAstur) and 
launched a public tender offer for the 
Spanish electricity firm Hidroeléctrica 
del Cantábrico (Hidrocantábrico), ending 
up with some 35% of the company. The 
main shareholders in Hidrocantábrico 
subsequently reached agreement on the 
management of the company, giving control 
to EDP.a In July 2004, in accordance with 
the company’s existing strategy for its 
international operations, EDP increased its 
stake in Hidrocantábrico from 40% to 96%, 
at a cost of 1.2 billion euros.b EDP thus 
consolidated its position as the third-largest 
electricity company in the Iberian peninsula, 
behind Endesa and Iberdrola.
The acquisition of Hidrocantábrico 
represented a great opportunity for growth in 
a strategically important market. The dynamic 
of the Spanish market and the geographical 
continuity between the two countries 
make this the natural direction for EDP to 
expand in —all the more so once MIBEL is 
in place.c By acquiring Hidrocantábrico, EDP 
has managed to adapt and position itself 
ahead of the full operation of this agreement, 
becoming the only Iberian firm to have built 
up experience in producing and distributing 
electricity on both sides of the border. What 
is more, its position could be cemented yet 
further by the good fit between EDP and 
Hidrocantábrico assets.d
At the same time, EDP tried to use 
the solid position it had attained with 
Hidrocantábrico to create integrated 
businesses in the natural gas and electricity 
sectors across the peninsula. This strategy 
was particularly important in that natural gas 
was soon to become the main generating 
fuel for the Spanish peninsular system. 
In 2003, Hidrocantábrico acquired 62% 
of NaturCorp, a natural gas distributor in 
the Basque region, for 573 million euros. 
The company was subsequently renamed 
Naturgas Energía SA (Naturgas). In 
Portugal, EDP and the Italian group ENI 
SpA tried to take over Gas de Portugal 
(GdP), which would have enabled the 
Portuguese company to enter the natural 
gas business in its domestic market. 
The European Commission blocked the 
operation, however (Bulletin of the European 
Union, 9 December 2004). Despite this 
setback, EDP carried on trying to strengthen 
its position in the Iberian market and to 
consolidate Naturgas as an integrated 
energy operator and leader in the natural 
gas sector in the Basque region. To this 
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end, Naturgas has been taking full control 
of the natural gas distribution companies 
in which it holds equity.
Naturgas has now established itself 
as Spain’s second-largest natural gas 
company, attaining a market share of 12% 
in distribution and 6% in trading. In the 
Basque region, Naturgas is the leader in 
both activities, as well as being the second-
largest electricity trader in this region (EDP 
press release, 3 May 2006). From this 
position, EDP has improved its access to 
natural gas contracts, a factor that has been 
crucial to the success of its new generating 
capacity in the Iberian peninsula, and has 
achieved major synergies thanks to the 
good operational and strategic fit between 
Hidrocantábrico and Naturgas.
EDP: OPERATIONS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA
 
 (a) Electricity (b) Natural gas
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of EDP, Relatório e contas, various years.
a
 This agreement gave EDP 40% of Hidrocantábrico’s equity, while Energie Baden-Württemberg AG (EnBW) and CajaAstur were left with stakes of 35% and 25%, respectively. 
The agreement was approved by the competition authorities of Spain and the European Union (EDP, 2002, p. 101).
b
 This acquisition was financed with a capital increase of 1.2 billion euros carried out in the Portuguese market. This operation was one of the largest financial transactions 
of the year anywhere in Europe, the largest capital increase ever seen in Portugal and the largest investment ever made by a Portuguese company in Spain (EDP, 2005, 
p. 105).
c In April 2004, the governments of Spain and Portugal signed an agreement for the creation of MIBEL. The agreement continues to be subjected to further revisions, however, 
delaying implementation.
d
 Firstly, Hidrocantábrico’s production is primarily thermal (85%), the reverse of EDP’s situation, which reduces the risks associated with hydroelectricity. Secondly, EDP has 
a very solid position in trading, again in clear contrast to Hidrocantábrico.
Table IV.12
ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL (EDP): OPERATING AND FINANCIAL 
INVESTMENT, BY ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY, 2001-2006
(Millions of euros)
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 a
A. Operating investment b 907.7 1 339.8 1 003.3 1 222.0 1 577.6 900.6
1. Energy c 568.2 940.6 891.0 1 136.7 1 507.0 879.3
(a) Iberian peninsula 478.5 818.0 757.7 851.8 1 087.6 660.8
   Portugal 478.5 733.2 687.2 736.7 740.3 323.9
   Spain 0 84.8 70.5 115.1 347.3 336.9
(b) Brazil 89.7 122.6 133.3 284.9 419.4 218.5
   Generation 40.8 55.6 58.7 195.5 255.4 81.7
   Distribution 47.2 66.8 74.2 89.2 163.4 136.6
   Other 1.6 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.2
2. Telecommunications 310.0 353.8 87.3 53.9 34.1 14.2
3. Other 29.5 45.4 24.9 31.3 36.6 7.0
B. Financial investment d 553.3 967.9 181.8 1 350.1 568.2 …
1. Energy c 471.4 921.5 100.2 1 324.9 568.2 …
(a) Iberian peninsula 262.4 541.6 100.2 1 324.9 568.2 …
   Portugal 0 21.0 0 124.1 58.8 …
   Spain 262.4 520.6 100.2 1 200.8 509.4 …
(b) Brazil 209.0 380.0 0 0 0 …
2. Telecommunications 69.6 0 0 0 0 …
3. Other 12.3 46.4 81.5 25.2 0 …
C. Total (A+B)  1 461.0 2 307.7 1 185.0 2 572.1 2 145.8 …
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




 Development and acquisition of fixed assets.
c
 Includes electricity in Portugal and Brazil and electricity and natural gas in Spain.
d
 Acquisition of equity stakes in companies.
Table IV.13
ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL (EDP): OPERATIONAL INDICATORS 
FOR LOCAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ACTIVITIES, 2005
(In MW, GWh and thousands of customers)
 Maximum Electricity Electricity Electricity Natural gas
 output produced distributed customers customers
 (MW) (GWh) (GWh) (thousands) (thousands)
Iberian peninsula 12 023 41 734 53 031 6 492 843
 Portugal 8 921 25 237 43 784 5 907 149
 Spain 3 102 16 497 9 247 585 694
Brazil 531 2 756 23 061 2 972 -
Total 12 554 44 489 76 093 9 462 843
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of EDP, Annual Report 2005, Institutional Report and Report on 
Corporate Governance, Lisbon, 30 March 2006 [online] http://www.epd.pt.
EDP’s first steps outside the borders of Portugal were 
in markets where there were strong links of culture and 
language, particularly Brazil. The Portuguese firm was one 
of the first and most active participants in the Brazilian 
privatization plan, and this enabled it to become one of 
the leading investors in the electricity sector of South 
America’s largest economy (EDP, 2001, p. 8).
Box IV.3 (concluded)
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To gain experience, EDP began cautiously as 
a participant in consortia seeking to take control of 
distribution companies. The Portuguese firm quickly began 
to implement a more active strategy, however, increasing 
its presence in companies it already had stakes in (and 
thereby becoming a significant player in this segment), 
exploring new power generation initiatives and making 
investments in other Latin American countries (Chile 
and Guatemala).
In late 1996, EDP took a minority stake in a distributor, 
Companhia de Eletricidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 
(CERJ) (now AMPLA), through which it subsequently 
acquired interests in other privatized companies such 
as Companhia Energética do Ceará (COELCE).33 The 
following year, it made its first major investment in the 
generating segment, taking a 25% stake in the Luís Eduardo 
Magalhães (Lajeado) hydroelectric plant. The company 
also made its first Latin American investment outside 
Brazil as part of a consortium led by Iberdrola of Spain 
and involving TECO Energy Inc. of the United States 
which acquired 80% of Empresa Eléctrica de Guatemala 
SA (EEGSA) for US$ 520 million.34
Having established a “bridgehead” in Brazil, EDP 
commenced the most active phase of its expansion in the 
country. In 1998, in an auction in which they were the 
only bidders, EDP and Companhia Paulista de Força e Luz 
SA (CPFL) acquired Empresa Bandeirantes de Energia 
(EBE), an electricity distribution company in the State of 
São Paulo and one of the firms into which Eletropaulo had 
been divided.35 A year later, EDP bought 73.1% of IVEN 
SA, an investment company, for US$ 535 million, thus 
acquiring an indirect stake in the Brazilian distributors 
Espírito Santo Centrais Elétricas SA (ESCELSA) and 
Empresa Energética do Mato Grosso do Sul (ENERSUL) 
(EDP press release, 25 August 1999).36 The Portuguese 
company thereby acquired a presence in electricity 
distribution in four Brazilian states (Rio de Janeiro, São 
Paulo, Espírito Santo and Mato Grosso do Sul), serving 
more customers than in Portugal and attaining a market 
share of some 15% (EDP, 2000, p. 40).
In a context of greater instability in the international 
economy and increasing competition in its domestic 
market and Europe generally, EDP began to recast its 
strategy. This meant further restructuring of the group’s 
companies and businesses in Portugal and abroad. 
Faced with the prospect of integration between the 
electricity markets of Spain and Portugal, furthermore, 
the company sought to strengthen its strategic presence 
in both countries (see box IV.3). These changes resulted 
in a major shift in its core business, which was now 
focused on the electricity sector in the Iberian peninsula 
(see table IV.14).
Table IV.14
ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL (EDP): MARKET SHARE, BY SEGMENT 
AND COUNTRY, 2006
(Percentages)
 Electricity Natural gas a
 Power generation 
Distribution Trading Distribution Trading
 Conventional Wind
Iberian
 peninsula 16 9 19 15 8 6
Brazil 1 - 8 10 - -
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of EDP, “Estratégia da EDP. Compromisso para a criação de valor: 
risco controlado, eficiência superior e crescimento orientado”, London, 19 July 
2006 [online] http://www.edp.pt.
a
 Naturgas, of which EDP is a joint owner, is the second-largest natural gas operator 
in Spain, with a market share of 12% in distribution and 6% in trading.
Seeking to build a solid and competitive platform 
from which to meet the challenge of the forthcoming 
Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL), EDP acquired a 
controlling interest in the Spanish company Hidroeléctrica 
del Cantábrico (Hidrocantábrico) in late 2002. With this 
operation, the company hoped to exploit the synergies 
resulting from its presence in Portugal and Spain (EDP, 
2002, p. 6).
In Brazil, the company implemented a far-reaching 
restructuring programme that included at least three 
core elements: reorganizing its activities in the country, 
gaining management control of the distributors in which it 
held equity, and expanding its presence in the generating 
segment.
Having taken the decision to concentrate on the 
electricity sector and raise financing for the restructuring, 
EDP sold a number of assets deemed non-strategic, such 
as those in the telephony, sewage and drinking water 
sectors, along with some of its less attractive international 
33
 In April 1998, CERJ participated in the consortium led by Endesa of Spain and Enersis of Chile which acquired COELCE (ECLAC, 2005, p. 86).
34
 The winning consortium consisted of Iberdrola (49%), TECO Energy Inc. (30%) and EDP (21%).
35
 CPFL and EDP had considered participating separately in the EBE auction. The night before, however, they decided to join forces to acquire the 
company for the reserve price, as they were the only bidders. The consortium formed by EDP (56%) and CPFL (44%) acquired 74.9% of the 
distributor’s ordinary shares for US$ 860 million (Jornal do Brazil, 18 September 1998; Folha de São Paulo, 18 September 1998; and ECLAC, 
2005, p. 86).
36
 At the time of this acquisition, the investment company IVEN SA owned 52.3% of ESCELSA, which in turn controlled 64.9% of ENERSUL’s 
equity (EDP press release, 25 August 1999 [online] http://www.edp.pt). Thus, IVEN SA controlled 34.1% of ENERSUL, a company which 
held a 30-year concession to generate and distribute electricity in the State of Mato Grosso (ECLAC, 2005, p. 138).
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operations (in Chile and Morocco).37 One of the largest 
operations was the sale of the EDP stake in Iberdrola 
(EDP, 2004, p. 14).
Thus, EDP operations in Brazil began to undergo 
major changes at the beginning of the present decade. First, 
EDP replicated the model applied in Portugal by seeking 
to simplify the structure of its operations in the country, 
grouping them into a holding company named EDP Brazil. 
The purpose of the restructuring was to create synergies 
between the different companies in which EDP had an 
interest, facilitate the reinvestment of locally generated 
resources in projects to expand production, and raise funds 
on the local financial market, thereby reducing currency 
risk (EDP, 2003, p. 43). This strengthened the company’s 
strategic capacity in Brazil and paved the way for integrated 
management of its different activities in the electricity 
production, distribution and trading segments.
To take management control of the companies in 
which it held equity, EDP made adjustments to its Brazilian 
operations in order to consolidate its position in the electricity 
distribution segment. First, it reduced its interest in CERJ by 
accepting a public tender offer from the Spanish company 
Endesa.38 Second, the Portuguese firm made a public 
tender offer for EBE, increasing its holding from 17% to 
54% and thus taking operational and managerial control of 
the company (EDP, 2001, p. 50). Not long afterwards, the 
Brazilian regulator for the sector, the Agência Nacional de 
Energía Elétrica (ANEEL) approved the break-up of EBE 
into two independent companies: Bandeirantes Energia, 
controlled by EDP, and Companhia Piratininga de Força 
e Luz, which remained in the hands of CPFL. Third, in 
late 2001 EDP signed an agreement with the Opportunity 
Investment Fund which enabled it to secure a majority of 
voting rights in IVEN SA and thus ensure management 
control over ESCELSA and ENERSUL. EDP later launched 
a public tender offer for the 17% of IVEN SA equity that 
was owned by minority shareholders.
In the midst of its consolidation, EDP was severely 
affected, like most of the electricity companies operating 
in Brazil, by the economic, climatic and regulatory 
difficulties afflicting the country (ECLAC, 2005, p. 143). 
These difficulties affected revenues, owing to falling 
demand and the devaluation of the local currency, and 
spending, as it became more expensive to meet financial 
commitments incurred in other currencies.39 The situation 
was particularly difficult for distributors, since they bought 
in some of their energy in dollar-denominated prices and 
this led to cost increases that could be passed on to final 
users only in part and after a time lag.
Progress by EDP in the generating segment centred 
on hydroelectric production. In 2001, the Luís Eduardo 
Magalhães hydroelectric plant (Lajeado, 903 MW) began 
operating; the Portuguese firm held 28% of INVESTCO, 
the consortium behind the project. That same year, EDP 
was a member of the consortia that won the concessions 
to build and operate the hydroelectric plants of Peixe 
Angical (452 MW) and Couto Magalhães (150 MW) 
(EDP, 2002, p. 4). At the same time, EDP was beginning 
to explore new options in the area of thermal production. 
In 2001, the Fafen thermoelectric plant (situated in the 
Pólo Petroquímico de Camaçari in the State of Bahia) 
came into operation; this had been built in partnership with 
Petróleo Brasileiro SA (Petrobras), EDP holding an 80% 
stake.40 As a consequence of the Brazilian energy crisis, 
furthermore, the local authorities launched the Priority 
Programme for Thermoelectric Power (PPT). This proved 
attractive to EDP and some of the companies it held stakes 
in (CERJ, ESCELSA and ENERSUL), which expressed 
their interest in a number of the projects proposed (EDP, 
2001, p. 49).41 Delays in finalizing the regulations and 
problems with natural gas supplies increased the risk 
associated with investments in thermoelectric plants, 
however, which meant that none of these projects came 
to fruition and Fafen Energia came to be classed among 
37
 In December 2001, EDP sold its 25.5% holding in ESSEL to Thames Water Plc for 78 million euros (EDP press release, 21 December 2001). 
As part of the same agreement, EDP acquired the 50% that Thames Water Plc held in ValorÁgua, thus obtaining full control of the company 
(EDP, 2002, p. 100). In November 2006, EDP sold the whole of ONI to the United States company Win Reason for 160 million euros. To realize 
this operation, EDP first had to buy the 44% of ONI’s equity held by Brisa, BCP and GALP Energia, in addition to taking on all of ONI’s bank 
debt. The operation is expected to be completed in early 2007 (Invierta, 9 November 2006 [online] http://www.invierta.com).
38
 In August 2000, EDP sold Endesa all the shares it owned apart from the controlling block in CERJ, reducing its stake from 23% to 19% (EDP, 
2001, p. 48). EDP currently owns 7.7% of CERJ (now called AMPLA), the reduction being due to capital increases in which the Portuguese 
company has not participated (EDP, 2006b, p. 92).
39
 In 2001, Brazil’s federal government approved a programme of restrictions on electricity use in response to a drought, and this remained in force 
until February 2002. The objective was to reduce demand, and the resulting behaviour patterns outlasted the programme. 
40
 This project was originally designed as a power station to supply electricity and steam to the Fábrica de Fertilizantes Nitrogenados (Fafen) 
owned by Petrobras. Surplus production was meant for other customers in the Pólo Petroquímico de Camaçari. When it proved impossible to 
sell the steam to other companies, however, the project underwent some alterations so that the surplus steam could be turned into electricity 
(EDP, 2003, p. 44).
41
 The objective of the Priority Programme for Thermoelectric Power was to meet the country’s electricity needs from 2003, and for this it proposed 
the construction of 55 thermoelectric plants with a total output of some 15,000 MW.
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the non-strategic assets of EDP. The Portuguese company 
eventually sold 80% of the Fafen power plant to Petrobras 
for US$ 35.4 million.
The company’s impetus in this segment was checked 
by Brazil’s deteriorating political and economic situation. 
In fact, EDP had to reschedule the projects to build 
the Couto Magalhães and Peixe Angical hydroelectric 
plants (EDP, 2003, p. 3).42 While the former was shelved 
indefinitely, in the second case negotiations were begun 
with financial institutions, chiefly the Banco Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), to 
see how the project might be implemented. Construction 
finally resumed in October 2003, after Eletrobrás became 
involved in the project, and was completed in 2006 (EDP, 
2004, p. 10 and EDP press release, 18 September 2006 
[online] http://www.edp.pt).43
In October 2002, EDP completed the first phase in 
the restructuring of its activities in Brazil. Thus, EDP 
Brazil SA took direct control of the generating assets, 
Enertrade Comercializadora de Energia SA and the 
distributor Bandeirantes Energia SA (EDP, 2003, p. 42). 
In 2003, the Portuguese firm concentrated on restructuring 
the electricity distribution companies over which it had 
operational control (EDP, 2003, p. 3). At the end of that 
year, EDP completed the second phase of the process 
by transferring direct control of IVEN SA, the company 
which controlled ESCELSA and ENERSUL, to EDP 
Brazil (EDP, 2004, p. 95).44 The idea was that integrated 
management of the distribution companies would allow 
EDP’s businesses in Brazil to operate more efficiently.
In early 2004, as EDP was making its strategic preference 
for the Iberian peninsula explicit, in Brazil a new regulatory 
framework was being enacted with the objective of restoring 
the possibility of medium- and long-term planning in the 
electricity sector.45 The new law provided private- and 
public-sector actors with incentives to build and maintain 
generating capacity in order to guarantee a supply of energy 
at moderate rates, by means of competitive public energy 
auctions (EDP, 2006a, p. 75).46
In this context, EDP moved ahead with restructuring 
and decided on the strategic direction for its activities in 
Brazil: self-sufficient operations and greater autonomy 
for local managers (EDP, 2004, p. 93). To achieve this, the 
company initiated a process involving a number of steps 
that were not necessarily sequential. First, integrate all the 
company’s activities in Brazil into a single organization, 
EDP Brazil. Second, persuade minority shareholders to 
migrate from the distributors (ESCELSA, ENERSUL and 
Bandeirantes) to EDP Brazil. Third, float EDP Brazil on 
the São Paulo stock exchange (BOVESPA) and design 
a mechanism to ensure share liquidity. Fourth, hive off 
generating assets that were still integrated into the distributors 
ESCELSA and ENERSUL (EDP, 2005, p. 114).
In 2005, EDP completed the reorganization of its 
activities in Brazil and grouped operations into three 
strategic areas: electricity generation, distribution and 
trading (see table IV.15 and map IV.3) (EDP, 2006a, p. 
12).47 The main objective of this measure was to comply 
with the vertical unbundling rules of the new electricity 
sector model as laid down by ANEEL, which had to be 
implemented by September 2005. In addition, the changes 
in the company’s name and visual identity implemented in 
Portugal the year before, when Electricidade de Portugal 
SA became Energias de Portugal SA, were paralleled in 
Brazil, so that EDP Brazil became Energias do Brasil 
(EDP, 2006a, p. 78).
42
 In the case of the Peixe Angical hydroelectric development, this rescheduling meant postponing the start of commercial operations. The hydroelectric 
plant’s three generators came on stream between June and September 2006 (EDP press release, 18 September 2006 [online] http://www.edp.pt). 
In the case of the Couto Magalhães hydroelectric development, construction was scheduled to begin in early 2004 and production in mid-2007 
(EDP, 2003, p. 44). In 2003, however, Couto Magalhães failed to complete the environmental, energy and engineering studies phase, and work 
was suspended. ANEEL was then asked to terminate the concession contract on an amicable basis (EDP, 2004, p. 96). During 2006, work on 
Couto Magalhães remained suspended while the regulator’s response was awaited (EDP, 2006a, p. 82).
43
 Once the negotiations had concluded, Furnas Centrais Elétricas SA (Furnas), a subsidiary of Eletrobrás, acquired a 40% interest in Peixe Angical, 
leaving EDP Brazil with the remaining 60% (EDP, 2005, p. 115). Meanwhile, BNDES provided about 40% of the project’s total financing, some 
US$ 750 million (EDP press release, 18 September 2006 [online] http://www.edp.pt).
44
 This process left EDP Brazil with 24% of IVEN’s total equity and 70% of its voting shares (EDP, 2004, p. 95).
45
 In December 2003, EDP presented its business plan for 2004-2006, whose main objectives included: (i) consolidating the competitive position 
of the company in the Iberian peninsula, (ii) strengthening the company’s assets by integrating the natural gas business, and (iii) maximizing 
the economic value of existing investments, mainly those in Brazil and in the telecommunications area. It was estimated that the plan would 
involve some 3.25 billion euros of investment, of which more than 75% would go on maintaining and expanding electricity generating capacity 
in Portugal and Spain and on extending and modernizing the distribution network in Portugal (EDP, 2004, pp. 18 and 19).
46
 The new electricity industry model law created two different sectors for energy trading. The procurement of energy for distribution companies 
takes place within what is known as the regulated procurement sector and is based on energy auctions, while the market for producers, unregulated 
consumers and energy trading companies is called the unregulated procurement sector and has more flexible trading rules. The law also established 
a requirement for vertical unbundling of companies to separate distribution from generation and transport.
47
 In the generating business, Energest took over the management of CESA, Costa Rica and Pantanal Energética, keeping two power stations 
separate (EDP Lajeado and Enerpeixe). In trading, Enertrade, which operates in the unregulated market, was consolidated. In distribution, lastly, 
the operators are Bandeirantes, ESCELSA and ENERSUL (EDP, 2006a, p. 78).
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Table IV.15
ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL (EDP): MAIN ASSETS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN ELECTRICITY SECTOR, 2006
  Percentage Generation or transmission Year of Year full-capacity
 Company control capacity or number entry output began
   of customers
Brazil Generation
 Luís Eduardo Magalhães (Lajeado) hydroelectric plant 27.7 a b 902.5 MW 1997 2002
 Peixe Angical hydroelectric development 60.0 a c 452 MW 2001 2006
 Energest d 100.0 a 276.9 MW 1999 
  - Suíça hydroelectric plant 100.0 a 30.1 MW 1999 
  - Mascarenhas hydroelectric plant 100.0 a 131.0 MW 1999 
  - Castelo Energética (CESA) 100.0 a 58.5 MW 1999 
  - Costa Rica 51.0 a 16.5 MW 1999 
  - Pantanal Energética e 100.0 a 40.8 MW 1999 
 Couto Magalhães hydroelectric development 49.0 a f  150 MW 2001 …
 Distribution
 Bandeirantes Energia SA 100.0 a 1 283 000 1998 -
 Espírito Santo Centrais Elétricas SA (ESCELSA) 100.0 a 1 031 000 1999 -
 Empresa Energética Mato Grosso do Sul (ENERSUL) 100.0 a 658 000 1999 -
 Trading
 Enertrade 100.0 a - ... -
Guatemala Empresa Eléctrica de Guatemala SA (EEGSA) 17.0  680 000 1997 -
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Energias de Portugal (EDP), Annual Report 2005, Lisbon, 30 March 2006 [online] 
http://www.edp.pt.
a
 Held by Energias do Brasil, the conglomerate grouping EDP’s assets in Brazil. In 2005, following a wide-ranging restructuring process, EDP came to control 67.5% of Energias 
do Brasil equity.
b
 The Luís Eduardo Magalhães (Lajeado) hydroelectric plant was built by Investco SA, a consortium whose participants, besides Energias do Brasil, were Grupo Rede (43.3%), 
Companhia Energética de Brasilia (CEB) (20%) and CMS Energy (20%).
c
 The company responsible for building the Peixe Angical hydroelectric development is Enerpeixe SA, whose equity is divided between Energias do Brasil (60%) and Furnas 
Centrais Elétricas SA (40%), a subsidiary of Eletrobrás.
d
 Includes the generating assets of the distributor ESCELSA.
e
 Includes the generating assets of the distributor ENERSUL.
f
 The company responsible for the Couto Magalhães concession is the EnerRede Couto Magalhães consortium, in which Energias do Brasil holds 49% and Grupo Rede the 
remaining 51%.  Work on this plant has been suspended pending a decision by the Agência Nacional de Energia Eléctrica (ANEEL) on the consortium’s request for amicable 
termination of the concession contract.
Map IV.3
ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL (EDP): OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL, 2006
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of EDP, Annual Report 2005, Institutional Report and Report on Corporate Governance, 
Lisbon, 30 March 2006 [online] http://www.epd.pt.
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In this way, the entire equity of the distributors 
(Bandeirantes, ESCELSA and ENERSUL) was transferred 
to Energias do Brasil. This involved an equity swap 
between EDP and minority shareholders in these 
companies (EDP, 2006a, p. 77). This latter operation 
had a twofold benefit: it made it possible to adopt a 
good model of vertical unbundling that avoided fiscal 
and operational inefficiencies, and it provided greater 
room for manoeuvre in redesigning the company’s 
organizational structure in Brazil (EDP, 2006a, p. 77). 
In mid-2005, furthermore, the shares of Energias do 
Brasil began to be traded on BOVESPA and US$ 480 
million was raised, the largest operation of this type 
that year (EDP, 2006a, p. 78 and p. 112).48 When the 
company’s equity was floated, EDP kept 62.4% of 
Energias do Brasil while the remaining 37.6% was 
traded on BOVESPA, a higher proportion than the 
required minimum (see figure IV.10).
Figure IV.10




BRAZIL: MARKET SHARE OF THE MAIN OPERATORS,
BY SEGMENT, 2005
(Percentages)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Energias do Brasil [online] http://www.energiasdoBrazil.com.br.
The most important segment for Energias do Brasil 
is now distribution, where Bandeirantes, ESCELSA and 
ENERSUL operate. It distributes energy to a total of 
around 3 million customers in the states of São Paulo, 
Espírito Santo and Mato Grosso do Sul, representing a 
population of almost 10 million inhabitants (EDP, 2006a, 
p. 83). By 2005, Enertrade had become one of the most 
active trading companies in the market, especially in the 
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 Once this operation was finalized, the shares issued by Bandeirantes, ESCELSA and ENERSUL ceased to be quoted on BOVESPA (EDP, 
2006a, p. 78).
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28%
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of EDP, “Estratégia da EDP. Compromisso para a criação de valor: 
risco controlado, eficiência superior e crescimento orientado”, London, 19 July 
2006 [online] http://www.edp.pt.
Generating activities have grown strongly in the past few 
years. In late 2005, the installed capacity of Energest was 276.9 
MW and it was responsible for running the Mascarenhas and 
Suíça hydroelectric facilities in addition to three companies, 
CESA, Costa Rica and Pantanal Energética. The firm received 
these assets during the corporate reorganization of Energias 
do Brasil, in April 2005, and the vertical unbundling that took 
place in June that same year (EDP, 2006a, p. 81). In late 2006, 
with the completion of the Peixe Angical plant and the fourth 
turbine at the Mascarenhas facility, the generating capacity 
of Energias do Brasil reached 1,018 MW (see table IV.16). 
In addition, Energias do Brasil has two other projects under 
construction: the São João small hydroelectric station (25 
MW), which was intended to come into operation in 2006, 
and the Santa Fé small hydroelectric station (30 MW), whose 
inauguration is scheduled for early 2009 (EDP press release, 
4 October 2006 [online] http://www.edp.pt.
To sum up, EDP’s strategy in Brazil has consisted in 
acquiring diversified, complementary assets to build a presence 
in all segments: electricity generation, distribution and trading. 
Starting out from a strong position in the distribution segment, 
the company has been steadily expanding its generating 
capacity. Following a difficult period, the situation of the 
Portuguese company was eased considerably by a review 
of distribution charges and a debt refinancing operation in 
which BNDES played a central role. Thus, the company’s 
global strategy currently focuses, among other things, on 
expanding and strengthening its position in Brazil and 
reorganizing its asset structure.
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Table IV.16





Energy contracts Start of operations
Lajeado hydroelectric plant 250 a … Contracts with Bandeirantes and 




266 … PPA and contracts with EDP distributors -
Total December 2005 516
Peixe Angical hydroelectric plant 452 740 100% through PPA June 2006: 151 MW
July 2006: 151 MW
October 2006: 151 MW
Mascarenhas hydroelectric plant 
(fourth unit) b
50 30 100% in auctions 
(US$ 51.85 - December 2005) October 2006
Total December 2006 1 018
São João hydroelectric plant 25 41 100% through PPA January 2007
Santa Fé hydroelectric plant 30 49 100% in auctions
(US$ 55.84 – June 2006) January 2009
Projects under construction 55
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of EDP, “Estratégia da EDP. Compromisso para a criação de valor: risco controlado, 
eficiência superior e crescimento orientado”, London, 19 July 2006 [online] http://www.edp.pt.
a
 Percentage of installed capacity belonging to EDP (27.65% of 902.5 MW).
b
 In October 2006, Energias do Brasil brought the fourth power plant of the Mascarenhas hydroelectric facility into commercial operation (EDP press release, 4 October 2006 
[online] http://www.edp.pt).
3. The cement industry: a Portuguese-speaking company
 in the top ten?
The cement market in Portugal is dominated by two firms: 
Cimentos de Portugal (CIMPOR) and Companhia Geral 
de Cal e Cimento (SECIL).49 Given the concentration 
and consolidation of the cement industry worldwide, 
and particularly in Europe, and the saturation of their 
domestic market, Portuguese producers started to look 
for opportunities outside their national borders.50 The 
pioneer was CIMPOR, which extended its operations 
to markets chosen for their geographical and cultural 
proximity to Portugal. In the early 1990s, CIMPOR 
extended its activities to Spain and then to emerging 
markets in the Mediterranean basin (Egypt, Morocco, 
Tunisia), Africa (Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique 
and South Africa), Latin America (Brazil) and, recently, 
China. At the beginning of the present decade, SECIL 
followed in its footsteps, entering the markets of Angola 
(2000), Tunisia (2000) and Lebanon (2002).
In the mid-1970s, the Portuguese cement industry 
was nationalized, leading to the creation of CIMPOR 
and the transformation of SECIL into a partially State-
owned private-sector company. In 1994, the process was 
reversed and the privatization of the sector began. Thus, 
SECIL passed wholly into the private sector and CIMPOR 
completed the first phase of its privatization by transferring 
20% of equity to private investors. The privatization of 
CIMPOR went through three further stages between 1996 
and 2001, by which time the whole of its equity had been 
transferred to private-sector agents.51
As the company’s privatization proceeded and 
competition intensified in the country and the region, 
CIMPOR began to see the Iberian peninsula as a natural 
area for expansion. In 1992, it acquired the Spanish cement 
and concrete manufacturer Corporación Noroeste SA, 
which had its headquarters in the frontier town of Vigo 
49
 SECIL was created in 1930 as a result of the merger between Sociedade de Emprendimentos Comerciais e Industriais, Lda. (SECIL) and 
Companhia Geral de Cal e Cimento and the participation of the Danish companies F.L. Smidth & Co. A/S and Hojgaard & Schultz A/S.
50
 The global market for cement is limited. The ratio between weight and price ultimately makes exports unviable, particularly to far-off destinations. 
This means that external sales are made only to nearby countries or to places where there is a market for large volumes. Furthermore, cement 
is perishable.
51
 The second phase of the CIMPOR privatization was completed in 1996, when 45% of the company was transferred to private investors. The 
third stage began a year and a half later, with a further 25% of the company’s equity being floated on the market. The State was left with 10% at 
that time. Finally, in June 2001, the process was completed and the Portuguese State sold all its remaining shares in CIMPOR to the engineering 
and construction company Teixeira Duarte SA.
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and factories in Oural and Toral de los Vados. With this 
operation, the Portuguese firm gained a market share 
of about 4% in Spain and over 50% in the autonomous 
community of Galicia (Cinco Días, 14 November 2002). 
Ten years later, CIMPOR took advantage of a planned asset 
sale by Lafarge, the world leader in the industry, to acquire 
factories in Córdoba and Niebla, a port terminal in Seville 
and a package of mining rights, all in the Andalusia region 
(CIMPOR, 2003, p. 1). This operation cost the Portuguese 
firm 225 million euros (Cinco Días, 14 November 2002). As 
with the company’s first incursion into the Spanish market, 
the assets acquired on this occasion were also close to the 
border with Portugal, in this case its southern end, which 
created the potential for substantial operating synergies. 
With this acquisition, CIMPOR became the second-largest 
producer in the Iberian peninsula (after CEMEX of Mexico) 
and the tenth-largest in the world (Europa Press, 16 March 
2004 and CIMPOR, 2006, p. 2).
CIMPOR did not confine its internationalization strategy 
to Spain, however. Rather, it sought to create a balanced 
external presence by making new investments in emerging 
economies. Thus, like most major companies in the industry, 
the Portuguese firm looked for opportunities in markets 
with high growth potential, even at the cost of higher risk, 
progressively combining these with its operations in the 
Iberian peninsula. The Spanish and Portuguese markets had 
little room for growth, but they had the great advantage of 
generating hard currency revenues.
On this premise, the Portuguese company sought to 
combine geographical proximity with cultural and linguistic 
affinity. Between 1994 and 2000, CIMPOR went into some 
of the leading African markets in the Mediterranean basin 
(Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) and the former Portuguese 
colony of Mozambique.52 Since then, during the 2000s, it 
has continued to expand its presence in Africa (Angola,53 
Cape Verde and South Africa) and entered the world’s 
largest cement market, China54 (see table IV.17).
At the same time, CIMPOR was making large investments 
in the world’s largest Portuguese-speaking economy, Brazil. 
In 1997, it acquired Companhia de Cimento do São Francisco 
(CISAFRA) in Campo Formoso (Bahia) and the cement 
business of Grupo Serrana (Bunge) (two units in Rio Grande 
do Sul and one in São Paulo), leading to the creation of 
Sociedade de Cimento do Brazil SA (CIMPOR do Brasil). 
Two years later, CIMPOR strengthened its position in the 
country by acquiring three companies from the Brennand 
group (Cimentos Goiás, Companhia de Cimento Atol and 
Companhia de Cimento Pórtland) for US$ 594 million 
(ECLAC, 2001, p. 77). In 2002, it continued to strengthen 
its presence in north-east Brazil after acquiring Cimentos 
Brumado (Bahia) from Lafarge of France for 93 million 
euros (CIMPOR press release, 2 May 2002). All this left 
the Portuguese group solidly placed as Brazil’s third-largest 
producer, accounting for about 10% of local production, 
and very strongly positioned in the markets of the country’s 
north-east and centre-west (see table IV.18). The Brazilian 
operation is currently the company’s largest outside the Iberian 
peninsula, accounting for about 18% of global production 
and 15% of revenue (see figure IV.12).
Table IV.17
CIMENTOS DE PORTUGAL: MAIN OPERATIONS,
BY COUNTRY, 2006
 Installed Market   
 capacity share Cement Starting Concrete
 (thousands (%) factories year plants
 of tons)
Portugal 6 900 52.2 Alhandra  60
    Souselas  
    Loulé  
Spain 2 700 7.8 Oural 1992 74
    Toral de los Vados 1992 
    Niebla 2002 
    Córdoba 2002 
Brazil 5 745 9.8 Campo Formoso 1997 25
    Candiota 1997 
    Cajati 1997 
    Cimepar 1999 
    Atol 1999 
    Goiás 1999 
Morocco 1 245 8.8 Asment de Témara 1996 4
Tunisia 1 600 24.1 Jbel Oust 1998 -
Egypt 3 810 8.8 Amreyah 2000 
Mozambique 730 83.3 Matola 1994 3
South Africa 1 020 10.1 Simuma 2002 5
Cape Verde a 63.4  2005 -
China ... ... Shandong Liuyuan 2006 ...
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Cimentos de Portugal SGPS SA (CIMPOR).
a
 In Cape Verde, CIMPOR carries out cement importing, storage, packaging and 
distribution. It does not produce cement there.
Table IV.18
BRAZIL: CEMENT PRODUCTION BY GROUP, 1996-2005
(Thousands of tons)
Group Origin 1996 2005
Votorantim Brazil 16 615 14 473
João Santos Brazil 2 450 4 975
CIMPOR Portugal 1 359 3 682
Holcim Switzerland 4 145 2 948
Camargo Corrêa Brazil 1 618 2 902
Lafarge France 3 806 2 500
Others - 4 838 5 194
Total  34 831 36 673
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the Sindicato Nacional da Indústria do Cimento 
(SNIC).
52
 In 1994, CIMPOR acquired 51% of Empresa de Cimentos de Mozambique SA, and in 1995 it bought 51% of a Moroccan company, Asment 
de Témara. In 1998, the company continued to reinforce its internationalization by purchasing Société des Ciments de Jebel Oust in Tunisia. In 
2000, CIMPOR entered Egypt, acquiring Armella Cement Company.
53
 CIMPOR acquired 49% of the Angolan cement manufacturer Nova Cimangola in 2004, but sold this stake in 2006.
54
 In late 2006, CIMPOR bought 60% of the Chinese company Shandong Liuyuan New Type Cement Development for 2.1 million euros (El 
Economista, 17 October 2006).
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Figure IV.12
CIMPOR: SALES BY REGION, 2001-2005
(Millions of euros)
To sum up, CIMPOR has internationalized rapidly, 
establishing itself as a major player in the Iberian peninsula, 
a market which accounts for some 60% of total sales, with 
Portugal representing 34%. Meanwhile, operations further 
afield in the Mediterranean basin, Africa and Latin America 
have been increasing in importance (see figure IV.12). 
Brazil features particularly prominently in this group. In 
South America’s largest economy, the Portuguese firm has 
succeeded in establishing itself as the third-largest local 
producer, overtaking the two giants of the world industry, 
Lafarge and Holcim (see table IV.18). CIMPOR has also 
been expanding its product range by moving into related 
businesses such as the manufacture of concrete and other 
building materials. The company will probably carry on 
making new acquisitions, with priority going to the emerging 
markets where it already operates, but without neglecting 
the need to balance this with a good presence in mature, 
consolidated markets where lower growth potential is made 
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4. Retailing: losing the war with the major international chains
In the late 1950s, Sociedade Gestora de Participações 
Sociais SA (Sonae SGPS), originally Sociedade Nacional de 
Estratificados SARL, was created to produce wooden panels 
for construction (see box IV.4). In the 1980s, coinciding with 
the country’s entry into the European Union, the Portuguese 
firm began a period of rapid expansion and diversification, 
entering the food retailing industry in partnership with 
the French group Promodés (when it introduced Modelo 
Continente supermarkets) and then the real estate business, 
building shopping centres adjacent to its premises (see box 
IV.5). At the same time, the company began to invest in new 
areas such as telecommunications, information technology, 
entertainment and tourism. Retailing-related activities currently 
account for over 60% of group sales (see figure IV.13).
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Cimentos de Portugal SGPS, SA (CIMPOR).
Box IV.4
THE ORIGINS OF PORTUGAL’S LARGEST NON-FINANCIAL GROUP
Very early in its existence, Sociedade 
Gestora de Participações Sociais SA (Sonae 
SGPS) began to diversify around its main 
business, wood panelling for construction. 
To expand the range of products it supplied 
(melamine coatings and components 
for furniture and decoration), it acquired 
companies in the local market. Sonae 
also began operating in the industrial 
chemicals sector, producing melamine 
and phenolic resins.
In the 1980s, the company implemented 
an ambitious expansion project, including 
major investments to increase installed 
capacity in component and coating 
manufacture. In addition, Sonae set out 
to become the dominant player in the 
chipboard segment in Portugal by acquiring 
what was at the time the largest company 
in the business, Agloma. Between 1987 
and 1989, Sonae consolidated its position 
in the local market by acquiring SIAF and 
Paivopan and began to internationalize 
its operations by purchasing Spanboard 
of Northern Ireland.
By the early 1990s, Sonae was 
the largest non-financial group in 
Portugal. As part of the reorganization 
of the conglomerate, it grouped its wood 
businesses under Sonae Indústria SGPS, 
which initiated a major expansion and 
internationalization of its operations. By 
acquiring a controlling interest in one of 
the two largest Spanish groups in the 
industry, Tableros y Fibras SA (TAFISA) 
in Valladolid, Sonae Indústria became the 
leader of the board sector in the Iberian 
peninsula and one of the four largest 
producers in Europe. In 1994, Sonae 
Indústria expanded its operations into 
Canada, opening a chipboard factory in 
Lac-Mégantic. At the same time, it initiated 
trading activities in Brazil and two African 
countries (Mozambique and South Africa), 
soon to be supplemented by production 
operations. In 1997, Sonae Indústria 
invested some US$ 100 million in a new 
medium-density fibreboard (MDF) factory 
in Paraná, Brazil.
In 1998, acting through its Spanish 
subsidiary TAFISA, Sonae Indústria acquired 
85% of Glunz AG of Germany. With this 
operation, the Portuguese company became 
the world leader in the wood derivatives 
sector. It also expanded its industrial base 
to Germany and France and extended its 
product range to include oriented strand 
board (OSB), softboard and plywood. It also 
expanded its presence in Spain, basically 
in resin production. In 2005, Sonae SGPS 
spun off Sonae Indústria. Once this operation 
was complete, Sonae was left with 6.7% 
of Sonae Indústria’s equity.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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Figure IV.13
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Sonae SGPS.
a
 In Brazil this includes only 11 months of 2005, as Sonae’s operations were sold to 
Wal-Mart in December.
b
 In Brazil this includes only the 9 months in 2005 before Sonae Indústria was spun 
off.
By the late 1980s, Sonae was the largest non-financial 
conglomerate in Portugal and one of the largest in the 
European distribution sector. It was then that the company 
initiated a bold internationalization process, centring on 
Brazil (see figure IV.14). Its initial link with the country 
came through a partnership with a local firm, Josapar with 
which it created Companhia Real de Distribuição (CRD) 
based in the State of Rio Grande do Sul. In 1990, it acted 
through this company to open the first hypermarket in 
the city of Porto Alegre. In 1997, the Portuguese group 
took full ownership of CRD and initiated an ambitious 
expansion process centred on the states of Rio Grande do 
Sul, Santa Catarina, Paraná and São Paulo, in the south 
of the country (see map IV.4). To capitalize on synergies 
with the retailing business, Sonae also moved ahead in the 
property development business, specializing in shopping 
centres (see box IV.5).
Retailing used to be highly fragmented in Brazil, with 
low operating margins and a large investment deficit, and 
it faced intense competition from the informal sector. As a 
result, the entry of foreign capital into the industry was seen 
as highly desirable, and this led to a high level of penetration 
by international operators: Sonae, as well as Carrefour and 
Casino of France, Royal Ahold of the Netherlands and, more 












1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Portugal Brazil
Figure IV.14
SONAE: NUMBER OF RETAIL OUTLETS, BY COUNTRY,
1999-2005 a
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Modelo Continente SGPS, SA.
a
  In December 2005, Sonae sold all its assets in Brazil to Wal-Mart of the United 
States.
Map IV.4
SONAE: MARKET SHARE IN BRAZIL, BY STATE, 2005 a
(Percentages)
    (%)
São Paulo    3.4
Paraná  23.1
Santa Catarina 15.4
Rio Grande do Sul 32.3
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Modelo Continente SGPS, SA.
a
  In December 2005, Sonae sold all its assets in Brazil to Wal-Mart of the United 
States.
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 In 1999, which was a particularly testing time for the Brazilian economy, four chains (Exxtra, Nacional, Coletão and Muffatão) were integrated into 
Sonae’s operations in Brazil, giving it a total of 169 outlets and US$ 1.42 billion in sales, more than double its revenue the previous year. Sonae’s 
operations were concentrated in four states that between them accounted for over 50% of Brazil’s GDP (Sonae Distribução, 2000, pp. 14-16).
Box IV.5
THE SONAE GROUP: FROM SUPERMARKETS TO SHOPPING CENTRES?
Portuguese direct investment in the Brazilian 
property sector has been dominated by a 
subsidiary of the Sonae group, Sonae Sierra 
(formerly Sonae Imobiliária). The company 
began operating in Portugal in 1989. Sonae 
Sierra is currently controlled in equal parts by 
Grupo Sonae SGPS and Grosvenor Plc of the 
United Kingdom. The company’s operations 
have dovetailed perfectly with the group’s 
activities in the retailing sector.
Sonae Sierra currently owns stakes in 
40 shopping centres in Europe (Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and South 
America (Brazil), and is implementing 15 
new projects in the six countries where 
it operates (Sonae Sierra, 2006, p. 3). 
Its internationalization has been based 
on partnerships with local actors, and 
Brazil is no exception. In that country, the 
Portuguese firm forged an alliance with 
Enplanta Engenharia, a Brazilian company 
with great experience of shopping centre 
management. This partnership gave birth to 
Sonae Enplanta SA (now Sierra Enplanta), 
half-owned by each company, which began 
by operating five shopping centres owned 
by Enplanta Engenharia. Sierra Enplanta 
now has nine shopping centres in the 
country, eight in the State of São Paulo 
and one in Brasilia.
SONAE SIERRA: SHOPPING CENTRES IN BRAZIL, 2006
 Shopping centre Location Area (m2) Outlets Opening date
 1 Shopping Metrópole São Bernardo do Campo, São Paulo 24 825 157 1980
 2 Shopping Penha Penha, São Paulo 30 000 247 1992
 3 Franca Shopping Franca, São Paulo 18 000 97 1993
 4 Plaza Sul Shopping São Paulo 26 569 226 1994
 5 Parque Don Pedro Campinas, São Paulo 115 000 370 1997
 6 Pátio Brasil Brasilia, DF 31 600 193 1997
 7 Trivoli Shopping Santa Bárbara, São Paulo 22 000 135 1998
 8 Boavista Shopping St. Amaro, São Paulo 24 000 167 2004
 9 Shopping Campo Limpo São Paulo 20 000 151 2006
 10 Manaus Shopping Manaus, Amazonas 43 126 252 2008 a
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Sonae Sierra, Passionate About Innovation, Lisbon, 8 November 2006.
a
  Under development.
The most important of all these operations 
would appear to be the Parque Dom Pedro 
in Campinas, State of São Paulo, one of the 
cities with the highest per capita income in 
Brazil. This shopping centre was inaugurated 
in 2002 with an initial investment of some 
80 million euros, making it the largest of its 
kind in the country (370 outlets, nine anchor 
stores, multiplex cinemas, etc.).
However, poor GDP growth and the 
consequent squeeze on consumption 
have meant that the company’s results 
have come in below expectations. Sonae 
Sierra has nonetheless continued with its 
expansion strategy in Brazil. In 2004, it 
inaugurated Boavista Shopping in Santo 
Amaro, one of the most heavily populated 
areas in the city of São Paulo, for which it 
invested 20 million euros. It also spent some 
11 million euros remodelling the Shopping 
Penta shopping centre. In 2006, it opened 
the Shopping Campo Limpo shopping 
centre in São Paulo, investing 20 million 
euros, and began the construction of a 
new shopping centre in the city of Manaus 
that will cost it 60 million euros (Sonae 
Sierra, 2006, p. 17). In addition to these 
operations, the company plans to invest a 
further 160 million euros by 2010 in building, 
expanding and remodelling shopping 
centres in Brazil in the expectation that 
conditions will improve. Porto Alegre and 
Florianopolis (Santa Catarina) have been 
selected as the first cities to benefit from 
these likely new investments (Portugal 
Digital, 14 December 2005).
In October 2006, Sonae Sierra signed 
an agreement with a United States firm, 
Developers Diversified, to sell half its 
operations in Brazil for US$ 150 million 
(El Economista, 21 October 2006). In 
addition, the two companies agreed to 
invest some US$ 300 million between them 
in acquisitions and new projects in Brazil 
over the coming three years (Sonae Sierra 
press release, 23 October 2006). According 
to the company, this commitment will not 
alter its strategy in Brazil, as happened 
in the retail segment. In fact, the idea is 
that the agreement should turn Sonae 
Sierra into the two shareholders’ platform 
for future shopping centre investment 
and promotion in Brazil (El Economista, 
21 October 2006).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
In 1998, Sonae entered into a joint venture with a 
São Paulo firm, Cândia Mercantil Norte Sul, giving birth 
to Sonae Distribuição Brazil SA (SDB). The partnership 
lasted just a few months, after which the Portuguese firm 
acquired the whole of Cândia’s operations. To continue 
strengthening its position in its core markets, furthermore, 
Sonae quickly made further acquisitions of major operators. 
In Paraná it took over the chains of Mercadorama (the 
state’s largest), Coletão and Muffatão. In this period, the 
Portuguese group took control of five of the 10 largest 
supermarket operators in the State of Paraná and carried 
through a process of unprecedented concentration in the city 
of Curitiba (Cardoso de Lima, 2005, p. 15). In Rio Grande do 
Sul, it bought the network of Exxtra Econômico and Redes 
Nacional. Thus, in less than two years Sonae consolidated 
its leadership in the markets of Brazil’s southern region and 
rose to become the country’s third-largest retailer (Sonae 
Distribução, 2000, p. 6).55
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2006 177
From this solid position, Sonae continued to strengthen 
its operations and corporate image in Brazil. To do this, it 
embarked upon a wide-ranging programme of consolidation 
and rationalization that built on the most widely accepted 
brands in the subregional markets concerned, such as 
Nacional and Mercadorama, and extended the hypermarket 
format (under the Big brand name) to all areas where 
it had a presence. Sonae also continued to standardize 
operating procedures and systems in its different chains 
(Modelo Continente, 2001, p. 10). In the early part of the 
present decade, the Portuguese company achieved strong 
growth in Brazil by opening new outlets, particularly 
hypermarkets, and thereby achieving a substantial increase 
in sales (see figure IV.15).
Figure IV.15
SONAE: GROSS SALES, BY COUNTRY, 1998-2005 a
(Millions of euros)
56
 The company also invested in remodelling its stores and bringing in new specialized retail formats for electronics, household electrical appliances, 
clothing and fuels (Modelo Continente, 2003, p. 8). In 2004, it also signed an agreement with a financial institution that enabled it to offer credit 
cards to the customers of its supermarket chains (Modelo Continente, 2005, p. 6).
company concentrated on rationalizing its operations in 
the Brazilian market, which included the closure of some 
outlets.56 Sonae dropped from third- to fourth-largest 
among the country’s retailers during this period and its 
operations remained concentrated in the south of Brazil, 
especially Rio Grande do Sul (see figure IV.17) (Modelo 
Continente, 2004, p. 42).
Figure IV.16
SONAE: GROSS SALES IN BRAZIL, IN REAIS AND EUROS,
1999-2005 a
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Modelo Continente SGPS, SA.
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  In December 2005, Sonae sold all its assets in Brazil to Wal-Mart of the United 
States.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Modelo Continente SGPS, SA.
a
  In December 2005, Sonae sold all its assets in Brazil to Wal-Mart of the United 
States.
In 2002, at a time of instability in the world economy, 
Brazil went through a particularly difficult period dominated 
by the election timetable and a lack of confidence among 
consumers and investors. The local currency, the real, 
continued to depreciate against the euro and interest 
rates rose steadily, severely affecting business dynamism 
and the consumption capacity of the population. In these 
circumstances, Sonae’s euro revenues fell sharply, and 
as a result the rate of installed capacity growth in the 
Brazilian market was dramatically lower than in earlier 
years (see figure IV.16) (Modelo Continente, 2003, 
p. 7). Like most of its peers in the sector, the Portuguese 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Modelo Continente SGPS, SA.
a
  In December 2005, Sonae sold all its assets in Brazil to Wal-Mart of the United 
States.
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In 2004, the retail industry recovered strongly along 
with the economy as a whole. At the same time, competition 
began to intensify and the industry concentrated rapidly 
as the large operators took advantage of the fragility of 
the smaller chains to make numerous acquisitions. The 
world leader in the industry, Wal-Mart of the United 
States, expanded strongly by purchasing the Bompreço 
chain from Royal Ahold of the Netherlands (ECLAC, 
2005, p. 61). In the meantime, Sonae continued with its 
cautious strategy of organic growth, focused mainly on 
the hypermarket segment.
Given the circumstances, the Portuguese company 
began to look seriously at the possibility of withdrawing 
from the Brazilian market. In mid-2005, it sold 10 Big 
hypermarkets in the metropolitan area of São Paulo to 
Carrefour of France for 105 million euros. The Portuguese 
company initially announced that it would keep the seven 
outlets it still owned in São Paulo and use the funds 
raised by the sale to strengthen its position in the south 
of the country (Diário de Notícias, 10 July 2005). At 
the end of the year, however, Sonae sold all its assets in 
Brazil, a total of 141 outlets, to Wal-Mart for US$ 750 
57
 With this acquisition, Wal-Mart became Brazil’s third-largest retailer with 295 outlets in 17 of the country’s 26 states, behind Carrefour and Companhia 
Brasileira de Distribuição (CBD), which has the backing of the French group Casino (The Wall Street Journal Americas, 15 December 2005).
58
 The cities most visited by Portuguese tourists are those of the Atlantic coast and the north-east, particularly Recife in the State of Pernambuco 
(27%), Fortaleza in the State of Ceará (25%), Salvador in the State of Bahia (24%) and Rio de Janeiro in the State of Rio de Janeiro (16%) 
(Diário económico, 27 July 2006).
million (ECLAC, 2006a, p. 26) (see figure IV.17). This 
was a key operation for Wal-Mart, since it had not had 
a presence in the country’s south until then.57
Thus, Sonae completely pulled out of retailing 
in Brazil, a decision it took in the belief that in all 
likelihood this could not be made profitable enough to 
justify the opportunity cost of alternative investments 
(Modelo Continente, 2006, p. 10). From the company’s 
perspective, this problem could only be solved by 
participating actively in the consolidation of the country’s 
retail industry. To cope with the high levels of informal 
operations in the sector, it would have had to grow 
substantially to achieve economies of scale. This would 
have meant heavy investment to acquire new assets 
and expand its supermarket chains. Yet economic and 
political volatility, combined with high interest rates, 
made future investments in Brazil very risky, and it was 
this that ultimately convinced the firm to pull out of the 
country (Modelo Continente, 2006, p. 10). In addition, 
the conglomerate was involved in one of the greatest 
challenges in its history, a hostile takeover bid for Portugal 
Telecom (PT), for which it needed liquidity.
5. Real estate and tourism: smaller investors looking for a place
 in the Brazilian sun
Investments by Portuguese companies in the real estate 
and tourism sector have grown very substantially in the 
last few years. Brazil is now one of the main recipients 
of Portuguese capital and the leading destination for 
Portuguese companies operating abroad. The firms that 
have invested in these areas vary enormously in size and 
profile and have implemented their projects throughout 
the country. They have employed all sorts of mechanisms, 
operating alone or in partnership with local groups, using 
their own resources or raising funds locally or externally. 
Many of these investments are in projects in the tourism 
sector, which basically revolves around middle- and 
high-income European travellers.
Portugal has been developing a strong tourism sector 
since the 1970s, and the industry now represents some 10% 
of the country’s GDP. Portuguese investors began to pay 
attention to Brazil because with its ample supply of cheap 
land, exceptionally good year-round climate and convenience 
of access and language it represented an excellent alternative 
to their increasingly saturated domestic market and its high 
investment costs. Businesses in the sector benefited from 
a large increase in flights operated by Transportes Aéreos 
Portugueses (TAP) to Brazil, with some 50 services a week 
that included daily flights to Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Natal 
and Fortaleza. Thus, Portugal has become the third-largest 
source of tourists visiting Brazil.58
In terms of geographical distribution, most Portuguese 
tourism investments have been in the north-east of the 
country, especially the states of Ceará, Bahia and Rio Grande 
do Norte. Some tourism investments in the south-eastern 
states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo and in Curitiba in the 
south (State of Paraná) are also of some strategic interest. 
The majority are gated condominiums built alongside 
luxury hotels to form resorts with golf courses and other 
collective leisure facilities. They have involved considerable 
investment, most of it by the largest Portuguese groups 
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complex under construction in the municipality of Aquiraz, 
25 kilometres from Fortaleza in the State of Ceará. The 
project will cover an area of 280 hectares and will involve the 
construction of eight hotels, six pousadas, 700 apartments, a 
golf course and an equestrian centre, among other facilities, 
at a cost of some 260 million euros (Portugal Digital, 
16 November 2005 and Noticias Governo Municipal de 
Aquiraz, 21 October 2006). Construction of this tourism 
complex, which will be the largest in Latin America, 
began in early 2007 and the first phase is expected to be 
completed in 2008. The participants in this megaproject 
are a Portuguese consortium consisting of Banco Privado 
Portugués (BPP),60 the Dom Pedro hotel group and the 
Sol Verde tourism group, and a Brazilian businessman of 
Portuguese origin, Ivan Dias Branco, with each side holding 
a 50% stake. BPP is also going ahead with a similar project 
in the same region (Diário económico, 27 July 2006).
(from the financial, property and tourism sectors) working 
in partnership with one another or with Brazilian firms. The 
most active groups include Pestana (the leading Portuguese 
hotel conglomerate and one of the five largest in Europe), 
Vila Galé, Oásis Atlântico, Somague Engenharia, Agesco 
and Espírito Santo (see box IV.6). Many of these projects 
have been financed by Banco do Nordeste.59
The choice of north-eastern Brazil can be put 
down to three main factors: geographical proximity to 
Europe, a climate that is attractive to European tourists, 
and competitively priced services. The region’s greatest 
competitor, in fact, is the Caribbean area (Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic and Mexico), which is almost three 
hours’ flying time further from Europe, an important 
factor in the pricing of tourism services.
The largest Portuguese investment in Brazil’s property 
and tourism sector is the Aquiraz Golf & Beach Villas 
59
 The Banco do Nordeste (BNB) is owned by the Brazilian federal government and headquartered in the city of Fortaleza, State of Ceará. It is 
the largest regional development financing institution in South America. BNB operates the Tourism Development Programme in Northeastern 
Brazil (PRODETUR/NE), created to promote tourism in the region with funding of some US$ 800 million.
60
 Banco Privado Portugués (BPP) has a representation office in São Paulo where it conducts normal private and corporate banking activities. Its 
operations centre on investments in the property and tourism sector, essentially in the north-east of the country.
Box IV.6
PESTANA GROUP: “THE EUROPEAN WHO SPEAKS YOUR LANGUAGE”
Founded in 1972, Grupo Pestana is currently 
Portugal’s largest hotel group and one of 
the 200 largest chains in the world. This 
consortium pioneered the timeshare concept 
in Portugal and is now Europe’s third-largest 
group in this segment. Through its Pestana 
Hotels & Resorts (PH&R) chain, it runs 39 
hotel complexes (6,500 rooms) in Portugal, 
Africa and Latin America.a The group’s 
internationalization drive has left it with a 
well-established presence in Argentina, 
Brazil, Cape Verde, Mozambique, São Tomé 
and Principe, South Africa and, recently, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Over 
the coming years, the Pestana group plans 
to continue its international expansion, 
always concentrating on countries that have 
affinities with Portuguese culture.
After building up a solid base in its 
home market, the autonomous region 
of Madeira, the Pestana group sought to 
expand its presence in its main business, 
hotels. This expansion took place both in 
Portugal and abroad (Brazil, Cape Verde 
and Mozambique). With a view to offering 
full tourism packages, furthermore, the 
Pestana group moved into other subsectors 
such as gaming, golf courses, charter 
flights, tourism programmes in Portugal 
and abroad (Spain, United Kingdom and 
United States) and vehicle rental. By thus 
building up its operations in particular 
geographical regions, the group succeeded 
in achieving major synergies and economies 
of scale and consolidating its knowledge 
of the business, which then equipped it 
to expand into other areas. In Brazil, the 
Pestana group’s presence has centred on 
resort hotels in the north-east and in Angra 
dos Reis (State of Rio de Janeiro) and on 
the business hotel market in São Paulo, 
Rio de Janeiro and Curitiba.
The Pestana group was the first 
Portuguese hotel company to make large 
investments in Brazil. The consortium now 
ranks twenty-first among the hotel chains 
operating in the country, where virtually all 
the major global operators have a presence. 
In 1999, the Pestana group acquired the 
Hotel Rio Atlântica (now Pestana Rio 
Atlântica) in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Since 
then it has bought two more hotels (one 
in Bahia and one in São Paulo) and two 
resorts (one in Rio Grande do Norte and 
one in Angra dos Reis). All the hotels have 
gradually switched to a common identity 
whereby the Pestana name is coupled 
with a reference to the unit’s geographical 
location and the slogan “The European 
who speaks your language”.
In 2004, the Pestana group took a 
further step in its positioning strategy in 
Brazil by opening a new hotel in Curitiba 
for business travellers visiting the Paraná 
capital and acquiring a majority stake in 
a hotel to be created in the Convento do 
Carmo in the historic centre of Salvador, 
Bahia. This latter hotel began operating 
under the Pousadas de Portugal name.b In 
early 2005, the Pestana group diversified 
its businesses in Brazil, hitherto centred 
on luxury tourist hotels, by entering the 
economy hotel segment and condominium 
management. It took the first steps in this 
direction in Curitiba with the Evolution Towers 
complex and the Smart Residence economy 
hotel. In 2006, the Pestana group also bought 
a new hotel in São Luís do Maranhão, its 
eighth hotel acquisition in Brazil (Pestana 
press release, 29 June 2006).
Thus, the Pestana group has invested 
more than 100 million euros in Brazil, and 
this amount could rise over the coming 
years, since the company aims to build 
or acquire a further four hotels by 2010 
(Portugal Digital, 16 November 2005 and 
Diário económico, 27 July 2006).
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Pestana group [online] http://www.pestana.com/hotels/pt/
pestana/group/about.
a
 The Pestana group owns 23 hotels in Portugal, eight in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, Angra dos Reis, São Paulo, Bahia, Natal, Curitiba, São Luís and, shortly, Costa do Sauípe), 
three in Mozambique and one each in Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Principe, and South Africa.
b
 The Pestana group acquired Pousadas de Portugal in 2003, when Empresa Nacional de Turismo (ENATUR) was privatized. The investment in Brazil was its first attempt to 
internationalize this brand.
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Besides these large complexes, many of the property 
investments made in the tourism sector are small. Like the 
former, they are mainly located in the north-east region 
of the country, basically in the states of Ceará, Bahia and 
Rio Grande do Norte, and they encompass a wide range 
of facilities: sophisticated pousadas, small hotels and 
resorts, medium-sized hotels, etc.
Given the characteristics of these projects, it is very 
hard to arrive at an accurate estimate of the resources 
invested by Portuguese businesses. The number of ventures 
runs into the hundreds, and not all of them have been 
registered as direct investments with the Central Bank 
of Brazil. The leading groups include Miramar, Dorisol, 
Bristol Hotels & Resorts, Hotéis Alexandre de Almeida, 
Reta Atlântico, Comitur Anteal, Carisma, Beleza Tropical 
and Euro Constroi.
For all the difficulty of quantifying them, there can 
be no doubt that these investments have changed the 
economic landscape of certain cities in Brazil’s north-
east. In Rio Grande do Norte, for instance, tourism has 
grown much faster than in other regions over recent years, 
and this has led to rapid changes in the economic and 
social environment. Between 2002 and 2004, the flow of 
domestic and international tourists increased by 18% and 
92%, respectively, so that the number of foreign tourists 
in the state almost doubled in just two years. In 2005, the 
number of international flights increased and the pace 
of expansion quickened beyond all expectations, with 
revenue from international tourism increasing by almost 
400%. Tourism became the leading economic activity in 
the State of Rio Grande do Norte, yielding revenue of 
some US$ 600 million.
By contrast with this recent past, the current economic 
situation in Brazil has created some uncertainty about the 
continuity of such investments. For one thing, low GDP 
growth and the consequent reduction in the disposable 
income of middle class consumers of these services could 
create a glut of rooms and a price war that affects the value 
of the investments made. For another, the appreciation of 
the Brazilian currency has been making the country more 
expensive for foreign tourists, who may opt for other, 
cheaper destinations, causing these investments to lose 
value and contract.
Besides projects associated with the tourism sector, 
there have been innumerable Portuguese investments in 
property, both residential and commercial. Projects in 
the residential sector are highly diversified in respect 
of both the amount and type of investment. As with 
tourism-related activities, residential property projects 
are concentrated in the north-east of the country. The 
leading companies include Organização e Gestão 
Imobiliária (OGI), Actitud and Luxus. In the commercial 
segment, the main investments have been in shopping 
centres, particularly those of the Sonae group (see box 
IV.5), and the civil construction operations of the Lena 
group.61
In the infrastructure sector, lastly, the leading Portuguese 
company is Brisa, Portugal’s largest motorway operator. 
In 2001, the firm took an 18% stake in Companhia de 
Concessões Rodoviárias (CCR). CCR is currently Latin 
America’s largest motorway contractor, running about 
1,452 kilometres of highways, or 15% of the concessions 
farmed out to the private sector in Brazil. Brisa has sought 
to break into new markets through this Brazilian company, 
essentially in Chile and Mexico (Diário económico, 
29 November 2006).
To sum up, the tourism property sector has been at 
the centre of a new upsurge in Portuguese investments 
in Brazil. As the investment impetus of large Portuguese 
firms slowed down in the late 1990s, much smaller 
companies with little international experience began to 
arrive in considerable numbers on the beaches of the 
Brazilian Atlantic. The great bulk of these investments 
have been made in the country’s north-east, attracted 
by the natural characteristics of the region, incentives 
from state governments and the great increase in flights 
from Portugal to different locations in Brazil. However, 
this rapid growth could potentially lead to oversupply 
and price wars that might undermine the value of the 
investments made.
61
 The Lena group is highly diversified and has a presence in Angola, Brazil, Bulgaria, Mozambique and Rumania. In Brazil, the group has its 
centre of operations in the State of Bahia, where it has implemented projects worth some 40 million euros. The group’s main subsidiary in 
the country is Liz Construções, which accounts for about 80% of its business in Brazil, chiefly public works (Bahiainvest Últimas Notícias, 
6 December 2005 [online] http://www.bahiainvest.com.br). The company is building a theatre and a convention centre in the municipalities of 
Feira de Santana and Itabuna and a prison in Lauro de Freitas, representing some 14 million euros’ worth of investment.
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6. Financial services: an unsuccessful wager?
62
 Espírito Santo group participated in major operations such as the acquisition of Bradesco by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) and that 
of Tele Centro-Oeste Celular (TCO) by the partnership between Telefónica and Portugal Telecom.
In the financial sector, a number of companies have begun 
to operate in Brazil in recent years, chief among them 
being Grupo Espírito Santo, Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
(Banco Financial Português) and Grupo Banif. This was 
one of the business areas in which Portuguese investors 
struggled most. Like other foreign banks, Portuguese firms 
came up against a market which was far more intractable 
than they had expected and where large local operators 
were strongly entrenched. 
During the second half of the 1990s, foreign banks 
increased their presence in Brazil substantially, mainly 
through takeovers. Between 1995 and 2001, the share of 
foreign banks in the sector’s total assets rose from 7% 
to 25% (ECLAC, 2005, p. 90). From 2001 on, however, 
the market share of foreign operators began to decline, 
essentially because local banks reacted by severely 
rationalizing their operations and investing heavily in new 
technology. In these circumstances, many foreign banks 
modified their market penetration strategies in Brazil, 
relinquishing control of certain financial institutions to 
become minority shareholders in locally owned groups.
Like other foreign investors, some of Portugal’s 
leading financial groups took over local banks that were 
too small for their purposes and tried to grow organically. 
They quickly realized, however, that this strategy was 
costly and hard to implement. A small group of firms that 
took over larger banks had the conditions they needed in 
place and chose to stay in the Brazilian market.
Of the Portuguese banks that are still operating in 
Brazil, most preferred to orient their activities towards 
property and tourism investments, foreign trade and the 
capital market. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a 
segment much favoured by the leading Portuguese banks. 
Along with the United Kingdom, Portugal is the country 
where this infrastructure investment model is most highly 
developed, and from the point of view of Portuguese 
banks PPPs could open up interesting opportunities for 
new business. However, these investments have been 
held back by delays in shaping the regulatory framework 
(Valor econômico, 27 December 2005).
One Portuguese investor with a longer-standing 
presence in the Brazilian financial system is the Espírito 
Santo group. It concentrated on commercial banking in 
the 1990s, first going into partnership with a local group, 
Monteiro Aranha, and Crédit Agricole of France in Banco 
Interatlântico, and then working through the latter to acquire 
Banco Boavista in Rio de Janeiro. For this operation, the 
partners took advantage of the benefits offered by the Incentive 
Programme for the Restructuring and Strengthening of the 
National Financial System (PROER). However, this was 
an especially difficult period in the Brazilian economy and 
they never achieved the scale required to compete with the 
established banks and the large international institutions 
that arrived later. In 2000, after huge losses, Banco Boavista 
was transferred to a local operator, Bradesco. Since then, 
Espírito Santo group has been shifting its strategy in Brazil 
by concentrating on large firms, mergers and acquisitions, 
capital markets, fixed- and variable-income funds and 
property and tourism projects.62
Following a strategy similar to that of the Espírito 
Santo group, Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD) took over 
Banco Bandeirantes, thus gaining access to a network 
of over 500 branches in Brazil. The company sought to 
consolidate as a commercial bank by capitalizing on the 
size of the Brazilian market and the large Portuguese 
colony residing in the country and by supporting the 
Portuguese investors attracted to Brazil by the privatization 
programme. This strategy did not yield the expected results. 
In 2000, CGD established an alliance with a local firm, 
Unibanco, which came into force after the Portuguese 
bank had transferred its stake in Banco Bandeirantes to 
Unibanco in exchange for 12% of the latter’s equity. The 
partnership was marred by conflicts between the parties, 
leading to its dissolution in 2005.
After this long and painful learning process, CGD 
recast its strategy in Brazil by turning itself into an 
investment bank specializing mainly in the financing of 
foreign trade operations. The Portuguese bank also aims 
to support Iberian companies in the Brazilian market, 
the Portuguese colony in Brazil and Brazilian firms in 
their internationalization efforts. Like other Portuguese 
financial groups, furthermore, the company has invested 
in real-estate projects and would consider participating 
in future PPPs. CGD currently has just eight offices, in 
São Paulo (4), Rio de Janeiro (2), Paraná (1) and Rio 
Grande do Sul (1).
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Brazil has now become more expensive; asset 
values have risen substantially and Portuguese 
companies do not have the financial capacity to 
position themselves properly in this market. For this 
reason, Africa has emerged as an alternative with clear 
competitive advantages. With the pacification of former 
Portuguese colonies, the high price of oil (which Angola 
possesses in abundance) and the incipient repayment 
of external debts, many business people from Angola 
and Mozambique are returning to their countries, and 
Portuguese financial institutions are trying to seize 
this opportunity before others do.
To sum up, Portuguese banks tried to replicate the 
strategy of other financial institutions from industrialized 
countries, particularly Spain, and grew fast in Latin America 
by buying up local assets. The experience was much harder 
than had been expected, however, and they were forced by 
rising competition to abandon or scale back their operations 
in the region. In Brazil, the size of the market, the reaction of 
the large domestic banks and the instability of the economy 
severely affected the expectations of Portuguese financial 
institutions, leading them to scale their activities right back 
so that they could concentrate on specific niches such as 
investment banking and property development.
C. Conclusions
During recent decades, Portugal has been used by 
transnational enterprises as a platform for exports, most 
of them going to other European economies. Portuguese 
firms used to have a very limited presence in international 
markets, but this situation has changed quickly over the 
last 15 years as they have actively expanded beyond the 
country’s borders.
The consolidation of European integration and 
adoption of the single currency helped to strengthen 
the Portuguese economy. This process also brought a 
number of reforms, chiefly the liberalization of some 
key business areas such as telecommunications, energy 
and the financial sector, which led to a sharp increase in 
competition in domestic markets.
In these circumstances, large Portuguese companies 
(which would qualify as medium-sized by European and 
world standards), many of which were being privatized 
at the time, were forced to react. One of the measures 
they took was to try to combine growth with improved 
competitiveness to avoid becoming the target of an 
unwanted takeover bid from their European rivals.
Generally speaking, the largest Portuguese companies 
have traditionally held a large share of the domestic market 
in their area of business, and some have had the advantage 
of being natural monopolies in certain activities, allowing 
them to generate large surpluses. This advantage was 
supplemented by favourable financial and stock market 
conditions, allowing them to access the financing they 
needed to launch ambitious expansion initiatives.
In relatively mature, saturated local markets, 
international expansion became not so much an opportunity 
as an obligation. With few options available in Europe, 
the first large-scale investments mainly took place in 
the Iberian peninsula, after which companies gradually 
expanded into other countries and regions, always showing 
a preference for those with strong ties of culture and 
language, primarily Brazil and former Portuguese colonies 
in Africa. This trend consolidated the main peculiarity of 
Portuguese outward direct investment: relatively small 
companies that saw a common language as their main 
comparative advantage (see table IV.19). This process 
received explicit governmental support.
During the 1990s, Portuguese firms were presented 
with a major opportunity that perfectly matched their needs: 
the privatizations in Brazil. In the midst of this process, 
they displayed remarkable decisiveness by acting, either 
alone or as members of consortia, to acquire some of the 
most sought-after businesses, especially in the areas of 
telecommunications and electricity. Thus, Portuguese 
outward direct investment experienced an unprecedented 
surge during the second half of the decade, with Brazil 
as the main recipient. This process was led by a small 
group of major companies, principally Portugal Telecom 
(PT), Energias de Portugal (EDP), Cimentos de Portugal 
(CIMPOR), Sonae and Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD) 
(see table IV.19).
Thus, in a short space of time Portugal became a net 
exporter of capital and a base for major European service 
sector companies, chiefly in the areas of telecommunications 
and energy. This represented one of the most significant 
structural changes in the Portuguese economy since its 
incorporation into the European integration process.
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At the start of the present decade, a new pattern 
of Portuguese outward investment began to emerge. 
Because of the deteriorating international economic 
situation and its domestic and regional repercussions, 
investment by Portuguese firms contracted sharply. 
The economic and political crisis in Argentina and the 
uncertainty associated with presidential elections in 
Brazil further undermined confidence in the region, 
leading to alterations in corporate strategies. In addition, 
many of the Portuguese companies involved found that 
they needed to consolidate the large investments they 
had made by restructuring their main Latin American 
subsidiaries. In these circumstances, investment began to 
be increasingly targeted on other countries in the European 
Union, chiefly Spain, while the relative importance of 
Latin America declined substantially.
Table IV.19
THE LARGEST PORTUGUESE COMPANIES: LOCATION OF MAIN INVESTMENTS
Community of Portuguese-speaking countries














GALP Energia X X X X
Energias de Portugal X X X X X X
Sonae X X X X X X X
Portugal Telecom X X X X X X X X
Cimentos de Portugal X X X X X X X
Grupo Pestana X X X X X X X
Caixa Geral de Depósitos X X X X X X X
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Even as the largest Portuguese companies checked 
their international expansion in Latin America, however, 
smaller firms emulated their earlier behaviour and began 
a new wave of investments. Indeed, a much larger number 
of firms arrived in this phase than during the original 
boom. The new wave of Portuguese investment has been 
concentrated in the construction and tourism sectors.
Some of the Portuguese companies that led the 
process have pulled out of Latin America, and particularly 
Brazil, in the last few months, and others may be forced 
to do the same. This is true of Sonae, PT and the great 
majority of banks. This reflects the difficulties faced by 
Portuguese companies in the Brazilian economy and 
the limitations of an approach based on ties of culture 
and language.
The experience of Portuguese companies in Latin 
America, particularly Brazil, has important policy 
implications. First, from the standpoint of the companies, 
internationalization is not a simple process and ought to be 
based on competitive advantages underpinned by managerial 
and financial strengths, and by a thorough knowledge of 
the industry they operate in and the markets into which 
they mean to expand. Clearly, it is not enough just to 
speak the same language. As evidence of this, a number 
of these companies were taken over by transnationals from 
elsewhere in the world that seemingly had more solid 
competitive advantages. Many Portuguese companies 
learned valuable lessons in this process, leading them 
to carry out profound restructuring in their subsidiaries 
abroad, relinquish certain markets or pursue further 
integration in the economic area of the Iberian peninsula. 
This experience should be an inspiration to the many 
Latin American companies that are now beginning to 
expand abroad. Second, the arrival of companies without 
much international experience or local knowledge can 
prove costly for Latin American countries. When this 
happens, the potential benefits of FDI are not realized 
and, especially in basic infrastructure and service sectors, 
severe harm may be caused to users and to the systemic 
competitiveness of the host country.
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